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ABSTRACT 
Science and A c t i o n i n the Work o f T a l c o t t Parsons 1928-50 
A science o f a c t i o n has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been associated w i t h 
a range o f methodological problems,, Parsons' exposure to 
German ide a l i s m gave him an awareness o f such problems. 
The question examined by t h i s study i s how Parsons addresses 
and attempts to resolve three methodological problems i n a 
science o f a c t i o n ; the nature o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p o f normative e n t i t i e s and a c t i o n and the place 
of values i n knowledge„ Central to the argument pursued 
here i s t h a t Parsons formulates and answers these problems 
w i t h i n the i n t e r r e l a t e d framework o f h i s a n a l y t i c a l 
conception o f science and h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic. 
Chapters I I and I I I are concerned w i t h The Structure 
o f Social Action., I n the f i r s t j Parsons' general methodology 
o f science i s o u t l i n i n g leading up to h i s understanding and 
reasons f o r ' s t r u c t u r a l analysis's the importance o f 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d schemes o f general elements o f 
a c t i o n . I n chapter I I I Parsons' voluntarism i s analyzed 
before examining the three problems noted above and showing 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to the a n a l y t i c / v o l u n t a r i s t i c framework, 
Chapters IV and V f o l l o w through these themes i n t o 
Parsons' work between 1938 and 1950 when he e x p l i c i t l y 
adopts a s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l approach,, Chapter IV 
- 2 -
r e t u r n s to general methodology and Parsons" r a t i o n a l e f o r 
s t r u c t u r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m but notes a number o f anomolies 
i n t h i s which lead to chapter V i n which s t r u c t u r a l 
f u n c t i o n a l i s m i s considered i n the l i g h t o f methodological 
problems o f a science o f action,. Here the close 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between voluntarism and s t r u c t u r a l 
f u n c t i o n a l i s m i s stressed. 
I n conclusion a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f 
voluntarism are c r i t i c a l l y assessed and a c l o s i n g comment 
on Parsons 4 c o n t r i b u t i o n to s o c i o l o g i c a l theory i s 
o f f e r e d . 
„ 3 -
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I o I n t r o d u c t i o n s E s t a b l i s h i n g the Theme o f Parsons' 
C Concern w i t h the Methodological Problems o f a Science 
A c t i o n e 
The f o l l o w i n g pages are intended as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to 
the h i s t o r y o f s o c i o l o g i c a l theory, s p e c i f i c a l l y , my aim i s 
to explore and e l u c i d a t e what T a l c o t t Parsons means by a 
science o f a c t i o n i n h i s work between 1928 and 1950« A 
number of p r e l i m i n a r y p o i n t s a r i s e from t h i s intention,, 
To begin w i t h , a note on the w r i t i n g o f the h i s t o r y o f 
Parsons' work i s p e r t i n e n t as two r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t approaches 
can r e a d i l y be discerned. The f i r s t i s marked by i t s 
attempt to l o c a t e Parsons' i n t e l l e c t u a l corpus i n h i s 
soci e t y v i a the concept o f ideology,, The most conspicuous 
exponent o f t h i s approach i s A o W . Gouldner (1971)° I n 
broad terms Gouldner i n t e r p r e t s Parsons' work as an 
i d e o l o g i c a l response to the needs o f American society i n 
the mid-twentieth century. Whilst having many p o s i t i v e 
q u a l i t i e s Gouldner's volume has a number o f weaknesses, 
two o f which are re l e v a n t here. F i r s t l y , the concept o f 
ideology i s a d i f f i c u l t one to employ as around i t hang a 
p l e t h o r a o f conceptual problems. I t g e n e r a l l y i m p l i e s 
t h a t the body o f ideas to which i t i s applied i s a 
d i s t o r t i o n o f r e a l i t y i n accordance w i t h the i n t e r e s t o f 
some s o c i a l group. Each o f the terms i n t h i s statement 
can be regarded as problematical and r e q u i r i n g c a r e f u l 
handling. Now Gouldner does develop a conceptual frame-
work f o r the examination o f 9 the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i a l 
t h e o r y 8 (1971s Chapter 2) but i t can h a r d l y be said t h a t 
t h i s i s adequate to meet the problems associated w i t h the 
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concept o f ideology. For example, the concept o f 
i n t e r e s t which an ideology serves i s d i f f i c u l t to s p e c i f y 
o b j e c t i v e l y and independently yet we f i n d Gouldner using 
i t s synonym i n the n o t i o n o f the needs o f u t i l i t a r i a n 
c u l t u r e w i thout any attempts to overcome t r a d i t i o n a l 
problems. I n many ways then the i n f l u e n c e o f Gouldner"s 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t background which he i s at such pains to 
at t a c k shows through, h i s stage by stage model of the 
h i s t o r i c a l development o f sociology (1971s Chapter k) 
reminds one o f what J a r v i e c a l l s the f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
•snapshot 0 approach to s o c i a l change, (1964s 15^) 
The f i r s t weakness i n the i d e o l o g i c a l approach to 
the h i s t o r y o f Parsons 5 theory i s then i t s inadequate 
t h e o r e t i c a l framework. The second fl a w i s t h a t by s t r e s s i n g 
the i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n s o f Parsons' work t h i s approach 
i s i n s e n s i t i v e to Parsons' own more or less conscious aims 
and problems e s p e c i a l l y i n the area o f methodology. 
Parsons' e x p l i c i t theory has i t s own methodological 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e which, when understood, throws a d i f f e r e n t 
l i g h t onto the theory i t s e l f . Recognition o f t h i s has 
l e d to the second type o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Parsons' work 
which Schwanenberg c a l l s 8 an analysis from wi t h i n ' ( 1 9 7 1 )O 
A number o f recent commentaries on Parsons can be placed 
under t h i s heading (Bershady ( 1 9 7 3 ) , Mulkay (1 9 7 1 ) , 
Schwanenberg ( 1 9 7 1 ) , Turner (197Z0)»^1^ Each of these 
would want to disagree s t r o n g l y w i t h Bottomore's view 
- 1 1 -
t h a t Parsons 'has not thought i t necessary to give an 
extended account o f h i s views or methods,, I t i s 
evident t h a t h i s own t h e o r e t i c a l " g o a l - o r i e n t a t i o n " 
would have become a good deal c l e a r e r had he undertaken, 
at some stage, to examine the l o g i c a l foundations o f h i s 
t h e o r y 9 . (1975s 40). To these i n t e r p r e t e r s Parsons does 
concern h i m s e l f w i t h the l o g i c a l foundations o f h i s theory 
which are both d i s t i n c t i v e and important f o r i t s understanding, 
a viexir which i s shared i n t h i s present work. 
Two examples of t h i s approach r e q u i r e f u r t h e r comment, 
those o f Bershady and Schwanenberg 8 Both o f these attempt 
to l i n k Parsons' concern w i t h methodology to a f u r t h e r 
aspect of h i s thinking,, I n the case of Bershady Parsons 
i s i n t e r p r e t e d as t r y i n g to resolve a long standing and 
deeply grounded problem i n the very idea o f a s o c i a l science, 
the problem o f r e l a t i v i s m w h i l s t Schwanenberg l i n k s Parsons' 
methodology to h i s preoccupation w i t h the problem o f s o c i a l 
order saying t h a t 8 „ «, „ 0 i n e x p l o r i n g the general theory o f 
a c t i o n one should be s e n s i t i v e to the discovery o f moral 
premises as p a r t o f i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n ' (1971s 571)„ This 
present work p a r a l l e l s these e x p l o r a t i o n s i n t o Parsons' 
t h i n k i n g i n t h a t i t p3a ces emphasis on the proper under-
( 2 ) 
standing o f Parsons' method. v ' I t f u r t h e r attempts to 
l i n k t h i s w i t h other aspects o f h i s thought but here I wish 
to draw together both Bershady 8s and Schwanenberg's f o c i . 
Like the former I wish to stress Parsons' concern w i t h 
problems inherent i n a science o f a c t i o n , i n t h i s case 
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problems o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , normative determinism and 
( 3 ) 
v a l u e 1 ' r a t h e r than Bershady's emphasis on r e l a t i v i s m . 
Further, w i t h Schwanenberg I wish to r e l a t e these metho-
d o l o g i c a l problems to Parsons' moral premises, i n t h i s 
case h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic o f a c t i o n . Bershady 
i s l i t t l e concerned w i t h such questions c o n f i n i n g h i m s e l f 
to a b r i e f 'metaphysical i n t e r l u d e ' (1973s Chapter 5) 
which con s i s t s o f a number of s c e p t i c a l remarks i n the 
d i r e c t i o n o f o v e r - s i m p l i f i e d analyses o f Parsons' meta-
physics. However, he does say t h a t he hopes t h a t these 
p r e l i m i n a r i e s ° . . ..may be suggestive o f a more i n t e n s i v e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ' (1973s 8 2 ) . I t i s hoped t h a t the present 
work might represent a c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s . 
Having i n d i c a t e d the nature o f my approach i t i s 
time to say something about what i s being approached. 
Again Bottomore (1975? 3 1 - 2 ) seems to be r a d i c a l l y wrong 
but p r o v o c a t i v e l y r a i s e s the issue. He says t h a t Parsons 
a c t i o n language ('meaningful i n t e n t i o n ' , 'normative 
o r i e n t a t i o n * , 'means-end r e l a t i o n s h i p s ' , etc) would prima 
f a c i e suggest t h a t he would a l i g n h i m s e l f w i t h the wide 
range o f t h i n k e r s who r e j e c t the idea o f a science o f 
s o c i e t y , examples being Marcuse, Sar t r e , Collingwood and 
Winch. 
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•But t h i s i s not the course which Parsons 
f o l l o w s o I n The Structure o f Social A c t i o n 
h i s i m p l i c i t argument (derived from Max 
Weber) seems to be t h a t the theory o f 
a c t i o n occupies some middle ground between 
the p o s i t i v i s t or n a t u r a l science conception 
o f sociology and the i d e a l i s t view which 
emphasises the r o l e o f " i n t u i t i o n " i n the 
understanding o f society; „„„ He does n o t , 
however, explore the nature o f t h i s middle 
ground, and the seeker a f t e r methodological 
enlightenment w i l l have to t u r n elsewhere f o r 
an analysis o f the concept o f a c t i o n 0„.' 
(Bottomorei 1975s 32) 
I n f a c t I t h i n k Bottomore i s wrong here, as I hope to show 
i n what f o l l o w s 0 Parsons does not adopt some undefined 
middle ground between p o s i t i v i s m and idealism, he i s 
always committed to a science o f a c t i o n a k i n to physics or 
t h e o r e t i c a l h i o l o g y . Further, Parsons does provide an 
analysis o f the concept o f a c t i o n which addresses the 
same range o f problems as has concerned the t h i n k e r s 
mentioned by Bottomore„ Of course, whether t h i s i s 
methodologically e n l i g h t e n i n g i s a d i f f e r e n t matter, 
indeed t h i s i s the question u n d e r l y i n g my analysis o f 
Parsons" science o f action,, 
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A comment on recent trends i n s o c i a l theory can 
f u r t h e r develop my theme„ One strand o f the apparently 
a l l pervasive current a t t a c k on ' p o s i t i v i s m 1 i n sociology 
has come from s o c i o l o g i s t s and others s t r e s s i n g the 
importance o f "meaning 8 to s o c i a l a c t i o n and consequently 
to sociology. I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g i r o n y o f h i s t o r y t h a t 
the work o f Parsons should be one major r e c i p i e n t o f a n t i -
p o s i t i v i s t i c c r i t i q u e s r e s t i n g on such premises. (Examples 
are Douglas (1 9 7 1) Wilson (1 971 ) ) . For, o f course, 
Parsons f i r s t major work i s marked by i t s own c r i t i q u e o f 
p o s i t i v i s m and p a r a l l e l emphasis on the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f 
a c t i o n . Whenever the terms p o s i t i v i s m and a n t i - p o s i t i v i s m 
are employed there are innumerable problems o f d e f i n i t i o n 
yet f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n gives r i s e to the 
suspicion t h a t there i s more to t h i s r e v e r s a l of p o s i t i o n s 
than semantic d i f f e r e n c e s . I n The Str u c t u r e o f Social 
A c t i o n Parsons considers not only p o s i t i v i s m but also 
German idealism as a t r a d i t i o n o f s o c i a l thought, as 
Bershady has emphasised (1973s Chapter 2 ) . This i s 
relev a n t i n t h a t i t can be claimed t h a t many o f the 
problems and perspectives which cha r a c t e r i z e the contemporary 
1phenomenological' movement i n sociology are c l o s e l y 
r e l a t e d to those o f the German i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n the 
nxneteenth century. v ' A few examples w i l l s u f f i c e here. 
The r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the sciences o f nature 
and man, the German Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissen-
shaft en re-emerge i n essays by Natanson (1963) and Winch 
( 1 9 5 8 )O The l a t t e r i n p a r t i c u l a r i s associated w i t h the 
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view t h a t the object o f the s o c i a l sciences i s c o n s t i t u t e d 
by systems o f meaning which must be understood r a t h e r 
than explained. Again as Gellner (197*0 n a s pointed out 
such a view i s at the centre o f the c l a s s i c a l German 
(5) 
t r a d i t i o n o f i d e a l i s t scholarship„v ' F i n a l l y a p a r a l l e l 
might be suggested between the present day ethnomethodo-
l o g i s t ' s i n t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f miniscule i n t e r a c t i o n 
s i t u a t i o n s and the h i s t o r i c a l aspect o f idealism, what 
Ringer (1969s Chapter 2) has c a l l e d 8 the p r i n c i p l e o f 
individuality"„ 
The above remarks are r a t h e r g l i b but t h e i r f u n c t i o n 
i s merely suggestive„ For i t i s the case t h a t the e a r l y 
Parsons was c l o s e l y f a m i l i a r w i t h the lead i n g p r i n c i p l e s o f 
the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . Here I disagree w i t h B u t t s ' recent 
claim t h a t Parsons was i n s e n s i t i v e to the problems involved 
i n the study o f values and meanings on the grounds t h a t he 
reasons from a p o s i t i v i s t i c and b e h a v i o u r i s t i c background 
(Buttss 1975s 2 0 1 )O A number o f p o i n t s can be made to 
support t h i s position,, F i r s t l y , there i s Parsons' short 
but p e n e t r a t i n g discussion o f the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n 
The Structure o f Social A c t i o n [ l937as ^73-87] . The 
sources f o r t h i s are l i s t e d i n the book's b i b l i o g r a p h y 
which includes the names o f D i l t h e y , Meinecke, T r o e l t s c h , 
Windelband and R i c k e r t but also references to Husserl and, 
most i n t e r e s t i n g l y , Schutz's Per sinnhafte Aufbau der 
sozialen Welt. Secondly, i n h i s most extensive auto-
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b i o g r a p h i c a l essay Parsons (1970) notes the in f l u e n c e o f 
t h i s t r a d i t i o n on him. Mentioning t h a t as an undergraduate 
he took 8 an i n t e n s i v e course i n Kant's C r i t i q u e o f Pure 
Reason' (1970s 829) he goes on to says 
'The Heidelburg experience c a r r i e d me 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y f a r t h e r , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
studies o f the issues involved w i t h 
Weber"s Wissenschaftslehre. Notable 
among these were, f i r s t , the problems 
ce n t e r i n g around the German h i s t o r i c a l 
t r a d i t i o n s and hence the status o f 
generalized t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n 
i n the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l d i s c i p l i n e s , and, 
second, those o f the status o f the i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e meanings and motive 
i n the analysis o f human a c t i o n , what the 
Germans c a l l e d the problem o f Verstehen. 
(1970s 8 2 9 - 3 0 ) . 
Mention o f Parsons at Heidleburg can serve as the l a s t 
p o i n t , there he was taught by Jaspers (Parsonss 1970s 
876) and i n a recent l e c t u r e ^ ^ Parsons noted i n passing 
t h a t d u r i n g h i s student days the works o f Husserl and 
Heidegger were very much i n vogue. 
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So, Parsons' own c r i t i q u e o f p o s i t i v i s m was p a r t l y 
founded on a knowledge o f a t r a d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t s i m i l a r 
t o t h a t o f h i s own p r e s e n t day c r i t i c s . Out o f t h i s 
h i s t o r i c a l conundrum emerges the l e a d i n g problem o f t h i s 
p r e s e n t work. The s t u d y o f human a c t i v i t y as " a c t i o n ' has 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n v o l v e d a number o f s p e c i a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
problems such as the n a t ure o f the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v i t y , 
t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between s u b j e c t i v e phenomena and b e h a v i o u r , 
and the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the v a l u e q u a l i t i e s o f the i n v e s t i -
g a t i n g subject„ C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f such problems has l e d 
some t h i n k e r s e i t h e r t o doubt t h a t t h i s aspect o f i n t e l l e c t u a l 
endeavour c o u l d be s c i e n t i f i c a t a l l o r t o draw a more o r l e s s 
r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i s form o f s c i e n c e and o t h e r s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t he s c i e n c e s o f n a t u r e . Parsons i s n o t 
i g n o r a n t o f t h e importance o f these problems b u t he t a k e s 
n e i t h e r o f these paths„ Rather, i n h i s work b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d 
here c l a s s i c a l mechanics appears as t h e model f o r the 
( 7 ) 
development o f t h e sc i e n c e s o f action,, The problem 
t h e n i s q u i t e what Parsons i n t e n d s by a s c i e n c e o f a c t i o n ? 
What do these terms mean and how does Parsons d e f i n e and 
p r o v i d e s o l u t i o n s t o the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h such an e n t e r p r i s e ? Rather s u r p r i s i n g l y perhaps 
d u r i n g the r e c e n t r e v i v e d i n t e r e s t i n such problems l i t t l e 
a t t e m p t has been made t o e x p l o r e them i n Parsons' work, 
Bershady r a i s e s the i s s u e s i n the c o n c l u s i o n t o h i s book and 
a g a i n i n h i s commentary on Parsons' r e v i e w . I n the l a t t e r 
he sayss 
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'There has been a t e n s i o n [jLn Parsons' 
work I o P j J from t h e o u t s e t between t h e 
statement o f the e x p l a n a t o r y g o a l , a 
" n o m o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n " o f a c t i o n , and 
the a c t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f the c a t e g o r i e s 
and t h e substance o f t h e t h e o r y . For a 
l a w f u l e x p l a n a t i o n o f a c t i o n would seem t o 
impose a " d e t e r m i n i s m " upon b e i n g s who are 
h e l d t o be f r e e i n t h e i r e s sence 8, ( 1 9 7 ^ S 281) 
But Bershady has n o t f o l l o i v e d t h r o u g h how Parsons un d e r s t a n d s 
t h i s ' t e n s i o n ' o r how he a t t e m p t s t o overcome i t . T h i s i s 
(8) 
t h e t a s k o f t h i s p r e s e n t work,* ' 
So f a r I have a t t e m p t e d t o o u t l i n e my approach t o t h e 
h i s t o r y o f Parsons' t h e o r y and b r o a d l y i n d i c a t e t he t h e m a t i c 
problems I am a d d r e s s i n g , I am t r y i n g t o uncover and 
e x p l o r e c e r t a i n u n d e r l y i n g problems i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s a m b i t i o n t o c o n s t r u c t a 
sc i e n c e o f a c t i o n , I have suggested t h a t Parsons' 
background i n German i d e a l i s m s e n s i t i z e s him t o c e r t a i n 
problems i n t h a t a m b i t i o n w h i c h t h e n l e a d s t o the q u e s t i o n 
o f how he understands and endeavours t o overcome them, I 
s h a l l now proceed to s u b s t a n t i a t e my c l a i m t h a t Parsons i s 
aware o f the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b s t a c l e s t o a science o f a c t i o n 
by r e f e r r i n g t o c e r t a i n a s pects o f the essays w r i t t e n by him 
p r i o r t o The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n , I n these Parsons 
on s e v e r a l occasions m a n i f e s t s such an awareness p a r t i c u a r l y 
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i n h i s a t t a c k on ' p o s i t i v i s m ' w h i c h i s a r e c u r r e n t theme„ 
But, on the o t h e r hand, no d e f i n i t e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n 
emerges i n these essays, Parsons tends t o ' c r u c i a l 
e q u i v o c a t i o n s ' , t o borrow a phrase used by S c o t t {^^6^% 
252) t o d e s c r i b e Parsons 5 post-war a c t i o n t h e o r y . 
Parsons p r o c l a i m s t h a t 'The p o s i t i v i s t i c r e a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t p h i l o s o p h y has, i n i t s e f f e c t s on t h e s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e s , m a n i f e s t e d a s t r o n g tendency t o obscure t he 
f a c t t h a t man i s e s s e n t i a l l y an a c t i v e , c r e a t i v e , e v a l u a t i n g 
c r e a t u r e ' (1935^5 282)„ I t i s h i s 'vague g e n e r a l c o n v i c t i o n 
o f t h e importance o f v a l u e s ' and 'the vague r e a l i z a t i o n 
t h a t these p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r i e s somehow, by a k i n d o f 
l o g i c a l j u g g l e r y r a t h e r t h a n by e m p i r i c a l p r o o f , were 
squeezing what I have here c a l l e d t h e " v a l u e " - elements 
out o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s o c i a l l i f e 1 ( l935as 313) 
t h a t l e a d Parsons t o oppose p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r i e s . So 
i t i s n ot d i r e c t l y t o p o s i t i v i s m as a method f o r the s t u d y 
o f a c t i o n t h a t Parsons o b j e c t s b u t r a t h e r i t s c o n c e p t i o n o f 
t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f s t u d y , t h e n a t u r e o f a c t i o n s 
'The t a s k o f s o c i o l o g y , as o f t h e o t h e r 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , I c o n s i d e r t o be s t r i c t l y 
s c i e n t i f i c - the a t t a i n m e n t o f s y s t e m a t i c 
t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e m p i r i c a l 
f a c t o The f a i l u r e o f t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c 
s c h o o l s o f s o c i o l o g y t o a t t a i n such a 
g o a l I do n o t a t t r i b u t e , as so many do, 
t o t he i n h e r e n t i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e g o a l , 
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b u t r a t h e r t o t h e i r own inadequate 
methods o f appr o a c h i n g i t . T h e i r 
inadequacy c o n s i s t s e s s e n t i a l l y i n 
t r y i n g t o a p p l y b o t h modes o f th o u g h t 
and s u b s t a n t i v e concepts developed i n 
the s t u d y o f and s u i t e d t o one k i n d o f 
e m p i r i c a l f a c t - m a i n l y t h a t o f t h e 
p h y s i c a l w o r l d - t o q u i t e a n o t h e r , human 
a c t i o n i n society,, I t i s s u r e l y n o t 
a l t o g e t h e r h e t e r o d o x t o say t h a t t h e 
b a s i c c o n c e p t i o n s o f a science s h o u l d be 
developed i n connectL on w i t h a s t u d y o f 
i t s own s u b j e c t m a t t e r - n o t i m p o r t e d 
from o t h e r s c i e n c e s ' (1935a; 31^=5") 
So Parsons c h a r a c t e r i z e s p o s i t i v i s m i n terms o f i t s 
u n c r i t i c a l acceptance o f the 'basic c o n c e p t i o n s ' and 
'modes o f th o u g h t and s u b s t a n t i v e concepts' o f t h e s u b j e c t 
m a t t e r o f the n a t u r a l sciences» T h i s Parsons c a l l s 
' o b j e c t i v i s m ' ( l 935as 283) by which he means t h e tendency 
t o t r e a t a c t i o n n o t o n l y i n the same way as the p h y s i c a l 
w o r l d , as ' e x t e r n a l l y observed e v e n t s ' ( l 9 3 5 as 283) b u t 
a l s o i n t h e same terms, what Parsons c a l l s t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c 
f a c t o r s o f h e r e d i t y and environment„ The c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s 
i s t h a t p o s i t i v i s m o m i t s the ' s u b j e c t i v e ' aspect o f a c t i o n . 
Yet Parsons i s 
s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s 
t h a t p a r t l y l e d the 
aware t h a t i t was t h e b e l i e f 
were i n c a p a b l e o f s c i e n t i f i c 
p o s i t i v i s t t o exclude them. 
t h a t 
s t u d y 
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'Any a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n man's b e h a v i o u r 
i n terms o f ends,purposes, i d e a l s , has been 
under s u s p i c i o n as a form o f " t e l e o l o g y " 
ivhich was th o u g h t t o be i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h 
t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f 
p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e . One must, on t h e 
c o n t r a r y , e x p l a i n i n terms o f "causes" 
and " c o n d i t i o n s " , n o t o f ends'. ( l 935as 282) 
A g a i n Parsons n o t e s t h e ' r e p u d i a t i o n , i n t h e name o f 
s c i e n t i f i c r i g o r , o f a l l evidence d e r i v e d from " o b s e r v a t i o n " 
o f t h e " s u b j e c t i v e " aspects o f o t h e r people's minds -
t h e i r i d e a s , d e s i r e s , ends, o r " i n t e r n a l " m e n t a l s t a t e s 
o r processes' ( l 9 3^as 5 1 2 ) „ 
I n t h e passage quoted above Parsons c l e a r l y s t a t e s 
t h a t he b e l i e v e s t h e g o a l o f a science o f a c t i o n t o be 
l o g i c a l l y possible,, A t a n o t h e r p o i n t he saysj 'There i s 
a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l core common t o a l l e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e , no 
m a t t e r what i t s c o n c r e t e s u b j e c t matter 8,, ( l 936as 6 7 9 ) . 
Yet he i s aware t h a t t o some t h i n k e r s t h e s u b j e c t i v e 
q u a l i t y o f a c t i o n makes such a g o a l and common core c h i m e r i c a l . 
He a l s o says; 
'What i s f o r m u l a t e d i n an "economic 
law" i s n o t a d e s c r i p t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n 
i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e a t a l l , b u t a 
r a t i o n a l t y p e case. I t i s how a c t i o n 
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would proceed g i v e n t he "wants" o f t h e 
s u b j e c t s and g i v e n t he c o n d i t i o n s under 
which t h e y a c t , i n so f a r as t h e y a c t 
r a t i o n a l l y . I t i s , g i v e n the d a t a , a 
norm o f r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . I t s e m p i r i c a l 
r e l e v a n c e r e s t s on the circ u m s t a n c e t h a t 
men do i n f a c t t r y ( n o t m e r e l y " t e n d " ) 
t o "economize", t o " e x p l o i t " t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i r l i v e s r a t i o n a l l y i n 
o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e i r wants. T h i s 
i d e a o f a norm which men can be conceived 
as s t r i v i n g t o a t t a i n by e f f o r t i s something 
e n t i r e l y f o r e i g n t o the " p o s i t i v e " p h y s i c a l 
s c i e n c e s ' , 
'But Robbins' a t t i t u d e seems t o i n v o l v e a 
m i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f "law" as 
a p p l i e d t o the sci e n c e s o f a c t i o n . As 
a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , i t s n e c e s s i t y i s n o t 
d e s c r i p t i v e , b u t " n o r m a t i v e " . I t i s n o t 
t h a t g i v e n c e r t a i n d a t a men n e c e s s a r i l y 
must a c t i n c e r t a i n ways, b ut t h a t ^ f t h e y 
would achieve c e r t a i n k i n d s o f ends which we 
assume do serve as motives t o them, the most 
r a t i o n a l way o f d o i n g so i s t h a t f o r m u l a t e d 
i n t h e law. The c o n c r e t e r e l e v a n c e o f the 1 
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depends on t h e " f a c t " o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t 
men do t r y t o a t t a i n such norms o f e f f i c i e n c y , 
o f course w i t h v a r y i n g degrees o f success„ 
The n e c e s s i t y o f economic law l i e s i n i t s 
l o g i c , n o t i n the " f a c t s " . There i s always 
an " i f " a t t a c h e d t o i t . There i s no reason 
why t h e same sho u l d n o t be t r u e o f the o t h e r 
elements o f a c t i o n 1 . (1 9 3^aj5 1 9 - 2 0 and 539 . 
See a l s o 1935b: zH9, 1935as286) . 
Now t h i s i s s u r e l y n o t a concept o f s c i e n t i f i c law a p p l i c a b l e 
i n n a t u r a l s cience and g i v e n t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f t h e concept o f 
law i n the l a t t e r i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how Parsons* n o t i o n o f 
a c e n t r a l core common t o a l l science can be c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i t . 
Here t h e n i s a f u r t h e r example of Parsons' awareness o f the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g a science o f a c t i o n and h i s r a t h e r u n s t a b l e 
p o s i t i o n p r i o r t o The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n . 
I n t h i s statement on the n a t u r e o f economic laws Parsons 
r e f e r s t o norms o f a c t i o n . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between s u b j e c t i v e 
e n t i t i e s such as norms and a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r i s a f u r t h e r a rea o f 
debate i n the methodology o f the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
on t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether norms can p r o p e r l y be c o n s i d e r e d 
'causes' o f a c t i o n . (See, f o r example, M a c l n t y r e ( 1 9 ^ 2 } ) ) 
Again Parsons d i s p l a y s a degree o f awareness o f such d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
He speaks o f '... t h e g r e a t i n t r i c a c y and s u b t l e t y o f the 
p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a c t i o n and moral r u l e s ' ( l 935as 
300) and mentions '... the whole g r e a t q u e s t i o n o f t h e c a u s a l 
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r o l e o f ends,,,, 1 adding t he f o o t n o t e s 'That i s i n one 
sense the q u e s t i o n o f t e l e o l o g y . But t h i s s l i p p e r y concept 
must be handled w i t h g r e a t c a u t i o n ' ( 1 9 3 6 b ) , But Parsons 
i s h a r d l y c l e a r and c o n s i s t e n t as t o t h e p o s i t i o n he adopts 
here as i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g passage i n which 
mechanical c a u s a t i o n , laws as dependent upon norms and moral 
e x h o r t a t i o n form a p e c u l i a r m i x t u r e , 
"One prominent r e s u l t o f the dogmatic 
p o s i t i o n i s t o l e a d i t s exponents i n 
th e d i r e c t i o n o f a s o r t o f m e c h a n i s t i c 
automatism, as though t h e human 
i n d i v i d u a l were as i n e r t a l i n k i n t h e 
c h a i n o f economic c a u s a t i o n as the atom 
o r p a r t i c l e i s i n a mechanical system , 
As a g a i n s t t h i s tendency T a u s s i g 
a s s e r t s a g a i n and a g a i n t he importance 
o f e f f o r t , o f the a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
o f men i n t h e i r a f f a i r s . There i s 
n o t h i n g i n e v i t a b l e under any and a l l 
c o n d i t i o n s about t he l e v e l o f a 
p r o d u c t i v e e f f o r t w h i c h we are apt t o 
tak e f o r g r a n t e d . Above a l l i s 
l e a d e r s h i p i m p o r t a n t i n human a f f a i r s 
o f a l l s o r t s , n o t l e a s t i n the f i e l d o f 
bu s i n e s s and i n d u s t r y . I t s changes and 
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accomplishments cannot be accounted 
f o r i n terms o f any s t e r e o t y p e d 
average o f a b i l i t y o r e f f o r t , b u t 
o n l y o f the l e a d e r s h i p o f the e x t r a -
o r d i n a r y and r a r e i n d i v i d u a l ' . 
( 1 9 3 6CS3 7 1 ) . 
However a t one p o i n t Parsons g i v e s a f a i r l y s y s t e m a t i c 
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e q u e s t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s and b e h a v i o u r . T h i s occurs i n h i s 
a n a l y s i s o f what Pareto means when he says t h a t an a c t o r ' s 
t h e o r i e s and o v e r t a c t i o n are ' m a n i f e s t a t i o n s ' o f t h e a c t o r ' s 
' s t a t e o f mind' (193&b% 259=260) 0 The q u e s t i o n i s t h e meaning 
o f t h e term 'manifestation'„ I t i s used i n two senses which 
c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e two components o f the ! s t a t e o f mind', t he 
u l t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n s ( h e r e d i t y and environment) and the u l t i m a t e 
9 
v a l u e element. I n the for m e r t he t h i n g m a n i f e s t e d , 
h e r e d i t y and environment and the m a n i f e s t a t i o n , t he a c t o r ' s 
a c t i o n and t h e o r i e s are b o t h p a r t s o f t h e same p h y s i c a l 
system analogous t o a thermometer and what i t measures. 
There i s a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between heat 
and i t s m a n i f e s t a t i o n i n t h e temperature r e a d i n g . Parsons 
sees t h i s as a p p l y i n g t o t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f h e r e d i t a r y and 
environment i n a c t i o n , he g i v e s t he example o f ' . . , c e r t a i n 
m ental symptoms, as f i n a n c i a l i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , may be ta k e n 
i n p a r e s i s as evidence o f c e r t a i n s y p h i l i t i c l e s i o n s o f the 
b r a i n • ( I 9 3 6 b s 2 5 9 ) . 
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I n t h e case o f t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f u l t i m a t e v a l u e s 
i n a c t i o n t h e s i t u a t i o n i s more c o m p l i c a t e d . Here the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t he m a n i f e s t a t i o n and t h e t h i n g 
m a n i f e s t e d i s a symbolic one, a r e l a t i o n between a symbol 
( t h e a c t o r ' s a c t i o n o r t h e o r y ) and i t s meaning, what i s 
symbolized. But f u r t h e r , Parsons uses two d i f f e r e n t 
senses o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h i s based on the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between l o g i c a l and n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n . I n l o g i c a l a c t i o n 
t h e symbol, s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and a c t i o n based on i t , 
' r e f e r t o o r express systems o f i n t r i n s i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n 
the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ' ( l 9 3 6 b s 2 5 9 ) . The 'meaning' symbolized 
i s t h u s ' o b j e c t i v e ' , l o g i c a l a c t i o n i s the ' r e f l e c t i o n ' o f 
e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y and hence a l t h o u g h mediated t h r o u g h symbols 
Parsons c a l l s t h i s t h e i n t r i n s i c means=end r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
a r g u i n g t h a t c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n i s j u s t as a p p l i c a b l e here 
as i n the d i r e c t r e l a t i o n between h e r e d i t y and environment 
above. I n n o n = l o g i c a l a c t i o n , however, t h e symbol, non-
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and a c t i o n r e f e r s n o t t o the ' o b j e c t i v e ' 
b u t t o t h e ' s u b j e c t i v e ' . N o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n i s a 'form o f 
e x p r e s s i o n ' o f t h i s s u b j e c t i v e r e a l m , as Parsons says t h e r e 
i s a 'double i n c i d e n c e o f symbolism' ( l 9 3 5 a s 3 0 5 ) , the symbol 
symbolizes a n o t h e r symbol. Then t h e c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n i s , 
can t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p be a c a u s a l one? Parsons n o t e s t h a t 
i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h e r e l a t i o n between norm and a c t i o n ' i s 
always a r b i t r a r y * b u t t h e n adds an i m p o r t a n t f o o t n o t e s 'Once 
a g i v e n symbol i s accepted i t o f course comes t o form p a r t o f 
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a c a u s a l system b u t t h i s depends on the phenomenon o f 
"acceptance" w h i c h i s f o r e i g n t o t h e p h y s i c a l systems'„ 
( l 9 3 6 b s 2 5 9)o Here Parsons says t h a t f o r c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s 
t o a p p l y between s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s and a c t i o n the f o r m e r 
must be 'accepted' by t h e a c t o r . 
Now the above paragraphs i n no way r e p r e s e n t a 
s y s t e m a t i c d i s c u s s i o n o f problems i n t h e methodology o f the 
science o f a c t i o n . They are meant o n l y t o demonstrate t h a t 
i n a number o f ways Parsons d i s p l a y s an awareness t h a t t h e r e 
are problems i n v o l v e d i n speaking o f s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s i n 
s c i e n c e , o f 'economic l a w s ' , o f s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s 'causing' 
b e h a v i o u r , I hope t h a t t h i s and t h e background o f i d e a l i s m 
i s s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e problem f o r t h i s p r e s e n t work 
which i s , i f Parsons' a m b i t i o n i s t o c o n s t r u c t a science o f 
a c t i o n how does he t a c k l e the problems o f method which are 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h such an aim? 
Having e s t a b l i s h e d my theme I w i l l conclude t h i s 
i n t r o d u c t i o n by summarizing the o v e r a l l argument o f the 
f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s . Chapter I I w i l l c o n s i d e r Parsons' 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the n a t u r e o f science i n g e n e r a l as i t i s 
developed i n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n , The c e n t r a l 
emphasis t o Parsons i s the t h e o r e t i c a l q u a l i t y of s c i e n c e , 
a q u a l i t y he c o n s i d e r s t o have been g r o s s l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d 
i n the d o m i n a n t l y e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n s o f European t h o u g h t . 
T h i s forms one p l a n k o f Parsons' a t t e m p t t o c o n s t r u c t a 
science o f a c t i o n . I n Chapter I I I I w i l l s t i l l be 
concerned w i t h The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n b u t t h e r e t u r n 
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t o t h e methodology o f t h e sciences o f a c t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r . 
Three m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems o f such a sci e n c e w i l l be 
c o n s i d e r e d b e g i n n i n g w i t h the n a t u r e o f ' s u b j e c t i v i t y ' . 
There are o f course a number o f t h e o r i e s o f 'mind' b u t what 
i s r e l e v a n t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a science o f a c t i o n i s the 
me a n i n g f u l q u a l i t y o f a c t i o n which r e q u i r e s a model o f the 
a c t o r as capable o f a t t r i b u t i n g meaning t o a c t i o n . The 
n a t u r e o f t h i s c a p a c i t y i s much debated b u t here I w i l l 
t ake a c a t h o l i c v iew and s i m p l y say t h a t f o r an a c t o r t o 
act m e a n i n g f u l l y i m p l i e s a p u r p o s i v e , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s and 
r e a s o n i n g b e i n g . These t h r e e q u a l i t i e s I t a k e from Schutz, 
Mead and Winch. Schutz (1972) emphasises t h e a c t o r ' s 
' p r o j e c t ' , t h e image o f the completed a c t wh i c h g u i d e s and 
c o - o r d i n a t e s a c t i o n i n p r o g r e s s . Mead's (193^) focus i s on 
the a c t o r ' s consciousness o f s e l f as an o b j e c t t o i t s e l f , the 
a b i l i t y t o r e f l e c t upon and m o n i t o r one's own b e h a v i o u r and 
s u b j e c t i v e processes. F i n a l l y , Winch (1958) c h a r a c t e r i z e s 
a c t i o n as r u l e - f o l l o w i n g , meaning b e i n g bound up w i t h t h e 
c a p a c i t y t o un d e r s t a n d t he p r o p e r use o f r u l e s . I s h a l l 
use t h i s model o f t h e a c t o r as a f o i l t o d i s c u s s Parsons' 
concept o f s u b j e c t i v i t y i n o r d e r t o b r i n g o u t how he uses 
an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t model i n which t h e q u a l i t y o f 
meaning i s p e r i p h e r a l . Rather, Parsons' model o f the a c t o r 
g a i n s i t s form f r o m h i s n o t i o n o f science and i t s c o n t e n t 
from h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic. As I s h a l l argue t h a t 
th e l a t t e r i s f a r from t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l sense o f v o l u n t a r y 
a c t i o n t h i s l e a d s t o a c e n t r a l l y i m p o r t a n t p o i n t . Parsons 
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can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a d d r e s s i n g t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems 
o f a sci e n c e o f a c t i o n b u t the way he d e f i n e s these problems 
i s p e c u l i a r t o him and c o n s e q u e n t l y so are t h e s o l u t i o n s 
he o f f e r s . 
T h i s a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o t h e second such problem which 
I s h a l l c a l l t h e problem o f n o r m a t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m . The i s s u e 
here i s how n o r m a t i v e e n t i t i e s such as norms, ends o r v a l u e s 
can be t h o u g h t o f as d e t e r m i n a n t s o f a c t i o n . A g a in a 
f o i l i s u s e f u l . F o l l o w i n g t h e Humean sense o f c a u s a t i o n , 
t o speak o f cause and e f f e c t r e q u i r e s two c o n d i t i o n s i n t h i s 
c o n t e x t . F i r s t l y t h e c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n o f cause and 
e f f e c t , whenever x, t h e n y. Secondly, the independent 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f cause and e f f e c t , y i s i n no way i m p l i c i t i n 
x, t he two can be d e f i n e d and e x p e r i e n c e d s e p a r a t e l y . 
Problems have a r i s e n i n a p p l y i n g Humean c a u s a l i t y t o the 
r e l a t i o n s o f s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s and a c t i o n s because i t has 
been argued t h a t these two c o n d i t i o n s are n o t met. A norm 
i s n o t c o n s t a n t l y c o n j o i n e d w i t h an a c t i o n n o t because i t i s 
o n l y a necessary n o t s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n o f the a c t i o n b u t 
because a norm i s un d e r s t o o d by the a c t o r who may i n t e r p r e t 
i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a c t i o n n o t o n l y d i f f e r e n t l y b u t a l s o 
c r e a t i v e l y , t h i s b e i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e 
use o f language r u l e s . F u r t h e r , t o d e f i n e an a c t i o n , t o say, 
f o r example, t h a t the a c t o r i s 'going f o r a walk' i n i t s e l f 
imputes an i n t e n t i o n t o t h e a c t o r so t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e 
e n t i t y , t h e a c t o r ' s g o a l , cannot be l o g i c a l l y and e x p e r i e n t i a l 
s e p a r a t e d from t h e a c t i o n . Now Parsons wishes t o t a l k 
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about s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s as causes o f a c t i o n and he a l s o 
r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h e r e are problems i n this„ However, we 
w i l l f i n d t h a t once a g a i n h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what i s 
p r o b l e m a t i c a l here i s r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t t o the i s s u e s 
above ( a l t h o u g h Parsons i s n o t i g n o r a n t o f these i s s u e s ) 
and can be e l u c i d a t e d by h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f v o l u n t a r i s m 
and s c i e n c e . 
The t h i r d problems t o be c o n s i d e r e d below i s t h a t o f 
v a l u e , n o t i n t h e sense o f the p r a c t i c a l r o l e of the s o c i o -
l o g i s t i n s o c i e t y b u t the r o l e o f v a l u e i n c o n s t i t u t i n g the 
o b j e c t o f e n q u i r y , what Weber c a l l s the v a l u e - r e l e v a n c e o f 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e , (19^9?71=85, 105=12, 1 3 1 - 6 3 ) , I s h a l l use 
Weber here as my p o i n t o f c o n t r a s t , h i s p e r t i n a n c e b e i n g t h a t 
Parsons a l s o employs Weber's ideas t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree. 
But I s h a l l argue t h a t Weber's ideas are c o n s i d e r a b l y 
changed i n Parsons' hands, a g a i n becoming welded i n t o h i s 
own framework. 
Chapter I I I t h e n i s concerned w i t h The S t r u c t u r e o f 
S o c i a l A c t i o n as a p o i n t o f s y n t h e s i s i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g 
i n which problems are addressed and ' r e s o l v e d ' , so t h a t t o 
him a f i r m f o u n d a t i o n i s l a i d f o r a sci e n c e o f a c t i o n , a 
view w h i c h c h a l l e n g e s what T u r n e r and Beeghley (197^) c a l l 
' c u r r e n t f o l k l o r e ' i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Parsons' work. 
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T h i s f o l k l o r e r e c u r r e n t l y p o s i t s a s h i f t i n the f o u n d a t i o n 
o f Parsons' t h e o r y between t he 1 9 3 0 's and h i s post-war 
work. T h i s s h i f t i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n v a r i o u s ways, g e n e r a l l y 
as between an emphasis on ' a c t i o n ' t o one o f 'system'„ Such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e f i n a l c h a p t e r b u t 
p r i o r t o t h a t I w i l l c o n s i d e r Parsons' work i n t h e p e r i o d 
1938=50 i n w h i c h he s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y adopts a s t r u c t u r a l -
f u n c t i o n a l mode o f a n a l y s i s . My c l a i m h e r e w i l l be t h a t 
f a r from r e p r e s e n t i n g a move from a c t i o n t o system Parsons' 
t h i n k i n g i n t h i s p e r i o d i s (a) the e x t e n s i o n and development 
o f v o l u n t a r i s m and (b) once a g a i n an e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f the 
c l o s e l i n k s between h i s methodology o f science and h i s 
v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic. T h i s w i l l t a k e two c h a p t e r s . 
I n Chapter I V I w i l l examine what Parsons says about methodology 
l e a d i n g up t o h i s account o f what i s i n v o l v e d i n s t r u c t u r a l -
f u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . T h i s c h a p t e r w i l l conclude by p o i n t i n g 
out c e r t a i n a m b i g u i t i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y about the c e n t r a l n o t i o n s 
o f s t r u c t u r e and pr o c e s s . Chapter V w i l l t a k e up these 
a m b i g u i t i e s a f t e r e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic 
once more, the key p o i n t b e i n g t h a t t h e v a g u e r i e s i n 
s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m can be c l a r i f i e d when p l a c e d i n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f Parsons' v o l u n t a r i s m . T h i s , t h e n , w i l l be the 
b a s i s o f my c l a i m f o r c o n t i n u i t y i n Parsons' work once the 
n a t u r e o f v o l u n t a r i s m i s p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d . F i n a l l y , 
i n Chapter V I I w i l l c r i t i c i z e a number o f o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
o f Parsons' v o l u n t a r i s m b e f o r e d r a w i n g some g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s 
on the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f Parsons' science o f a c t i o n . 
I I The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n As 
Science as T h e o r e t i c a l 
A. The T h e o r e t i c a l C h a r a c t e r o f S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge. 
A c u r s o r y r e a d i n g o f The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n 
i s enough t o convince any r e a d e r t h a t Parsons emphasises 
th e t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e o f s c i e n c e . T h i s i s announced i n the 
Prefac e and i n t h e p e n u l t i m a t e paragraph Parsons r e f e r s t o 
t h e importance o f ' 0 „ 0° the s y s t e m a t i c t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g 
w h i c h forms the b a s i s and i s the s u b j e c t o f t h i s study'„ 
| j 937as775^« But t h e o r y i n science i s n o t j u s t Parsons' 
p a r t i c u l a r s p e c i a l i s m , r a t h e r t o him s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 
i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e . T h i s i s most 
c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d by a c o n t r a s t drawn between s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge and 'the p r a c t i c a l " l o r e " o f everyday l i f e ' . 
' I t i s p o s s i b l e t o have s c a t t e r e d and 
u n i n t e g r a t e d b i t s o f knowledge, and 
t o assent t o the " t r u t h " o f f u r t h e r 
s c a t t e r e d b i t s as t h e y are c a l l e d t o 
one's a t t e n t i o n . T h i s type o f knowledge 
does n o t , however, c o n s t i t u t e " s c i e n c e " 
i n the sense i n which t h i s s t u d y i s 
i n t e r e s t e d i n i t . 
The l a t t e r i s p r e s e n t o n l y i n so f a r as 
these b i t s o f knowledge have become 
i n t e g r a t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o f a i r l y 
c l e a r - c u t t h e o r e t i c a l systems. 
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Footnotes Much e m p i r i c a l knowledge 
whic h i s s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v a l i d i s thus 
n o t science i n t h i s sense because i t s 
i n t e g r a t i o n i n v o l v e s o t h e r c e n t r e s o f 
r e f e r e n c e t h a n s y s t e m a t i c theory'„ 
[ l 9 3 7 a s l 6 j / 1 ) 
As t h i s q u o t a t i o n i m p l i e s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s n o t o n l y 
t h e o r e t i c a l , Parsons argues s t r o n g l y f o r i t s e m p i r i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r as a g a i n s t the " d i a l e c t i c a l s t e r i l i t y " o f t h e o r y 
w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o e m p i r i c a l problems, j j 9 3 7 a s x x i - x x i i j „ 
The p o i n t i s t h a t science's approach t o e m p i r i c a l problems 
i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s t h e o r e t i c a l nature„ 
' o o o f a c t u a l c o r r e c t n e s s i s n o t the 
s o l e aim o f sc i e n c e ; i t must be 
combined w i t h t h o r o u g h g o i n g t h e o -
r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the f a c t s 
known and c o r r e c t l y stated'„ 
[l937as97j . 
"The essence o f s c i e n c e , the 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g as d i s t i n c t from t he 
mere p h o t o g r a p h i c r e c e p t i o n o f c o n c r e t e 
phenomena, i s t h e o r y , and the essence 
o f t h e o r y i s a n a l y t i c a l abstraction'„ 
( 1 9 3 5 C S 6 6 I ) « ( 2 ) 
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T h i s b e i n g s a i d t h e q u e s t i o n s t o ask are what i s ' t h e o r y 8 
and why does science have t h i s c h a r a c t e r ? The l a t t e r 
q u e s t i o n w i l l be broached f i r s t . 
B. Fhy i s Science T h e o r e t i c a l ? 
I n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n t h e r e are a t l e a s t 
t h r e e reasons why Parsons emphasises t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r 
o f s c i e n t i f i c knoxvledge. These are 1, The r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between s c i e n t i f i c and common sense e m p i r i c a l knowledge, 
2. Parsons' t h e o r y o f the development o f science and 3» H i s 
a t t a c k on e m p i r i c i s m i n s c i e n c e . I s h a l l c o n s i d e r each o f 
these i n t u r n . 
1. Science and common senses 
I n the q u o t a t i o n g i v e n above £l937asl6j i t i s e v i d e n t 
t h a t b o t h s c i e n t i f i c and p r a c t i c a l common sense knowledge are 
concerned w i t h e m p i r i c a l phenomena. As Parsons expresses i t 
t h e y are bo d i e s o f knowledge which " r e f e r t o something beyond 
themselves' £l937asxxi]] „ F u r t h e r the passage above suggests 
t h a t i t i s the presence o r absence o f ' t h e o r y ' which 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e s t h e two ty p e s o f knowledge. However the 
s i t u a t i o n i s n o t q u i t e as simple as t h i s . I n the f i r s t 
p l a c e , as w i l l be n o t e d below, one i m p o r t a n t aspect o f t h e o r y 
i n science i s what Parsons c a l l s t h e d e s c r i p t i v e frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e . Our ex p e r i e n c e o f e m p i r i c a l phenomena i s never 
d i r e c t b u t mediated by t h e o r e t i c a l c oncepts. The r e l e v a n t 
p o i n t here i s t h a t t h i s same c o n s i d e r a t i o n a p p l i e s t o common 
sense knowledge. 
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• I n o t h e r words, i n P r o f e s s o r Henderson's 
phrase, a l l e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n i s " i n 
terms o f a c o n c e p t u a l scheme"„ T h i s i s 
t r u e n o t o n l y o f s o p h i s t i c a t e d s c i e n t i f i c 
o b s e r v a t i o n b u t o f the s i m p l e s t common-
sense statements of f a c t . Conceptual 
schemes i n t h i s sense are i n h e r e n t i n t h e 
s t r u c t u r e o f language and, as anyone 
t h o r o u g h l y f a m i l i a r w i t h more t h a n one 
language knows, t h e y d i f f e r i n i m p o r t a n t 
r e s p e c t s from one language t o another' 
[ l 937a: 28, See alsos 1C-]. 
The converse o f the p l a c e o f t h e o r y i n common sense a p p l i e s , 
t h a t i s , Parsons c o n s i d e r s t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y i s h i s t o r i = 
c a l l y r o o t e d i n common sense knowledge. T h i s i s mentioned 
a t s e v e r a l p o i n t s i n h i s account o f the h i s t o r i c a l development 
o f t he p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r y o f a c t i o n s 
'The o r i g i n o f the mode o f t h i n k i n g i n 
terms o f the a c t i o n schema i n g e n e r a l i s 
so o l d and so obscure t h a t i t i s f r u i t l e s s 
t o i n q u i r e i n t o i t h e r e . I t i s s u f f i c i e n t 
t o p o i n t out t h a t , j u s t l i k e t h e schema o f 
the c l a s s i c a l p h y s i c s , i t i s d e e p l y r o o t e d 
i n t h e common sense ex p e r i e n c e o f everyday 
l i f e , and i t i s o f a range o f such e x p e r i e n c e 
t h a t i t may be rega r d e d as u n i v e r s a l t o a l l 
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human b e i n g s , P r o o f o f t h i s c l a i m can 
be found i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e b a s i c 
elements o f t h e schema are imbedded 
i n the s t r u c t u r e o f a l l languages, as 
i n the u n i v e r s a l e x i s t e n c e o f a ve r b 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the E n g l i s h v e r b " t o 
do", 1 [ l 9 3 7 a s 5 l ] 
So t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between science and common sense does n o t 
r e s t on a r a d i c a l break, i t i s r a t h e r a case o f g r a d u a l 
t r a n s i t i o n , t h e two ty p e s o f knowledge as the two p o l e s o f 
a continuum. Parsons says a t one p o i n t s 
•From t h i s p o l e o f common sense t h e r e 
i s a v e r y g r a d u a l t r a n s i t i o n t o such 
c o n c e p t i o n s a t the o t h e r end o f the 
sc a l e as the second law o f thermodynamics'. 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 6 2 5 ] . 
I t i s p e r t i n a n t t o no t e here t h a t Parsons has s e v e r a l t i m e s 
been c r i t i c i s e d (For example: B l a c k (1961s278=283) , 
Zimmerman (1967s139=140), Schrag (1952s249) ) on t h e grounds 
t h a t h i s schema o f a c t i o n i s b u t common sense t h i n k i n g about 
human a c t i v i t y . The f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s may be some r e p l y t o 
such c r i t i c i s m s as Parsons i s on t h e one hand q u i t e e x p l i c i t 
about t h i s b u t on the o t h e r does p o i n t t o d i f f e r e n c e s between 
common sense and s c i e n t i f i c use o f t h e a c t i o n schema. Such 
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c r i t i c i s m , however, does provoke the q u e s t i o n o f how such 
a d i f f e r e n c e i s t o be drawn, p a r t i c u l a r l y , i n t h i s context,, 
the r o l e o f t h e o r y i n such a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , , 
T h i s q u e s t i o n can be approached t h r o u g h f o u r p o i n t s . 
The f i r s t i s whether concepts are i m p l i c i t o r e x p l i c i t . 
I n d i s c u s s i n g Weber's c r i t i q u e o f i n t u i t i o n i s t i d e a l i s m 
Parsons remarks? 
•One t h i n g Weber g r a n t s , t h a t i n our 
statements about human a f f a i r s the 
c o n c e p t u a l element o f t e n remains imp-
l i c i t , and t h e statements take a form 
s u g g e s t i n g immediate i n t u i t i o n . T h i s 
Weber says, i s owing t o the f a c t t h a t 
common knowledge i n t h i s f i e l d reaches 
so f a r , and above a l l c overs so many 
o f the aspects o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i s t , t h a t t o make them e x p l i c i t 
would be s u p e r f l u o u s ; t h e y are ommitted 
on grounds o f "economy" , [ l 937as 588J . 
I n common sense knowledge t h e n the t h e o r e t i c a l element tends 
t o be i m p l i c i t . However? 
'When s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n b e g i n s t o 
t r a n s c e n d common sense and becomes t o a 
degree m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d , t h e r e 
emerge e x p l i c i t schemata which may be c a l l e d 
d e s c r i p t i v e frames o f r e f e r e n c e ' . f l 9 3 7 a s 2 8 ^ . 
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T h i s l a s t passage, w i t h i t s r e f e r e n c e t o transcendence and 
emergence suggests t h a t science develops o u t o f common 
sense knowledge,, T h i s takes us t o the second p o i n t h e r e . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o t j u s t a m a t t e r o f t h e o r y b e i n g i m p l i c i t 
i n common sense, e x p l i c i t i n s c i e n c e , as w e l l as t h i s , s cience 
develops o u t o f common sense, i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n . The 
second p o i n t o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n t h e n i s t h a t the two t y p e s o f 
knowledge serve d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s . As has a l r e a d y been 
no t e d common sense knowledge ' i s i n t e g r a t e d about p r a c t i c a l 
needs and i n t e r e s t s ' ( j937as l63 . T h i s a g a i n i s e v i d e n t i n 
Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n o f c r i t e r i a o f adequate e x p l a n a t i o n . 
The example employed i s a husband's e x p l a n a t i o n o f the hardness 
o f p o t a t o e s served t o him by h i s w i f e . The e x p l a n a t i o n i s 
'They were n o t cooked l o n g enough'. Parsons comments! 
'This i s a p e r f e c t l y adequate c a u s a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the purpose. H i s i n t e r e s t 
i n t h e p o t a t o i s o n l y i n i t s r e l a t i v e h a r d -
ness o r s o f t n e s s i n r e l a t i o n t o p a l a t a b i l i t y . 
I t i s " g e n e r a l l y known" t h a t t o make a p o t a t o 
s o f t i t must be b o i l e d about f o r t y - f i v e 
minute s . ( S i c I ) The p o i n t i s t h a t f o r t h i s 
purpose i t i s not necessary t o know the 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f the complex c h e m i c a l changes 
which go on w i t h i n a p o t a t o i n t h e process o f 
b e i n g b o i l e d , o r the laws these f o l l o w ' . 
[l 937a: 6 2 5 ] . 
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Common sense knowledge t h e n serves p r a c t i c a l purposes 
and as a consequence t he t h e o r e t i c a l element o f such 
knowledge i s s u b s e r v i e n t t o the p r a c t i c a l purpose a t 
hand, I n s c i e n c e , however, t h e o r y i s n o t a means t o an 
end b u t the end i t s e l f , (see below) t h e i n t e r e s t o f 
science i s t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s b r i n g s us 
to t h e t h i r d p o i n t , q u i t e what such t h e o r e t i c a l under-
s t a n d i n g c o n s i s t s o f , We can ag a i n r e f e r t o Parsons' 
d i s c u s s i o n o f the c r i t e r i a o f adequate e x p l a n a t i o n 
j j 937as . As has been n o t e d , so l o n g as common 
sense knowledge s o l v e s t he p r a c t i c a l problem a t hand 
t h e n i t s e x p l a n a t i o n s are adequate,, The t r a n s i t i o n 
from t h i s t o c r i t e r i a o f s c i e n t i f i c adequacy i s marked 
f i r s t l y by the i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y o f the d a t a . T h i s 
i s e v i d e n t l y a m a t t e r o f degree r a t h e r t h a n a p o i n t o f 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two typ e s o f knowledge. Secondly, 
s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n s ! 
8... t r a n s c e n d common sense and what 
i s g e n e r a l l y known and become ju d g e -
ments o f p r o b a b i l i t y i n v o l v i n g h i g h l y 
t e c h n i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f elements, and 
r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n o f the i n v o l v e d 
l o g i c a l consequences o f c e r t a i n f a c t s ' , 
[ i 937a: 625"]. 
There are t h r e e aspects t o t h i s . The f i r s t two are 
statements i n terms o f p r o b a b i l i t y and l o g i c a l r i g o u r . 
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I n these cases the d i s t i n c t i o n between common sense and 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge would appear t o be again a m a t t e r o f 
degree„ T h i s i s a d m i t t e d i n t h e f i r s t case, s c i e n t i f i c 
e x p l a n a t i o n s are p r o b a b i l i s t i c because o f t h e i n c r e a s e d 
knowledge i s a l s o presumably l o g i c a l t o some degree a l t h o u g h 
l a c k i n g i n e x p l i c i t r i g o u r , T h i s l e a v e s t h e t h i r d a s p e c t , 
the ' h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f elements'. T h i s 
means t h a t t h e elements o f the e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e concepts 
employed t o d e s c r i b e t h e d a t a and analyze i t i n terms o f 
e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s , are t e c h n i c a l l y f o r m u l a t e d , t h a t i s , 
the concepts employed i n science are s p e c i f i c a l l y s c i e n t i f i c , 
p e c u l i a r t o scie n c e i t s e l f . Q u i t e what t h i s means w i l l be 
ta k e n up i n the l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n o f t y p e s o f concepts„ 
The f i n a l p o i n t o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between common sense 
and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s t h e r o l e o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems 
( r a t h e r t h a n p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s ) as t h e means o f i n t e g r a t i o n 
o f knowledges 
c o m p l e x i t y o f r e l e v a n t d a t a |T937as625-6J Common sense 
' I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t o have sound and 
t h e r e f o r e u s e f u l i n s i g h t s i n the form o f 
r e l a t i v e l y d i s c o n n e c t e d aphorisms, o f 
g e n e r a l statements about what e x p e r i e n c e 
has t a u g h t men t o ex p e c t . I t i s , however, 
e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s l e v e l s hould be 
transce n d e d by the development o f a r e l a t i v e l y 
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i n t e g r a t e d body o f concepts which 
t r a n s f o r m s knowledge from a s e r i e s o f 
wise i n s i g h t s and p r a c t i c a l p r e c e p t s 
based upon them i n t o a system based 
on a rounded c o n c e p t u a l scheme, a 
" t h e o r y " i n the s p e c i f i c s c i e n t i f i c 
sense' (1936c; 359) . 
A g a i n the concept o f system i s c r u c i a l t o Parsons n o t i o n 
o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y so t h a t as i n the case o f s c i e n t i f i c 
concepts t h e o r y marks t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f s c i e n c e . I n 
sum, i t i s not the presence o r absence o f t h e o r y b u t i ) 
i t s i m p l i c i t n e s s / e x p l i c i t n e s s , i i ) whether t h e o r y i s a means 
t o an end o r an end i n i t s e l f , i i i ) t h e type o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
concept employed and i v ) t he presence o f s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n 
t h a t marks o f f common sense and s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. T h i s 
t h e n i s the f i r s t reason why Parsons emphasises t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r o f sc i e n c e , t he second l i e s i n h i s t h e o r y o f 
s c i e n t i f i c development. 
2 . The t h e o r y o f the development o f s c i e n c e . 
One o f the s u b s t a n t i v e themes o f The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l 
A c t i o n i s i t s t h e o r y o f s c i e n t i f i c development. The book 
opens w i t h a s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d 'The Problem' and t h e problem 
i s t h e 'death' o f t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c - u t i l i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n o f 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t M937a:3~6j . Again, Parsons 
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d e f i n e s h i s s t u d y as, i n p a r t , '..„ an a t t e m p t e d e m p i r i c a l 
v e r i f i c a t i o n , i n a p a r t i c u l a r case, o f a t h e o r y o f the 
process by wh i c h s c i e n t i f i c t h o u g h t d e v e l o p s , . , 1 [ l937as 
697] . H i s t h e o r y o f s c i e n t i f i c development he p u t s 
f o r w a r d as one o f t h e ' e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i e d c o n c l u s i o n s ' 
o f t he s t u d y p 937a: 725] . ^ 
What i s r e l e v a n t here i s the r o l e o f t h e o r y i n 
s c i e n t i f i c development and how t h i s l e a d s Parsons t o charac= 
t e r i z e s cience by t h e o r y . We can b e g i n t h i s i n q u i r y by 
n o t i n g t h a t Parsons develops h i s own p o s i t i o n as a c r i t i c a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o two o t h e r s , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l and e m p i r i c i s t 
p o s i t i o n s [ i 937a; 725] . ^ ^ 
I n s i m p l e terms Parsons understands an i d e o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r y o f s c i e n t i f i c development as one which e x p l a i n s change 
i n science as a ' r e f l e c t i o n o f c e r t a i n b a s i c s o c i a l changes' 
[l 937a: 5] • The i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s l i e o u t s i d e o f science 
i t s e l f . I n Parsons' view s c i e n t i f i c development, a term 
w h i c h w i l l be s p e c i f i e d i n a moment, cannot be u n d e r s t o o d 
5... as o n l y t h e r e s u l t o f elements e x t e r n a l t o science 
a l t o g e t h e r such as the p e r s o n a l s e n t i m e n t s o f t h e a u t h o r s , 
t h e i r c l a s s p o s i t i o n , n a t i o n a l i t y , e t c . ' [l 937as 725~J« As 
such one reason f o r the choice o f the f o u r l e a d i n g t h i n k e r s 
d i s c u s s e d i n t h e book i s t h e i r d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l 
p o s i t i o n s 5937a:13-10 . 
Parsons' d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h 
such an approach i s no doubt connected \ i r i t h h i s o v e r a l l 
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l a c k o f sympathy w i t h a marxian p o s i t i o n and h i s g e n e r a l 
s t r e s s on t h e p l a c e o f s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s ( i n c l u d i n g 
knowledge) i n s o c i e t y . But more s p e c i f i c reasons can 
be o f f e r e d . These are t h a t h i s own t h e o r y i s i n t e n d e d 
as a c o u n t e r t o a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c r e l a t i v i s m and 
t h a t Parsons' t h e o r y i s an a t t e m p t e d e x p l a n a t i o n o f 
s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s r a t h e r t h a n change. On t h e f i r s t , 
Bershady (1973) has c o n v i n c i n g l y argued t h a t The S t r u c t u r e 
o f S o c i a l A c t i o n i s an a t t a c k on h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i s m . 
T h i s w i l l be t a k e n up a g a i n l a t e r , f o r the moment i t w i l l 
s u f f i c e t o n o t e t h a t t o Parsons i d e o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s o f 
science are p a r t o f a l a r g e r t r e n d . The death o f 
p o s i t i v i s m has been accompanied by t h e demise o f i t s charac-
t e r i s t i c f a i t h i n s c i e n c e , 
"The r o l e o f reason and the s t a t u s o f s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge as an element o f a c t i o n have been 
a t t a c k e d a g a i n and a g a i n , T/e have been 
overwhelmed by a f l o o d o f a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c 
t h e o r i e s o f human n a t u r e and b e h a v i o u r , a g a i n 
o f many e m p i r i c a l v a r i e t i e s ' ( l 9 3 7 a s 5 j » 
Again, r e f e r r i n g t o ' , „ , a s t r o n g c u r r e n t o f pessimism i n 
the t h o u g h t o f s t u d e n t s o f t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , e s p e c i a l l y 
those who c a l l themselves s o c i o l o g i s t s ' Parsons speaks o f 
the f e e l i n g t h a t ' a l l i s a r b i t r a r y and s u b j e c t i v e 1 and t h i s 
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1 „ . „ encourages a dangerous i r r a t i c n a L i s m which l e t s go o f 
s c i e n t i f i c s t a n d a r d s a l t o g e t h e r ' Jl 937as 77^1 « The r e j e c t i o n 
o f a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l and i r r a t i o n a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s o f a c t i o n 
has f o r Parsons t h e l o g i c a l consequence o f r e j e c t i o n o f 
i d e o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s o f s c i e n c e . 
But t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t Parsons excludes the i n f l u e n c e 
o f f a c t o r s e x t e r n a l t o science a l t o g e t h e r . Here we must 
be more s p e c i f i c as t o what the t h e o r y i s about; s c i e n t i f i c 
'development'. Thus a t one p o i n t Parsons sayss 
'But t h e p r e s e n t t a s k i s n o t t o a r r i v e 
a t an account which i s complete, o n l y 
a t one i n v o l v i n g the l i m i t a t i o n s which 
have been s t a t e d . T h i s o t h e r would be 
a phase o f W i s s e n s s o z i o l o g i e and as 
such f a l l s o u t s i d e the scope o f t h i s 
s t u d y ' . j l 9 3 7 a : 2 7 l . 
The l i m i t a t i o n here i s t h a t Parsons' t h e o r y i s developed 
t o account f o r the emergence o f a new t h e o r e t i c a l system 
i n s o c i a l science, t h e v o l u n t a r i s t i c t h e o r y o f a c t i o n 
j j 9 3 7 a ; l C J . Two p o i n t s are o f n o t e h e r e . F i r s t l y , i t 
i s c l e a r t h a t t h e t h e o r y i s i n t e n d e d f o r g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n , 
i t i s n o t s p e c i f i c t o the emergence o f v o l u n t a r i s m . 
Secondly, t h e v o l u n t a r i s t i c t h e o r y i s n o t s i m p l y new b u t 
a l s o a p r o g r e s s i v e development o f i t s p r e d e c e s s o r s . Parsons 
says 'What h a s been t r a c e d i s n o t m e r e l y a movement o f t h o u g h t 
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o f m ajor p r o p o r t i o n s ; i t i s s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s ; i n d e e d , 
n o t a b l e s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s ' [ l937as775] » As a c o r o l l a r y -
t h e n Parsons i s q u i t e w i l l i n g t o admit t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l 
components are i m p o r t a n t t o a t h e o r y o f change i n sci e n c e 
i n g e n e r a l . For example he says t h a t 1 . « <> . d i s c u s s i o n o f 
p o l i c y i n the two c l o s e l y r e l a t e d f i e l d s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
t r a d e and o f monetary problems formed perhaps t i e c e n t r a l 
b r e e d i n g ground o f modern economics' (1936cs359)« More 
b r o a d l y , i n h i s b r i e f s k e t c h o f the h i s t o r i c a l emergence 
o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m [i937as51 -58] account i s t a k e n o f t h e 
p l a c e o f v a l u e s and i n t e r e s t s . Parsons n o t e s t h a t t h e 
atomism o f the t h e o r e t i c a l system has i t s r o o t s i n 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m and t h a t '.... t h e main burden o f t h i s 
i n d i v i d u a l i s m has been e t h i c a l r a t h e r t h a n scientific'„ 
{ J 9 3 7 a s 5 2 ] . On the o t h e r hand, ' I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t 
t h e immediate p r a c t i c a l animus o f Hobbes' s o c i a l t h o u g h t l a y 
i n the defense o f p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y on a s e c u l a r b a s i s ' . 
[l937as9 z<] (See a l s o 1935bs 428-9 ) . Ag a i n , Parsons 
r e f e r s t o P a r e t o ' s '... r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n c r e t e inadequacy 
o f economic t h e o r y w h i c h c e n t r e d above a l l around t h e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f two c o n c r e t e "economic" phenomena - t h e 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t movement and the s o c i a l i s t movement•„ (1 9 3 5 cs6 5 0 ) . 
But i n g e n e r a l Parsons i s n o t concerned w i t h such m a t t e r s 
because t h e y do n o t seem i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e v a n t t o h i s t a s k , 
t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f p r o g r e s s i n s c i e n c e . 
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From t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f Parsons* a t t i t u d e t o i d e o l o g i c a l 
t h e o r i e s o f science i t can be concluded t h a t f o r h i m p r o g r e s s 
i s g e n e r a t e d w i t h i n science itself„ More p o s i t i v e l y h i s 
p o s i t i o n i s t h a t p r o g r e s s must be accounted f o r 1..., by an 
"immanent" development w i t h i n the body o f s o c i a l t h e o r y and 
knowledge o f e m p i r i c a l f a c t i t s e l f ' „ [ l937as53 •> There a r e , 
t h e n , two major components o f the t h e o r y o f p r o g r e s s i n 
sc i e n c e . F i r s t l y the s i g n i f i c a n t c a u s a l f a c t o r i s * . o , , t h e 
mutual interdependence o f the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
systems w i t h o b s e r v a t i o n and v e r i f i c a t i o n o f f a c t " j j 9 3 7 a s 7 2 5 j . 
Secondly, p r o g r e s s i s e v o l u t i o n a r y , though t h e r e i s an element 
o f r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h I w i l l n o t e s h o r t l y ! t h e a s y m p t o t i c 
[ l 9 3 7 a s l 8 ] approach t o the g o a l o f adequate knowledge o f 
r e a l i t y j l 937as 75^ +1 v i a the immanent u n f o l d i n g o f science 
i t s e l f . Parsons' statement t h a t 'The t h e s i s o f t h i s s t u d y 
w i l l be t h a t t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c = u t i l i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n i s the 
v i c t i m o f the vengeance o f the j e a l o u s God, E v o l u t i o n , i n t h i s 
case the e v o l u t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y " j j 9 3 7 a ; 3 ] i s n o t t o 
be read as e n t i r e l y i r o n i c . I t i s , as w e l l , a r e f l e c t i o n o f 
h i s own approach. 
Before e l a b o r a t i n g these remarks i t i s as w e l l t o note 
the second a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n r e j e c t e d by Parsons, what he 
r e f e r s t o as t h e e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e . W h i l s t t h i s 
p o s i t i o n i s i n accord w i t h t h e s t r e s s on t h e immanent d e v e l o p -
ment o f science i t d i f f e r s from Parsons i n r e g a r d i n g t h e o r y as 
a dependent v a r i a b l e i n t h i s development. The p o s i t i o n i s 
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summarized ass 
'There i s , more o f t e n i m p l i c i t t h a n 
e x p l i c i t , a deep-rooted view t h a t the 
p r o g r e s s o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge c o n s i s t s 
e s s e n t i a l l y i n the c u m u l a t i v e p i l i n g up 
o f " d i s c o v e r i e s " o f " f a c t " . Knowledge 
i s h e l d t o be an e n t i r e l y q u a n t i t a t i v e 
a f f a i r . The one i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i s t o 
have observed what has n o t been observed 
b e f o r e . Theory, a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view, 
would c o n s i s t o n l y i n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n from 
known f a c t s , i n the sense o f what g e n e r a l 
s t a t e m e n t s t h e known body o f f a c t would 
j u s t i f y . Development o f t h e o r y would 
c o n s i s t e n t i r e l y i n t h e process o f 
m o d i f i c a t i o n o f these g e n e r a l statements 
t o t a k e account o f new d i s c o v e r i e s o f 
f a c t . Above a l l , t h e process o f d i s c o v e r y 
o f f a c t i s h e l d t o be e s s e n t i a l l y independent 
o f t h e e x i s t i n g body o f " t h e o r y " , t o be the 
r e s u l t o f some such impulse as " i d l e 
c u r i o s i t y " . ' [ l 9 3 7 a j 6 j . 
A g a i n s t t h i s , Parsons' s t r e s s i s on t h e o r y as a s i g n i f i c a n t 
f a c t o r , n o t independent b u t i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w i t h a body o f 
between t h e o r y and f a c t which accounts f o r t h e p r o g r e s s i v e 
development o f s c i e n c e . 
I a s 6 7 
f a c t u a l knowledge. I t i s e s s e n t i a l l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
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To c o n t i n u e t h i s account o f Parsons' p o s i t i o n two 
q u e s t i o n s can be posed; what i s 'progress' and how does 
such p r o g r e s s come about? I n each case the s i g n i f i c a n t 
p o i n t i s the r o l e o f t h e o r y and f a c t o To Parsons, p r o g r e s s 
i n science i s s i m p l y more and b e t t e r e m p i r i c a l knowledge. 
•One o f i t s [ s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s ' s j main 
aspects i s a c l e a r e ^ sounder u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
a broad range o f the f a c t s o f human a c t i o n . 
The whole t h e o r e t i c a l work here r e v i e w e d i s 
o r i e n t e d t o and j u s t i f i e d by t h i s achievement' 
[i 937a: 775] . 
As t h i s i n d i c a t e s , p r o g r e s s i n terms o f e m p i r i c a l knowledge 
depends upon the p l a c e o f t h e o r y . The key word i n the above 
i s t he ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' o f f a c t . Theory f a c i l i t a t e s t h i s 
by a c t i n g as an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l framework f o r f a c t u a l knowledge. 
The r o l e o f t h e o r y i n t h i s sense i s summarized when Parsons 
remarks; 
'At the same t i m e the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e 
c o n c e p t u a l scheme i t s e l f i n e v i t a b l y 
focuses i n t e r e s t on a l i m i t i n g range o f 
such e m p i r i c a l f a c t s . These may be 
t h o u g h t o f as a " s p o t " i n t h e v a s t 
e n c i r c l i n g darkness, b r i g h t l y i l l u m i n a t e d 
as by a s e a r c h l i g h t . The p o i n t i s , what 
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l i e s o u t s i d e t h e s p o t i s n o t r e a l l y 
" s e e n " u n t i l t h e s e a r c h l i g h t moves, 
and t h e n o n l y w h a t l i e s w i t h i n t h e 
a r e a i n t o w h i c h i t s beam i s n e w l y c a s t . 
Even t h o u g h any number o f f a c t s may 
be "knoxvn" o u t s i d e t h i s c e n t r e , t h e y 
a r e n o t s c i e n t i f i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t u n t i l 
t h e y c a n be b r o u g h t i n t o r e l a t i o n w i t h 
a t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m ' , ( l 9 3 7 a s l 6 ) . 
Here e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e w i t h o u t t h e o r y i s p i c t u r e d as a 
" v a s t e n c i r c l i n g d a r k n e s s ' , a mass o f ad hoc and u n r e l a t e d 
f a c t s , P a r s o n s i s f o n d o f m e t a p h o r s i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n s 
' S c i e n c e , i f i t f a i l e d to map o u t i t s c o u r s e , t h r o u g h t h e o r y ^ 
w o u l d be as l o s t i n t h e u n c h a r t e d sea o f " f a c t " as a s h i p 
w i t h o u t a n a v i g a t o r ' . ( 1 9 3 2 S 3 ^ 7 ) » The t a s k o f t h e o r y i s t o 
o r g a n i z e t h e mass o f f a c t s i n a c o h e r e n t way. B u t as s u c h 
t h e o r y i s s e l e c t i v e , i t i s l i k e a s p o t l i g h t i l l u m i n a t i n g 
o n l y p a r t o f w h a t i s known. As such t h e o r y p l a y s a s e c o n d 
r o l e , as a c r i t e r i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c i m p o r t a n c e . O n l y when 
any g i v e n f a c t c a n be p l a c e d on t h e map, ' b r o u g h t i n t o 
r e l a t i o n w i t h a t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m ' c a n i t s s c i e n t i f i c 
i m p o r t a n c e be j u d g e d , t h a t i s , w h e t h e r i t h a s c o n s e q u e n c e s 
f o r t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e t h e o r y as a w h o l e [ l937as7 j f <> B u t 
a l t h o u g h t h e o r y i s n e c e s s a r y f o r e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e i t i s 
t h a t e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e w h i c h i s t h e f i n a l c r i t e r i o n o f 
s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s . 
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T h i s i s a g a i n t h e case i f an o b v i o u s i m p l i c i a t i o n o f 
t h e above p a r a g r a p h i s t a k e n up; t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f change 
i n t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m s . M a t t e r s o f f a c t c a n be o r g a n i z e d 
and t h e i r i m p o r t a n c e e v a l u a t e d b y r e f e r e n c e t o d i f f e r e n t 
s y s t e m s o f t h e o r y . I n d e e d t h i s i s l a r g e l y w h a t The S t r u c t u r e 
o f S o c i a l A c t i o n i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h , t h e change f r o m p o s i t i -
v i s t i c and i d e a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s t o a v o l u n t a r i s t i c t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m . Now t h i s seems t o have two a l t e r n a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s 0 
The f i r s t i s t h a t e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e i s r e l a t i v e t o t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k . T h i s P a r s o n s i s w i l l i n g t o 
a d m i t up t o a p o i n t . What he i s n o t w i l l i n g t o a d m i t i s 
t h a t s u c h f r a m e w o r k s a r e e q u a l i n s c i e n t i f i c v a l u e and v a l i d i t y . 
T h i s l e a v e s t h e second a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a t some t h e o r e t i c a l 
f r a m e w o r k s a r e b e t t e r t h a n o t h e r s . I f t h i s i s t h e case t h e n 
i s n o t p r o g r e s s i n s c i e n c e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s 
o f t h e o r y ? The answer t o t h i s i s y e s b u t o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e 
q u a l i t y o f t h e t h e o r y i s e v a l u a t e d i n t e r m s o f i t s f u n c t i o n s 
f o r e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . T h i s i s e x e m p l i f i e d b y t h e c o n c e p t 
o f ' p e r m a n e n t l y v a l i d p r e c i p i t a t e ' . When a t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m d e c l i n e s t o be r e p l a c e d b y a d i f f e r e n t one t h e ' o l d ' 
e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e i s n o t t h e r e b y l o s t , r a t h e r i t f o r m s a 
p e r m a n e n t l y v a l i d p r e c i p i t a t e o f t h e f o r m e r t h e o r e t i c a l ' 
s y s t e m . 
'The o r i g i n a l e m p i r i c a l i n s i g h t s a s s o c i a t e d 
w i t h t h e p o s i t i v e c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e o r i g i n a l 
s y s t e m w i l l be r e s t a t e d i n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s , 
b u t u n l e s s t h e y e n t i r e l y f a i l t o s t a n d up t o 
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t h e c o m b i n e d c r i t i c i s m o f t h e o r y and 
renevred e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n , t h e y 
w i l l n o t be e l i m i n a t e d . I n d e e d , as h a s 
be e n n o t e d a bove, t h i s i s u n l i k e l y t o 
happen,, T h i s f a c t i s t h e e s s e n t i a l 
b a s i s f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t a l k o f 
t h e " p r o g r e s s " o f science„ T h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m s c h a n g e , T h e r e i s n o t m e r e l y a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f " k n o w l e d g e " 
o f f a c t " b u t a q u a l i t a t i v e change i n t h e 
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m s , B u t 
i n so f a r as v e r i f i c a t i o n h a s b e e n v a l i d 
and s o u n d , t h i s change l e a v e s b e h i n d i t a 
p e r m a n e n t p r e c i p i t a t e o f v a l i d e m p i r i c a l 
k n o w l e d g e . The f o r m o f s t a t e m e n t w i l l 
change b u t t h e s u b s t a n c e w i l l r e m a i n . 
The o l d e r s t a t e m e n t w i l l g e n e r a l l y t a k e 
t h e f o r m o f a " s p e c i a l c a s e " o f t h e n e w 1 , 
[1 9 3 7 a ; 1 9 ] . 
it 
As P a r s o n s s a y s h e r e t h e p e r m a n e n t p r e c i q f a t e o f v a l i d 
e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e i s t h e b a s i s o f t h e p r o g r e s s o f s c i e n c e . 
Thus when he says t h a t 1 Spencer i s dead' he adds t h e f o o t n o t e ; 
•Not o f c o u r s e , t h a t n o t h i n g i n h i s t h o u g h t w i l l l a s t . I t i s 
h i s s o c i a l t h e o r y as a t o t a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t i s d e a d 1 , [ 1937a ; 
3~J, To P a r s o n s w h a t w i l l l a s t i n u t i l i t a r i a n t h o u g h t i s i t s 
e m p i r i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c t i o n . 
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•The u t i l i t a r i a n b r a n c h o f p o s i t i v i s t i c 
t h o u g h t h a s , b y v i r t u e o f t h e s t r u c t u r e 
o f i t s t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m , b e e n f o c u s s e d 
u p o n a g i v e n r a n g e o f d e f i n i t e e m p i r i c a l 
i n s i g h t s and r e l a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s 0 
The c e n t r a l f a c t - a f a c t b e y o n d a l l 
q u e s t i o n - i s t h a t i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s 
and t o c e r t a i n d e g r e e s , u n d e r c e r t a i n 
c o n d i t i o n s , human a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l ' , 
[ 1 9 3 7 a : 19] . 
T h i s i s w h a t i s l e f t a f t e r t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m and i n t h e l o n g r u n t h i s was w h a t was s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
i m p o r t a n t a b o u t t h a t s y s t e m . 
I t i s t h i s c o n c e p t o f p e r m a n e n t l y v a l i d k n o w l e d g e w h i c h 
p r o v i d e s t h e c o n t i n u i t y n e c e s s a r y t o P a r s o n s 9 e v o l u t i o n a r y 
t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e and p r e v e n t s t h e i d e a o f change i n t h e o r e -
t i c a l s y s t e m s d e g e n e r a t i n g i n t o r e l a t i v i s m [l 937as 6 0 0 - 0 V] 0 
B u t t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s p r o g r e s s i n s c i e n c e 
seems t o go a g a i n s t t h e m a i n theme o f t h i s a r g u m e n t , t h a t 
s c i e n c e i s p e c u l i a r i n t h a t i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l e m p i r i c a l 
k n o w l e d g e . C e r t a i n l y t h e above r e m a r k s c o n f i r m t h a t 
s c i e n t i f i c k n o w l e d g e must be t h e o r e t i c a l b u t f r o m t h e p o i n t 
o f v i e w o f s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f 
k n o w l e d g e i s a means t o an end, t h e c r i t e r i o n o f p r o g r e s s i s 
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k n o w l e d g e o f f a c t o T h i s i s r e a d i l y admitted„ However a 
d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e emerges when we t u r n t o P a r s o n s ' a c c o u n t 
o f how s u c h p r o g r e s s comes about„ Here t h e o r y i n s c i e n c e 
p l a y s t h e c r u c i a l r o l e . 
The t h e o r y , i t w i l l be remembered, c e n t r e s o n t h e 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e o r y and f a c t o B u t i n P a r s o n s ' a c c o u n t 
o f how s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s i s made f a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e and i t s 
d i s c o v e r y p l a y a r a t h e r m i n o r r o l e 0 T h i s c a n p e r h a p s b e s t 
be d e s c r i b e d as a c a t a l y s t f u n c t i o n . I n The S t r u c t u r e o f 
S o c i a l A c t i o n P a r s o n s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e change i n s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e s ummarized as t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f v o l u n t a r i s m s o u t o f 
p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m . He g i v e s t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t o f 
i n t e n t as h i s 'canon o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' ( I 9 3 7 a s l 6 ] o f e m p i r i c a l 
w o r k , 
' I n s t u d y i n g a man's e m p i r i c a l w o r k t h e 
q u e s t i o n s a s k e d w i l l n o t m e r e l y b e , w h a t 
o p i n i o n s d i d he h o l d a b o u t c e r t a i n c o n c r e t e 
phenomena, n o r ev e n , w h a t has he i n g e n e r a l 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o o u r " k n o w l e d g e " o f t h e s e 
phenomena? The p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n s w i l l , 
r a t h e r , b e , w h a t t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n s d i d he 
have f o r b e i n g i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r 
p r o b l e m s r a t h e r t h a n o t h e r s , and w h a t d i d 
t h e r e s u l t s o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e 
t o t h e s o l u t i o n o f h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s ? 
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Then, i n t u r n , w h a t d i d t h e i n s i g h t s 
g a i n e d f r o m t h e s e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e r e s t a t e m e n t o f 
h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p r o b l e m s and t h r o u g h 
t h i s t o t h e r e v i s i o n o f h i s t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m ? ' [ l 9 3 7 a : 1 6 - 1 7] . 
P a r s o n s ' s t r a t e g y t h e n i s t o ask w h a t a r e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
f a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e f o r t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m s . As he says h i m s e l f 
h i s a p p r o a c h t o D u r k h e i m i s t h e b e s t e x a m p l e . D u r k h e i m ' s 
' e a r l y e m p i r i c a l w o r k ' [ l 9 3 7 a : C h a p t e r 8] i s i n t e r p r e t e d as 
c r e a t i n g p r o b l e m s f o r h i s i n i t i a l p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r e t i c a l 
f r a m e w o r k , [ c h a p t e r 9 ] <> T h i s t h e n i s t h e r o l e o f f a c t i n 
t h e t h e o r y - f a c t e q u a t i o n . P r o g r e s s does not r e s u l t f r o m t h i s 
d i s c o v e r i n g o f f a c t , r a t h e r , s u c h d i s c o v e r y t h r o w s up p r o b l e m s 
f o r t h e o r y and i t i s v i a t h e o r e t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t p r o g r e s s 
comes a b o u t . My d i s c u s s i o n w i l l now t u r n t o t h e p r o c e s s b y 
w h i c h t h i s o c c u r s . 
F a c t s as c a t a l y s t s o f change t e n d t o be t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f wha t P a r s o n s c a l l s ' r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s ' . 
T hese a r e b l a n k e t t e r m s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e i r n e g a t i v e q u a l i t y . 
' I f , as i s a l m o s t a l w a y s t h e c a s e , n o t a l l 
o f t h e a c t u a l l y o b s e r v a b l e f a c t s i n t h e f i e l d , 
o r t h o s e w h i c h have b e e n o b s e r v e d , f i t i n t o 
t h e s h a r p l y d e f i n e d c a t e g o r i e s , t h e y t e n d t o 
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be g i v e n one o r more b l a n k e t names 
w h i c h r e f e r t o c a t e g o r i e s n e g a t i v e l y 
d e f i n e d , t h a t i s , o f f a c t s knoxm t o 
e x i s t , w h i c h a r e e v e n more o r l e s s 
a d e q u a t e l y d e s c r i b e d , b u t a r e 
d e f i n e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y b y t h e i r f a i l u r e 
t o f i t i n t o t h e p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d 
c a t e g o r i e s o f the s y s t e m . The o n l y 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t s t a t e m e n t s t h a t 
can be made a b o u t t h e s e f a c t s a r e n e g a t i v e 
s t a t e m e n t s - t h e y a r e n o t so and s o ' , 
[ l 9 3 7 a : 17-18) . 
The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n i s l i t t e r e d w i t h s u c h r e s i d u a l 
c a t e g o r i e s ! P a r e t o ' s ' n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n ' , Weber's ' i d e a l = 
t y p e s ' , R i c a r d o ' s ' t h e h a b i t s and c u s t o m s o f t h e p e o p l e ' and 
D u r k h e i m ' s s o c i e t y a r e e x a m p l e s . E m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
e v e n t u a l l y p r o m o t e s s c r u t i n y o f s u c h c o n c e p t s , t h i s i s t h e 
f i r s t s t e p i n s c i e n t i f i c c h a nge. 
' I t f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e s u r e s t 
symptom o f i m p e n d i n g change i n a t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m i s i n c r e a s i n g g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t i n s u c h 
r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s ' ^ 1 9 3 7 a j l 8 j . 
What does s u c h s c r u t i n y c o n s i s t o f ? I t w i l l be remembered 
t h a t t h e r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y i s a b l a n k e t t e r m . I n t h e f i r s t 
p l a c e t h i s means t h a t t h e c o n c e p t c o n t a i n s a v a r i e t y o f e x t r a -
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s c i e n t i f i c m e t a p h y s i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . 
P a r s o n s c l a i m s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t u t i l i t a r i a n i s m as a 
t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m c o u l d o n l y a v o i d i t s i n h e r e n t i n s t a b i l i -
t i e s , w h i c h w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e 
m e t a p h y s i c a l d e v i c e o f t h e ' n a t u r a l i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r e s t s ' 
[ l 9 3 7 a : 9 7 l « T h i s c o n s t i t u t e d an i m p l i c i t taut c r u c i a l 
a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h remained, u n a n l y z e d w i t h i n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m . 
I n d e e d when i t comes t o be a n a l y z e d i t p r o v e s i n c o m p a t i b l e 
w i t h o t h e r c o n s t i t u e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , 
n a m e l y i t s a t o m i s m and p o s t u l a t i o n o f t h e randomness o f ends . 
As a r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y t h e n a t u r a l i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r e s t s 
was a m e t a p h y s i c a l hope w h i c h when s c r u t i n i z e d p r o v e d 
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d c o n c e p t u a l components 
o f t h e t h e o r y . 
As a s e c o n d example o f t h e s c r u t i n y o f r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s 
we c a n r e f e r t o P a r s o n s ' a p p r o a c h t o M a r s h a l l . T h i s b e g i n s 
w i t h a s c h e m a t i c o u t l i n e o f M a r s h a l l ' s t h e o r y o f a c t i v i t y 
[l 9 3 7 a ; 1 3 0 - 1 3 3 ] « I t i s t h i s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e p o s i t i v e l y 
d e f i n e d c o n c e p t u a l schema o f M a r s h a l l ' s e c o n o m i c s . However 
i t i s n e i t h e r t h i s a s p e c t o f M a r s h a l l t h a t P a r s o n s i s c o n c e r n e d 
w i t h n o r , i n h i s v i e w , t h e w h o l e o f h i s g e n e r a l t h e o r y . 
' C l o s e l y i n t e r w o v e n ' (l 9 3 7 a : 133 ] w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f u t i l i t y 
i s a n o t h e r a s p e c t , w h i c h c a n be r e g a r d e d as a s e r i e s o f 
r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s , w h i c h i s o f s i g n i f i c a n c e t o P a r s o n s . I t 
i s t h i s , w h a t P a r s o n s r e f e r s t o as t h e t h e o r y o f a c t i v i t i e s , 
w h i c h i s t o be ' d i s s e c t ( e d ) o u t ' i n h i s a n a l y s i s . What i s a t 
i s s u e h e r e i s q u i t e w h a t i s d i s s e c t e d o u t i n P a r s o n s ' s c r u t i n y 
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o f t h e r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s o f M a r s h a l l ' s t h o u g h t . 
I n P a r s o n s ' a c c o u n t w h a t i s d r a w n o u t o f M a r s h a l l ' s 
w o r k i s an i m p l i c i t s o c i o l o g y i n t h e sense t h a t above and 
b e y o n d t h e economic e l e m e n t e m b o d i e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f u t i l i t y 
he d i s c o v e r s a v a l u e f a c t o r . 
' I t becomes e v i d e n t , t h e n , t h a t t h e r e a l 
b a s i s o f M a r s h a l l ' s d i s c o n t e n t w i t h p u r e 
u t i l i t y t h e o r y i s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a 
c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e o t h e r 
f a c t o r s i n t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c r e p e r t o i r e . 
The f a c t i s t h a t h i s " a c t i v i t i e s " have no 
p l a c e t h e r e a t a l l . They c o n s t i t u t e r a t h e r 
a " v a l u e " f a c t o r ' [ l 9 3 7 a s l 6 f ] . 
I n o t h e r w o r d s P a r s o n s c l a i m s t h a t i m p l i c i t l y M a r s h a l l i s 
s a y i n g t h a t t o e x p l a i n c o n c r e t e economic a c t i v i t i e s we h a v e t o 
make r e f e r e n c e t o economic and s o c i o l o g i c a l v a r i a b l e s . T h i s 
i s i m p l i c i t p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t i s 
c o n t a i n e d i n r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s . 
We w i l l come t o t h e e x p l i c i t and p o s i t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f 
s u c h c a t e g o r i e s i n a moment. A t p r e s e n t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o 
n o t e t h a t a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n be p u t on P a r s o n s ' a n a l y s i s 
o f M a r s h a l l w h i c h i s n o t m a n i f e s t i n t h a t a n a l y s i s y e t c a n be 
p l a u s i b l y a r g u e d t o be p a r t o f t h e s c r u t i n y o f r e s i d u a l c a t e -
g o r i e s . What P a r s o n s d i s s e c t s o u t o f M a r s h a l l i s n o t an 
i m p l i c i t t h e o r y o f t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f v a l u e s t o a c t i o n b u t t h e 
i m p l i c i t v a l u e s i n M a r s h a l l ' s t h o u g h t . 
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As P i n n e y ( 1 9 ^ 0 : 1 7 7 ) p u t s i t : "The c h i e f i t e m o f i m p o r t a n c e 
i s t h a t P r o f e s s o r P a r s o n s r a i s e s M a r s h a l l ' s m o r a l i s i n g 
p r o n o u n c e m e n t s on " a c t i v i t i e s " as a mode o f e x p r e s s i n g 
q u a l i t i e s o f c h a r a c t e r w h i c h he v a l u e d on e t h i c a l g r o u n d s t o 
t h e l e v e l o f an embryo n o r m a t i v e s y s t e m i n a t h e o r y o f a c t i o n ' . 
A t one p o i n t P a r s o n s r e f e r s t o '... M a r s h a l l , t h e s t r o n g l y , 
m o r a l i s t i c m i d d l e - c l a s s E n g l i s h m a n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 1 3 j « I t i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e v a l u e s o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y E n g l i s h m i d d l e c l a s s w h i c h P a r s o n s r e g a r d s as t h e 
' v a l u e * f a c t o r i n M a r s h a l l ' s t h o u g h t . As he says M a r s h a l l 
h a d a ' d e e p - r o o t e d b e l i e f i n t h e e t h i c s o f a c a p i t a l i s t 
economy ( 1 9 3 2 : 3 2 0 ) s u m m a r i z i n g t h i s as f o l l o w s : 
'A d i f f e r e n t phase o f M a r s h a l l ' s i n t e r e s t 
i n c h a r a c t e r i s o f p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t h e r e ; h i s 
b e l i e f t h a t c e r t a i n t y p e s o f e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t i e s , 
p u r s u e d n o t f o r u l t e r i o r m o t i v e s b u t m a i n l y 
as ends i n t h e m s e l v e s , a r e t h e p r i n c i p a l 
a g e n t s i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e n o b l e s t q u a l i t i e s 
o f human c h a r a c t e r and t h e m a i n f i e l d s o f t h e i r 
e x p r e s s i o n . 
The c o n c r e t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f wh a t t y p e s o f 
a c t i v i t i e s and c h a r a c t e r he h a d i n m i n d i s 
t o be f o u n d p r i n c i p a l l y i n h i s p i c t u r e o f 
" f r e e i n d u s t r y and e n t e r p r i s e " , w i t h w h i c h 
t h e y a r e i n t i m a t e l y a s s o c i a t e d . T h e y 
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c o n s i s t i n two s e t s o f v i r t u e s ; on t h e 
one h a n d , e n e r g y , i n i t i a t i v e , e n t e r p r i s e ; 
on t h e o t h e r , r a t i o n a l i t y , f r u g a l i t y , 
i n d u s t r y , h o n o u r a b l e d e a l i n g . W i t h 
them a r e c o n t r a s t e d , on t h e one s i d e , 
s l u g g i s h n e s s , i d l e s t a g n a t i o n , s l a v e r y 
t o c u s t o m , l a c k o f a m b i t i o n ; on t h e o t h e r , 
l u x u r y , o s t e n t a t i o n , w a s t e , u n r e l i a b i l i t y ' , 
[ I 9 3 7 a s 135] . 
J u s t a b o u t t h e w h o l e o f c h a p t e r f o u r o f The S t r u c t u r e o f 
S o c i a l A c t i o n c a n be r e a d as a m a s t e r l y d r a w i n g o u t o f t h e 
v a l u e - p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f M a r s h a l l ' s e c o n o m i c s . B u t as h a s 
b e e n s a i d t h i s i s n o t how P a r s o n s ' d e f i n e s h i s t a s k . T h i s 
i s s i g n i f i c a n t n o t i n t h e sense t h a t t h e two r e a d i n g s o f w h a t 
i s g o i n g on a r e m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e b u t i n t h a t P a r s o n s ' t r e a t -
ment o f M a r s h a l l i s i l l u s t r a t i v e o f w h a t i s i n v o l v e d i n t h e 
t h e o r e t i c a l c r i t i c i s m o f r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s . I f i t be 
g r a n t e d t h a t s u c h c a t e g o r i e s c o n t a i n m e t a p h y s i c a l , and v a l u e 
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h e t a s k i s n o t m e r e l y t h e e x p o s u r e o f t h e s e . 
I n d e e d t h i s i s u n i m p o r t a n t . R a t h e r t h e t a s k i s t o t r a n s l a t e 
s u c h e x t r a - s c i e n t i f i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t o p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d 
s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s . 
' I n d e e d , one k i n d o f p r o g r e s s o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
w o r k c o n s i s t s p r e c i s e l y i n t h e c a r v i n g o u t 
f r o m r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s o f d e f i n i t e p o s i t i v e l y 
d e f i n e d c o n c e p t s and t h e i r v e r i f i c a t i o n i n 
e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The o b v i o u s l y 
u n a t t a i n a b l e b u t a s y m p t o t i c a l l y a p p r o a c h e d 
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g o a l o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s c i e n t i f i c 
t h e o r y i s , t h e n , t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f 
a l l r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s f r o m s c i e n c e i n 
f a v o u r o f p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d , e m p i r i c a l l y 
v e r i f i a b l e c o n c e p t s ' [ i 937a; 19-3. 
What P a r s o n s f a i l s t o make c l e a r , a l t h o u g h i t i s e x e m p l i f i e d 
i n h i s s c r u t i n y o f r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s , i s t h a t t h e e l i m i n a t i o n 
o f s u c h c a t e g o r i e s i n v o l v e s t h e a t t e m p t e d e l i m i n a t i o n o f 
m e t a p h y s i c a l and v a l u e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and t h e i r r e p l a c e m e n t 
b y p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d t h e o r y . ^ T h i s , t h e n , i s an i m p o r t a n t 
sense i n w h i c h s c i e n c e i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e o r e t i c a l 
k n o w l e d g e . The c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e o r y t o t h e p r o g r e s s i v e 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f s c i e n c e i s i t s r e p l a c e m e n t o f m e t a p h y s i c s and 
v a l u e s b y s p e c i f i c a l l y s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s . 
¥hat h a s b e e n s a i d up t o now r e l a t e s t o t h e d i r e c t i o n 
o f s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s , a f u r t h e r component of P a r s o n s ' 
p o s i t i o n i s t h e mechanism b y w h i c h t h i s p r o c e s s comes 
a b o u t . I t i s h e r e t h a t t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p e c t o f P a r s o n s ' 
t h e o r y p l a y s i t s p a r t . The d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e o r y i s n o t a 
m a t t e r o f t h e g r a d u a l a c c u m u l a t i o n o f p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d 
c a t e g o r i e s . I t i s , as has b e e n n o t e d a b ove, a p r o c e s s 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y more o r l e s s d r a m a t i c s h i f t s f r o m one ( o r 
more) t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m ( s ) t o a n o t h e r / ' The m e c h a n i c s 
o f s u c h d r a m a t i c s h i f t s c an be su m m a r i s e d as i ) o v e r -
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , i i ) i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n and i i i ) 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 
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As we s h a l l see i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f e m p i r i c i s m 
b e l o w t h e o v e r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r i e s i s 
an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f P a r s o n s ' c r i t i q u e o f p o s i t i v i s m . 
T h a t i s , t h e f i r s t s t e p i n t h e b r e a k d o w n o f a t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m i s when i t o v e r r e a c h e s i t s c a p a c i t i e s , ' T h i s 
i s b r o u g h t o u t w e l l i n a summary s t a t e m e n t o f P a r s o n s ' 
p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s p o s i t i v i s m s 
' T h i s must n o t , h o w e v e r , t o be t a k e n t o 
mean t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s w h i c h h ave b e e n 
d e v e l o p e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s e 
t h e o r i e s a r e s i m p l y w r o n g and hence o f 
no u s e f o r p r e s e n t o r f u t u r e s o c i a l s c i e n c e . 
On t h e c o n t r a r y , i n g e n e r a l e a c h o f t h e 
m a i n c a t e g o r i e s d e v e l o p e d h as f o u n d , 
s u b j e c t , o f c o u r s e , t o q u a l i f i c a t i o n and 
r e f i n e m e n t , a p e r m a n e n t p l a c e i n t h e a t t a c k 
on t h e p r o b l e m s o f human b e h a v i o u r . 
C r i t i c i s m i s h e r e d i r e c t e d n o t a g a i n s t 
t h e i r a d e q u a c y f o r p r o p e r l y d e f i n e d and 
r e s t r i c t e d p u r p o s e s , b u t a g a i n s t t h e i r c l a i m 
t o f o r m t h e b a s i s f o r a d e q u a t e g e n e r a l 
t h e o r i e s o f s o c i e t y . I t w o u l d be a 
s e r i o u s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o suppose t h a t , 
b e c a u s e p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l t h e o r i e s a r e h e r e 
s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d f o r some t h e o r e t i c a l 
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p u r p o s e s , i t i s t h e r e f o r e h e l d t h a t t h e 
c o n c e p t s e m p l o y e d i n them a r e i n v a l i d 
f o r a ny and a l l p u r p o s e s . The a t t e m p t , 
r a t h e r , w i l l be made t o d e v e l o p t h e 
o u t l i n e o f a g e n e r a l c o n c e p t u a l scheme 
i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t s 
o f v a l i d i t y i n them may f i n d a l e g i t i m a t e 
p l a c e and t h u s a v o i d t h e d a n g e r s o f b e i n g 
l o s t i n t h e g e n e r a l c r i t i c a l a t t a c k o n t h e 
e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s o f t h e i r u se i n a 
p o s i t i v i s t i c c o n t e x t 1 . [ l 9 3 7 a ; 1 2 5 3 « 
Here t h e n i s t h e p e r m a n e n t l y v a l i d p r e c i p i t a t e a r g u m e n t 
n o t e d above t h o u g h s i g n i f i c a n t h e r e i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t . 
P o s i t i v i s m as a g e n e r a l s y s t e m o f t h e o r y b r e a k s down 
i n i t i a l l y b e c a u s e i t o v e r g e n e r a l i z e d o u t o f t h e a r e a s i n 
w h i c h i t was v a l i d . 
T h i s l e a d s t o t h e second a s p e c t o f t h e p r o c e s s , as a 
t h e o r y i s o v e r g e n e r a l i z e d so i t d e v e l o p s i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c -
t i o n s . The c l e a r e s t example o f t h i s i s P a r s o n s ' d i s c u s s i o n 
o f t h e u t i l i t a r i a n v a r i a n t o f p o s i t i v i s m , j l 937as 62-69I . 
T h i s i s d e s c r i b e d as •... a c o n v e n i e n t s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s w h i c h a r e open w i t h i n 
t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e \ t f i d e r s y s t e m i . e . p o s i t i v i s m '„ 
j j 9 3 7 a s 6 2 3 „ P a r s o n s ' p r o c e d u r e i s t o t a k e two component 
e l e m e n t s o f t h e u t i l i t a r i a n t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m , ( t h e 
randomness o f ends and t h e norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y ) and t o dra w 
o u t t h e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y b e t w e e n t h e s e and t h e g e n e r a l 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f p o s i t i v i s m . However t h e c r u x o f 
t h e m a t t e r , t h e " u t i l i t a r i a n d i l e m m a " comes when, on 
p o s i t i v i s t i c g r o u n d s t h e s e i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s a r e 
r e s o l v e d . F o r i n P a r s o n s 8 a n a l y s i s when t h i s i s done 
an u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e o c c u r s , p o s i t i v i s m , i n w h a t 
a r e c a l l e d i t s r a d i c a l v a r i a n t s c e a s e s t o be a t h e o r y o f 
(9) 
a c t i o n a t a l l , ' The r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s t e x p l a i n s a c t i o n 
i n t e r m s o f i t s n o n - s u b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s , a s h i f t h a s 
b e e n made f r o m an a c t i o n t h e o r y t o a b i o - p h y s i c a l t h e o r y , 
jj937as68) , The o v e r e x t e n s i o n o f p o s i t i v i s m i n t o u t i l i -
t a r i a n i s m t h e n s e t s up c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w h i c h c a n n o t be 
s o l v e d w i t h i n p o s i t i v i s m w i t h o u t c r e a t i n g e v e n more s e v e r e 
p r o b l e m s , 
When t h e p r o c e s s e s o f ov e r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and 
c o n s e q u e n t i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n become a c u t e t h e r e o c c u r s 
t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems,, T h i s i s n o t 
a random p r o c e s s b u t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
o f t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m s . On t h e one h a n d t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f a 
p r e v i o u s l y o v e r g e n e r a l i z e d t h e o r y became r e c o g n i z e d , o n t h e 
o t h e r hand new c o n c e p t u a l components a r e d e v e l o p e d o u t o f 
r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s . F i n a l l y t h e o l d and t h e new a r e 
r e g r o u p e d t o f o r m a new g e n e r a l s y s t e m m a r k e d b y a g r e a t e r 
d e g r e e o f i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n t h a n t h e o l d . T h i s 
c a n be seen i f we j u x t a p o s e P a r s o n s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e 
d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r i n s c i e n c e a g a i n s t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f 
p o s i t i v i s m , i d e a l i s m and voluntarism„ He c l a i m s t h a t 
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5 . . . i t i s p o s s i b l e t o see e m e r g i n g o u t o f t h i s s t u d y as 
a w h o l e a d i v i s i o n i n t o t h r e e g r e a t c l a s s e s o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m s ' jjl 937 as 762] . These a r e c a l l e d t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m s o f n a t u r e , a c t i o n and c u l t u r e . I t c a n be s u g g e s t e d 
t h a t t h i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e i n 
t h e p o s t - p o s i t i v i s t / i d e a l i s t age. P o s i t i v i s m emerged as a 
s y s t e m o f t h e o r y i n t h e s t u d y o f n a t u r e b u t q u i c k l y o v e r -
g e n e r a l i z e d i t s c o n c e p t s i n t o t h e s t u d y o f a c t i o n . As a 
r e a c t i o n t o t h i s i d e a l i s m f a l l s f o u l o f t h e same e r r o r , 
o r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e s t u d y o f t h e m e a n i n g f u l c o n t e n t o f c u l t u r a l 
o b j e c t s t h e c o n c e p t s d e v e l o p e d t h e r e \irere g e n e r a l i z e d t o a c t i o n . 
When t h e p r o b l e m s w h i c h stem f r o m t h i s o v e r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n 
become a c u t e t h e p r o c e s s o f r e c o n s t r u c t i o n v i a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
s e t s i n . I t i s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t b o t h p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m 
as t h e o r i e s o f a c t i o n l e a v e p e r m a n e n t l y v a l i d p r e c i p i t a t e s 
b u t t h e i r p r o p e r f i e l d s a r e n a t u r e and c u l t u r e , T h e 
gap i s f i l l e d b y t h e i n d e p e n d e n t t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m o f a c t i o n . 
Out o f t h e r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s o f p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m a r e 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a new s e r i e s o f c o n c e p t s . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
e v i d e n t i n t h e s e c t i o n o f c h a p t e r e i g h t e e n o f The S t r u c t u r e 
o f S o c i a l A c t i o n e n t i t l e d 'Summary O u t l i n e o f t h e S t r u c t u r e 
o f A c t i o n ' . H e r e t h e v a r i o u s w r i t e r s c o v e r e d i n t h e b o o k 
a r e e a c h r e p r e s e n t e d i n t e r m s o f w h a t e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n t h e y 
' d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o u t ' f r o m t h e b l a n k e t t e r m s o f p o s i t i v i s m 
and i d e a l i s m , n o t a b l y ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' and ' v a l u e s ' . The 
f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s w e l l . 
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' I t s h o u l d be emphasised t h a t i n t h e 
r e s p e c t s r e l e v a n t t o t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t 
t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i m p o r t a n t i n the t h e o r i e s 
o f P a r e t o which i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h those 
o f Durkheim, and v i c e v e r s a . T h e i r 
d i f f e r e n c e s are complementary, l y i n g 
i n t h e d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s a t whic h t h e y 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d t h e elements o f t h e s t r u c t u r e 
o f action,, P areto b r o u g h t out, as 
Durkheim d i d a c t , the i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n - J <\ 
t i a t i o n o f the i n t e r m e d i a t e i n t r i n s i c 
s e c t o r and the u l t i m a t e - v a l u e element so 
f a r as i t i s n o t i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a common 
system, Durlcheim, on t h e o t h e r hand, 
b r o u g h t i n t o c l e a r r e l i e f t h e r o l e o f 
th e i n s t i t u t i o n a l element i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the i n t r i n s i c means-end c h a i n and c a r r i e d 
out a much f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e 
s t r u c t u r e and modes o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f 
the u l t i m a t e - v a l u e system, w h i c h f o r 
Pareto had remained r e s i d u a l 1 , (1937a-S 
Again t h e n we have the p i c t u r e o f t h e o r y p l a y i n g a c r u c i a l 
r o l e i n the p r o g r e s s i v e development o f sc i e n c e and with, t h i s 
p rocess an i n c r e a s i n g l y t h e o r e t i c a l sciences the w o r l d o f 
science becoming more complex and r e q u i r i n g t h e o r e t i c a l 
713-*G. 
- 66 = 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the l i m i t s o f any one system i n terms o f 
i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o o t h e r systems„ 
3o A n t i - e m p i r i c i s m o 
At one p o i n t Parsons r e f e r s t o m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
e m p i r i c i s m as a " s t a r t i n g p o i n t " o f h i s s t u d y , [ l937as 
4523. To him e m p i r i c i s m i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the 
methodologies o f b o t h p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m j l937as476] 
and as such i t takes d i f f e r e n t forms. Three types o f 
e m p i r i c i s m are d i s t i n g u i s h e d i n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l 
A c t i o n s p o s i t i v i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m and the p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c 
and c o l l e c t i v i s t i c subtypes o f i d e a l i s t empiricism,, £ l 9 3 7 a ? 4 7 6 -
477? 589-590 , 728-730} o Both v a r i e t i e s o f i d e a l i s t i c 
e m p i r i c i s m are c h a r a c t e r i s e d by t h e i r r e p u d i a t i o n o f 
g e n e r a l concepts and p r o p o s i t i o n s i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e . 
The s t r e s s i s on h i s t o r i c i s m i n t h e sense o f 'the c o n c r e t e 
uniqueness and i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f a l l t h i n g s human" [ l937as 
477] - T h i s common, theme works i n two d i r e c t i o n s , t h e f i r s t 
Parsons c a l l s p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m w h i c h i s d e s c r i b e d 
as! 1,„,the d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e o n l y o b j e c t i v e knowledge 
i s t h a t o f the d e t a i l s o f c o n c r e t e t h i n g s and e v e n t s . I t 
i s i m p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them 
which are a n a l y z a b l e i n terms o f g e n e r a l concepts. They can 
o n l y be observed and d e s c r i b e d , and p l a c e d i n te m p o r a l 
sequence' [ l 9 3 7 a s 7 2 9 ] . The a l t e r n a t i v e p a t h , c o l l e c t i v i s t 
e m p i r i c i s m 11 , , , p e r m i t s a c o n c e p t u a l element i n s o c i a l 
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s c i e n c e , b u t m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h i s can be o n l y o f an 
i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g c h a r a c t e r ; i t must f o r m u l a t e the unique 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f a c o n c r e t e phenomenon, such as a person 
o r a c u l t u r e complex' [l 937as 72sTj - Somewhat l e s s d r a m a t i c a l l y 
t h e n t h i s form o f i d e a l i s t e m p i r i c i s m r e j e c t s g e n e r a l concepts„ 
T h i s r e p u d i a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l as the d i s t i n c t i v e 
f e a t u r e o f i d e a l i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m arose h i s t o r i c a l l y a g a i n s t 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e o f p o s i t i v i s t i c empiricism,, Here 
g e n e r a l concepts and p r o p o s i t i o n s are n o t r e p u d i a t e d b u t are 
tlB c e n t r a l f e a t u r e o f the methodology o f s c i e n c e , The 
e m p i r i c i s m e n t e r s t h i s methodology w i t h the vievr t h a t such 
g e n e r a l t h e o r y bears a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o some c o n c r e t e 
r e a l i t y , t h e t h e o r y ' m i r r o r s ' i t s p a r t i c u l a r r e a l i t y . T h i s 
takes us t o the common core o f a l l v a r i a n t s o f e m p i r i c i s m , t h e 
q u e s t i o n o f 'the s t a t u s o f s c i e n t i f i c concepts i n r e l a t i o n t o 
r e a l i t y ' jR 937as 72&\J „ I n t h e i r d i f f e r e n t ways a l l t h r e e forms 
take the view t h a t knowledge i s o r shou l d a t t e m p t t o be a m i r r o r 
image o f a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y , , 
'The term e m p i r i c i s m w i l l be used i n 
a p p l i c a t i o n t o a system o f t h e o r y when 
i t i s c l a i m e d , e x p l i c i t l y o r i m p l i c i t l y , 
t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f a g i v e n t h e o r e t i c a l 
system are by themselves adequate t o 
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e x p l a i n a l l t h e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t 
f a c t s about t h e body o f c o n c r e t e phenomena 
t o which i t i s a p p l i e d 1 \\ 937as 69-70] „ 
I n p o s i t i v i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n 
o f knowledge and r e a l i t y has a p p l i e d t o the s t a t u s o f g e n e r a l 
t h e o r i e s . I n r e j e c t i n g such g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s t h e i d e a l i s t 
v a r i a n t s c a r r y over the e m p i r i c i s m , g e n e r a l t h e o r i e s do n o t 
g i v e an adequate account o f c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y , t h u s i n o r d e r 
t o g e t t h i s ( t h e e m p i r i c i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f knowledge) g e n e r a l 
t h e o r y must be abandoned. 
Parsons' c r i t i c i s m o f i d e a l i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m i s b r i e f , 
a b r u p t and f i n a l . To deny t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f g e n e r a l 
t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge o f human b e h a v i o u r i s t o him a k i n w i t h 
i r r a t i o n a l i s m [1937a; 599] and s c e p t i c i s m j j937as728) . The 
p o s i t i o n i s i r r a t i o n a l i s t because as we s h a l l see t o Parsons 
the v e r y i d e a o f r a t i o n a l a c t i o n depends on knowledge o f 
i n t r i n s i c c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f g e n e r a l 
la\\rs o f cause and e f f e c t . I t i s s c e p t i c a l because t h e p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t knowledge i s p a r t i c u l a r t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l 
i s soon r e v e r s e d , knowledge i s r e l a t i v e t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f i t s o r i g i n . 
As such Parsons' a t t e n t i o n i s d i r e c t e d much more f u l l y 
t o p o s i t i v i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m . Here as has been n o t e d t h e 
q u e s t i o n i s n o t whether g e n e r a l t h e o r y i s l e g i t i m a t e i n 
s o c i a l science b u t t h e s t a t u s o f t h a t t h e o r y i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the r e a l i t y i t p e r t a i n s t o . The e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n h e r e , 
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e o r y and c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y can be 
r e p e a t e d : 
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'The common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f e m p i r i c i s t 
p o s i t i o n s „„„ i s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the 
meanings o f t h e c o n c r e t e s p e c i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n s 
o f a g i v e n s c i e n c e , t h e o r e t i c a l o r e m p i r i c a l , 
w i t h t h e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y knowable t o t a l i t y 
o f t h e e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , t o which t h e y r e f e r . 
They m a i n t a i n , t h a t i s , t h a t t h e r e i s an 
immediate correspondence between c o n c r e t e 
e x p e r i e n c e a b l e r e a l i t y and s c i e n t i f i c 
p r o p o s i t i o n s , and o n l y i n so f a r as t h i s 
e x i s t s can t h e r e be v a l i d knowledge', 
[1 937a: 23] . 
The consequences o r c o r o l l a r i e s o f t h i s core p o s i t i o n are 
the f o l l o w i n g . A t h e o r e t i c a l system e i t h e r c l a i m s o r a s p i r e s 
t o g i v e a complete account o f a g i v e n c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y . Thus 
i n i t s d e f i n i t i o n o f i t s s u b j e c t m a t t e r e m p i r i c i s m t a k e s *a 
f i e l d o f c o n c r e t e phenomena' {j937as13Qj , "a c o n c r e t e c a t e g o r y 
o f phenomena 1 | j 9 3 7 a ; 1 7 l l j 'a c o n c r e t e l y s e p e r a b l e c a t e g o r y o f 
the phenomena o f human a c t i o n , a k i n d o r t y p e o f a c t i o n 1 
[ l 937as 1 74] 0 Then the e m p i r i c i s t a t t e m p t s t he ' f u l l 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e c o n c r e t e phenomena thus d e s c r i b e d ' 
( l 9 3 7 a s 1 7 3]o The b e s t example o f what Parsons i s r e f e r r i n g t o 
here i s t h e view t h a t economics as a t h e o r e t i c a l system takes 
as i t s o b j e c t and a t t e m p t s t o e x p l a i n " t h e economy" o r 
"economic a c t i o n s " as c o n c r e t e phenomena 11 9 3 5 ° s 4 2 0 ) , The 
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e m p i r i c i s t c l a i m t o completeness can ta k e two more and l e s s 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d forms | l 937a; 465=466, 7 2 8 - 7 2 9 ] . I n the f i r s t 
t he o b j e c t o f the science o r t h e o r y i n q u e s t i o n i s an 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g phenomena. I n t h e second t h e o b j e c t i s a 
h y p o t h e t i c a l l y e x i s t i n g o b j e c t , such as the economist's 
model o f 'a regime o f f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 7 2 9 ] . The 
p o i n t i s t h a t i n b o t h t h e o b j e c t i s c o n c r e t e , f r e e c o m p e t i t i o n 
i s a model o f an economy, and the t h e o r y a t t e m p t s t h e f u l l 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h a t c o n c r e t e phenomenon. 
The second c o r o l l a r y o f the e m p i r i c i s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f t h e o r y and r e a l i t y as t he movement from and c o n f u s i o n o f 
the ' l o g i c a l c l o s u r e ' o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system and 'the 
e m p i r i c a l c l o s u r e o f a S3<-stem' [ l 9 3 7 a ; 1 0 ] . As we s h a l l 
see i t i s a x i o m a t i c t o Parsons t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l concepts form 
l o g i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d systems. I n e m p i r i c i s m t h e l o g i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n o f a t h e o r y i s t r a n s l a t e d i n t o e m p i r i c a l c l o s u r e . 
I n o t h e r words t he t h e o r y becomes d e t e r m i n i s t i c j l 9 3 7 a ; 4 7 6 j . 
I f a t h e o r y i s l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d t h e n a l l t h e c a u s a l l y d e t e r m i n a t e 
r e l a t i o n s between i t s component v a r i a b l e s are known. The 
t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h i s t o e m p i r i c a l systems means t h a t a s i m i l a r 
c l a i m i s p ut f o r w a r d , t h a t as a c o n c r e t e system i t s b e h a v i o u r 
i s f u l l y c o n t r o l l e d by d e t e r m i n a t e causes and t h e i r l a w s . 
The t h i r d p o i n t here r e l a t e s t o the c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o r y 
i n e m p i r i c i s m . 
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'Theory, a c c o r d i n g t o the e m p i r i c i s t 
view, would c o n s i s t o n l y i n g e n e r a l i z a t i o n 
from known f a c t s , i n the sense o f what g e n e r a l 
s t a t e m e n t s t h e known body o f f a c t would 
j u s t i f y * p 9 3 7 a s 6 j . 
T h e o r e t i c a l concepts t h e n are l i m i t e d t o t y p e - p a r t concepts 
(see below) and t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s t o e m p i r i c a l 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s 1 9 3 7 a s 7 « 1 . As such s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e o r e -
t i c a l s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t y i s m i n i m i z e d , t h e o r y develops by 
b e i n g m o d i f i e d ' t o ta k e account o f new d i s c o v e r i e s o f f a c t ' 
[ j 9 3 7 a s 6 j , such d i s c o v e r i e s b e i n g t h e p r o d u c t o f ' i d l e 
c u r i o s i t y ' r a t h e r t h a n t h e s t i m u l a t i o n o f t h e o r y f\ 931 » 
F i n a l l y , a p o i n t w h i c h has a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d , t o the 
e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r e s s i n science c o n s i s t s i n and d e r i v e s from 
•the c u m u l a t i v e p i l i n g up o f " d i s c o v e r i e s " o f " f a c t " ' 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 6 ] „ 
Parsons' c r i t i c i s m o f p o s i t i v i s t i c e m p i r i c i s m focuses 
on two p o i n t s ; t h e f a l l a c y o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e o r y and 
r e a l i t y and the m i s t a k e n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e o r y i n e m p i r i c i s m . 
To Parsons t he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e o r y w i t h c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y 
i s a m i s t a k e , a mi s t a k e o f t e n d e s c r i b e d by him i n ¥hitehead's 
phrase 'the f a l l a c y o f m i s p l a c e d c o n c r e t e n e s s ' [ l 9 3 7 a : 4 7 6 j „ 
I t i s a mista k e because t o take t h i s v iew l e a d s t o one o r 
o t h e r o f two i m p o s s i b l e p o s i t i o n s . The f i r s t i s d e s c r i b e d 
by Parsons a t one p o i n t as ' i m p e r i a l i s t i c ' , , |1937as^99/<> T h i s 
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i s t h e o v e r g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f a t h e o r y t o areas o f r e a l i t y 
w i t h which i t cannot cope. The b e s t examples o f t h i s t o 
Parsons are r a d i c a l l y p o s i t i v i s t i c s o c i a l t h e o r i e s . The 
c o n c e p t u a l apparatus o f such t h e o r i e s are developed i n t h e 
stu d y o f the n a t u r a l w o r l d . Now on an e m p i r i c i s t b a s i s 
such a c o n c e p t u a l scheme must produce a complete account 
o f t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d . F u r t h e r i t i s m a n i f e s t l y t h e case 
t h a t human b e i n g s are p a r t o f t h a t n a t u r a l w o r l d . Hence 
the c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w s t h a t the c o n c e p t u a l scheme must be 
adequate t o e x p l a i n human b e h a v i o u r . T h i s t o Parsons i s the 
e m p i r i c i s t b a s i s o f t h e r e d u c t i o n o f human b e h a v i o u r t o 
b i o l o g i c a l b e h a v i o u r so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f r a d i c a l 
p o s i t i v i s m . 
The a l t e r n a t i v e p a t h i s t o some e x t e n t t he converse o f 
i m p e r i a l i s m . Parsons r e f e r s t o i t as the ' e n c y c l o p e d i c ' 
view ( i 937a; 173j «> T h i s i s b e s t d i s c u s s e d i n terms o f the 
example o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t ^ ^ c r i t i c i s m o f c l a s s i c a l 
economics. To t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t t h e t h e o r e t i c a l system 
o f c l a s s i c a l economics c o u l d n o t e x p l a i n c o n c r e t e economic 
a c t i o n s and systems w h i c h were always more t h a n t he w o r l d 
o f homo economicus. The e m p i r i c i s t remedy o f f e r e d was the 
expansion o f the t h e o r e t i c a l system o f economics t o i n c l u d e 
a l l r e l e v a n t aspects o f human a c t i v i t y . To Parsons t h i s 
has t h e consequence t h a t economics as a t h e o r e t i c a l system 
ceases t o e x i s t , economics becomes t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f 
en c y c l o p a e d i c knowledge o f human b e h a v i o u r t o one c o n c r e t e 
area o f l i f e [1 937ai 1 73} . 
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As a c o u n t e r t o the e m p i r i c i s t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f 
t h e o r y and r e a l i t y Parsons i n s i s t s t h a t t h e o r y bears an 
a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y . T h i s w i l l be 
a major theme o f the n e x t s e c t i o n b u t f o r the moment we 
can a n t i c i p a t e and note t h a t from t h i s i t f o l l o w s t h a t no 
g i v e n c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y can be exhausted by any g i v e n 
t h e o r e t i c a l system. T h i s would be the e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n . 
As such any c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y can and must be u n d e r s t o o d i n 
terms o f a p l u r a l i t y o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems. T h i s o f 
course i m m e d i a t e l y c o m p l i c a t e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f the s t a t u s 
o f any t h e o r e t i c a l system. I t cannot be regarded as t h e 
g e n e r a l summation o f t h e r e a l i t y t o which i t r e f e r s . As a 
consequence t he e m p i r i c i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
must be changed. Such a c t i v i t y must p l a y an independent 
n o t dependent r o l e i n s c i e n c e . I f t h i s i s denie d t h e n t h e 
awareness o f the a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n o f t h e o r y t o r e a l i t y i s 
l o s t , t h e o r e t i c a l systems become ' r e i f i e d ' . The ' r e i f i c a t i o n 
o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems' i s used by Parsons as an a l t e r n a t i v e 
form o f e x p r e s s i o n t o 'the f a l l a c y o f mi s p l a c e d c o n c r e t e -
ness' [ l 9 3 7 a ; 7 2 8 , 589, 4 7 6 ] , I t means e s s e n t i a l l y a 
s i m p l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n o f t h e o r y t o r e a l i t y 
and the consequent d e n i a l o f an independent p l a c e f o r 
t h e o r i z i n g i n s c i e n c e . 
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n can be concluded by n o t i n g a g a i n t h a t 
e m p i r i c i s m i s common t o b o t h p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m as 
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i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a d i t i o n s and t h e o r e t i c a l systems i n s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e . The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h i s p a r a l l e l i s t h a t by 
a d o p t i n g a n o n - e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n Parsons hopes t o achieve 
two t h i n g s . F i r s t l y , o n l y on the b a s i s o f n o n - e m p i r i c i s m 
can t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m be r e s o l v e d , 
'What i s perhaps t h e deepest m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
b a s i s o f t h i s c o n f l i c t has l a i n i n t h e 
e m p i r i c i s m common t o b o t h g r e a t t r a d i t i o n s 
o f t h o u g h t . As l o n g as t h i s p e r s i s t s , 
t h e two are, i n d e e d , i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i f 
any a t t e m p t i s made t o a p p l y them t o 
the same c o n c r e t e s u b j e c t m a t t e r " . 
[1 937a: 476], 
Secondly, n o n - e m p i r i c i s m i s the means t o a v o i d o r r e s o l v e 
the f a i l i n g s o f b o t h p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m . On an 
e m p i r i c i s t b a s i s t h i s cannot be done, the problem lead-,' 
t o the dilemma's o f r e i f i c a t i o n o r irrationalism„ 
•From t h i s p o i n t o f view i t may be s a i d 
t h a t t o make t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s the 
b a s i c f a l l a c y o f a l l o f what has here 
been c a l l e d e m p i r i c i s m , common t o a l l t h r e e 
o f t h e v a r i e t i e s d i s c u s s e d above. The 
r e s u l t i s i n v a r i a b l y a dilemma. On the 
one hand, the c l a s s o f c o n c r e t e phenomena 
i n q u e s t i o n may be t r e a t e d by the method 
o f an a n a l y t i c a l s c i e n c e . Then t h e 
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r e s u l t i s " r e i f i c a t i o n " , t h e f a l l a c y o f 
mi s p l a c e d c o n c r e t e n e s s , w i t h a l l i t s 
consequences, Or, on the o t h e r hand, 
i t may be t r e a t e d by the method o f a 
h i s t o r i c a l s c ience a l o n e , i n which 
case the r e s u l t i s , t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
c o n s i d e r e d , i r r a t i o n a l i s m , t h e d e n i a l 
o f the v a l i d i t y o f g e n e r a l c o n c e p t u a l i -
z a t i o n a t a l l . On an e m p i r i c i s t b a s i s 
t h e r e i s no escape from t h i s dilemma', 
[ l937as599] . 
Parsons' aims t h e n are a m b i t i o u s and the c r u c i a l means t o 
achieve t h i s a m b i t i o n i s a n o n - e m p i r i c i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f 
science which as we have seen i s a p o s i t i o n w h i c h g r a n t s an 
independent r o l e t o t h e o r y as a necessary consequence o f 
th e a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n o f t h e o r y and r e a l i t y . 
S c i e n t i f i c knowledge t h e n i s p e c u l i a r l y t h e o r e t i c a l 
knowledge. To Parsons t h i s must be the case i f science i s 
t o be o t h e r t h a n r e f i n e d common sense, i f science i s t o make 
p r o g r e s s and i f the ' i n s i d i o u s * r e s u l t s o f e m p i r i c i s m are t o 
be av o i d e d . But as y e t v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g has been s a i d as 
t o i^hat t h i s amounts t o , t h a t i s , what i t means t o say t h a t 
s c ience i s t h e o r e t i c a l . T h i s i s the t a s k o f the n e x t 
s e c t i o n . 
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C o What i s theory? 
Parsons d e f i n e s s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y as 'a body o f 
l o g i c a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d " g e n e r a l concepts" o f e m p i r i c a l 
r e f e r e n c e ' {]937as6^]. The t a s k o f t h i s s e c t i o n x ^ i l l be 
t o e l a b o r a t e t h e t h r e e components o f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e 
' e m p i r i c a l ' c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o r y , 'general concepts' and 
' l o g i c a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n ' , , As g e n e r a l themes o f t h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e o r y w i l l be paramount, 
t h e ' a b s t r a c t ' and 'systemic' q u a l i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y , 
1 . Theory as ' o f e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e ' . 
As so much o f what has been s a i d i n the above remarks 
has s t r e s s e d the t h e o r e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge i t i s as w e l l t o i n c l u d e a few paragraphs here 
t o s t r e s s t he e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h a t knowledge. We 
can b e g i n by n o t i n g Parsons' h i g h r e g a r d f o r Pareto as a 
m e t h o d o l o g i s t . 
•Indeed, o f t h e f o u r w r i t e r s P a r e t o , 
i n h i s g e n e r a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e q u i r e -
ments o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y , came much 
the c l o s e s t t o f o r m u l a t i n g a view 
t h a t can be c o n s i d e r e d a c c e p t a b l e f o r 
the purposes o f t h i s s tudy' [ l 9 3 7 a . 7 0 4 , 
see a l s o % 4691 « J
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When these remarks are j u x t a p o s e d a g a i n s t what Parsons 
says o f Pa r e t o ' s methodology t h e n the e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r 
o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s o b v i o u s l y o f g r e a t i m p o r t s 
" I n f a c t , P a reto f o r t h e most p a r t l i m i t s 
h i m s e l f t o the most g e n e r a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . To him science i s be s t 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the term " l o g i c o -
experimental"« That i s t o say, t h e r e 
are two e s s e n t i a l elements i n v o l v e d ? 
l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g and o b s e r v a t i o n o f 
" f a c t " , L o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g i s by i t s e l f 
i n c a p a b l e o f y i e l d i n g n ecessary r e s u l t s 
beyond t a u t o l o g i e s , b u t none t h e l e s s 
i t i s an e s s e n t i a l element. I t i s tho u g h t 
o f , however, as s u b o r d i n a t e t o the o t h e r 
element, t h a t o f f a c t , e x p e r i m e n t a l o r 
observed* „ £ l937a? 1 81] , 
Again i t i s p e r t i n a n t t o not e t h a t as w e l l as d e f i n i n g 
The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n as a t h e o r e t i c a l work Parsons 
a l s o i n s i s t s t h a t t h e s t u d y i s 'an e m p i r i c a l monograph' 
Jj937ag 697J 5 the work o f the w r i t e r s c o n s i d e r e d c o n s t i t u t e 
the f a c t s o f ' o b s e r v a t i o n ' f o r h i s s c i e n t i f i c s t u d y . I n i t s 
(12 ) 
a u t h o r ' s view ( v then^ the book accords w i t h h i s statement 
t h a t 'True s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y i s n o t t h e p r o d u c t o f i d l e 
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" s p e c u l a t i o n " o f s p i n n i n g out the l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f 
assumptions, b u t o f o b s e r v a t i o n , r e a s o n i n g and v e r i f i c a t i o n , 
s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e f a c t s and c o n t i n u a l l y r e t u r n i n g t o t h e 
f a c t s ' | j 9 3 7 a s x x i i ] . 
A t t e n t i o n has a l r e a d y been drawn t o the importance o f 
th e interdependence o f t h e o r y and f a c t t o Parsons, T h i s 
i s emphasised t h r o u g h o u t The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n i n 
t h a t 8 the s o l i d a r i t y o f g e n e r a l t h e o r y and e m p i r i c a l 
knowledge' i s 'one o f the p r i n c i p a l theses o f t h i s s t u d y ' 
So p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c h a p t e r s on Durkheim 
and Weber Parsons i s a t p a i n s t o draw o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the e m p i r i c a l problems t h e y were a t t e m p t i n g t o s o l v e 
and t h e i r development o f g e n e r a l theory„ 
Having made t h i s p o i n t we can now t u r n t o what i t means. 
Parsons' concept o f f a c t draws upon the id e a s o f Pareto (see 
e s p e c i a l l y [l 937as 1 81 - ^ j ) and L.J. Henderson ^See e s p e c i a l l y 
p 937a: 41 - 2 ] ) . 
'To f o r e s t a l l a v e r y common so^^rce o f 
c o n f u s i o n i t i s as w e l l a t t h e o u t s e t t o 
note t he sense i n which t he te r m " f a c t " 
i s t o be employed. A d a p t i n g P r o f e s s o r 
Henderson's d e f i n i t i o n , i n t h i s s t u d y a 
f a c t i s u n d e r s t o o d t o be an " e m p i r i c a l l y 
v e r i f i a b l e statement about phenomena i n 
terms o f a c o n c e p t u a l scheme" '. [ l937as 
4 1 ] . 
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I w i l l m ention v e r i f i a b i l i t y i n a moment, what Parsons 
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y keen t o s t r e s s i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
f a c t and phenomenon which t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i n c l u d e s , 
"The d i s t i n c t i o n between a f a c t , w h i c h 
i s a p r o p o s i t i o n about phenomena, and 
the phenomena themselves, w h i c h are 
c o n c r e t e , r e a l l y e x i s t e n t e n t i t i e s , 
w i l l , i f k e p t c l e a r l y i n mind, a v o i d 
a g r e a t d e a l o f c o n f u s i o n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 l ] „ 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a r i s e s o u t o f Parsons' r e j e c t i o n o f 
e m p i r i c i s m p a r t i ^ x l a r l y t h e a n t i - t h e o r i s t s who e i t h e r 
c l a i m t o l e t t he f a c t s 'speak f o r themselves' [l937as1cT], 
o r , i n the German v a r i a n t , c l a i m *a d i r e c t grasp o f 
meaning w i t h o u t t he i n t e r v e n t i o n o f concepts i n any 
form' [ l 9 3 7 a s 5 8 6 ] „ To Parsons 
' I t i s fundamental t h a t t h e r e i s no 
e m p i r i c a l knowledge w h i c h i s n o t i n 
some sense and t o some degree c o n c e p t u a l l y 
formed. A l l t a l k o f "pure sense d a t a " , 
"raw e x p e r i e n c e " o r t h e unformed stream 
o f consciousness i s n o t d e s c r i p t i v e o f 
a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e , b u t a m a t t e r o f 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n , l e g i t i m a t e and 
i m p o r t a n t f o r c e r t a i n purposes b u t , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , a b s t r a c t i o n ' [ l937as28] , 
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The b a s i s o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t and phenomena 
i s t h a t phenomena are c o n c r e t e w h i l s t f a c t s are a b s t r a c t i o n s 
from t he c o n c r e t e phenomena, 
'... an e x p e r i m e n t a l f a c t does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y embody the t o t a l i t y o f a 
con c r e t e phenomenon, , , , . , the f a c t s 
i n v o l v e d i n the f o r m u l a t i o n o f a t h e o r y 
are a r r i v e d a t by a process o f a n a l y s i s 
and are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y complete 
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f c o n c r e t e phenomena. 
Indeed P a r e t o s t a t e s t h a t " i t i s 
i m p o s s i b l e t o know a c o n c r e t e phenomena 
i n a l l i t s d e t a i l s " . . . . The f a c t s 
embodied i n a t h e o r y d e s c r i b e elements, o r 
aspec t s , o r p r o p o r t i e s o f c o n c r e t e 
phenomena, n o t t h e t o t a l phenomena 
themselves 1 [l 937a: 1 83 ] . 
Parsons, t h e n , f o l l o w s P a r e t o i n t h a t t o s t r e s s t h e e m p i r i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r o f science *„,„ i s n o t t o set t h e o r y o ver a g a i n s t 
f a c t , b u t t o i n c l u d e t h e element o f t h e o r e t i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n 
i n h i s concept o f f a c t i t s e l f [ l 9 3 7 a s l 8 3 j . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f t h e e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e o f t h e o r y i n science t h e n l e a d s vis 
i n t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e a b s t r a c t s t a t u s o f knowledge. T h i s 
w i l l be t a k e n up e x p l i c i t l y i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n . B e f o r e so 
d o i n g t h e above c o n c l u s i o n can be r e i n f o r c e d by c o n s i d e r i n g 
t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e o r y and f a c t and the v e r i f i a b i l i t y 
o f f a c t u a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
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Parsons' s t r e s s on the interdependence o f t h e o r y and 
f a c t has been n o t e d above. I t i s p e r t i n a n t here a l s o t o 
not e t h a t interdependence n e c e s s a r i l y means p a r t i a l 
independence„ 
• I t i s one o f the commonest b u t most 
s e r i o u s o f f a l l a c i e s t o t h i n k t h a t 
i nterdependence i m p l i e s absence o f 
independence , No two e n t i t e s can be 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w h i c h are not a t the 
same time independent i n c e r t a i n 
r e s p e c t s " [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 5 j 0 
Given t h i s i t would seem t o be the case t h a t i f t h e o r y and 
f a c t are i n t e r d e p e n d e n t t h e n we must be a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r 
independent q u a l i t i e s , t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e two, Yet t h i s i s 
n o t i m m e d i a t e l y e v i d e n t i n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n , 
On the one hand we have a l r e a d y n o t e d t h a t t h e o r y i s 
i n v o l v e d i n the concept o f f a c t , a f a c t i s a p r o p o s i t i o n 
c a s t i n terms o f concepts. On the o t h e r hand Parsons 
remarks s 
'Indeed, i f the term f a c t i s p r o p e r l y 
i n t e r p r e t e d i t may be s a i d t h a t a 
t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n , i f i t has a 
p l a c e i n science a t a l l , i s e i t h e r i t s e l f 
a statement o f f a c t o r a statement o f a 
mode o f r e l a t i o n between f a c t s ' /l937a-s7J ° 
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Agains 
' A l l s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s are made up o f 
f a c t s and statements o f r e l a t i o n s between 
f a c t s i n t h i s sense" [ l 9 3 7 a : 4 l ] . 
I t i s n o t b e i n g c l a i m e d here t h a t Parsons i s confused on 
t h i s , o n l y t h a t t o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e o r y and f a c t we 
have t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e d i f f e r e n t senses o f a b s t r a c t i o n o f 
each. 
I n t h e above d e f i n i t i o n o f f a c t as a p r o p o s i t i o n about 
phenomena i t w i l l be remembered t h a t such p r o p o s i t i o n s must 
be v e r i f i a b l e o Parsons i n s i s t s t h a t "the process o f 
v e r i f i c a t i o n ' i s 'fundamental t o sc i e n c e ' f l 9 3 7 a s 8 j . I n 
g e n e r a l i f a statement o f f a c t i s t o be v e r i f i a b l e i t must 
i m p o r t a n t t o no t e i m m e d i a t e l y t h a t t h i s does n o t mean t h a t 
an appeal i s made t o some d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e o f t h a t 
phenomena, T h i s would go a g a i n s t t he whole t h r e a d o f 
what has been e s t a b l i s h e d so f a r . The ' d i r e c t grasp o f 
meaning' o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c branch o f i d e a l i s t i c 
e m p i r i c i s m ( a l s o termed ' i n t u i t i o n i s m 1 by Parsons) has a l r e a d y 
been mentioned. B e h a v i o u r i s m , i n i t s most r a d i c a l v e r s i o n 
which p r e o c c u p i e s Parsons, f i t s i n t o t h e same c a t e g o r y . I t 
c l a i m s t h a t a l l knowledge must be based on t h e i m p r e s s i o n s 
o f our senses. As such i t excludes what t o Parsons i s the 
prime phenomenon o f i n t e r e s t t o the s t u d e n t o f a c t i o n , t h e 
meanings o f symbols. Speech o r w r i t i n g fox 1 example cannot 
[ a s 8 j 
be c a s t i n terms o f o.bservable phenomena. However i t i s 
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be observed as symbols s a l l t h a t our senses p e r c e i v e are 
sound wave com b i n a t i o n s and i n k marks. To Parsons t h i s i s 
an e n t i r e l y u n t e n n a b l e p o s i t i o n , , A g a in w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o 
Par e t o ' s concept o f f a c t he remarks 
•¥hat i s common t o t h e two s e t s o f 
d a t a [speech and w r i t i n g ] i s n o t the 
"sense i m p r e s s i o n s " as such i n any 
co n c r e t e sense, b u t the "meaning" 
o f t h e symbolso T h i s i n c l u s i o n o f 
meanings i n the rea l m o f e x p e r i m e n t a l 
f a c t s o r ob s e r v a b l e phenomena i s 
perhaps t he most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g t o 
note about P a r e t o ' s concept o f f a c t 1 
[l 937a5 1 8 2 - 3 ] . 
The s u b j e c t i o n o f f a c t u a l p r o p o s i t i o n s t o the t e s t o f 
o b s e r v a t i o n a g a i n s t phenomena t h e n must take a r a t h e r more 
complex form. 
T/hat i s e s s e n t i a l about o b s e r v a t i o n i n science i s t h a t 
i t s h ould be c o n t r o l l e d i n two ways; t he means and d i r e c t i o n 
o f o b s e r v a t i o n . On the f i r s t Parsons f o l l o w s Bridgman i n 
s t a t i n g t h a t 'the f a c t s s h o u l d be o b t a i n e d by a c l e a r l y 
d e f i n e d " o p e r a t i o n " ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 7 ] > the i d e a b e i n g t h a t 
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'Experience i s the judge because two 
o r more s c i e n t i s t s p e r f o r m i n g t h e 
same o p e r a t i o n get the same r e s u l t ' 
[ l937as 182] . 
F u r t h e r such o p e r a t i o n s should be designed t o f u l f i l l t h e 
f o l l o w i n g t a s k , what we might c a l l t he d i r e c t i o n o f 
o b s e r v a t i o n . The e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e o f t h e o r y i s t h a t i t 
i n c o r p o r a t e s concepts which s t a t e p r o p o s i t i o n s about 
phenomena. The t a s k i s t o show t h a t change o r v a r i a t i o n 
i n the b e h a v i o u r o f the phenomena are a d e q u a t e l y d e s c r i b e d i n 
such c o n c e p t s o T h i s i s done by the p r i n c i p l e o f 
•independent v a r i a t i o n ' J? 9 3 7 a s 7 ^ 2 , 7k9] „ That i s , t h e t a s k 
i s t o show t h a t the v a l u e s , o r o b s e r v a b l e p r o p e r t i e s o f 
phenomena, v a r y i n a d e t e r m i n a t e way i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o t h e r 
c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e s n o t i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e t h e o r y i n q u e s t i o n . 
T h i s i s demonstrated by the comparative method w h i c h Parsons 
d e s c r i b e s as 1 i n d i s p e n s i b l e * t o a n a l y t i c a l s c i e n c e . 
Comparison t a k e s d i f f e r e n t forms one o f w h i c h i s experiment 
' , o o where the cases t o be compared are produced t o o r d e r 
under c o n t r o l l e d c o n d i t i o n s ' [l 937a? 7^3] ° T h i s i s t h e most 
d e s i r a b l e form o f v e r i f i c a t i o n b u t i s n o t e s s e n t i a l , ' «,.„ t h i s 
i s a m a t t e r o f p r a c t i c a l t e c h n i q u e , n o t o f l o g i c ' f l 9 3 7 a s 8 j 0 
What i s o f p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e here i s the a l t e r n a t i v e 
t o experiment as a t e c h n i q u e o f c o n t r o l l i n g s c i e n t i f i c 
o b s e r v a t i o n , i t i s the c o n t r o l o f o b s e r v a t i o n by t h e o r e t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s % 
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•For the aspects o f c o n c r e t e phenomena 
wh i c h are r e l e v a n t t o a p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y 
are n o t g e n e r a l l y g i v e n i n any us a b l e form 
i n t h e raw d a t a o f e x p e r i e n c e . Indeed i t 
i s d e s i r a b l e t o he a b l e t o observe the 
f a c t s r e l e v a n t t o a p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r y i n 
i s o l a t i o n from o t h e r s . Some, though by no 
means a l l , o f the n a t u r a l s ciences can do 
t h i s t h r o u g h t h e method o f experiments 
But t h i s , Pareto e x p l i c i t l y says, i s a 
p r a c t i c a l a i d t o s c i e n c e , n o t a l o g i c a l 
n e c e s s i t y o f i t 0 The process o f a b s t r a c t i o n 
i n the s o c i a l s ciences must be c a r r i e d o u t 
m a i n l y by a n a l y s i s , n o t by exp e r i m e n t . 
But t h i s does n o t make i t any the l e s s 
l e g i t i m a t e 1 [ l 9 3 7 a : 1 8A-] „ 
•What Parsons has i n mind here i s Weber 1 s method o f 
o b j e c t i v e p o s s i b i l i t y : 
'Moreover, the o n l y way i n w h i c h t o a r r i v e 
a t a judgement o f the c a u s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f a f a c t o r i s t o ask what would have 
happened i f t h e f a c t o r i n q u e s t i o n had n o t 
been p r e s e n t o r had been a l t e r e d , e 0 g . i f t he 
P e r s i a n s had n o t been stopped a t Marathon a t 
a l l . I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s n o t h i n g , i n 
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p r i n c i p l e , b u t the l o g i c o f ex p e r i m e n t . 
1/here p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s make i t 
i m p o s s i b l e a c t u a l l y t o produce t h e i n i t i a l 
s i t u a t i o n , and a l t e r the f a c t i n q u e s t i o n , 
and t h e n see what would happen, r e c o u r s e 
must be had t o a mental e x p e r i m e n t , t he 
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an o b j e c t i v e l y p o s s i b l e 
course o f events' [ l 9 3 7 a ; 6 l 2 ] . 
The o b s e r v a t i o n o f phenomena t h e n must be checked by r e f e r e n c e 
t o t h e o r e t i c a l concepts, once a g a i n t he e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r 
o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y l e a d s t o the q u e s t i o n o f the sense i n 
which t h e o r y i s an a b s t r a c t i o n from r e a l i t y . 
2 . Theory as c o n s t i t u t e d by ' g e n e r a l concepts' 
i ) E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s 
I t has a l r e a d y been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t f o r Parsons 
t h e o r y bears an a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n t o reality„ T h i s i s n o t 
at a l l a simple i d e a , t he c o m p l e x i t y o f the problem l y i n g i n 
the p l u r a l i t y o f senses i n w h i c h t he term ' a b s t r a c t i o n ' i s 
used. B e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h e d i f f e r e n t forms o f a b s t r a c t i o n 
i n v o l v e d i n d i f f e r e n t t y pes o f concepts i t i s as w e l l t o b e g i n 
w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f h i s 
t h i n k i n g . 
Parsons d e s c r i b e s h i s p o s i t i o n as ' a n a l y t i c a l r e a l i s m ' 
[1937as 730] , T h i s i n v o l v e s f i r s t o f a l l t he r e j e c t i o n o f 
s o l i p s i s m and i d e a l i s m ; 
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" I t i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n 
o f t h e p o s i t i o n t a k e n here t h a t t h e r e 
i s an e x t e r n a l w o r l d o f s o - c a l l e d 
e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y w h i c h i s n o t t h e 
c r e a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l human mind 
and i s n o t r e d u c i b l e t o terms o f an i d e a l 
o r d e r , i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense' 
[ l937as753] . 
Parsons' r e a l i s m t h e n i s n ot based on the view t h a t i t i s 
t h r o u g h c o n c e p t u a l thought t h a t one g e t s t o the 'essence' 
o f r e a l i t y . Rathers 
' , o , i t i s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t a t l e a s t some 
o f t h e g e n e r a l concepts o f science are 
not f i c t i o n a l b u t a d e q u a t e l y "grasp" 
aspects o f the o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ' 
[ l937as730] o 
Parsons' r e a l i s m d e s c r i b e s t h e view t h a t some o f t h e 
concepts o f science reproduce t he r e a l w o r l d . Now as we 
might expect f r o m t h e above d i s c u s s i o n o f e m p i r i c i s m 
Parsons' r e a l i s m i s c a r e f u l l y q u a l i f i e d t o a v o i d t h e 
c o r o l l a r i e s and consequences o f e m p i r i c i s m o u t l i n e d above, 
(14) 
These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are t h r e e f o l d ; x ' the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n 
o f f a c t u a l o r d e r , the r e c o g n i t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
p o s s i b l e knowledge and humanly p o s s i b l e knowledge and t h e 
a b s t r a c t n a t u r e o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. As a consequence 
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o f these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s Parsons d e s c r i b e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between knowledge and r e a l i t y as a " f u n c t i o n a l " one 
[l937a .s601, 753I9 o n l y on the b a s i s o f these p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 
can i t be s a i d t h a t s c i e n t i f i c knowledge g i v e s an 'adequate 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' |T937as753~J o f r e a l i t y . 
The f i r s t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h e n i s t h a t e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y 
i s a ' f a c t u a l o r d e r ' . T h i s i s d e f i n e d i n the f o l l o w i n g way; 
"\ 
'The a n t i t h e s i s [ o f f a c t u a l o r d e r ] i s randomness 
o r chance i n the s t r i c t sense o f phenomena 
co n f o r m i n g t o the s t a t i s t i c a l laws o f 
p r o b a b i l i t y . F a c t u a l o r d e r , t h e n , connotes 
e s s e n t i a l l y a c c e s s i b i l i t y t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
i n terms o f l o g i c a l t h e o r y , e s p e c i a l l y o f 
s c i e n c e . Chance v a r i a t i o n s are i n these 
terms i m p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d o r t o reduce 
t o law. Chance o r randomness i s the name 
f o r t h a t which i s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , n o t 
capable o f i n t e l l i g i b l e a n a l y s i s • [l937as 
9 1 ] . 
To presuppose t he f a c t u a l o r d e r o f r e a l i t y t h e n i s t o assume 
t h a t the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n p a r t a t l e a s t 
by o r d e r l y r e g u l a r i t i e s which are 'congruent w i t h t h e o r d e r 
o f human l o g i c ' ( l 9 3 7 a s 7 5 3 } » 
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Secondly, Parsons p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h i s i s human 
l o g i c and t h a t we cannot assume t h a t r e a l i t y i s exhausted 
by t h e l o g i c a l c a p a c i t i e s o f the human mind. S c i e n t i f i c 
t h e o r y 
1 o . o i s an i d e a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f 
e m p i r i c a l phenomena o r aspects o f them„ 
I t i s th u s s u b j e c t t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n s 
i n h e r e n t i n t h i s f a c t . I t i s n o t a 
j u s t i f i e d assumption t h a t r e a l i t y i s 
exhausted by i t s congruence w i t h t h e 
k i n d o f i d e a l systems a c c e s s i b l e t o 
the human mind i n i t s s c i e n t i f i c phase, 
such as what we c a l l l o g i c ' [l 937as 75^] •> 
The same q u a l i f i c a t i o n a p p l i e s t o o t h e r aspects o f the 
i d e a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s c i e n c e , i t i s s u b j e c t , f o r example, 
t o t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f human o b s e r v a t i o n . So '„,„ i t may be 
i n f e r r e d t h a t human p o s s i b l e knowledge i s not i d e n t i c a l w i t h 
t h a t c o n c e i v a b l y p o s s i b l e t o a mind f r e e d from these human 
l i m i t a t i o n s ' / l937a;75^7 = 
The t h i r d q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o Parsons' r e a l i s m i s the a b s t r a c t 
s t a t u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge„ I t will be m a i n t a i n e d here 
t h a t t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t senses o f a b s t r a c t i o n w h i c h are 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f concepts„ Thus, 
r e f e r r i n g t o u n i t and element concepts (see below) Parsons 
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says 'What s h o u l d be i n s i s t e d upon i s the r a d i c a l l o g i c a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n between these two k i n d s o f concepts, . ..' 
[ I937as3^] . There are two c r i t e r i a by which such t y p e s 
are d i s t i n g u i s h e d which are i n d i c a t e d when Parsons r e f e r s 
t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n as a ' l o g i c a l - o p e r a t i o n a l ' [ l 9 3 7 a : 35] 
one. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e concepts d i f f e r i n t h e i r d i f f e r e n t 
modes o f a b s t r a c t i o n , t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n which t h e y 
a b s t r a c t from r e a l i t y 0 So Parsons a d v i s e s ; 
' I t i s n o t wise t o a t t e m p t t o proceed w i t h 
t h e main t a s k w i t h o u t some c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
o f d i f f e r e n t types o f t h e o r e t i c a l concepts 
and t h e i r d i f f e r e n t k i n d o f r e l a t i o n t o the 
e m p i r i c a l elements o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge' 
p 937a: 28] . 
So concepts have d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l s t a t u s e s . But secondl y 
concepts are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s , t h e p o i n t 
b e i n g t h a t t h e same i d e a s , so t o speak, can c o n s t i t u t e 
d i f f e r e n t concepts even when t h e same terms are a p p l i e d . 
Thus, f o r example, i n Parsons i n t r o d u c t o r y d i s c u s s i o n o f 
'Types o f concepts' [l 937a: 2 7 - ^ l ] we f i n d t h e same terms 
( e . g . v e l o c i t y and mass from c l a s s i c a l mechanics) used t o 
e x e m p l i f y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f concepts. The s t a t u s o f a 
concept t h e n o n l y becomes c l e a r i n the c o n t e x t o f i t s use. 
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On the f a c e o f i t Parsons uses a t h r e e f o l d t y p o l o g y 
o f concepts, frame o f r e f e r e n c e , u n i t and element concepts 
Jl937as 27=41 , 731-753jo A t h e o r e t i c a l system w i l l i n c l u d e 
a l l t h r e e types j l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 ] , a f a c t w hich, i n c o n j u n c t i o n 
w i t h the above parag r a p h , makes the c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f Parsons 
p o s i t i o n d i f f i c u l t , t he s t a t u s o f t h e ' t h e o r e t i c a l - system o f 
a c t i o n ' i s a complex q u e s t i o n indeed,, However the t a s k i s 
y e t more d i f f i c u l t f o r the t h r e e - f o l d system a c t s as a 
s h o r t h a n d f o r a more complex d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Parsons tends 
t o o p e r a t e i n terms o f m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e p a i r e d a l t e r n a t i v e s 
so t h a t t h e s t a t u s o f any concept must be judged i n terms o f 
the f o l l o w i n g scheme o f modes o f a b s t r a c t i o n and concept 
f u n c t i o n s 5 
E i t h e r Or 
F u n c t i o n o f D e s c r i p t i o n E x p l a n a t i o n 
concept„ O r d e r i n g r e a l i t y C l a s s i f y i n g r e a l i t y 
Means End 
Mode o f P r i m a r y Secondary 
a b s t r a c t i o n Concrete A n a l y t i c a l 
A c t u a l H y p o t h e t i c a l 
S t r u c t u r e V a r i a b l e 
A l l o f these dichotomous p o s s i b i l i t i e s are woven i n t o 
The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n . No a t t e m p t w i l l be made 
j u s t noAif t o e3.ucidate them, r a t h e r each w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d 
i n i t s a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e i n what f o l l o w s . The d i s c u s s i o n 
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w i l l proceed by f o l l o w i n g ' Parsons t h r e e f o l d framework 
f o c u s i n g on t h e d e s c r i p t i o n - e x p l a n a t i o n , c o n c r e t e - a n a l y t i c a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . Thus frame o f r e f e r e n c e concepts p l a y 
d e s c r i p t i v e f u n c t i o n s , u n i t and element concepts e x p l a n a t o r y 
f u n c t i o n s , W i t h i n t he e x p l a n a t o r y f u n c t i o n u n i t s and 
elements are d i s t i n g u i s h e d p r i m a r i l y by the c o n c r e t e -
a n a l y t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e . T h i s i s the b a s i c framework b u t the 
d i s c u s s i o n w i l l a t t e m p t t o be a l i v e t o the c o m p l i c a t i o n s 
i n d i c a t e d i n the above, 
i i ) D e s c r i p t i v e frame o f r e f e r e n c e c o ncepts. 
As can be g a t h e r e d from t h e above accounts o f 
e m p i r i c i s m and e m p i r i c a l a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d 
i s n o t a simple m a t t e r o f m i r r o r i n g what i s ' t h e r e ' . 
R ather ',.,„ d e s c r i p t i o n o f the f a c t s i n v o l v e s a c o n c e p t u a l 
scheme ,„,, I t i s n o t me r e l y a r e p r o d u c t i o n o f e x t e r n a l 
r e a l i t y b u t a s e l e c t i v e o r d e r i n g o f i t ' [ l937as283. To use 
one o f Parsons' examples i f we d e s c r i b e an event as a man 
c o m m i t t i n g s u i c i d e by jumping from a b r i d g e we have o r d e r e d 
the phenomena o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d i n a s e l e c t i v e way. The 
same phenomena c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f f a l l i n g b o d i e s 
where the d e s c r i p t i v e terms 'man', ' c o m m i t t i n g s u i c i d e ' o r 
'jumping' are i r r e l e v a n t , what i s r e l e v a n t i s the 'mass' and 
'weight' o f the body, i t s ' v e l o c i t y ' e t c , [ l 937a; 29, 73^-735/ • 
Parsons i n s i s t s on t h e n e c e s s i t y o f such d e s c r i p t i v e 
concepts % 
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' D e s c r i p t i v e frames o f r e f e r e n c e i n t h i s 
sense are fundamental t o a l l s c i e n c e . But 
by no means do t h e y exhaust s c i e n t i f i c 
c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . F a c t s cannot be 
d e s c r i b e d except w i t h i n such a schema. 
But t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n w i t h i n i t has i n the 
f i r s t i n s t a n c e , the f u n c t i o n o f d e f i n i n g a 
"phenomenon" which i s t o be e x p l a i n e d . 
That i s , o f the g r e a t mass o f p o s s i b l e 
e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s we s e l e c t those 
w h i c h are a t the same t i m e m e a n i n g f u l 
w i t h i n such a schema and "belong t o g e t h e r " . 
They th u s serve t o g e t h e r t o c h a r a c t e r i s e 
t h e e s s e n t i a l o b j e c t s o f a c o n c r e t e pheno-
menon, which t h e n becomes the o b j e c t o f 
s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t . T h i s i s what Max 
Weber c a l l s a " h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l " . 
I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t o be n o t e d t h a t t h i s 
i s n o t a simple case o f r e f l e c t i o n o f 
e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , b u t o f i t s c o n c e p t u a l i -
z a t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o a p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n 
o f s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t ' ["i937a;30]. 
We can i n i t i a l l y n o t e from t h e above t h a t frames o f 
r e f e r e n c e f a c i l i t a t e s e l e c t i o n and o r d e r i n g o f phenomena. 
Speaking o f t h e s e l e c t i v e n e s s o f s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t s Parsons 
says t h a t a d e s c r i p t i o n 
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* o » o i s p r e c i s e l y t he statement i n 
o u t l i n e form o f the aspects o f the 
co n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n w h i c h are o f 
i n t e r e s t f o r e x p l a n a t o r y purposes. 
I f t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t o 
be capable o f c a u s a l a n a l y s i s i t must 
be o v e r s i m p l i f i e d | i t must be reduced 
t o what i s e s s e n t i a l , o m i t t i n g the 
u n i m p o r t a n t ' „ [ l 9 3 7 a s 6 o 4 ] . 
S e l e c t i o n i s accompanied by a process o f c o n c e p t u a l o r d e r i n g ; 
'The su p p l y and demand schema i s a 
x^ay o f a r r a n g i n g r e l e v a n t f a c t s f o r purposes 
o f economic a n a l y s i s . Footnotes I t i s , i n 
the t e r m i n o l o g y o f t h i s s t u d y , a " d e s c r i p t i v e 
frame o f r e f e r e n c e " ' [ l 937as 1 71] , 
So d e s c r i p t i o n i n v o l v e s concepts w h i c h f a c i l i t a t e t h e 
s e l e c t i o n o f r e l e v a n t phenomena and ' p r e p a r i n g and o r g a n i z i n g 
the c o n c r e t e m a t e r i a l f o r ca u s a l a n a l y s i s ' ^1937as6o4j, 
The f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e p l a c e o f frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e concepts has a c c o r d i n g t o Parsons been one o f the 
bases o f the 'deep-rooted e r r o r s ' o f e m p i r i c i s m [ l937as29j . 
As a consequence he p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r e s s e s t he need f o r s e l f -
awareness and c l a r i t y o f such concepts. There are t h r e e 
reasons why t h i s i s necessary, t h r e e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n s 
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so t o speak, o f frames o f r e f e r e n c e s t o f a c i l i t a t e 
judgements about what phenomena are r e l e v a n t t o a g i v e n 
e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y , the converse, t o f a c i l i t a t e judgements 
o f t h e c a p a c i t i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s o f a g i v e n e x p l a n a t o r y 
t h e o r y , and f i n a l l y , t o f a c i l i t a t e the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 
d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s o f the same phenomena. 
•What i s o f i n t e r e s t t o a s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y i s n o t s e l f -
e v i d e n t , the o b j e c t t o be e x p l a i n e d must f i r s t be d e f i n e d i n 
r e s p e c t s which are r e l e v a n t t o t h e t h e o r y . Two examples can 
i l l u s t r a t e what Parsons has i n mind h e r e . The concept o f 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p can a c t as a d e s c r i p t i v e frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e [1 937as 7 ^ J <> As such i t a c t s as a c r i t e r i o n o f 
what are r e l e v a n t f a c t s ; 
'The i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i s t h a t i n s o f a r as 
th e r e l a t i o n s h i p schema i s employed f o r 
the o b s e r v a t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n o f the 
f a c t s o f human l i f e i n s o c i e t y i t s e t s 
a s t a n d a r d o f what are adequate observa-
t i o n s . I t i s n o t necessary t o observe 
a l l the a c t s o f t h e p a r t i e s t o a r e l a t i o n -
s h i p , o r a l l t h e i r a t t i t u d e s , e t c . , b u t 
o n l y enough t o e s t a b l i s h what i s f o r t h e 
purposes i n hand the r e l e v a n t " c h a r a c t e r " 
o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p ' | l 9 3 7 a : 7 4 4 ] . 
The supply-demand schema can a c t i n the same way. From h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n o f M a r s h a l l Parsons concludes t h a t f o r M a r s h a l l 
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"economics i s e s p e c i a l l y concerned w i t h the everyday b u s i n e s s 
o f l i f e i n so f a r as i t can be b r o u g h t i n t o r e l a t i o n with. 
s u p p l y and demand' [l937as17l] ° The d a t a o f everyday l i f e 
are o n l y r e l e v a n t t o M a r s h a l l ' s economics i f t h e y can be 
l o c a t e d i n terms o f s u p p l y and demands 
'A f a c t t o be r e l e v a n t t o £orthodoxJ 
economic t h e o r y must, i n an analogous 
way, be capable o f l o c a t i o n i n terms o f 
supp l y and demand. I t must be capable 
o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n as i n some way 
q u a l i f y i n g a good o r s e r v i c e f o r w h i c h 
t h e r e i s a demand, and which i s i n some 
degree sca r c e , r e l a t i v e l y t o t h e demand 
f o r i t ' p 937a: 28-29] . 
Parsons g i v e s as an example a s t u d y o f p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g 
jl 937as 172] „ T h i s i s r e l e v a n t t o economic t h e o r y o n l y 
i n s o f a r as p r o f e s s i o n a l t r a i n i n g can be expressed i n terms 
o f c o s t and r e l a t e d t o t h e e a r n i n g s o f p r o f e s s i o n a l men a 
So here frames o f r e f e r e n c e a c t as c r i t e r i a w hich f a c i l i t a t e 
judgements o f what are adequate o r r e l e v a n t f a c t s t o a t h e o r y . 
On the o t h e r hand frame o f r e f e r e n c e concepts p l a y t h e 
o p p o s i t e r o l e , f a c i l i t a t i n g judgements o f the c a p a c i t i e s and 
l i m i t a t i o n s o f a g i v e n e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y . Here t he q u e s t i o n 
i s a t what p o i n t does a t h e o r y o v e r r e a c h i t s e l f and d i s t o r t 
what i t p r e t e n d s t o e x p l a i n . 
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•The s c i e n t i f i c f u n c t i o n o f a d e s c r i p t i v e 
frame o f r e f e r e n c e i s t o make i t p o s s i b l e 
t o d e s c r i b e phenomena i n such a way as t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h those f a c t s about them whi c h 
are r e l e v a n t t o j ^ t h i s i s the f i r s t f u n c t i o n 
above] and capable of e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f 
a g i v e n t h e o r e t i c a l system from those w h i c h 
are no t ' f937a:735]. 
Again we can ta k e t he example o f s u p p l y and demand„ Parsons 
emphasises t h a t t o s e l e c t r e l e v a n t d a t a and arrange i t i n terms 
o f t h e concepts s u p p l y and demand does n o t mean t h a t t h e 
e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f economics can f u l l y e x p l a i n a l l aspects 
o f t h e f a c t s so d e s c r i b e d {T937as29j „ T h i s i s the reason 
f o r s e p a r a t i n g o u t these f i r s t two f u n c t i o n s as the adequacy 
o f f a c t s t o t h e o r y and the adequacy o f t h e o r y t o facts« 
Rathers 
' So l o n g as these f a c t s are talc en o n l y as 
d a t a , and t h e a n a l y s i s c o n f i n e d t o t h e i r 
i m p l i c a t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e market 
mechanism, i t may be argued t h a t t he 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f phenomena i s k e p t on an 
economic p l a n e i n the f a c t o r sense. The 
problems o f economic sci e n c e are t h e n 
c o n f i n e d t o a set o f r e l a t i o n s o f the 
d a t a o f su p p l y and demand, and are n o t 
extended t o the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the d a t a 
themselves fl937a; 172] (See alsos 
1937b5379 ) o 
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So some o f the f a c t s d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f a frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e are n o t capable o f e x p l a n a t i o n by the theory,, 
T h i s i s e l a b o r a t e d on i n Parsons' d i s t i n c t i o n between 
two c l a s s e s o f d a t a s e l e c t e d and o r g a n i z e d w i t h i n a frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e s c o n s t a n t and variable„ Constant d a t a i s 
r e l e v a n t t o the problem a t hand b u t i s n o t p r o b l e m a t i c a l 
from t h e p o i n t o f view o f the e x p l a n a t o r y theory,, V a r i a b l e 
f a c t s are those which are p r o b l e m a t i c a l s w h i c h the t h e o r y seeks 
t o e x p l a i n , I n the s u i c i d e example mentioned above t h e 
h e i g h t o f a b r i d g e and the d e p t h o f the w a t e r are r e l e v a n t 
f a c t s , i f the b r i d g e was o n l y t h r e e f e e t h i g h and the w a t e r 
one f o o t deep t h e n one xirould want t o q u e s t i o n the ' s u i c i d e ' 
h y p o t h e s i s o But these f a c t s are g i v e n , o r c o n s t a n t , d a t a , 
from t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f a c t i o n one 
i s n o t concerned t o e x p l a i n them,, 
'Thus the d a t a o f any c o n c r e t e problem 
f a l l i n t o the two c l a s s e s , " c o n s t a n t " d a t a 
and the v a l u e s o f v a r i a b l e s . One. o f the 
most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s o f the frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e i s t o enable t h e d i s t i n c t i o n t o 
be drawn. Constants can o n l y be d e s c r i b e d 
i n terms o f t h i s frame o f r e f e r e n c e ; t h e i r 
f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e s a f u r t h e r s e t o f 
t e r m s o The d e s c r i p t i o n o f v a l u e s o f 
v a r i a b l e s , on the o t h e r hand, i s the 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a n a l y s i s ' f\ 937as 736-7] • 
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Frames o f r e f e r e n c e p e r f o r m t h i s f u n c t i o n by making-
e x p l i c i t t he p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s \ r t i i c h an e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y 
makes about i t s s u b j e c t m a t t e r , thus, one o f the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 
o f t h e t h e o r y o f a c t i o n i s t h a t the f a c t s can be d e s c r i b e d 
i n terms o f 'the s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f view o f the a c t o r 1 . 
T h i s a p p l i e s t o p h y s i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l phenomena, w i t h i n 
t h e frame o f r e f e r e n c e these are d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f t h i s 
p o i n t o f view, as means and c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n . P a r t i c u l a r l y 
r e l e v a n t here i s the a c t o r ' s own body as a b i o l o g i c a l 
organism. The b i o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e body are 
c o n s t a n t s f o r the t h e o r y o f a c t i o n , t h e y may be r e l e v a n t d a t a 
b u t are o u t s i d e the e x p l a n a t o r y c a p a c i t y o f the t h e o r y as i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the c r i t e r i o n , o f s u b j e c t i v i t y . The converse 
a p p l i e s , one o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f a b i o l o g i c a l frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e i s the i r r e l e v a n c e o f s u b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i e s ^1937as 
75 3 J } the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f the organism as an a c t o r i s t h e n 
o u t s i d e the c a p a c i t i e s o f the b i o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e s . The 
l a c k o f awareness o f t h e parameters o f the b i o l o g i c a l and 
p h y s i c a l frames o f r e f e r e n c e and t h e i r a t t e m p t s t o a p p l y the 
e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f those sciences t o ' a c t i o n ' i s what 
Parsons l a b e l s r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m . 
By making e x p l i c i t t he parameters o f r e l e v a n t f a c t s 
and the c a p a c i t i e s o f t h e o r y frame o f r e f e r e n c e concepts 
make p o s s i b l e a t h i r d t a s k ; t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f d i f f e r e n t 
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h e same phenomena. Parsons i s p a r t i , c u l a r l y 
i n s i s t e n t t h a t any c o n c r e t e phenomenon i s capable o f 
d e s c r i p t i o n i n terms o f d i f f e r e n t frames o f r e f e r e n c e and t h a t 
- 100 -
these w i l l o v e r l a p i n the sense t h a t a g i v e n phenomena 
w i l l be c o n s t a n t f o r one frame o f r e f e r e n c e b u t v a r i a b l e 
f o r a n o t h e r . 
' I t i s above a l l t o be emphasized t h a t 
t h e same e m p i r i c a l f a c t s may, a c c o r d i n g 
t o the s c i e n t i f i c purpose i n view, be 
s t a t e d i n terms o f more t h a n one such 
schema... 1 [ l 937a: 2 9 ] . 
There i s an i n i t i a l a m b i g u i t y as t o t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p 
o f such d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s c a s t i n terms o f d i f f e r e n t 
frames o f r e f e r e n c e . Parsons says t h a t t h e l a t t e r 
may be o f g r e a t l y v a r y i n g degrees o f g e n e r a l i t y o f a p p l i c a -
t i o n s and perhaps d i f f e r i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s ' j l 9 3 7 a : 2 8 j . 
There are two p o s i t i o n s h e r e . F i r s t l y , frames o f r e f e r e n c e 
can be r e l a t e d t o each o t h e r i n terms o f ascending o r d e r s 
o f g e n e r a l i t y . So one frame o f r e f e r e n c e i s a * subschemata 1 
o f a more g e n e r a l scheme. For example, 'Supply and demand 
i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d as a subschemata o f a c t i o n ' j j 9 3 7 a : 3 Q ] „ 
But secondly Parsons says t h a t frames o f r e f e r e n c e may 
' d i f f e r i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s ' t h a n t h e i r degree o f g e n e r a l i t y 
so t h a t t h e y may be '... r e l a t e d t o each o t h e r n o t o n l y i n 
the sense t h a t one i s a narrow, s p e c i a l case o f an o t h e r b u t 
by c u t t i n g across each o t h e r 1 J\ 937a: 29-30] . Here r a t h e r 
t h a n g e n e r a l i t y a d i f f e r e n t t y p e o f r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
suggested which ' c u t s a c r o s s ' t h e f i r s t . T h i s i s 'the 
s c i e n t i f i c purpose i n view' £l937a;3oJ « To e x e m p l i f y t h i s 
Parsons w r i t e s : 
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• I t i s a g r e a t s e r v i c e o f P r o f e s s o r 
Z n a n i e c k i t o have p o i n t e d out t h a t 
e s s e n t i a l l y the same f a c t s about "man 
i n s o c i e t y " may be s t a t e d i n any one 
o f f o u r d i f f e r e n t schemata o f t h i s 
c h a r a c t e r , which he c a l l s " s o c i a l a c t i o n " , 
" s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s " , " s o c i a l groups" 
and " s o c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y " ' [1937as3<5] . 
Then t h e q u e s t i o n i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these two, 
the degree o f g e n e r a l i t y o f a frame o f r e f e r e n c e and i t s 
s c i e n t i f i c p u r p o s e 0 T h i s i s ambiguous as the two seem t o 
get confused, a few pages a f t e r t h e passage quoted above 
Parsons sayss 
'The mutual r e l a t i o n s o f the f o u r 
schemata mentioned above are p r i m a r i l y 
those o f d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s on which 
" s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e " i s described,, Of 
these f o u r , a t any r a t e , t h e one o f 
i n t e r e s t h e r e , t h a t o f " a c t i o n " , may 
be r e g a r d e d as t h e most elementary' 
[ l 937as39] . 
Here Z n a n i e c k i ' s f o u r frames o f r e f e r e n c e , w h i c h were 
i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e d as e x e m p l i f y i n g d i f f e r e n t s c i e n t i f i c 
purposes are now r e l a t e d i n terms o f v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e i r 
g e n e r a l i t y , , 
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E s s e n t i a l l y t h i s problem seems t o a r i s e because 
Parsons i n c l u d e s a v a r i e t y o f d e s c r i p t i v e concepts under 
the h e a d i n g 'frame o f reference'„ These range a l l t he way 
from t he fundamental p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e scie n c e s o f 
n a t u r e , a c t i o n and c u l t u r e t o d e s c r i p t i o n s o f c o n c r e t e 
' h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s ' and events„ I n between these are 
a l s o i n c l u d e d t h e frames o f r e f e r e n c e o f p a r t i c u l a r s ciences 
such as economics and t h e problem areas w i t h i n a sc i e n c e 
such as Z n a n i e c k i ' s f o u r f o l d system o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g 'man 
i n s o c i e t y ' 0 When Parsons t a l k s about each o f these t h e 
same g e n e r a l terms are employed; the s e l e c t i v e o r d e r i n g 
o f r e a l i t y i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t . C l e a r l y 
these are r a t h e r o v e r g e n e r a l i z e d and d i s t i n c t i o n s must be 
made between them,, 
We can d i s t i n g u i s h between two types o f frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e concepts w h i c h can be c a l l e d p r i m a r y and 
(1 6 ^ 
secondary.* ' The p r i m a r y c o n c e p t u a l schemes are the 
frames o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n , n a t u r e and c u l t u r e . W i t h i n 
each o f these are p l u r a l i t i e s o f secondary d e s c r i p t i v e 
schemas whic h are b o t h n a r r o w e r i n scope and developed f o r 
s p e c i f i c purposes w i t h i n the parameters o f the p r i m a r y frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i m a r y and secondary 
frames o f r e f e r e n c e r e s t s on two grounds w h i c h I w i l l c a l l t h e 
c r i t e r i o n o f r e d u c i b i l i t y and the b a s i s o f ' s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t . 
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¥ith r e s p e c t t o the f i r s t , t h e c r i t e r i o n o f 
r e d u c i b i l i t y , t h e q u e s t i o n i s whether o r n o t i t i s p o s s i b l e 
t o reduce the aspects o f phenomena r e l e v a n t t o a g i v e n frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e t o a more b a s i c frame o f r e f e r e n c e w i t h o u t 
l o s i n g j u s t those aspects c e n t r a l t o the o r i g i n a l frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e , I n the case o f p r i m a r y concepts t h i s i s n o t 
p o s s i b l e , a l l t h r e e have i n h e r e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h 
cannot be subsumed under each o t h e r . I n t h e case o f 
secondary frames o f r e f e r e n c e i t i s p o s s i b l e t o do t h i s , 
f o r example, the s u p p l y and demand scheme and the s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , s o c i a l group and s o c i a l p e r s o n a l i t y schemes 
are a l l subschemas o f t h e primajry frame o f r e f e r e n c e o f 
a c t i o n . T h e i r subschema s t a t u s i n terms o f t h e c r i t e r i o n 
o f r e d u c i b i l i t y i s i n d i c a t e d by the f o l l o w i n g passages? 
•That the r e l a t i o n s h i p schema i s secondary 
t o t h a t o f a c t i o n i s proved by the f o l l o w i n g 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; I t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t o 
i s o l a t e ( c o n c e p t u a l l y ) u n i t a c t s from a 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . But i t i s q u i t e 
i m p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e even c o n c e p t u a l l y 
a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p from the a c t i o n s 
o f the p a r t i e s ' [ l 937a; 7^5] . 
'At the same ti m e i n the p r e s e n t c o n t e x t 
the group schema i s a l s o t o be re g a r d e d 
as secondary t o the a c t i o n schema. 
There are no group p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are n o t 
r e d u c i b l e t o p r o p e r t i e s o f systems o f 
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a c t i o n and t h e r e i s no a n a l y t i c a l t h e o r y 
o f groups w h i c h i s n o t t r a n s l a t a b l e i n t o 
terms o f the t h e o r y o f a c t i o n ' Fl937as 
7^7] = 
So t he employment o f secondary frames o f r e f e r e n c e i s a m a t t e r 
'When a c e r t a i n degree o f c o m p l e x i t y i s 
reached, however, t o d e s c r i b e the system 
i n f u l l i n terms o f t h e ac t i o n , schema, 
would i n v o l v e a degree o f e l a b o r a t i o n 
o f d e t a i l w h i c h would be v e r y l a b o r i o u s 
and p e d a n t i c t o work o u t , „„„ F o r t u n a t e l y , 
as c e r t a i n degrees o f c o m p l e x i t y are 
reached, t h e r e emerge o t h e r ways o f 
d e s c r i b i n g t h e f a c t s , t h e employment o f 
which c o n s t i t u t e s a c o n v e n i e n t " s h o r t h a n d " 
t h a t i s adequate f o r a l a r g e number o f 
s c i e n t i f i c purposes' [l 937as 7^3=7^4] «, 
There i s , however, a f u r t h e r p o i n t o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
between p r i m a r y and secondary frames o f r e f e r e n c e on w h i c h 
i n f a c t t h e c r i t e r i o n o f r e d u c i b i l i t y u l t i m a t e l y r e s t s . I n 
the above i t has been n o t e d t h a t frames o f r e f e r e n c e f a c i l i t a t e 
t h e s e l e c t i o n and o r d e r i n g o f phenomena w h i c h are r e l e v a n t f o r 
an e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y w h i l s t g u a r d i n g a g a i n s t t h e ove r -
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f a t h e o r y t o f a c t s i t cannot cope w i t h . As 
o f ' s c i e n t i f i c economy [ I937as7^5j 
[1 a; ^ ^^] 
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such frames o f r e f e r e n c e d e f i n e t he parameters o f 
r e l e v a n c e , competance and i n t e r e s t . ¥e can now ask on 
what grounds can t h i s c l a i m be j u s t i f i e d ? To answer 
t h i s q u e s t i o n t he d i s c u s s i o n w i l l proceed i n terms o f 
the s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e sources o f the c o n t e n t o f 
frames o f r e f e r e n c e . 
I n the f i r s t case, the s u b j e c t i v e , the c o n t e n t o f 
the concept d e r i v e s from the s c i e n t i s t , i t i s a'way o f 
l o o k i n g ' a t the phenomena o f exp e r i e n c e which must i n some 
way o r o t h e r be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h a t phenomena i t s e l f . As 
i t stands however t h i s i s too crude, we must f u r t h e r 
d i s t i n g u i s h between what can be c a l l e d t h e c u l t u r a l and 
a p r i o r i c o n t e n t o f frames o f r e f e r e n c e . The f i r s t are 
p a r t i c u l a r t o g i v e n c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n s , t h e n the 'way o f 
l o o k i n g ' would be s p e c i f i c t o l i m i t e d common-sense w o r l d s and 
v a l u e s t a n d p o i n t s . The second are 'ways o f l o o k i n g ' w h i c h 
t r a n s c e n d any p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e b e i n g g e n e r i c 
t o a l l human bei n g s and hence must be counted as a p r i o r i 
p r o p e r t i e s o f the human mind. 
The q u e s t i o n t h e n i s whether Parsons frame o f r e f e r e n c e 
concepts are s u b j e c t i v e i n e i t h e r o r b o t h o f the above senses? 
As has been n o t e d i n the p r e c e e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n o f science 
and common sense Parsons does suggest t h a t frames o f 
r e f e r e n c e have c u l t u r a l c o n t e n t . Another example r e l a t e s 
- 106 -
t o t h e s u i c i d e jumping from the b r i d g e mentioned above. 
Parsons comments a t one p o i n t ; 
'Indeed t he word b r i d g e i n everyday-
speech g e t s i t s p r i m a r y meaning p r e c i s e l y 
from i t s r e l a t i o n t o the a c t i o n schema. 
I t i s a s t r u c t u r e o ver a body o f wa t e r 
o r some o t h e r b a r r i e r , over which people 
o r v e h i c l e s may go. I t i s d e f i n e d 
f u n c t i o n a l l y by i t s r e l a t i o n t o a c t i o n 
n o t p h y s i c a l l y as an a g g r e g a t i o n o r as a 
d e t e r m i n a t e s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n s ' , 
fl937a;738] , 
However the above d i s c u s s i o n o f science and common sense 
and the t h e o r y o f the development o f science have a t t e m p t e 
t o show t h a t as a s c i e n t i f i c frame o f r e f e r e n c e ' t r a n s c e n d 
common sense and becomes ' m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d ' 
f l 937a; 28] , i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s c u l t u r a l c o n t e n t w h i c h i s 
eliminated„ 
'The a t t i t u d e o f the s c i e n t i s t i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t o f t h e obs e r v e r ; he 
i s concerned w i t h g i v e n phenomena. I t 
i s t r u e t h a t modern s c i e n t i f i c metho-
d o l o g y has become s u f f i c i e n t l y 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d t o r e a l i z e t h a t t h e 
s c i e n t i s t i s more t h a n a p u r e l y p a s s i v e 
m i r r o r o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a p h o t o g r a p h i c 
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p l a t e . S c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s 
i t s e l f a process o f a c t i o n ; i t i s t h e 
p u r s u i t , n o t o f knowledge i n the 
a b s t r a c t , b u t o f p a r t i c u l a r knowledge 
o f p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s , ¥ith r e f e r e n c e 
t o d a t a i t i s a s e l e c t i v e p rocess, 
s e l e c t i o n b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d b o t h , as has 
been seen, by the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
systems and by e x t r a - s c i e n t i f i c 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . But n e v e r t h e l e s s the 
aim o f science i s t o reduce t o a minimum 
the elements which do n o t l i e i n the f a c t s 
themselves. I t s development approaches 
an asymptote when t h e y are e l i m i n a t e d ' 
[ I 9 3 7 a s 3 6 9 l . 
T h i s passage p o i n t s t o a major p l a c e f o r the o b j e c t i v e 
c o n t e n t o f frames o f r e f e r e n c e . But b e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s 
we must f i r s t t u r n t o t h e a p r i o r i s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t o f frames 
o f r e f e r e n c e . 
Parsons c l a i m s t h a t t h e r e are f e a t u r e s o f the frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n w h i c h are a p r i o r i i n the above 
sense [ l 9 3 7 a ; kk-k8, 7 3 2 - 7 3 3 } . These ar e ; (a) the concepts 
o f end, means, c o n d i t i o n s and norms as components o f a c t s , 
(b) the t e m p o r a l r e f e r e n c e ; a c t i o n i s a process i n t i m e , 
( c ) t he s u b j e c t i v i t y o f the above concepts; t h e y are 
c o n s t r u e d from the p o i n t o f view o f the a c t o r , (d) the 
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p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r ( i n c l u d e d o n l y i n [1937a; £|4-48] ) and 
(e) the t e l e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f a c t i o n ( i n c l u d e d o n l y i n 
[l 937a; 732-733] ) o U i t h o u t t h i s c o n c e p t u a l framework ' t a l k 
about a c t i o n f a i l s t o make sense' [1937a; 732], ' i t i s 
i m p o s s i b l e even t o t a l k about a c t i o n i n terms t h a t do n o t 
i n v o l v e t he means-end framework w i t h a l l the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
j u s t d i s c u s s e d ' [1 937a: 733] ° 
Three p o i n t s should be n o t e d h e r e . F i r s t l y , the 
frame o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n i s s u b j e c t i v e i n the above 
sense, Parsons c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the c o n s t i t u e n t 
o f the frame o f r e f e r e n c e and the " e m p i r i c a l w o r l d " . 
'These u n d e r l y i n g f e a t u r e s o f t h e a c t i o n 
schema which are here c a l l e d the "frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e " do n o t c o n s t i t u t e " d a t a " 
o f any e m p i r i c a l problem; t h e y are n o t 
components o f any c o n c r e t e system o f a c t i o n 
. . . o T h i s i s not t r u e o f the components 
o f c o n c r e t e a c t i o n system, o r o f the v a l u e s 
o f a n a l y t i c a l elements, the s p e c i f i c 
c o n t e n t o f ends and the l i k e . They are 
o f t h e e m p i r i c a l o r d e r o f e x i s t e n c e and 
are s u b j e c t t o a n a l y s i s i n terms o f c a u s a l i t y 
and c o n c r e t e e m p i r i c a l p r o c e s s . The 
d i s t i n c t i o n bet\^een the a c t i o n frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e and the c o n c r e t e d a t a i s v i t a l ' 
[1937a: 733] • 
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Secondly, from what has been s a i d i t i s c l e a r t h a t these 
concepts are n o t p a r t i c u l a r t o any g i v e n c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t , 
Parsons one cannot conceive o f a c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t from 
which i t would be p o s s i b l e t o t a l k about ' a c t i o n ' 
o u t s i d e o f these terms. They thus t r a n s c e n d any c u l t u r a l 
c o n t e n t . T h i r d l y , t h i s i s n o t a m a t t e r o f c o n v e n t i o n a l 
d e f i n i t i o n , i t i s n o t t h a t Parsons i s s a y i n g t h a t the 
above f e a t u r e s are necessary t o t a l k about a c t i o n because 
t h i s i s how a c t i o n i s d e f i n e d . Parsons i s w a n t i n g t o 
p u t f o r w a r d a f a r s t r o n g e r view t h a n t h i s , t h a t the a c t i o n 
frame o f r e f e r e n c e s t a t e s c o n c e p t u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f the 
human mind i n terms o f which c e r t a i n phenomena are 
i n e v i t a b l y e x p e r i e n c e d ; 
'Thus t h e a c t i o n frame o f r e f e r e n c e may 
be s a i d t o have what many, f o l l o w i n g 
H u s s e r l , have c a l l e d a "phenomenological" 
s t a t u s . I t i n v o l v e s no c o n c r e t e d a t a 
t h a t can be " t h o u g h t away", t h a t are 
s u b j e c t t o change. I t i s n o t a pheno-
menon i n the e m p i r i c a l sense. I t i s 
t h e i n d i s p e n s i b l e l o g i c a l framework i n 
w h i c h we d e s c r i b e and t h i n k about the 
phenomena o f a c t i o n ' [l 937a; 733]. 
I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t Parsons f r e q u e n t r e f e r e n c e s t o 
c l a s s i c a l mechanics becomes c l e a r . The a c t i o n frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e i s a p a r a l l e l t o the c a t e g o r i e s o f t h o u g h t w h i c h 
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Kants c r i t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f Newton's p h y s i c s 
(17) 
p r o d u c e d . v ' The f e a t u r e s o f t h e a c t i o n frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e t h e n 
' o o o are i n t h i s r e s p e c t analogous 
t o the space-time framework o f p h y s i c s . 
Every p h y s i c a l phenomenon must i n v o l v e 
processes i n t i m e , w h i c h happen t o 
p a r t i c l e s w h i c h can be l o c a t e d i n 
space. I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o t a l k about 
p h y s i c a l processes i n any o t h e r terms, 
a t l e a s t so l o n g as the c o n c e p t u a l 
scheme o f the c l a s s i c a l p h y s i c s i s 
employed' [l937as733] . 
From the above remarks i t can be concluded t h a t i n the 
i d e a l case a t l e a s t , the s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t o f frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e concepts i s r e s t r i c t e d t o such a p r i o r i c a t e g o r i e s . 
The p r i m a r y and secondary d i s t i n c t i o n and the c r i t e r i o n o f 
i r r e d u c i b i l i t y can now be p u t i n t o t h i s c o n t e x t . C l e a r l y 
the c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e n t o f a l l frames o f r e f e r e n c e cannot 
c l a i m an a p r i o r i s t a t u s , i t would be absurd t o say t h a t the 
concepts o f s u p p l y and demand were p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e mind, 
f o r example. So t h i s a p r i o r i c o n t e n t o f frames o f 
r e f e r e n c e must be r e s t r i c t e d t o the p r i m a r y t y p e , t h e most 
ele m e n t a r y concepts o f n a t u r e , a c t i o n and c u l t u r e . I t i s i n 
these terms, t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e n t , t h a t t h e y c o n s t i t u t e 
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p r i m a r y frames o f r e f e r e n c e . F u r t h e r i t i s from t h i s 
s t a n d p o i n t t h a t secondary frames o f r e f e r e n c e are d e r i v a t i v e 
and can be reduced t o the p r i m a r y concepts w h i l s t i t i s 
i m p o s s i b l e t o reduce p r i m a r y frames o f r e f e r e n c e t o each 
o t h e r o r t h e i r d e r i v a t i v e s . 
T h i s l e a v e s us w i t h d e f i n i t e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the 
c o n t e n t o f secondary frames o f r e f e r e n c e ; i t d e r i v e s 
from t he o b j e c t o f s t u d y . The concept summarises s e l e c t e d 
aspects o f the phenomena i t s e l f . As a concept t he frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e o n l y s t a t e s the parameters o f s e l e c t i o n , w h i c h 
aspects o f the c o n c r e t e phenomena are t o be s e l e c t e d . So 
o f t he supply-demand schema Parsons says; 
'But the phenomena whic h are d e s c r i b e d i n 
terms o f the s u p p l y and demand schedules 
M a r s h a l l uses are c o n c r e t e phenomena. 
They a r e , on the one hand, the r e g i s t e r 
o f t he c o n c r e t e wants o f a p l u r a l i t y o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s , n o t ends as an a n a l y t i c a l element 
i n t h e i r a c t i o n . On the o t h e r hand t h e 
sup p l y schedule i s a s t a t e o f the c o n c r e t e 
( i n p a r t h y p o t h e t i c a l ) r e l a t i o n s o f q u a n t i t y 
s u p p l i e d as a f u n c t i o n o f p r i c e 1 ^1937a;17lJ° 
A g a i n i n the case o f t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p scheme the same 
p o i n t a p p l i e s . 
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' . . . i t lias been seen t h a t t h e a c t s and 
a c t i o n systems o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s , 
i n so f a r as t h e y are m u t u a l l y o r i e n t e d 
t o one a n o t h e r , c o n s t i t u t e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -
s h i p s . I n so f a r as t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n o f 
the a c t i o n systems o f i n d i v i d u a l s i s 
c o n t i n u o u s and r e g u l a r these r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
a c q u i r e c e r t a i n i d e n t i f i a b l e , r e l a t i v e l y 
c o n s t a n t p r o p e r t i e s o r d e s c r i p t i v e aspects' 
[1 937a; 7 ^ ] . 
So t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p scheme r e s t r i c t s a t t e n t i o n t o 
a c t i o n i n t h a t i t s e l e c t i v e l y draws o u t t h e c o n t i n u o u s and 
r e g u l a r i n t e r a c t i o n o f a c t i o n systems and arranges t h i s d a t a 
i n terms o f ' i d e n t i f i a b l e , r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t p r o p e r t i e s o r 
d e s c r i p t i v e a s p e c t s ' . F i n a l l y a ' h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l ' 
such as Weber's 'modern r a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s c a p i t a l i s m , t h e 
I n d i a n c a s t e system, Chinese p a t r i m o n i a l bureaucracy' are 
' p r e c i s e l y t h e statement i n o u t l i n e form o f the aspects o f 
the c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n w h i c h are o f i n t e r e s t f o r e x p l a n a t o r y 
purposes. I f t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t o be capable o f 
caus a l a n a l y s i s i t must be o v e r s i m p l i f i e d ! i t must be 
reduced t o what i s e s s e n t i a l , o m i t t i n g what i s u n i m p o r t a n t ' 
[1 937a: 60k] . 
Secondary frames o f r e f e r e n c e t h e n are c l a s s i f i c a t o r y 
concepts by means o f which s e l e c t i o n i s made from t h e 
phenomena o f e x p e r i e n c e . However i n the above account i t 
has been mentioned s e v e r a l t i m e s t h a t frames o f r e f e r e n c e 
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d e f i n e n o t o n l y w h a t i s r e l e v a n t d a t a b u t a l s o wiiat i s 
' i m p o r t a n t ' , ' s i g n i f i c a n t ' a n d o f ' i n t e r e s t ' . C l a s s i f i -
c a t o r y c o n c e p t s d o n o t i n t h e m s e l v e s seem t o j u s t i f y t h i s G 
On t h e o t h e r h a n d s u b j e c t i v e c o n c e p t s w i t h c u l t u r a l c o n t e n t 
h a v e s u c h q u a l i t i e s , i n ¥ e b e r ' s t e r m s c o n c e p t s p r o v i d e a 
l i n k b e t w e e n t h e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d a n d o u r v a l u e s t a n d p o i n t s 
a s P a r s o n s r e c o g n i z e s i n h i s a c c o u n t o f v a l u e r e l e v a n c e ; 
'Human b e i n g s , t h e i r a c t i o n s a n d c u l t u r a l 
a c h i e v e m e n t s a r e t h e e m b o d i m e n t s o f v a l u e 
t o w a r d w h i c h we m u s t , i n some d e g r e e , t a k e 
a v a l u e a t t i t u d e . H e n c e o u r i n t e r e s t i n 
t h e m i s d i r e c t l y d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e i r 
r e l e v a n c e t o t h e v a l u e s w h i c h e i t h e r t h e 
s c i e n t i s t h i m s e l f s h a r e s o r w h i c h a r e 
s i g n i f i c a n t t o h i m b y a g r e e m e n t w i t h h i s 
own v a l u e s o r c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e m ' £l937as592j. 
B u t a s we h a v e s e e n P a r s o n s w i s h e s t o e l i m i n a t e t h e c u l t u r a l 
c o n t e n t o f f r a m e s o f r e f e r e n c e a s ' e x t r a - s c i e n t i f i c 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' [I937a-s3^>9] <• What P a r s o n s s u g g e s t s t h e n i s 
t h a t a s t h i s p r o c e s s o f e l i m i n a t i o n p r o c e e d s t h e c o n t e n t 
o f f r a m e s o f r e f e r e n c e b e c o m e s o b j e c t i v e i n t h e a b o v e s e n s e 
a n d t h e b a s i s o f i n t e r e s t b e c o m e s t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e . T h i s c a n b e s e e n 
i n P a r s o n s ' c r i t i c i s m o f W e b e r ' s v a l u e r e l e v a n c e p r i n c i p l e . 
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'A f u r t h e r e l e m e n t seems n o t t o h a v e 
r e c e i v e d s u f f i c i e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n W e b e r " s 
o f o r i g i n a l i n t e r e s t may b e , t h e r e i s a n 
i n h e r e n t t e n d e n c y f o r t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e s o f a l l s c i e n c e i n w h a t e v e r 
f i e l d t o b e c o m e l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d s y s t e m s . 
T h e n , i n so f a r a s t h e r e i s a n i n s t r u m e n t a l 
i n t e r e s t i n t h e s o c i a l f i e l d , t h e g e n e r a l 
c o n c e p t u a l p r o d u c t s o f t h i s i n t e r e s t w i l l 
t e n d t o b e c o m e i n t e g r a t e d i n t h e same 
s y s t e m s a s t h o s e i s s u i n g f r o m t h e v a l u e 
a s p e c t . Once t h i s h a s h a p p e n e d t o a n 
a p p r e c i a b l e d e g r e e t h e r e x i r i l l e x i s t , a s h a s 
b e e n e m p h a s i s e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s s t u d y , a 
s e c o n d a r y b a s i s o f i n t e r e s t i n c o n c r e t e 
p h e n o m e n a — t h a t d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e 
o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m i t s e l f . T h e 
i n t e r e s t t o t h i s e x t e n t w i l l b e d i r e c t e d 
t o t h o s e a s p e c t s o f c o n c r e t e p h e n o m e n a 
w h i c h a r e i m p o r t a n t t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
s e n s e , i n t e r e s t i n p h e n o m e n a i n s o f a r a s t h a t p h e n o m e n a i s 
i m p o r t a n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e . 
p a r t „ I t i s t h a t w h a t e v e r t h e m o t i v e s 
s y s t e m ' f l 9 3 7 a s 5 9 7 ] . 
P a r s o n s ' f r e q u e n t r e f e r e n c e t o s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t ( f o r 
a m p l e I l 9 3 7 a s 3 0 , bOk, 582] ) t h e n i s m e a n t i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
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' J u s t w h a t o r d e r o f s t a t e m e n t s a n d how 
m a n y i s a q u e s t i o n w h i c h i s r e l a t i v e b o t h 
t o t h e e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n 
b e i n g s t u d i e d , a n d t o t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m i n t e r m s o f w h i c h i t i s b e i n g 
a n a l y z e d . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f a n y 
c o n c e p t u a l s cheme t h e r e i s a n " a d e q u a t e " 
d e s c r i p t i o n , t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a 
s u f f i c i e n t n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t facts„ 
o . „ TThat f a c t s a r e i m p o r t a n t i s d e t e r m i n e d 
b y t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m ' 
[ l 937a: 42] . 
We c a n now come b a c k t o t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h s c i e n t i f i c 
k n o w l e d g e i s a b s t r a c t b e c a u s e i t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s f r a m e 
o f r e f e r e n c e d e s c r i p t i v e concepts» F r o m t h e a b o v e i t i s 
c l e a r t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a b s t r a c t i o n d i f f e r s a s b e t w e e n 
p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y d e s c r i p t i v e c o n c e p t s . I n t h e c a s e 
o f t h e f o r m e r t h e s e n s e o f a b s t r a c t i o n i s a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e 
s e c o n d q u a l i f i c a t i o n o n r e a l i s m n o t e d above„ A p r i m a r y f r a m e 
o f r e f e r e m e s t a t e s t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e 
a b o u t t h e r e a l i t y i t c l a i m s t o s t u d y . A s s u c h P a r s o n s 
seems t o b e s a y i n g v e r y l i t t l e f o r i f a l l p o s s i b l e k n o w l e d g e 
i s a b s t r a c t i n t h i s s e n s e t h e n , a s common d e n o m i n a t o r s 
p r i m a r y f r a m e s o f r e f e r e n c e h a r d l y seem i m p o r t a n t g i v e n 
P a r s o n s ' e m p h a s i s o n t h e p a r t i a l i t y o f d e s c r i p t i o n a n d 
t h e r o l e o f f r a m e s o f r e f e r e n c e i n i d e n t i f y i n g t h e l i m i t s 
o f t h i s p a r t i a l i t y „ H o w e v e r , t h e r e i s a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t 
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h e r e , f o r t h e r e i s n o t o n e b u t t h r e e p r i m a r y f r a m e s o f 
r e f e r e n c e a n d h e n c e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e m b e c o m i n g c o n f u s e d 
a n d ' m i s a p p l i e d ' i s o p e n . E x a m p l e s o f t h i s a r e v i t a l i s m i n 
b i o l o g y i n w h i c h t h e a c t i o n s c heme f r a m e s o u r t h i n k i n g a b o u t 
n a t u r e a n d c o n v e r s e l y p o s i t i v i s m i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e i n w h i c h 
t h e a t t e m p t i s made t o e m p l o y t h e f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e o f n a t u r e 
t o i n v e s t i g a t e a c t i o n . P a r s o n s w i s h e s t o a v o i d s u c h ' m i s -
a p p l i c a t i o n ' a n d p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l t o o l s 
t o a c h i e v e t h i s . 
S e c o n d a r y f r a m e s o f r e f e r e n c e r e p r e s e n t a d i f f e r e n t s e n s e 
o f a b s t r a c t i o n , t h e s e l e c t i o n a n d o r d e r i n g o f p a r t i a l a s p e c t s 
o f c o n c r e t e p h e n o m e n a . A d e s c r i p t i o n d e f i n e s a n o b j e c t o f 
s t u d y b u t a s s u c h i t i s n o t a c o m p l e t e o r f u l l a c c o u n t o f a l l 
t h a t c o u l d b e s a i d . T h e p r o b l e m t h e n l i e s i n t h e c r i t e r i a 
b y w h i c h t h e p a r t i a l i t y o f d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e l i m i t e d ' a n d 
d i r e c t e d . T h i s i s t h e n e c e s s a r y p l a c e o f f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e 
c o n c e p t s . B u t t o P a r s o n s a n e m p i r i c i s t m e t h o d o l o g y d o e s n o t 
r e a l i z e t h a t s u c h c o n c e p t s h a v e a n e c e s s a r y p l a c e a n d h e n c e 
f a i l s t o r e a l i z e t h e s e l e c t i v i t y a n d p a r t i a l i t y o f a n y 
d e s c r i p t i o n . One c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s i s t h e e m p i r i c i s t 
t e n d e n c y t o c a r r y o v e r common s e n s e c o n c e p t s a s f r a m e s o f 
r e f e r e n c e . Two p r o m i n e n t e x a m p l e s o f t h i s i n T h e S t r u c t u r e 
o f S o c i a l A c t i o n a r e D u r k h e i m ' s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l 
f a c t o r w i t h t h e c o n c r e t e s y s t e m o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n 
i n d i v i d u a l s [ l 9 3 7 a ; 3 3 7 s 367] a n d M a r s h a l l ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f 
e c o n o m i c s . O f M a r s h a l l s P a r s o n s s a y s 'He c o n s i s t e n t l y t h o u g h t 
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o f t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f h i s e c o n o m i c s a s t h a t o f a f i e l d o f 
/ 
c o n c r e t e p h e n o m e n a - i t w a s " a s t u d y o f m a n k i n d i n t h e e v e r y d a y / 
b u s i n e s s o f l i f e " 1 fl937as13o] , 
T h e e m p i r i c i s t t e n d e n c y t h e n i s t o d e f i n e t h e o b j e c t o f 
s t u d y i n t e r m s o f c o n c r e t e c a t e g o r i e s s s o c i e t y a n d t h e e v e r y d a y 
b u s i n e s s o f l i f e 0 T o P a r s o n s t h e v e r y f a c t t h a t t h e s e a r e 
s e l f - e v i d e n t b e t r a y s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y e m b o d y c o m m o n - s e n s e 
d e f i n i t i o n s o f t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r ; d e f i n i t i o n s w h i c h a r e 
l i m i t e d b y t h e s p e c i f i c i t y o f t h e i r c u l t u r a l c o n t e n t . T h i s i s 
w h a t P a r s o n s w i s h e s t o e x c l u d e . T o h i m s c i e n t i f i c f r a m e s o f 
r e f e r e n c e c o n c e p t s m u s t b e g r o u n d e d b o t h i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
o f t h e p h e n o m e n a i t s e l f a n d i n i m p o r t a n c e f o r e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y . 
T h e u p s h o t o f t h i s i s t h a t t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y c a n n o t b e u n d e r -
s t o o d a s a c o n c r e t e a r e a o f l i f e b u t a s a n a s p e c t o f t h e 
c o n c r e t e . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y o f t h e n a t u r a l 
s c i e n c e s i s n o t ' n a t u r e ' a s a c o n c r e t e e n t i t y somehow d i s t i n c t 
f r o m 'man'. C l e a r l y men a n d t h e i r a c t i o n s c a n b e j u s t a s m u c h 
t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y o f n a t u r a l s c i e n c e a s a n y o t h e r p a r t o f 
n a t u r e , men j u s t a s a p p l e s , f a l l f r o m a p p l e t r e e s . 
B u t n a t u r a l s c i e n c e c a n o n l y b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h a l i m i t e d 
a s p e c t o f h u m a n b e h a v i o u r . S i m i l a r l y w i t h i n t h e s c i e n c e s o f 
a c t i o n a d e s c r i p t i o n o f a n o b j e c t m u s t b e c a s t i n t e r m s o f c e r t a i n 
a s p e c t s o f i t s c o n s t i t u e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h a r e r e l e v a n t t o 
a t h e o r y , , So e c o n o m i c s i s n o t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d a s t h e s t u d y o f 
a p a r t i c u l a r a r e a o f l i f e , t h e ' e c o n o m y ' s a y , b u t a s t h e s t u d y o f 
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a n y a r e a o f l i f e i n s o f a r a s i t c a n b e b r o u g h t i n t o r e l a t i o n 
w i t h t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f e c o n o m i c s . I n M a r s h a l l ' s c a s e 
t h i s i s h i s u t i l i t y t h e o r y . T h e n ; 
' T h i s l o g i c a l l y s e p e r a b l e u t i l i t y a s p e c t 
c a n f o r m t h e b a s i s f o r a l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t 
d i s c i p l i n e , g e n e r a l l y c a l l e d e c o n o m i c t h e o r y , 
w h i c h , h o w e v e r , i n t h e s e t e r m s m u s t be h e l d 
t o b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h a n e l e m e n t o r g r o u p o f 
e l e m e n t s i n c o n c r e t e h u m a n a c t i o n a n d n o t a 
c o n c r e t e l y s e p a r a b l e c a t e g o r y o f t h e p h e n o m e n a 
o f h u m a n a c t i o n , a k i n d o r t y p e o f a c t i o n ' 
So w h e n P a r s o n s , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o c o n c e p t u a l s c h e m e s a s f r a m e s 
o f r e f e r e n c e s p e a k s o f a d e f i n e d p h e n o m e n a a s ' " m e a n i n g f u l " w i t h i n 
s u c h a s c h e m e ' o r t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f p h e n o m e n a w h i c h ' b e l o n g 
c r i t e r i a o f m e a n i n g f u l n e s s a n d b e l o n g i n g t o g e t h e r l i e w i t h i n 
t h e e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e . 
T h i s t a k e s t h e d i s c u s s i o n o n t o e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t s b u t 
b e f o r e d o i n g t h a t o n e a n t i c i p a t o r y p o i n t o u g h t t o b e made. 
E x p l a n a t i o n c a n n e v e r a p p l y t o p h e n o m e n a p e r s e , o n l y t o t h o s e 
a s p e c t s o f p h e n o m e n a c a p t u r e d w i t h i n a f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e a n d so 
d e s c r i b e d . A n y g i v e n p h e n o m e n o n , t h e n , w i l l b e o p e n t o 
e x p l a n a t i o n b y a p l u r a l i t y o f e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r i e s . A c r u c i a l 
q u e s t i o n i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e s e t h e o r i e s , i n . p a r t i c u l a r s 
[ l 937a; 11k\ . 
t o g e t h e r ' i n t e r m s o f a f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e L l 9 3 7 a ; 3 0 j t h e 
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h o w a d e q u a t e a n e x p l a n a t i o n i s c o n t a i n e d i n a n y o n e ? G i v e n 
P a r s o n s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g - o f d e s c r i p t i o n t h i s q u e s t i o n c a n n o t b e 
a n s w e r e d b y e m p i r i c a l t e s t a l o n e a t h i s w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e 
e m p i r i c i s t ' s d i r e c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f a t h e o r y a n d a p a r t i c u l a r 
c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y e So; 
' I t i s q u i t e i l l e g i t i m a t e t o r e q u i r e , a s a 
t e s t o f v a l i d i t y , d i r e c t c o n c r e t e c o r r e s -
p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s d e r i v e d 
f r o m a s c i e n t i f i c l a \ i r a n d t h e c o n c r e t e 
c o u r s e o f events„ T h i s w i l l e x i s t o n l y 
i n so f a r a s t h e l a t t e r i s f r e e f r o m t h e 
i n f l u e n c e o f e l e m e n t s n o t f o r m u l a t e d i n 
t h e l a w i n q u e s t i o n ' [ l 9 3 6 d ; l 4 l ] „ 
To s a y t h i s o f c o u r s e o n l y p o s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f how t o e v a l u a t e 
t h e e m p i r i c a l a d e q u a c y o f e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y , a q u e s t i o n w h i c h 
w i l l b e r e t u r n e d t o i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e s y s t e m i c q u a l i t i e s o f 
t h e o r y o 
i i i 0 E x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t s 
T h e t a s k o f e x p l a n a t i o n b e g i n s w i t h a ' h i s t o r i c a l 
i n d i v i d u a l * d e s c r i b e d w i t h i n a f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e . , T o P a r s o n s , 
t o e x p l a i n i s l a r g e l y t o ' a n a l y s e ' t o ' b r e a k d o w n ' t h i s o b j e c t 
( 1 7 ) 
o f s t u d y b y t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t s * v ' 
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'We s t a r t w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t a d e f i n e d 
o b j e c t o f s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t i s g i v e n , 
t h a t i t i s d e s c r i b e d i n t e r m s o f o n e o r 
m o r e f r a m e s o f r e f e r e n c e a s s t a t e d . 
T h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n d e m a n d s t h a t i t 
s h a l l b e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o s i m p l e r e l e m e n t s 
w h i c h s h a l l s e r v e a s t h e u n i t s o f o n e o r 
m o r e t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h 
i t i s t o b e e x p l a i n e d ' //1937a;3l] . 
H o i \ r e v e r s t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n c a n p r o c e e d i n t w o d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s , 
t h e h i s t o r i c a l a n d t h e a n a l y t i c a l , f l 937as 598-9, 7 6 o J . ^ 1 8 ^ 
T h e t w o a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e r e l a t i v e s t a t u s 
o f t h e o r y a n d c o n c r e t e p h e n o m e n a a s means a n d e n d s . I n t h e 
h i s t o r i c a l a p p r o a c h t h e e n d i s t o a c h i e v e a s c o m p l e t e a n 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p o s s i b l e o f a c o n c r e t e c l a s s o f p h e n o m e n a , w h i c h 
may a t t h e e x t r e m e i n c l u d e o n l y a u n i q u e e v e n t . T h e n t h e o r y i s 
a m e a n s t o t h i s e n d . 
'The f i r s t g r o u p may b e c a l l e d t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
s c i e n c e s , w h i c h c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r a t t e n t i o n 
o n p a r t i c u l a r c o n c r e t e p h e n o m e n a , a t t e m p t i n g 
a s f u l l a n u n d e r s t a i i d i n g o f t h e i r c a u s e s a n d 
c o n s e q u e n c e s a s p o s s i b l e . I n d o i n g t h i s t h e y 
s e e k c o n c e p t u a l a i d w h e r e v e r i t may b e f o u n d . 
E x a m p l e s i n t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e f i e l d a r e 
g e o l o g y a n d m e t e o r o l o g y ^ t h e s o c i a l f i e l d , 
h i s t o r y , a b o v e a l l , b u t a l s o a n t h r o p o l o g y a s 
i t h a s g e n e r a l l y b e e n c o n c e i v e d ' Pi 937a! 598] . 
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I n t h e a n a l y t i c a l a p p r o a c h t h e e n d i s t o a t t a i n a s y s t e m o f 
t h e o r y . T h e n ' c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s a r e m e a n s , 
" c a s e s " i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m may b e t e s t e d b y " v e r i f i c a t i o n " ' £ l 9 3 7 a s » J u s t a s 
t h e h i s t o r i c a l a p p r o a b h u s e s t h e o r y f r o m a n u m b e r o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m s so a t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m w i l l b e a p p l i c a b l e t o a n u m b e r 
o f c o n c r e t e a r e a s , b u t n o t o f c o u r s e a s a f u l l e x p l a n a t i o n o f 
a n y o n e o f t h e s e a r e a s , 
•The o t h e r g r o u p , t h e " a n a l y t i c a l " s c i e n c e s ' 
i s c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h b u i l d i n g u p 
s y s t e m s o f g e n e r a l t h e o r y v e r i f i a b l e i n t e r m s 
o f a n d a p p l i c a b l e t o a w i d e r a n g e o f c o n c r e t e 
p h e n o m e n a , T o t h e m t h e i n d i v i d u a l p h e n o m e n o n 
i s a " c a s e " ' //I 937a: 598] „ 
P a r s o n s i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e a p p r o a c h t o e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e 
a n a l y t i c a l s c i e n c e s a n d I , l i k e h i m , w i l l h a v e n o m o r e t o s a y 
o n t h e h i s t o r i c a l . To g o b a c k t h e n t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l 
t o b e e x p l a i n e d b y a n a l y s i s i n t e r m s o f e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t s . 
P a r s o n s ' o n l y e x p l i c i t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s o f 
e x p l a n a t i o n i s h i s o u t l i n e o f W e b e r ' s l o g i c o f e m p i r i c a l p r o o f 
£l 937as 610-61 kj . H e r e h e f o l l o w s v o n S c h e l t i n g * s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
o f s i x s t a g e s i n s u c h a p r o o f . H o w e v e r i t i s o n l y t h e f i r s t o f 
t h e s e w h i c h i s r e l e v a n t a t p r e s e n t . 
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' D r . v o n S c h e l t i n g g i v e s a c o n v e n i e n t 
s u m m a r y o f t h e l o g i c a l s t e p s i n v o l v e d 
i n t h e p r o c e d u r e o f c a u s a l i m p u t a t i o n . 
I t p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d 
v e r i f i c a t i o n d e s c r i p t i v e l y o f a 
h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d ^ l a l - t h e t h i n g t o 
be e x p l a i n e d . T h e n t h e i n d i s p e n s i b l e 
s t e p s a r e a s f o l l o w s ? ( l ) A n a l y s i s 
o f t h i s p h e n o m e n o n ( o r p r o c e s s ) i n 
s u c h a w a y t h a t i t i s b r o k e n d o w n 
i n t o e l e m e n t s o f s u c h a c h a r a c t e r t h a t 
e a c h o f t h e m may b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r a 
g e n e r a l l a w . ' [ 1 9 3 7 a ; 6 l 6 ] . 
T h i s i s e n o u g h t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t P a r s o n s f o l l o x \ r s w h a t h a s b e e n 
c a l l e d t h e d e d u c t i v e n o m o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f e x p l a n a t i o n ; t o 
e x p l a i n i s t o s u b s u m e u n d e r g e n e r a l l a x i r s . B u t P a r s o n s i s 
p e r h a p s s o m e w h a t i d i o s y n c r a t i c i n t h a t h i s c o n c e r n i s n o t 
f i r s t l y w i t h s u c h l a w s a s s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o u r o f 
p h e n o m e n a b u t w i t h w h a t m i g h t b e t e r m e d t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s o f 
( 1 9 ) 
g e n e r a l l a w s . ' T h e s e a r e t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t u a l e l e m e n t s 
t h a t t h e c o n c r e t e c a s e i s b r o k e n d o w n i n t o a n d w h i c h l a w s 
s t a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n . 
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•The p r e s e n t i s s t i e i s w h a t i s m e a n t b y 
t h e e l e m e n t s a n d t h e g e n e r a l l a w s t h a t 
a r e n e c e s s a r y t o t h e s c h e m a o f l o g i c a l 
p r o o f . O n l y o n e t h i n g c a n b e d e f i n i t e l y 
g a t h e r e d f r o m W e b e r ' s t r e a t m e n t ; t h e y 
a r e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s o r c a t e g o r i e s , . 
T h e e l e m e n t s r e f e r r e d t o m u s t b e i n some 
s e n s e g e n e r a l c a t e g o r i e s , f o r m s o f w h i c h 
t h e f a c t s i n q u e s t i o n c o n s t i t u t e t h e 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e n t . „„. T h e q u e s t i o n i s , 
t h e n , x / h a t , i n t h e t e r m i n o l o g y o f l o g i c , 
i s t h e u n i v e r s a l , o f w h i c h t h e s p e c i f i c 
f a c t s i n q u e s t i o n c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t i c u l a r ? ' 
[ l 9 3 7 a ; 6 l 3 - 4 ] . 
P a r s o n s ' c o n c e r n t h e n i s w i t h t h e n a t u r e o f t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s 
w h i c h o n t h e o n e h a n d a r e t h e t e r m s i n w h i c h t h e c o n c r e t e f a c t s 
a r e a n a l y s e d a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d f o r m t h e c o m p o n e n t s o f 
g e n e r a l l a w s , 
' W h a t e v e r e l s e i t may b e , I s h o u l d t h i n k o f 
a s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y a s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d a n a l y s i s o f c e r t a i n c a u s a l 
f a c t o r s i n c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n s . I t c o n s i s t s 
n o t m e r e l y i n w o r k i n g o u t t h e g e n e t i c a n t e — 
c e d e n t s o f a g i v e n p h e n o m e n o n , b u t a l s o o f 
a n a l y s i s o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n i t s e l f , b r e a k i n g i t 
d o w n i n t o t h e v a r i o u s c a u s a l e l e m e n t s w h i c h go 
t o make i t u p . ( 1 9 3 5 d ; 6 9 1 - 2 ) . 
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T h i s e m p h a s i s a r i s e s i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e b e c a u s e P a r s o n s 
i n s i s t s t h a t t h e r e a r e t w o k i n d s o f c o n c e p t s e m p l o y e d h e r e 
w h i c h h e c a l l s u n i t s a n d e l e m e n t s . f l 9 3 7 a : 3 1 s 6 1 4 ] « He 
f u r t h e r i n s i s t s t h a t t h e r e i s a ' r a d i c a l l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n 
b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o k i n d s o f c o n c e p t s ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 4 ] » i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
o n e i s n o t a s t a g e . o n t h e w a y t o t h e o t h e r b u t e a c h i s 
' a b s t r a c t i n a d i f f e r e n c e s e n s e ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 6 3 ^ | . 
' I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e i t s h o u l d b e r e p e a t e d 
w i t h e m p h a s i s t h a t e l e m e n t a n a l y s i s a n d 
u n i t a n a l y s i s a r e n o t s t a g e s o f s c i e n t i f i c 
a b s t r a c t i o n b u t t w o d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f 
a b s t r a c t i o n o n t w o d i f f e r e n t p l a n e s ... 
u n i t a n a l y s i s u n r a v e l s t h e w a r p o f e m p i r i c a l 
r e a l i t y , e l e m e n t a n a l y s i s t h e w o r f ( l 9 3 7 a s 
7 ^ 8 ] . 
A n u m b e r o f q u e s t i o n s a r i s e h e r e , n a m e l y , w h a t a r e t h e c h a r a c t e r i -
s t i c s o f u n i t / e l e m e n t c o n c e p t s ? What i s t h e i r e x p l a n a t o r y i m p o r t ? 
I n w h a t s e n s e a r e t h e y d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f a b s t r a c t i o n ? F i n a l l y , 
h o w a r e t h e y r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r ? T h e s e t h e n c o n s t i t u t e t h e 
p r o b l e m a r e a s f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n 
( a ) U n i t a n a l y s i s . 
I n t h e s i m p l e s t t e r m s u n i t a n a l y s i s i s j u s t w h a t t h e t e r m 
s a y s , b r e a k i n g d o w n t h e d e s c r i b e d o b j e c t i n t o i t s u n i t s o r p a r t s . 
As e x a m p l e s P a r s o n s r e f e r s t o t h e c y l i n d e r s , p i s t o n s , d r i v i n g r o d s , 
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a s p a r t s o f a s t e a m e n g i n e ; c e l l s , t i s s u e s a n d o r g a n s a s t h e 
u n i t s o f o r g a n i s m s a n d r a t i o n a l a n d i r r a t i o n a l a c t s , r e l i g i o u s , 
e c o n o m i c o r p o l i t i c a l a c t s a s t h e p a r t s o f a c o m p l e x o f a c t i o n s . 
[1937a; • -*-n e a c n c a s e t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s o f t h e c o n c r e t e 
o b j e c t o f s t u d y a r e i d e n t i f i e d a s c a s e s o f g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s w h i c h 
s t a t e t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e s o f a c l a s s o f o b j e c t s . [1937a; 
6lk]„ I n o r d e r t o i d e n t i f y a g i v e n s e r i e s o f a c t i o n s a s 
' e c o n o m i c 1 , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e y m u s t d i s p l a y c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
w h i c h a r e s t a t e d i n t h e c o n c e p t o f a n ' e c o n o m i c a c t " . 
P a r s o n s f o l l o w s W e b e r i n n o t i n g s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t w a y s i n 
w h i c h c o n c e p t s o f t h i s t y p e c a n b e c o n s t i t u t e d . We c a n f o r m u l a t e 
t h e c l a s s o f o b j e c t s i n t e r m s o f a v e r a g e t r a i t s o f c o n c r e t e o b j e c t s , 
o r i n t e r m s o f t h e i r common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . P a r s o n s ' e x a m p l e 
i s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g a s a p a r t o f 
t h e s p e c i e s . I n t h e f i r s t c a s e a v e r a g e s t a t u r e o r w e i g h t m i g h t 
b e u s e d a s a n i n d e x , i n t h e s e c o n d c a s e t h e t y p e o f b r a i n s t r u c t u r e ^ 
e r e c t p o s t u r e o i " t h e o p p o s a b l e t h u m b . £l937a;6l4] . B u t P a r s o n s 
a g r e e s w i t h W e b e r t h a t i d e a l t y p e s a r e t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r m o f 
u n i t c o n c e p t s [ l 9 3 7 a ; 6 l 4 j . H e r e t h e c o n c e p t i s d e f i n e d i n t e r m s 
o f c e r t a i n p u r e o r i d e a l i s e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h a r e p e r h a p s n e v e r 
f o u n d i n s u c h a f o r m i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . I n t h e a c t u a l 
c a s e d i f f e r e n t u n i t s f u s e a n d m o d i f y e a c h o t h e r . A n e x a m p l e 
P a r s o n s g i v e s i s t h a t some o f t h e c h e m i c a l e l e m e n t s a r e n e v e r 
f o u n d i n n a t u r e u n c o m b i n e d w i t h o t h e r e l e m e n t s Jl937a;33^ « 
S i m i l a r l y i n a n y g i v e n c a s e a n e c o n o m i c a c t w i l l b e f u s e d w i t h 
r e l i g i o u s o r p o l i t i c a l a s p e c t s . T h i s i n c l u s i o n o f e x a m p l e s f r o m 
b o t h c h e m i s t r y a n d s o c i o l o g y i s i n d i c a t i v e o f t h e a m b i g u o u s 
p a r e n t h o o d o f P a r s o n s ' i d e a o f u n i t c o n c e p t s . On t h e o n e h a n d 
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t h e r e i s a c l a i m e d d e r i v a t i o n f r o m W e b e r ' s i d e a l t y p e s b u t o n 
t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t u r e s f r o m W e b e r ' s 
p o s i t i o n . T h e i d e a l i z e d s t a t u s o f t h e u n i t h a s o b v i o u s 
p a r a l l e l s w i t h W e b e r b u t f o r t h e l a t t e r t h i s ' p u r i f y i n g ' 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f i d e a l t y p e s was o n e s o u r c e o f t h e i r a b s t r a c t 
n a t u r e . H o w e v e r f o r P a r s o n s t h i s a s p e c t o f a b s t r a c t i o n h a s 
a l r e a d y b e e n c o v e r e d i n t h e p l a c e o f f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e c o n c e p t s . 
T h e a b s t r a c t n a t u r e o f u n i t c o n c e p t s d o e s 3 1 0 1 l i e i n t h e i r 
s e l e c t i v i t y a n d o r d e r i n g f u n c t i o n s . So w h e t h e r o r n o t i t i s 
a c t u a l l y p o s s i b l e t o o b s e r v e t h e p u r e t y p e i n r e a l i t y i s i r r e l e v a n t 
t o P a r s o n s s 
' I t i s t o b e r e m e m b e r e d t h a t s u c h a u n i t m u s t 
b e a " p a r t " o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n i n t h e s e n s e 
t h a t i t c a n b e c o n c e i v e d o f a s c o n c r e t e l y 
e x i s t i n g i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m t h e o t h e r p a r t s ; 
w h e t h e r o r n o t i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t o 
c a r r y o u t t h i s i s o l a t i o n e x p e r i m e n t a l l y i n 
c o n c r e t o i s n o t m e t h o d o l i g i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t ' 
[ I 9 3 7 a s 7 3 7 ] . 
A l t h o u g h t h e a c t u a l o r h y p o t h e t i c a l s t a t u s o f a u n i t i s n o t 
a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n t o P a r s o n s t h e f a c t t h a t u n i t s c a n b e 
h y p o t h e t i c a l p o s e s a p r o b l e m . T h e p r o b l e m i s t h e l i m i t , 
w i t h i n a g i v e n f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e , o f l e g i t i m a t e a n a l y s i s o f t h e 
o b j e c t o f s t u d y i n t o i t s p a r t s T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , w i t h i n t h e 
f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e o f b i o l o g y , i n b r e a k i n g d o w n a n o r g a n i s m 
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i n t o i t s p a r t s t h e l i m i t i s t h e c e l l , t o b r e a k d o w n t h e c e l l 
i n t o i t s n u c l e u s , p r o t o p l a s m a n d e p i d e r m a n d t r e a t t h e s e a s 
p a r t s i s a n i l l e g i t i m a t e u s e o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i t a n a l y s i s , , 
F o r t o f u r t h e r r e d u c e t h e p h e n o m e n o n b e l o w t h e l e v e l o f t h e 
c e l l i n v o l v e s m o v i n g t o a d i f f e r e n t f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e . I n 
s i m i l a r f a s h i o n t o t r e a t e n d s , m e a n s a n d n o r m s a s p a r t s ( n o t 
e l e m e n t s ) o f a s y s t e m o f a c t i o n i s i l l e g i t i m a t e . W i t h i n t h e 
f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n t h e a c t i s t h e b a s i c u n i t . How 
a r e s u c h j u d g e m e n t s o f l e g i t i m a t e e m p l o y m e n t o f u n i t s made? 
P a r s o n s s a y s s 
'A p a r t i n t h i s s e n s e i s a u n i t , t h e c o n c r e t e 
e x i s t e n c e o f w h i c h , a s i d e f r o m i t s r e l a t i o n 
t o t h e o t h e r p a r t s o f t h e same w h o l e , i s 
m e a n i n g f u l , "makes s e n s e " .... 
T h e t e s t q u e s t i o n i s a l w a y s w h e t h e r we c a n 
c o n c e i v e s u c h a n a c t a s e x i s t i n g " b y i t s e l f " , 
t h a t i t i s a " p u r e t y p e " w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g t h e 
o t h e r t y p e s f r o m w h i c h i t i s c o n c r e t e l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 l ] . 
' I t [/the u n i t c o n c e p t } r e f e r s t o a n a c t u a l l y , 
t 
o r h y p o t h e t i c a l l y e x i s t e n e - e c o n c r e t e e n t i t y . 
H o w e v e r m u c h t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e " p u r e t y p e " , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e " o r g a n i c " c a s e , may d i f f e r 
f r o m a n y t h i n g c o n c r e t e l y o b s e r v a b l e , t h e t e s t 
i s t h a t t h i n k i n g o f i t a s c o n c r e t e l y e x i s t e n t 
m a k e s s e n s e , t h a t i t d o e s n o t i n v o l v e a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t e r m s ' £l937as33] 
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F i r s t o f a l l n o t e t h a t t h e c r i t e r i o n o f l e g i t i m a c y a p p l i e s t o 
b o t h t h e a c t u a l o r h y p o t h e t i c a l p u r e t y p e . T h e t y p e m u s t b e 
' m e a n i n g f u l ' , ' c o n c e i v a b l e ' , ' n o n - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ' a n d 'make s e n s e ' 
T h e a p p e a l h e r e i s t o t h e f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e s 
'Weber h i m s e l f f r e q u e n t l y l a y s d o w n a s a 
p r i n c i p a l c r i t e r i o n o f t h e c o r r e c t f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f a n i d e a l t y p e t h a t t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f 
f e a t u r e s u s e d t o c h a r a c t e r i z e i t s h o u l d b e 
s u c h a s t a k e n t o g e t h e r a r e m e a n i n g f u l , make 
s e n s e . What t h i s m e a n s i s c l e a r - t h a t t h e y 
m u s t a d e q u a t e l y d e s c r i b e , i n t e r m s o f a f r a m e 
o f r e f e r e n c e , a p o t e n t i a l l y c o n c r e t e e n t i t y , 
a n o b j e c t i v e l y p o s s i b l e e n t i t y i n W e b e r ' s 
s e n s e ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 6 l 5 ] . 
B u t a s i i r e l l a s t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f n o n - c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f t h e f r a m e 
o f r e f e r e n c e t h e c r i t e r i o n i s t h a t w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f a f r a m e 
o f r e f e r e n c e t h e c o n c r e t e , i n d e p e n d e n t e x i s t e n c e o f t h e u n i t , 
w h e t h e r a c t u a l o r h y p o t h e t i c a l , i s c o n c e i v a b l e . I t i s t h e 
c o n c r e t e n e s s o f u n i t s w h i c h i s t h e i r p r i m e c h a r a c t e r s t i c . 
H o w e v e r a s we h a v e s e e n t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a p p l i e s t o 
b o t h a c t u a l l y c o n c r e t e a n d h y p o t h e t i c a l l y c o n c r e t e u n i t s a n d 
i t i s n o t t h e ' p u r e ' s t a t u s o f t h e c o n c e p t i t f \ h i c h g i v e s i t i t s 
a b s t r a c t c h a r a c t e r . Why t h e n a r e some u n i t s ' h y p o t h e t i c a l ' , 
w h y do t h e y i n v o l v e a b s t r a c t i o n ? 
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The a b s t r a c t , h y p o t h e t i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f some u n i t concepts 
d e r i v e s from the o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f the s u b j e c t m a t t e r t o w h i c h 
t h e y r e f e r , At one p o i n t Parsons c o n t r a s t s h i s a n a l y t i c a l 
r e a l i s m w i t h Weber's view t h a t concepts are ' u s e f u l f i c t i o n s ' . 
He remarks t h a t ' [ t ] h e r e i s , as has been shown, an element o f 
t r u t h i n t h i s view as a p p l i e d t o c e r t a i n t y pes o f c o n c e p t s , , . . 1 
[1 937a; 730] . These are h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n c r e t e t y p e s about whi c h 
Parsons says; 
'Only h y p o t h e t i c a l l y c o n c r e t e type concepts 
are f i c t i o n a l i n the s o c i a l f i e l d , a f a c t t h a t 
i s due t o t h e i m p o r t a n t degree o f o r g a n i c i s m 
o f the s u b j e c t m a t t e r ' £l937a:7l6]. (See a l s o ; 
[1 937a: 31 , 738-9]). 
By o r g a n i c i s m Parsons means t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s o f u n i t s r e s u l t 
in. p a r t from t h e i r coming t o g e t h e r t o form a l a r g e r whole. 
Conversely, t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y , as a xtfhole, 
are n o t o n l y the sum o f the p r o p e r t i e s o f i t s u n i t s b u t r e s u l t 
from t h e i r v e r y c o m b i n a t i o n as a whole. 
'The v e r y d e f i n i t i o n o f an o r g a n i c whole i s 
as one w i t h i n which t h e r e l a t i o n s d e t e r m i n e 
the p r o p e r t i e s o f i t s p a r t s . The p r o p e r t i e s 
o f the whole are n o t s i m p l y a r e s u l t a n t o f t h e 
l a t t e r ' [l937a;32] „ 
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T h i s i s developed under the hea d i n g o f emergent p r o p e r t i e s o f 
a c t i o n systems w h i c h w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . 
For the moment the p o i n t i s t h a t t o analyze an o r g a n i c 
whole i n t o i t s u n i t s o r p a r t s g i v e s u n i t concepts an a b s t r a c t 
c h a r a c t e r . For t h e u n i t g a i n s c e r t a i n o f i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
p r e c i s e l y from i t s p l a c e as a p a r t , w i t h o t h e r s , o f a whole. 
To remove t h e p a r t from i t s c o n t e x t , e i t h e r i n a c t u a l f a c t o r 
c o n c e p t u a l l y s means t h a t t h e a n a l y s i s o f the o b j e c t o f s t u d y 
i n t o u n i t s l o s e s j u s t these o r g a n i c properties„ 
'And i n so f a r as t h i s i s t r u e , t h e concept 
" p a r t " t a kes on an a b s t r a c t , indeed a 
" f i c t i o n a l " c h a r a c t e r . For the p a r t o f 
an o r g a n i c whole i s no l o n g e r t he same, once 
i t i s se p a r a t e d f a c t u a l l y o r c o n c e p t u a l l y 
from t h e whole' £l937as32]„ 
U n i t concepts t h e n are c o n c r e t e i n a d u a l sense, what Sosensky 
(1964s kj) c a l l s e m p i r i c a l and Hegelian,, Sosensky t a k e s the 
e m p i r i c a l sense from J„S„ M i l l s 'A c o n c r e t e name i s a name wh i c h 
stands f o r a t h i n g ; an a b s t r a c t name i s a name wh i c h stands f o r 
an a t t r i b u t e o f a t h i n g ' , (Quoted i n Sosenskys 19°"4;47). U n i t 
concepts r e f e r t o t h i n g s such as economic a c t s r a t h e r t h a n 
a t t r i b u t e s o f such t h i n g s such as e f f i c i e n c y ( s a y ) . But Parsons 
wants t o c l a i m t h a t u n i t concepts are a b s t r a c t because o f a 
f u r t h e r q u a l i t y o f concreteness which such ' t h i n g s ' haves 
'The H e g e l i a n sense, i n which t he c o n c r e t e i s t h a t w h i c h i s 
immersed i n i t s r e l a t i o n s ? one must c o n s i d e r the i n d i v i d u a l i n 
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i t s m i l i e u o f r e l a t i o n s and c o n n e c t i o n s ' . (Sosensky; 19bk%k7)„ 
To c o n c e p t u a l i z e a u n i t as a t h i n g i n i s o l a t i o n breaks down t h i s 
second q u a l i t y and as such i s a b s t r a c t t o Parsons. 
T u r n i n g t o the e x p l a n a t o r y i m p o r t o f u n i t concepts i t has 
been n o t e d t h a t f o r Parsons e x p l a n a t i o n i n v o l v e s subsuming a 
p a r t i c u l a r f a c t under a g e n e r a l concept whose r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r s 
i s expressed i n a law. Here, however, the term law sho u l d be 
re g a r d e d w i t h c a r e . Parsons t r e a t s t h e a c t i v i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g 
some p a t t e r n o f b e h a v i o u r as a case o f a more g e n e r a l c l a s s as 
•the f i r s t s t e p o f s c i e n t i f i c g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ' „ £l937as33j° For, 
from t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t o r y e x e r c i s e can be i n d u c t i v e l y b u i l t up 
e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about t he b e h a v i o u r o f u n i t s and 
co m b i n a t i o n s o f u n i t s . 
•Furthermore, on o c c a s i o n , a g r e a t d e a l can be 
s a i d about t he b e h a v i o u r o f these p a r t s under 
c e r t a i n k i n d s o f d e f i n a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
Such judgements may y i e l d a k i n d o f 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n w h i c h i s o f h i g h e x p l a n a t o r y 
v a l u e , and, w i t h i n l i m i t s , p e r f e c t l y v a l i d . 
General statements about the p o s s i b l e o r 
p r o b a b l e b e h a v i o u r o f such c o n c r e t e o r 
h y p o t h e t i c a l l y c o n c r e t e " p a r t s " o f 
c o n c r e t e phenomena, o r v a r i o u s c o m b i n a t i o n s 
o f them, under t y p i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i l l be 
r e f e r r e d t o as " e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s " ' 
fl937as33] o 
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Parsons' q u a l i f i c a t i o n s here r e l a t e t o the h y p o t h e t i c a l 
c h a r a c t e r o f the u n i t s o f a c t i o n systems,, 
• I d e a l type elements may, as u n i t s , be 
supposed t o have t y p i c a l modes o f b e h a v i o u r 
under g i v e n circumstances„ I n t h i s case 
the laws i n q u e s t i o n are g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s 
about these modes o f b e h a v i o u r . They are 
" e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s " i n the sense o f 
the p r e v i o u s d i s c u s s i o n , q u a l i f i e d o n l y by 
the element o f f i c t i o n a l a b s t r a c t i o n i n h e r e n t 
i n t h e i d e a l — t y p e concepts 
* £l937a:622j . 
So a l t h o u g h Parsons speaks o f g e n e r a l i z t i o n s about t he b e h a v i o u r 
o f h y p o t h e t i c a l l y c o n c r e t e u n i t s as e m p i r i c a l he r e c o g n i z e s t h a t 
t h i s term must be q u a l i f i e d , . Parsons a g a i n makes use o f Weber, 
i n t h i s case 5 the i d e a o f ' p r o b a b i l i t y 1 [ l 937as 629~63lj . I f we 
are t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n a complex i n t e r i - e l a t i o n s h i p such as t h e 
r e l a t i o n o f t h e P r o t e s t a n t e t h i c t o modern c a p i t a l i s m the o b j e c t 
o f s t u d y , w e s t e r n European h i s t o r y between the 17th and 20th 
Century must be analyzed i n t o a l a r g e number o f t y p e = u n i t s such 
as b u r e a u c r a c y , r a t i o n a l law, the s t a t e , s c i e n c e . Then 
'Each o f these must be s u b j e c t e d t o judgements 
o f p r o b a b i l i t y as t o i t s l i n e o f development 
under t h e r e l e v a n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s , These 
judgements r e s t on c o n s t r u c t i o n . Hence t h e 
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p r e d i c t a b i l i t y o f a h y p o t h e t i c a l o b j e c t i v e l y 
p o s s i b l e c o n c r e t e s t a t e i s n a t u r a l l y s u b j e c t 
t o e r r o r , i n the case o f the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
each element, t o say n o t h i n g o f t h e t o t a l i t y 
o f elements. Hence o b j e c t i v e e m p i r i c a l 
c e r t a i n t y i s out o f the q u e s t i o n ; t he 
judgement can be o n l y one o f p r o b a b i l i t y ' 
[1 937as 62k] . 
So ' " P r o b a b i l i t y " here means o n l y an e x p r e s s i o n o f our f a i l u r e 
t o a t t a i n c o m p l e t e l y a c c u r a t e e m p i r i c a l knowledge' [l937a;63Q] . 
T h i s a r i s e s because we are a t p r e s e n t o n l y d i s c u s s i n g u n i t a n a l y s i s 
I n terms o f t h i s form o f a n a l y s i s concepts are always e m p i r i c a l l y 
l a c k i n g i n p r e c i s i o n and 'the gap between the concepts and t h e 
f a c t s i s b r i d g e d by the concept o f p r o b a b i l i t y ' £l937as63lj . 
Now Parsons i s emphatic on t h e importance o f u n i t a n a l y s i s 
i n s c i e n c e . He says 
'The s c i e n t i f i c l e g i t i m a c y , indeed the 
i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y o f such concepts i s n o t t o 
be q u e s t i o n n e d . W i t h o u t them t h e r e c o u l d be 
no s c i e n c e ' [l937a:33]» 
However the l a s t remarks above i n d i c a t e one l i m i t a t i o n on 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms o f u n i t c o n c epts. There are o t h e r s and i n 
f a c t Parsons i n s i s t s t h a t e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y cannot be r e s t r i c t e d 
t o t h i s k i n d o f a n a l y s i s . Thus i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s Parsons 
c r i t i c i s e s e m p i r i c i s m f o r i t s ' l i m i t a t i o n o f the development o f 
t h e o r y t o t h e t y p e - p a r t concept and i t s e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n ' 
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El937a;7°i] . Aside from h i s g e n e r a l a t t a c k on e m p i r i c i s m the 
reasons f o r Parsons' u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o r e s t r i c t t h e o r y t o u n i t 
a n a l y s i s i s most e x p l i c i t i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Weber's p o s i t i o n 
on i d e a l types,, 
Parsons c o n s t r u e s ¥eber's t h e o r y as 'a s y s t e m a t i c 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l i d e a l t y p e s o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p ' 
[ l 937a;716] , and applauds t h i s as 'a tremendous " a r c h i t e c t o n i c " 
panorama' [l 937a; 653] d e s c r i b i n g i t i n the f o l l o w i n g ways 
'He proceeds t o develop s t e p by s t e p a 
system o f i d e a l types o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
S t a r t i n g w i t h t h r e e e l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s -
c o n f l i c t (Kampf), Vergemeinschaftung and 
V e r g e s s e l s c h a f t u n g - he b u i l d s them up i n t o 
more and more complex s t r u c t u r e s c u l m i n a t i n g 
i n such concepts a.s c hurch and s t a t e . I t 
i s almost needless t o say t h a t t h i s i s n o t 
g e n e r a l i z e d t h e o r y i n t h e p r e s e n t sense a t 
a l l , taut i s t h e development o f the o t h e r 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f g e n e r a l i z i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n -
t h a t o f a system o f i d e a l - t y p e concepts. The 
u n i t o f t h i s s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n i s t h e s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . The r e s u l t i s a scheme, o f 
" o b j e c t i v e l y p o s s i b l e " t y p e s o f s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e . 
As such i t i s a monumental work, unique o f i t s 
k i n d i n i t s scope and r e f i n e m e n t , and a mine f o r 
almost any k i n d o f e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h ' [l937as653~] ° 
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I n amongst the g l o w i n g terms here i s the statement t h a t Weber's 
's y s t e m a t i c t h e o r i z i n g tended t o r u n o f f i n a d i r e c t i o n d i f f e r e n t 
from t h a t o f the main p r e s e n t i n t e r e s t 1 [l937as7l6) „ I n f a c t 
Parsons i s s e v e r e l y c r i t i c a l o f Weber's s t y l e o f s y s t e m a t i c 
t h e o r i z i n g on two main c o u n t s . These c r i t i c i s m s can be 
summarized by s a y i n g t h a t u n i t a n a l y s i s cannot a c t as a f o u n d a t i o n 
e i t h e r on which t o b u i l d t h e o r e t i c a l systems or i n terms o f w h i c h 
th e o r g a n i c u n i t y o f e m p i r i c a l systems can be comprehended, The 
importance o f these c r i t i c i s m s w i l l become e v i d e n t as the 
d i s c u s s i o n proceeds. S u f f i c e i t t o say now t h a t the l o g i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n o f concepts t o c o n s t i t u t e a t h e o r e t i c a l system i s a 
prime c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e o r y f o r Parsons and as has a l r e a d y been 
i n d i c a t e d the e s s e n t i a l l y o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f the e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i s 
a fundamental assumption o f Parsons' t h i n k i n g , I w i l l now r e v i e w 
these c r i t i c i s m s i n more d e t a i l (See: £ 1937a;607-10, 6 l 6 - 2 0 ] ) . 
Parsons expresses the u n d e r l y i n g problems o f c o n f i n i n g 
e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y t o u n i t a n a l y s i s i n terms o f a dilemma. Such 
a p o s i t i o n l e a d s tos 
'... e i t h e r an i l l e g i t i m a t e r e i f i c a t i o n o f a 
s i n g l e t h e o r e t i c a l system, o r a " f i c t i o n " 
t h e o r y o f the r o l e o f concepts i n science 
w h i c h does n o t r e a l l y get away from the 
e m p i r i c i s t i r r a t i o n a l i s m o f the o b j e c t i v i s t 
and i n t u i t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n s * £l937as607]. 
- 136 -
The f i r s t h o r n o f the dilemma i s Parsons' c r i t i c i s m o f the 
course t a k e n by o r t h o d o x economics, h i s examples b e i n g 
M a r s h a l l and Robbins. The c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t t h e i r r e s t r i c t i o n 
o f t h e o r y t o u n i t a n a l y s i s l e a d s t o 1 the i l l e g i t i m a t e r e i f i c a t i o n 
o f a s i n g l e t h e o r e t i c a l system'„ There are two necessary 
p a r t s t o Parsons' argument. The f i r s t p o i n t t o no t e here i s 
t h a t by a t h e o r e t i c a l system Parsons means the l o g i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
o f a set o f co n c e p t s . I n terms o f u n i t a n a l y s i s t h e n l o g i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n means t h a t concepts are r e l a t e d as components o f a 
u n i f i e d xvliole. The second r e l e v a n t p o i n t r e l a t e s t o the prime 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f u n i t s n o t e d above 5 a u n i t must be c o n c r e t e l y 
p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e frame o f r e f e r e n c e . I n terms o f the 
a c t i o n frame o f r e f e r e n c e t h e b a s i c u n i t i s the a c t which must 
i n c l u d e end, norm and s i t u a t i o n t o be c o n c r e t e l y p o s s i b l e . I f 
the a t t e m p t t o b u i l d t h e o r e t i c a l systems i s t o proceed i n terms 
o f r e l a t i n g these concepts t o g e t h e r as u n i t s t h e n i n each case 
the n a t u r e o f ends, norms and s i t u a t i o n must be s p e c i f i e d . I n 
o t h e r wprds t h e components o f the a c t must be r e l a t e d t o g e t h e r 
i n a d e f i n i t e way. I f t h e y are n o t t h e n t he c r i t e r i o n o f 
co n c r e t e p o s s i b i l i t y i s n o t met. 
So on the one hand we have the i d e a o f the l o g i c a l i n t e -
g r a t i o n o f concepts t o form a . t h e o r e t i c a l system and on the o t h e r 
hand the r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t u n i t s must be c o n c r e t e l y p o s s i b l e . To 
Parsons these two r e q u i r e m e n t s r e p r e s e n t c o n t r a d i c t o r y demands. 
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To support t h i s view he uses the economic concepts o f the norm 
o f economic r a t i o n a l i t y and the end o f t h e m a x i m i z a t i o n s o f 
p r o f i t . I n terms o f u n i t a n a l y s i s these must form components 
o f a c o n c r e t e type o f a c t i o n , indeed i n M a r s h a l l ' s economics 
t h i s i s j u s t t h e case, the concepts are bound t o g e t h e r i n a 
f i x e d r e l a t i o n . To t h i s Parsons o b j e c t s ; 
'There would be no o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s were 
i t t r u e t h a t i n f a c t the r e l a t i o n i n q u e s t i o n 
always s u b s i s t e d i n c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y b u t t h i s 
i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y so' £l937a:6l7j. 
I n Parsons' view t o r i g i d l y f i x t h e concepts o f economic 
r a t i o n a l i t y and m a x i m i z a t i o n o f p r o f i t t o g e t h e r obscures 
' p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f independent v a r i a t i o n ' £l937a;6l8j. That i s , 
the same norm, f o r example, c o u l d be c o n c r e t e l y l i n k e d t o a 
d i f f e r e n t type o f end. T h i s s u g g e s t i o n i s backed up by Parsons 
by r e f e r e n c e t o ¥eber's concept o f t r a d i t i o n a l i s m i n t h e economic 
sphere [l937a;608-609, 617-620]. I n t h i s type o f economic 
a c t i o n Parsons c l a i m s t h a t t h e norm o f economic r a t i o n a l i t y 
remains b u t t h a t t he end changes, i t i s no l o n g e r t he m a x i m i z a t i o n 
o f p r o f i t hut t h e maintenance o f a t r a d i t i o n a l , f i x e d s t a n d a r d 
o f l i v i n g . As a u n i t t r a d i t i o n a l economic a c t i o n i s a g a i n a 
d e f i n i t e , c o n c r e t e l y p o s s i b l e type o f a c t i o n . 
So the a t t e m p t t o l o g i c a l l y i n t e g r a t e i m p o r t a n t concepts o f 
h i s economics by u n i t a n a l y s i s l e a d s M a r s h a l l t o r i g i d i f y t h e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between concepts. I n Parsons' a n a l y s i s t h i s has 
i m p o r t a n t consequences f o r i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s r i g i d r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between concepts which he sees as t h e l o g i c a l b a s i s o f M a r s h a l l ' s 
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l i n e a r e v o l u t i o n i s m : t h a t a l l economic l i f e e v o l v e s t o w a r d 
a " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e ' economy„ I n o t h e r words t h i s p o s i t i o n 
i m p l i e s t h a t a l l economic l i f e can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a 
t h e o r y founded on the b a s i c u n i t o f economic a c t i o n d e f i n e d i n 
terms o f t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f economic r a t i o n a l i t y and the 
m a x i m i z a t i o n o f p r o f i t . So n o t o n l y does t h e c o n c r e t e type 
'economic a c t i o n ' r i g i d l y t i e t h e concepts t o g e t h e r b u t t h i s 
l e a d s t o the assumption t h a t t h i s c o n c r e t e type stands i n a 
d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o a c o n c r e t e area o f life» I t i s t h i s 
t h a t Parsons c a l l s t he r e i f i c a t i o n o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system, 
So f a r Parsons' argument has been based o n l y on M a r s h a l l , 
However he wishes t o put f o r w a r d a more f a r r e a c h i n g claims 
'But e i t h e r t h i s f t h e case o f M a r s h a l l ! o r 
a n o t h e r theorem o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g r i g i d i t y 
i s the i n e v i t a b l e l o g i c a l oxitcome o f the 
i m p l i c i t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l view t h a t a l l t h e 
a n a l y t i c a l concepts o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system 
must correspond t o u n i t s o f c o n c r e t e systems 
t h e independent e x i s t e n c e o f which i s 
c o n c e i v a b l e ' [l937a:609] „ 
The b a s i c c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t u n i t s r e q u i r e t h e i r c o n c e p t u a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o be c o n c r e t e l y r e l a t e d w h i l s t t h e o r e t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n must a l l o w f o r t h e i r indepedent v a r i a t i o n , A way 
out o f t h i s problem i s o f f e r e d by Robbins who, r a t h e r t h a n t y i n g 
the norm o f economic r a t i o n a l i t y t o a p a r t i c u l a r t y pe o f end 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s economic a c t i o n s o l e l y i n terms o f t h e norm. 
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'Robbins' course i s , by p o s t u l a t i n g t h a t 
economic r a t i o n a l i t y i s a d e q u a t e l y 
d e s c r i p t i v e o f a c o n c r e t e type o f a c t i o n , 
t o push the v a l u e element o u t o f the 
co n c r e t e system a l t o g e t h e r ; ends become 
random 1 fl937a:609]. 
But t o Parsons t h i s does n o t s o l v e the problem a t a l l f o r as 
a u n i t economic a c t i o n cannot be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y i n terms o f a 
norm, i t does n o t meet the r e q u i r e m e n t o f c o n c r e t e n e s s , i t i s 
n o t c o n c e i v a b l e t o have an a c t w i t h o u t an end. The randomness 
o f ends i n Robbins b e t r a y s an i m p l i c i t assumption about the 
n a t u r e o f ends, the n a t u r a l i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r e s t s and once 
a g a i n 'a p r o f o u n d l a i s s e z - f a i r e b i a s 1 [l937a;62oJ . I n o t h e r 
words what was e x p l i c i t i n M a r s h a l l i s i m p l i c i t i n Robbins, the 
norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y r i g i d l y t i e d t o a d e f i n i t e t y pe o f end. 
So a n a l y s i s i n terms o f u n i t s i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the 
a t t e m p t t o b u i l d a t h e o r e t i c a l system. I f a t h e o r y i s l o g i c a l l y 
i n t e g r a t e d i n terms o f c o n c r e t e u n i t s t h e n t h i s l e a d s t o the 
r e i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l system, 
' I d e a l t y pe a n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s no means o f 
b r e a k i n g down the r i g i d i t y o f these f i x e d 
r e l a t i o n s ' £l937as6l7j. 
We can now t u r n t o the second h o r n o f the dilemma t a k e n , i n 
Parsons view, by Weber, T h i s p o s i t i o n i s t h a t i f we c o n f i n e 
e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y t o u n i t a n a l y s i s t h i s l e a d s t o the view t h a t 
a l l concepts can o n l y be ' u s e f u l f i c t i o n s ' , a p o s i t i o n Parsons 
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d e s c r i b e s as 'irrational1„ I n t h i s c o n t e x t the i r r a t i o n a l i s m 
o f t h i s view d e r i v e s from t he i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e l a t i n g u n i t s 
t o g e t h e r i n e m p i r i c a l systems. 
As we have a l r e a d y seen u n i t concepts must be c o n c r e t e l y 
p o s s i b l e and as such i n v o l v e a d e f i n i t e f i x e d r e l a t i o n between 
t h e i r components. T h i s a p p l i e s t o Weber's i d e a l t y pes and t h e 
same a c c u s a t i o n o f r i g i d i f y i n g these t i e s i s aimed a t Weber as 
i s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the economists. However because o f h i s 
'much g r e a t e r m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and e m p i r i c a l knowledge 
and i n s i g h t ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 6 0 7 ] 9 Weber r e p r e s e n t s a d i f f e r e n t case. 
For he r e c o g n i z e s t he dangers o f a t t e m p t i n g t o b u i l d a g e n e r a l 
t h e o r e t i c a l system on the b a s i s o f i d e a l t y pe u n i t s . Parsons 
comments t h a t Weber i s no 'naive m o n i s t ' j j 9 3 7 a ; 6 0 7 ] . I n s t e a d 
he o f f e r s what Parsons d e s c r i b e s as a ' p l u r a l i s t ' a l t e r n a t i v e , 
r a t h e r t h a n c o n s t r u c t i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l system whic h c l a i m s t o 
be adeqviate t o any g i v e n o b j e c t o f s t u d y Weber argues t h a t any 
such o b j e c t o f s t u d y can be viewed and e x p l a i n e d from a p l u r a l i t y 
o f p o i n t s o f view. T h i s d i v e r s i t y o f p e r s p e c t i v e s l e a d s t o 
the p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e concepts which are necessary t o any 
e x p l a n a t i o n have a f i c t i o n a l s t a t u s v i s - a - v i s t h e o b j e c t 
o f s t u d y . We have seen t h a t Parsons agrees w i t h t h i s i n r e s p e c t 
t o u n i t concepts b u t i f e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y i s r e s t r i c t e d t o u n i t 
a n a l y s i s the f o l l o w i n g u n f o r t u n a t e consequence ensues. 
D e s p i t e t h e i r c l a i m e d f i c t i o n a l s t a t u s i d e a l types are 
lxy p o s t a s i z e d |_1937as 6O7J , r e a l i t y i s g r a n t e d t o the t y p e - i m i t . 
T h i s i s p a r t l y because o f Weber's f a i l u r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between 
h i s i n d i v i d u a l and g e n e r a l i d e a l t y pes taut more s e r i o u s l y because 
i n terms o f u n i t a n a l y s i s t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y , as a whole, i s 
conceived as a 'mosaic' o f d i s p a r a t e i d e a l t y pe atoms, ' R e a l i t y ' 
can o n l y l i e i n the u n i t s themselves, W i t h t h i s Parsons r e f u s e s 
t o agree; 
'The f o r m u l a t i o n o f c l a s s concepts, i n c l u d i n g 
i d e a l types i n Weber's sense, i s an i n d i s -
p e n s i b l e p r o c e d u r e . But i t i s n o t u s u a l l y 
p o s s i b l e f o r s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s t o stop 
t h e r e . To do so would r e s u l t i n a type 
atomism - each type concept would be a u n i t 
o f a n a l y s i s by i t s e l f . But i n r e a l i t y 
these u n i t s are s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o 
one a n o t h e r ' //] 937a; 61 8] . 
Now t h i s c r i t i c i s m r e s t s p a r t l y on e m p i r i c a l grounds. At one 
p o i n t Parsons r e l a t e s i t t o Weber's e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f the 
o r i g i n s o f b o u r g e o i s c a p i t a l i s m . 
'The most i m p o r t a n t p o i n t a t whic h Weber's 
atomism i s e v i d e n t i s i n t h e r i g i d i t y o f the 
s e p a r a t i o n , as c o n c r e t e t y p e - u n i t s , between 
r a t i o n a l b o u r g e o i s c a p i t a l i s m , on the one 
hand, a d v e n t u r e r ' s c a p i t a l i s m on t h e o t h e r ' 
f l 937a; 631] . 
The c l a i m i s t h a t ' t h e r e i s almost c e r t a i n l y a more i n t i m a t e 
f u s i o n o f the two i n c o n c r e t e f a c t ' [l 937a; 631]] , t h a n Weber's 
i d e a l types r e c o g n i z e . F u r t h e r , i t i s j u s t t h i s f u s i o n w h i c h 
has t o be accounted f o r . 
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•The e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t modern 
c a p i t a l i s m i s one socio-economic system, 
no t two" [ i 937a: 631] . 
So on e m p i r i c a l grounds Weber f a i l s t o cope w i t h the o b j e c t o f 
s t u d y as an e m p i r i c a l system. 
However t h i s e m p i r i c a l c r i t i c i s m i s u n d e r l a i d by a more 
fundamental disagreement, Weber's 'mosaic t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e and 
s o c i e t y " tends ' t o b r e a k u p a i n a sense n o t i n h e r e n t i n a n a l y s i s 
as such, the o r g a n i c u n i t y b o t h o f c o n c r e t e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s 
and o f t h e h i s t o r i c p r o c e s s ' | / I 937as607 ] „ (See a l s o : 1 9 2 9 : 4 9 ) , 
Weber's type atomism i s a t odds w i t h Parsons' o r g a n i c i s m and i t i s 
on these grounds t h a t he l a b e l s Weber's method ' i r r a t i o n a l ' 0 He 
says o f Weber's Economy and S o c i e t y : 
• I t was the f i n e s t p r o d u c t o f the h i s t o r i c a l 
r e l a t i v i s m o f the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n ' 
T l 9 3 7 a : 6 5 3 ] o 
But Parsons i s u n w i l l i n g t o accept such a r e l a t i v i s t p o s i t i o n , f o r 
him b o t h knowledge and r e a l i t y are o r g a n i c u n i t i e s and form an 
o r g a n i c u n i t y . 
These c r i t i c i s m s conclude the d i s c u s s i o n o f u n i t a n a l y s i s . 
From them i t can be seen t h a t t h i s mode o f a n a l y s i s must be 
ssupplemented i n such a way t h a t concepts can be l o g i c a l l y i n t e -
g r a t e d t o form t h e o r e t i c a l systems and e m p i r i c a l l y i n t e g r a t e d t o 
form e m p i r i c a l systems. The a n a l y s i s o f the o b j e c t o f s t u d y i n 
terms o f c o n c e p t u a l elements i s designed t o do j u s t these t a s k s . 
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b) Element A n a l y s i s 
A n a l y s i s o f an o b j e c t o f study i n terms o f i t s elements 
means b r e a k i n g i t down i n t o i t s p r o p e r t i e s , a t t r i b u t e s o r 
q u a l i t i e s . For example, w i t h i n the p h y s i c a l frame o f 
r e f e r e n c e an o b j e c t might be analysed i n terms o f i t s mass 
o r v e l o c i t y . W i t h i n t he frame o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n 
a n a l y s i s might be i n terms o f the r a t i o n a l i t y o f a complex 
o f a c t i o n o r the d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s o f m o t i v a t i o n . The 
e s s e n t i a l p o i n t here i s t h a t by c o n t r a s t t o u n i t a n a l y s i s 
concepts do n o t have the q u a l i t y o f concreteness so c e n t r a l 
t o u n i t concepts. I n the examples aboves 
"We may say t h a t such and such a body has 
a mass o f x, b u t n o t t h a t i t jLs a mass. 
We may a l s o say t h a t such and such an a c t 
i s r a t i o n a l ( t o a c e r t a i n degree) b u t never 
t h a t i t .is r a t i o n a l i t y , i n t h e sense o f a 
c o n c r e t e t h i n g ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 ^ o 
Elements are q u a l i t i e s o f c o n c r e t e phenomena, t h e y themselves 
are n o t c o n c r e t e . As such t h e y bear an a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n t o 
r e a l i t y i n a sense q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f rom u n i t concepts. 
Element concepts are employed i n e x p l a n a t i o n and from t h i s 
t h r e e f u r t h e r aspects o f t h i s form o f a n a l y s i s can be n o t e d . 
Elements must be g e n e r a l , t h e y must be p o s i t i v e l y d e f i n e d by 
the s c i e n t i s t and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o each o t h e r expressed i n 
terms o f g e n e r a l laws. 
To e x p l a i n a p a r t i c u l a r event i n terms o f i t s elements 
i n v o l v e s f i r s t o f a l l i d e n t i f y i n g these elements as i n s t a n c e s 
o r 'values' j l 937a; 35] o f g e n e r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a l l phenomena 
r e l e v a n t w i t h i n t h e frame o f r e f e r e n c e b e i n g employed,, The 
p o s i t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f such g e n e r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a l l phenomena 
r e l e v a n t w i t h i n t h e frame o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n i s one o f 
th e prime t a s k s o f Parsons' s t u d y . Thus, f o r example, from 
h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f Durkheim and Weber's s t u d i e s o f r e l i g i o n 
Parsons c l a i m s 'a remarkable p o i n t — f o r — p o i n t correspondence' 
£l937as717] between them whic h r e s t s on t h e c o n c e p t u a l element o f 
u l t i m a t e v a l u e s . Weber's concept o f l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r i s t h e 
' d i r e c t e q u i v a l e n t ' o f Durkheim's ' r u l e s p o s s e s s i n g moral 
a u t h o r i t y ' and the concept o f c h a r i s m a ' c o r r e s p o n d s ' t o Durkheim* 
s a c r e d n e s S o These are a l l d i f f e r e n t i n s t a n c e s o f a common 
element, u l t i m a t e v a l u e s . 
But t h i s p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and d e f i n i t i o n o f 
elements o f a c t i o n i n v o l v e s n o t o n l y t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f such 
elements b u t a l s o the s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i r meaning as a n a l y t i c a 
elements. T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o the 
most fundamental elements o f end, norm and s i t u a t i o n . As we 
have n o t e d these concepts are employed i n one i n s t a n c e i n 
a d e s c r i p t i v e way, as c o n s t i t u e n t f e a t u r e s o f the p r i m a r y frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e o f a c t i o n . At the same ti m e t h e y can a c t as 
e x p l a n a t o r y concepts, a n a l y t i c a l elements. At two p o i n t s 
Parsons n o t e s the two d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s on which such concepts 
are employed [ l 937as k8-k9, 731-732], the c o n c r e t e and the 
a n a l y t i c a l . What emerges from t h i s i s t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r the 
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s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n o f a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s by the s c i e n t i s t , 
Thus w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the concept o f end. I n i t s 
d e s c r i p t i v e f u n c t i o n the term i s use d r a t h e r l o o s e l y , a 
" c o n c r e t e ' end i s 'the t o t a l a n t i c i p a t e d f u t u r e s t a t e o f 
a f f a i r s ' [ i 9 3 7 a ; 4 8 j „ But i f we a r e to e x p l a i n the a c t i o n 
i n terms o f the a c t o r ' s end as an a n a l y t i c a l element t h i s 
d e f i n i t i o n i s too wide, as P a r s o n s remarks, o n l y a s p e c t s 
o f t h a t t o t a l a n t i c i p a t e d f u t u r e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s can be 
a t t r i b u t e d to the f a c t t h a t the a c t o r i n q u e s t i o n was p u r s u i n g 
h i s end, So a more s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n o f the conc e p t end 
r -, 4 ( 2 0 ) xs n e c e s s a r y f o r e x p l a n a t o r y p u r p o s e s , 
The e x p l a n a t o r y v a l u e o f such g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s l i e s i n 
a n a l y t i c a l l a w s , Such a law ' s t a t e s a u n i f o r m mode o f 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the v a l u e s o f two o r more a n a l y t i c a l 
e l e m e n t s ' jl 9 3 7 a : 622J , U n f o r t u n a t e l y P a r s o n s does l i t t l e 
more th a n f o r m a l l y d e f i n e a n a l y t i c a l l a w s and h i s two 
examples f l 9 3 7 a s 3 3 9 7 5 1 - 7 5 2 ] a r e d e c i d e l y u n h e l p f u l . F o r one 
t h i n g t h e y n e i t h e r s t a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a n a l y t i c a l 
e l e m e n t s b e i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s about t h e i n c r e a s e o f one, 
( 2 1 ) 
r a t i o n a l i t y , and s e c o n d l y t h e y a r e d i s t i n c t l y t a u t o l o g i c a l . 
T h i s i s b e c a u s e P a r s o n s a t t e n t i o n i s d i r e c t e d toward the f u n c t i o n 
o f element a n a l y s i s i n r e s o l v i n g the problems o f u n i t a n a l y s i s 
o u t l i n e d above. 
B e f o r e t a k i n g up t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f u n i t and 
element a n a l y s i s one f u r t h e r f e a t u r e o f the l a t t e r must be no t e d , 
what P a r s o n s c a l l s the 'emergent p r o p e r t i e s ' o f a c t i o n s y s t e m s . 
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As w i l l become c l e a r a l i t t l e l a t e r t h e s e a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y -
i m p o r t a n t to P a r s o n s and a t one p o i n t he s a y s 
'Indeed, by c o n t r a s t w i t h the u t i l i t a r i a n 
system, i t i s p r i m a r i l y r e c o g n i t i o n o f the 
e m p i r i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e s e emergent 
a s p e c t s o f t o t a l s y s t ems w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s 
the v o l u n t a r i s t i c t h e o r y o f a c t i o n , The 
p r i m a r y i n t e r e s t o f the p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s i s 
h a s been i n them' [ l 9 3 7 a ; 7 3 ^ ] „ 
I n i t s r e f e r e n c e to u t i l i t a r i a n i s m t h i s p a s s a g e i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t the i d e a o f emergent p r o p e r t i e s a r i s e s i n r e a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t what P a r s o n s c a l l s 1 a t o m i s t i c ' t h e o r i e s fl 9 3 7 a : 3 5 3 ] . 
By t h i s he means a t h e o r y which, e i t h e r by i m p l i c a t i o n o r 
e x p l i c i t l y , h o l d s t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s o f complex systems c a n 
be ' d i r e c t l y g e n e r a l i z e d ' from the p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e i r p a r t s 
£ l 9 3 7 a s 7 3 9 ] » T h i s v i e w P a r s o n s h o l d s to be ' e m p i r i c a l l y 
i n a d e q u a t e ' L l 9 3 7 a s 3 5 ^ ] 9 f o r s y s tems o f a c t i o n (as w e l l as 
c h e m i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l s y s t e m s , [ l 9 3 7 a ; 3 5 ^ - ? 765J ) a r e o r g a n i c 
s y s t e m s , t h e y have p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h a r e p r e s e n t o n l y on a 
c e r t a i n l e v e l o f c o m p l e x i t y o f p a r t s and w h i c h d e r i v e not from 
the p a r t s but from the a s s o c i a t i o n o f p a r t s . The o r g a n i c i s m 
o f the phenomenon; 
' o o . i s p r e - e m i n a n t l y t r u e o f s y s t e m s o f 
a c t i o n as t h e y have been t r e a t e d i n t h i s 
s t u d y . I t i s t r u e t h a t i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s 
a l l s u c h s ystems a r e "composed" o f u n i t a c t s . 
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But i t i s n e c e s s a r y to be c a r e f u l i n 
i n t e r p r e t i n g what t h i s means. I t does 
not mean t h a t the r e l a t i o n o f the u n i t 
a c t s to the t o t a l system i s c l o s e l y 
a nalogous to t h a t o f a g r a i n o f sand to 
the heap o f w h i c h i t i s a part„ F o r i t 
ha s been shown t h a t a c t i o n systems have 
p r o p e r t i e s t h a t a r e emergent o n l y a t a 
c e r t a i n l e v e l o f c o m p l e x i t y i n the 
r e l a t i o n s o f u n i t a c t s to e a c h o t h e r ' 
[ i 9 3 7 a s 7 3 9 ] . 
Now P a r s o n s i s w e l l aware o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n c l a i m i n g t h a t 
'the whole i s l a r g e r t h a n the sum o f i t s p a r t s ' , i n p a r t i c u l a r 
the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t a 'whole' somehow e x i s t s c o n c r e t e l y a s an 
e n t i t y d i s t i n c t from i t s component p a r t s [ l 937as35^1 ° P a r s o n s 
p o s i t i o n i s j u s t the o p p o s i t e o f t h i s s emergent p r o p e r t i e s 
a r e a b s t r a c t p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y cannot, even h y p o t h e t i c a l l y s 
be thought o f as c o n c r e t e e n t i t i e s . 
' P r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e emergent, to 
t h i n k o f them as i s o l a b l e i n the form o f 
a n o t h e r c o n c r e t e e n t i t y , even a f i c t i o a a l 
one, does not make s e n s e ' j[l 9 3 7 a ; 367-8]J . 
On the c o n t r a r y , t h e y a r e e l e m e n t s i n the se n s e we have been 
d e s c r i b i n g ; a t t r i b u t e s o r q u a l i t i e s o f a c t i o n but i n t h i s c a s e 
not ' „ o o " a c t i o n as s u c h " , t h a t i s , o f i s o l a t e d u n i t a c t s o r o f 
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a t o m i s t i c s y s t e m s , but o n l y o f o r g a n i c systems o f a c t i o n beyond 
a c e r t a i n degree o f c o m p l e x i t y ' [ l937a;7^o]„ So P a r s o n s 
i n s i s t s t h a t ' t h e r e i s no m y s t i c i s m w h a t s o e v e r about t h i s 
c o ncept o f emergence* 0 9 3 7 a ; 7^9] ? the conc e p t o f emergent 
p r o p e r t y h a s 'a s t r i c t l y e m p i r i c a l meaning' [l 9 3 7 a ; 7^-9] » 
Emergent p r o p e r t i e s c o n c e p t u a l i z e e m p i r i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f 
phenomena and 'the c o n c r e t e e n t i t y s o c i e t y i s beyond a l l p o s s i b l e 
doubt i n t h i s s e n s e on o r g a n i c e n t i t y , . „ . 1 £l 9 3 7 a ; 35^1 , To 
deny t h i s , to a s c r i b e to t h e view t h a t o n l y the p r o p e r t i e s o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s a r e ' r e a l ' , P a r s o n s c a l l s 'a m e t a p h y s i c a l atomism' 
[ 1 9 3 7 a ; 7 ^ 9 ] . 
Here t h e n i s an i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n f o r the d u a l i s m i n 
e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t s w h i c h P a r s o n s i n s i s t s on as the 1 warp 1 
and the ' w o r f o f e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y . U n i t a n a l y s i s , p r e c i s e l y 
b e c a u s e i t b r e a k s down complex, o r g a n i c systems i n t o t h e i r p a r t s , 
l o s e s the emergent q u a l i t i e s o f t h e p a r t s i n c o m b i n a t i o n as 
sy s t e m s . E l e m e n t a n a l y s i s i s c o n c e r n e d , i n i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s , 
w i t h j u s t t h e s e emergent p r o p e r t i e s but as such l o s e s the c o n c r e t i 
n e s s o f u n i t c o n c e p t s . I n a s i g n i f i c a n t way t h e n b o t h o f 
P a r s o n s ' t y p e s o f e x p l a n a t o r y c o n c e p t s g a i n t h e i r ' a b s t r a c t ' 
q t i a l i t y from t h e o r g a n i c i s r a o f the s u b j e c t m a t t e r . U n i t 
c o n c e p t s a r e a b s t r a c t i n t h a t t h e y i s o l a t e p a r t s from t h e i r 
c o n t e x t i n a l a r g e r whole w h i l s t element c o n c e p t s a r e a b s t r a c t i n 
t h a t t h e y d e s c r i b e p r o p e r t i e s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h cannot 
e x i s t a p a r t from t h e i r component u n i t s . 
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\7e can now t u r n to the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f u n i t s and 
e3.ements, p a r t i c u l a r l y how element a n a l y s i s c a n r e s o l v e t h e 
problem o f u n i t a n a l y s i s o u t l i n e d above„ T h i s i s summarized 
when P a r s o n s s a y s ; 
'The o n l y means o f b r e a k i n g t h i s mosaic 
r i g i d i t y w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to s c e p t i c i s m 
i s g e n e r a l i z e d t h e o r y w h i c h b r e a k s down 
the p a r t i c u l a r element c o m b i n a t i o n s i n the 
i d e a l t y p e s , but by s e e i n g i n them a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f common e l e m e n t s i n 
c o n s t a n t modes o f r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h e ach 
o t h e r , t r a n s f e r s knowledge to a more 
f l e x i b l e , y e t a t the same time more 
r e a l i s t i c b a s i s ' fl 9 3 7 a ; 62oJ „ 
T h e r e a r e two c e n t r a l p o i n t s h e r e . F i r s t o f a l l a n a l y t i c a l 
e l e m e n t s d i s p e l the f e a r s o f the ' f i c t i o n ' t h e o r y o f c o n c e p t s . 
W i t h i n a frame o f r e f e r e n c e e l e ments c o n c e p t u a l i z e g e n e r a l 
p r o p e r t i e s o f the phenomena o f i n t e r e s t . As such P a r s o n s 
c l a i m s t h a t a r e a l i s t i c e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a t u s c a n be 
a t t r i b u t e d to a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s , t h a t i s , t h a t t h e y ' a d e q u a t e l y 
" g r a s p " a s p e c t s o f the o b j e c t i v e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ' [l 9 3 7 a ; 73o3 ° 
To P a r s o n s to a s c r i b e t h i s s t a t u s to a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s 
a v o i d s 'the o b j e c t i o n a b l e i m p l i c a t i o n o f e m p i r i c i s t r e a l i s m ' s 
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'These c o n c e p t s c o r r e s p o n d , n o t to c o n c r e t e 
phenomena, but to e l e m e n t s i n them w h i c h 
a r e a n a l y t i c a l l y s e p e r a b l e from o t h e r 
e l e m e n t s . T h e r e i s no i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t 
t h e v a l u e o f any one s u c h element, o r even 
a l l t h o s e i n c l u d e d i n one l o g i c a l l y c o h e r e n t 
system, i s c o m p l e t e l y d e s c r i p t i v e o f any 
p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g o r e v e n t ' [ l 9 3 7 a : 7 3 0 ] „ 
So a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s g i v e P a r s o n s a f i r m b a s i s i n r e a l i t y w h i c h 
' r e n d e r s t he r e s o r t to f i c t i o n a l i s m u n n e c e s s a r y ' [ l 9 3 7 a : 7 3 0 7 . 
S e c o n d l y , a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s p r o v i d e the means to b r e a k t h r o u g h 
the problem o f the r i g i d i t y o f t i e s i n c o n c r e t e u n i t s . P a r s o n s ' 
s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem i s to argue t h a t u n i t s a r e i n f a c t 
composed o f d i f f e r e n t c o m b i n a t i o n s o f a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . 
'From the p o i n t o f v i e w o f element a n a l y s i s 
e v e r y u n i t o r p a r t , c o n c r e t e l y o r c o n c e p t u a l l y 
i s o l a t e d , c o n s t i t u t e s a s p e c i f i c c o m b i n a t i o n 
o f the p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s o f one o r more 
a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . E v e r y " t y p e " i s a 
c o n s t a n t s e t o f r e l a t i o n s o f t h e s e v a l u e s ' 
[1 9 3 7 a ; 7^3 ] . 
However t h e s e two p o i n t s , w h i l s t c l e a r l y r e l e v a n t to the 
r e l a t i o n o f u n i t and element a n a l y s i s do not d i r e c t l y r e f e r to 
the problems o f t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l s y s t e m s n o t e d above. 
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F o r t h i s we must t u r n to .a t h i r d form o f a n a l y s i s , a 
co m b i n a t i o n o f t he f i r s t two, w h i c h h o l d s a more i m p l i c i t 
y e t q u i t e c e n t r a l p l a c e i n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n . 
T h i s i s the s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s o f sy s t e m s o f a c t i o n , 
c ) S t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
The q u e s t i o n r a i s e d i n the above paragraph, . i s w h e t h e r 
element a n a l y s i s a s so f a r d e s c r i b e d p r o v i d e s an adequate 
s o l u t i o n to the problems o f t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l s y s t e m s 
i n h e r e n t i n u n i t a n a l y s i s t a k e n a l o n e . The f i r s t problem 
l i e s i n t h e attempt to b u i l d l o g i c a l l y i n t e g r a t e d t h e o r e t i c a l 
s y s t e m s . E s s e n t i a l l y P a r s o n s ' p o i n t i s t h a t w h i l s t t h i s i s 
i m p o s s i b l e i n terms o f u n i t a n a l y s i s i t i s f e a s i b l e i n terms o f 
a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . Because u n i t s a r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n 
c o n c r e t e l y p o s s i b l e ways t h e i r s y s t e m a t i c i n t e g r a t i o n i s 
al w a y s accompanied by the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the a n a l y s i s f a l l s 
i n t o the t r a p o f c l a i m i n g e x h a u s t i v e n e s s w i t h r e s p e c t to any 
p a r t i c u l a r a r e a o f r e a l i t y . A n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s a r e by 
d e f i n i t i o n n o n - c o n c r e t e and t h e i r s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n v o l v e s r e l a t i n g t o g e t h e r not c o n c r e t e t h i n g s but o n l y a s p e c t s 
o f s u c h t h i n g s . But an i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n h e r e i s what would, 
i n p r i n c i p l e , the i n t e g r a t i o n o f e l e m e n t s to form a t h e o r e t i c a l 
s ystem amount t o ? Here we s h o u l d go back to the i d e a o f 
a n a l y t i c a l law b r i e f l y n o t ed above. An a n a l y t i c a l law 
' s t a t e s a u n i f o r m mode o f r e l a t i o n s h i p between the v a l u e s o f 
two o r more a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s ' [1937as 622] , A n a l y t i c a l 
e l e m e n t s t h e n a r e i n t e g r a t e d by the f o r m u l a t i o n o f l a w s w h i c h 
s t a t e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p to e a c h o t h e r . Then a t h e o r e t i c a l 
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system o f e l e m e n t s would e q u a l a system o f such l a w s . 
However t h e r e a r e two problems h e r e . The f i r s t i s the 
r e l a t i v e 'youth' o f the a c t i o n s c i e n c e s , P a r s o n s i s r e a d y to 
admit t h a t h i s t h e o r y i s i n the e a r l y s t a g e s o f development, 
(S e e , f o r example [l 9 3 7 a ; 727] ) , As such the t a s k i s the 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s , the components o f l a w s 
and the f o r m u l a t i o n o f a n a l y t i c a l l a w s l i e s i n the f u t u r e . 
But s e c o n d l y , and more s e r i o u s l y t h a n the a l w a y s u n c o n v i n c i n g 
y o u t h analogy, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n s t r u c t i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l 
system o f l a w s does not s o l v e the second problem, t h a t o f 
e m p i r i c a l s y s t e m s . Here the problem i s what a r e the p r o c e s s e s 
and mechanisms by w h i c h u n i t s combine to form i n t e r d e p e n d e n t 
s y s t e m s ? As so f a r d i s c u s s e d element a n a l y s i s seems to s a y 
l i t t l e o f d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e to t h i s problem. I n d e e d i t p e r h a p s 
deepens i t , f o r element a n a l y s i s b r e a k s up the c o n c r e t e n e s s 
o f type u n i t s ajid r e l a t e s t h e i r e l e m e n t s t o g e t h e r i n a f o r m a l , 
n o n - c o n c r e t e way, i n terms o f l a w s . 
To p e n e t r a t e to how P a r s o n s a t t e m p t s to answer t h e s e 
problems we must f i r s t o f a l l draw a t t e n t i o n to a p e r s i s t e n t 
a m b i g u i t y w h i c h r u n s thx-oughout the book. The a m b i g u i t y i s 
w hether P a r s o n s ' t h e o r e t i c a l scheme i s composed p r i m a r i l y o f u n i t 
o r element c o n c e p t s . At some p o i n t s he s t a t e s t h a t h i s main 
c o n c e r n i s w i t h u n i t c o n c e p t s : 
',.. s t u d i e s o f t h e o r e t i c a l s y s tems may 
d i f f e r i n the r e l a t i v e emphasis t h e y l a y on 
t h e s e t h r e e k i n d s o f c o n c e p t s . T h i s , l i k e 
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any o t h e r s t u d y , must i n v o l v e a l l t h r e e , 
but i t s c e n t r a l f o c u s o f i n t e r e s t w i l l 
be i n one, the " p a r t " o r u n i t concept,, 
I t s i n t e r e s t w i l l be i n the u n i t s and 
t h e i r s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s out o f 
w h i c h c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n a r e made 
up. T h e s e c o n c r e t e s y stems a r e a l l 
phenomena t h a t a r e c a p a b l e o f d e s c r i p t i o n 
i n terms o f t he a c t i o n frame o f r e f e r e n c e . 
A n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s w i l l be t r e a t e d a t 
v a r i o u s p o i n t s , but no attempt w i l l be 
made to work out s y s t e m a t i c a l l y t h e 
d e f i n i t i o n axid i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f the 
a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s i n v o l v e d i n su c h 
c o n c r e t e s y stems o f a c t i o n ' [1 937a: 38-39] « 
However a c u r s o r y r e a d i n g o f t h e book i s enough to g i v e the 
r e a d e r the s t r o n g i m p r e s s i o n t h a t i t s main c o n c e r n i s w i t h the 
e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n . I n d e e d t h i s i s e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d to be 
i t s aim. P a r s o n s s a y s t h a t h i s ' p r e s e n t i n t e r e s t i s i n the 
fundamental e l e m e n t s common to a l l human a c t i o n i n s o c i e t y ' 
[i 937a; ^1 "fj . He d e s c r i b e s 'the p r i n c i p a l s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f 
t h i s s t u d y ' as 'the scheme o f the s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t s o f 
a c t i o n ' [l 937a: 6271 . A g a i n t h e most i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t s i n 
Durkheim's s o c i o l o g y : 
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• ... a r e , i n the c o n t e x t most i m p o r t a n t 
to the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n , s t r u c t u r a l 
e l e m e n t s o f a t o t a l - s y s t e m o f a c t i o n , 
s een a n a l y t i c a l l y , as a whole. I f the 
s t a t u s o f the c o n c e p t s o c i a l r e a l i t y i s to 
be m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y c l a r i f i e d i t cannot 
be made to r e f e r to a c l a s s o f c o n c r e t e 
t h i n g s , even f i c t i o n a l e n t i t i e s 3.ike 
Durkheim's " i n d i v i d u a l " , but o n l y to s u c h 
a n a l y t i c a l c a t e g o r i e s ' | / 1937a ;368] . 
To r e s o l v e t h i s a m b i g u i t y we must f u r t h e r n o t e t h a t P a r s o n s 
makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between two k i n d s o f a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s ; 
s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t s and v a r i a b l e s . 
'Of p o s s i b l e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s t h e r e a r e 
t h r e e main c a t e g o r i e s , h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n c r e t e 
t y p e s , g e n e r a l i z e d , s t r u c t u r a l c a t e g o r i e s and 
v a r i a b l e e l e m e n t s . F o o t n o t e ; Which may, 
i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t , o v e r l a p , / l 9 3 7 a . : 6 2 7 j 
(See a l s o : [ l 9 3 7 a : 6 l 9 , 6 2 l ] ) . 
As P a r s o n s ' f o o t n o t e i m p l i e s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n r e s t s on a b a s i s 
o t h e r than, the c o n t e n t o f the c o n c e p t s . lie have a l r e a d y n o t ed 
t h i s a s p e c t o f P a r s o n s ' t h i n k i n g , i t i s made q u i t e e x p l i c i t i n 
f u r t h e r p a s s a g e i n w h i c h the s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t - v a r i a b l e 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s made [ l 9 3 7 a ; 6 l 9 ] . The p o i n t i s t h a t the same 
c o n c e p t can be t r e a t e d as e i t h e r a s t r u c t u r a l element o r a s a 
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v a r i a b l e . I t i s t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l f u n c t i o n , t h e i r mode o f 
use w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s them. Both however a r e el e m e n t s o f 
a c t i o n i n t h e above s e n s e , t h a t i s , t h e y c o n c e p t u a l i z e g e n e r a l 
p r o p e r t i e s o f a c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n c o n c r e t e l y p o s s i b l e t y p e s o f 
a c t i o n . However the d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t i n s u c h g e n e r a l 
p r o p e r t i e s c a n be t w o f o l d . On the one hand the aim c a n be 
the development o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system o f a n a l y t i c a l l a w s 
w h i c h s t a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between e l e m e n t s . I n t h i s c a s e 
the e l e m e n t s form the v a r i a b l e s o f a t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m . On 
the o t h e r hand e l e m e n t s c a n be employed i n the a n a l y s i s o f the 
e m p i r i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f u n i t s i n sy s t e m s , the s t r u c t u r e o f 
sy s t e m s o f a c t i o n . 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n can be s e e n by r e f e r r i n g to P a r s o n s ' 
c o n t r a s t o f h i s own i n t e r e s t i n a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s w i t h P a r e t o 
He i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t P a r e t o ' s employment o f element c o n c e p t s 
i s d i f f e r e n t from h i s own. 
•Paret o s e t about t h i s t a s k by employing a 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t w h i c h f i t t e d d i r e c t l y i n t o 
the main a n a l y t i c a l scheme o f the p r e s e n t 
s t u d y , but he employed t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t 
f o r a somewhat d i f f e r e n t purpose from t h a t 
w h i c h h a s been the main c o n c e r n h e r e , t h e 
d i r e c t f o r m u l a t i o n o f a system o f a n a l y t i c a l 
e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n an o u t l i n e 
o f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n s y s t e m s ' 
f l 9 3 7 a : 4 5 5 ] . 
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F u r t h e r P a r s o n s imputes to P a r e t o the i n t e n t i o n o f c o n s t r u c t i n g 
a t h e o r e t i c a l s ystem o f e l e m e n t s as v a r i a b l e s : 
' P a r e t o d e v e l o p e d the c o n c e p t i o n o f the r e s i d u e s 
and d e r i v a t i o n s d i r e c t l y a s v a r i a b l e e l e m e n t s 
i n a t h e o r e t i c a l system w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t 
r e f e r e n c e to the problem o f s t r u c t u r e . 
H a v i n g d e f i n e d the concept s he p r o c e e d e d to 
c l a s s i f y t h e i r v a l u e s , w i t h o u t a t t e m p t i n g , 
u n t i l a much l a t e r s t a g e , to c o n s i d e r 
c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n . The c o n c e r n 
o f t h i s s t u d y h a s , on the o t h e r hand, been to 
work out the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f h i s t r e a t m e n t 
f o r the s t r u c t u r e o f the sy s t e m s to w h i c h 
P a r e t o ' s a n a l y s i s o f e l e m e n t s i s a p p l i c a b l e ' 
[ 1 9 3 7 a : 7 0 5 ] . 
So P a r s o n s s a y s t h a t he i s not concerned, w i t h e l e m e n t s as 
v a r i a b l e s o r \-/ith s y s t e m s o f v a r i a b l e s , 
' I t h a s r e p e a t e d l y been s t a t e d t h a t t h i s s t u d y 
h a s not a t t e m p t e d a s y s t e m a t i c t r e a t m e n t o f 
what i s , i n t h i s s e n s e , the a n a l y t i c a l a s p e c t 
o f the t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . I t h a s been l i m i t e d , 
r a t h e r , to w o r k i n g out the s t r u c t u r a l o u t l i n e o f 
the g e n e r a l i z e d s y stems o f a c t i o n to w h i c h s u c h 
an a n a l y t i c a l t h e o r y would be a p p l i c a b l e . The 
two modes o f c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t e n o v e r l a p , 
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however, so t h e r e h a s been much t a l k o f 
v a r i a b l e s , o f a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . But 
no attempt h a s been made to c o n s i d e r the 
problem o f s e t t i n g up a system o f 
v a r i a b l e s . p l 9 3 7 a ; 7 5 l ] . (See a l s o 
[ l 9 3 7 a j 7 2 7 ] ) . 
P a r s o n s i n t e r e s t t h e n i n e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n i s not so much 
w i t h them i n t h e m s e l v e s but i n r e l a t i o n to what he r e f e r s t o , 
i n t h e above q u o t a t i o n , as 'the problem o f s t r u c t u r e ' i n 
' c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s ' . We have a l r e a d y n o t e d t h a t element 
a n a l y s i s i s an e s s e n t i a l accompaniment o f u n i t a n a l y s i s i n 
t h a t e l e m e n t s c o n s t i t u t e the components o f u n i t s . Here, i n 
the o t h e r d i r e c t i o n , so to speak, i s a second r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 
u n i t s and e l e m e n t s , e l e m e n t s employed w i t h r e s p e c t to the 
problem not o f how u n i t s can be b r o k e n down but how a p l u r a l i t y 
o f u n i t s combined t o g e t h e r . T h i s i n d e e d g i v e s P a r s o n s the t i t l e 
o f h i s book; 
•The t r e a t m e n t o f the p a r t s o r u n i t s o f 
sys t e m s o f a c t i o n f a l l s n a t u r a l l y under 
two h e a d i n g s , the d e f i n i t i o n and c l a s s i -
f i c a t i o n o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s and t he 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the r e l e v a n t r e l a t i o n s o f 
the u n i t s i n s y s t e m s . The l a t t e r may, f o r 
p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , be d e s i g n a t e d as s t r u c t u r a l 
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r e l a t i o n s . The main framework o f the 
p r e s e n t s t u d y may, then, be c o n s i d e r e d an 
a n a l y s i s o f the s t r u c t u r a l a s p e c t o f systems 
o f a c t i o n , i n a c e r t a i n s e n se t h e i r 
"anatomy". [l937as39] . 
B e f o r e g o i n g on to f o l l o w t h i s up we can note P a r s o n s ' most 
e x p l i c i t f o r m u l a t i o n o f h i s c o n c e p t u a l i n t e n t i o n s ! 
'The v i e w o f t h e p r o p e r a b s t r a c t i o n f o r the 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s h e r e put f o r w a r d i s not t h a t 
o f a s e r i e s o f h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s , 
but r a t h e r o f a b s t r a c t a n a l y t i c a l s y s t e m s 
each o f w h i c h assumes a s d a t a the main 
o u t l i n e o f fundamental s t r u c t u r e o f c o n c r e t e 
s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n i n c l u d i n g the e l e m e n t s o t h e r 
t h a n t h o s e i m m e d i a t e l y d e a l t x j i t h by the 
s c i e n c e i n q u e s t i o n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 466} . 
Here we have u n i t a n a l y s i s d e s c r i b e d as 'a s e r i e s o f h y p o t h e t i c a l 
c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s * . As h a s been noted s u c h c o n c e p t s a r e 
e s s e n t i a l to s c i e n c e but i n t h e m s e l v e s i n a d e q u a t e . They 
r e p r e s e n t the c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e o r y P a r s o n s iirants to move away 
from not by t o t a l abandonment but by r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e i r 
l i m i t a t i o n s and s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n . The way f o r w a r d l i e s i n 
' a n a l y t i c a l s y s t e m s ' o f v a r i a b l e e l e m e n t s but an ' i n d i s p e n s i b l e 
p r e l i m i n a r y " [ l 9 3 7 a ; 7 5 l ] "to t h i s i s an ' o u t l i n e o f the fundament 
s t r u c t u r e o f c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n ' . 
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So we now have t h e problem i n hand, how u n i t s a r e 
combined i n e m p i r i c a l s y s t e m s , and the means P a r s o n s p r o p o s e s 
as a s o l u t i o n to the problem, the s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t s o f 
a c t i o n . The q u e s t i o n i s what do t he problem and t h e i r 
s o l u t i o n amount to? I t i s s u g g e s t e d h e r e t h a t i t i n v o l v e s a 
r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t form o f t h e o r y t h a n t h a t a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d , 
e s s e n t i a l l y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f u n i t and element a n a l y s i s w h i c h 
P a r s o n s r e f e r s to as ' s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s ' [ l 9 3 7 a : 39 s 295J -
Of c o u r s e P a r s o n s e n t i t l e s h i s s t u d y The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l 
A c t i o n and a t one p o i n t s a y s ; 
'„„.whatever l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s i s employed 
t h e r e i s a common s t r u c t u r e o f a l l systems 
o f a c t i o n . I t i s t h i s common s t r u c t u r e w h i c h 
i t h a s been the main t a s k o f t h i s s t u d y to 
a n a l y s e ' fl 9 3 7 a : 7 3 ^ ] . 
Throughout the book t h i s p h r a s e o l o g y o f 'the s t r u c t u r e o f 
a c t i o n ' i s r e f e r r e d to when P a r s o n s mentions the aims o f h i s 
s t u d y ; 
1...„ a c o n c e p t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the 
c o n c r e t e system' £ l 9 3 7 a : 3 8 ] 
' . . . t h e " m o r p h o l o g i c a l " a n a l y s i s o f the 
s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n s y s t e m s ' [l 9 3 7 a : 2957 
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© o a t o t a l s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n s e e n 
a n a l y t i c a l l y , as a whole' fl 9 3 7 a : 368] 
0 0 0 the main o u t l i n e o f fundamental s t r u c t u r e 
o f c o n c r e t e s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n ' f l 9 3 7 a s 466] 
IJhat t h e n a r e the d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f t h i s s t r u c t u r a l 
a n a l y s i s above and beyond what h a s been s a i d o f u n i t and 
element a n a l y s i s , 'emergent', so to speak on the h i g h e r 
l e v e l o f c o m p l e x i t y ? 
The b e s t way to answer t h i s q u e s t i o n i s to examine an 
a c t u a l example o f P a r s o n s ' s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s . C h a p t e r 6 o f 
The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n ' V i l f r e d o P a r e t o , I I : E x t e n s i o n 
and V e r i f i c a t i o n o f the S t r u c t u r a l A n a l y s i s ' i s the most 
s u i t a b l e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . As the t i t l e s t a t e s P a r s o n s i s 
h e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s a l t h o u g h i t s h o u l d be 
n o t e d t h a t t h i s i s not h i s complete a n a l y s i s o f the s t r u c t u r e o f 
a c t i o n s y s t e m s . T h i s i s not i m p o r t a n t f o r the p r e s e n t purpose 
a s the i n t e r e s t i s i n what i s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s t y p e o f t h e o r e -
(22) 
t i c a l a c t i v i t y . v ' P a r s o n s ' p r o c e d u r e will be b r i e f l y 
d e s c r i b e d and t h e n we w i l l d i s c u s s what i t i n v o l v e s . 
The s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s i n the r e a l m o f u n i t a n a l y s i s , the 
a b s t r a c t type concept o f an i s o l a t e d r a t i o n a l u n i t a c t o f an 
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r . I n terms o f element a n a l y s i s 
t h i s type i s composed o f the minimum e l e m e n t s o f any u n i t 
a c t s end, norm and s i t u a t i o n . The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g q u a l i t y 
o f the r a t i o n a l u n i t a c t i s the c h a r a c t e r o f the norm: the 
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a c t o r s e l e c t s means t o ends by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e norm o f 
i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y , t h a t i s , i n terms o f the c a u s a l e f f i c a c y 
o f means t o bring- about ends. As such the norm can o n l y 
a p p l y t o the means-end r e l a t i o n s h i p n o t t o the s e l e c t i o n o f 
ends, a norm based on c a u s a l e f f i c a c y cannot e s t a b l i s h whether 
an end i s more d e s i r a b l e t h a n a n o t h e r . Hence i n terms o f the 
concept the end must be assumed as given,, 
From t h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t the procedure i s t o c o m p l i c a t e 
t h e p i c t u r e by i m a g i n a t i v e l y combining such i s o l a t e d r a t i o n a l 
u n i t a c t s i n systems, T h i s occurs i n two s t a g e s . F i r s t o f 
a l l Parsons moves fr o m the i s o l a t e d u n i t a c t t o the l e v e l o f 
a p l u r a l i t y o f u n i t a c t s o f an i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r , the 
i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n system. The second stage i s t o move from 
th e l e v e l o f the i s o l a t e d a c t o r t o t h a t o f a p l u r a l i t y o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s ' a c t i o n systems, a s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n . I n 
each case i n r e s p e c t s r e l e v a n t here the d i s c u s s i o n i s 
r e s t r i c t e d t o the r a t i o n a l t y p e , t h a t i s , the above element, 
the norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y , remains. However Parsons' q u e s t i o n 
i s when we c o m p l i c a t e the u n i t a n a l y s i s i n the above way 
what a d d i t i o n a l elements 'emerge' a t these more complex l e v e l s ? 
H i s argument i s t h a t when we c o m p l i c a t e the p i c t u r e the 
f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l elements are r e q u i r e d . On the f i r s t 
l e v e l , the i n d i v i d u a l system o f a c t i o n , we must i n c l u d e an 
i n t e g r a t e d system o f u l t i m a t e ends, t h e u l t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n s o f 
a c t i o n , and d i s t i n g u i s h between the norms o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l and 
economic r a t i o n a l i t y . F u r t h e r when we move t o the second l e v e l 
o f c o m p l e x i t y , a s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n , we must make a f u r t h e r 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between the t e c h n o l o g i c a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l 
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aspects o f the norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y and g e n e r a l i s e t he 
i n t e g r a t e d system o f u l t i m a t e ends t o a l l the i n d i v i d u a l 
a c t o r s j i t must be a system h e l d i n common by t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s 
o f the a c t i o n system, 
Nov/ t h e concern here i s w i t h t he n a t u r e o f Parsons 1 
s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s n o t the s u b s t a n t i v e c o n t e n t o f these 
elements. As such two q u e s t i o n s are p e r t i n a n t s on what 
grounds are these elements j u s t i f i e d and i n what sense are 
th e y ' s t r u c t u r a l ' elements? 
The most e x p l i c i t r a t i o n a l e f o r the n e c e s s i t y o f these 
elements i n Parsons' account i s t h a t o f l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y . 
The argument i s : i f t he p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f the a c t i o n frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e i n g e n e r a l and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the r a t i o n a l 
u n i t a c t i n p a r t i c u l a r are t o be m a i n t a i n e d t h e n when we move 
to these more c o m p l i c a t e d systems o f a c t i o n we must add 
a d d i t i o n a l elements. T h i s can be i l l u s t r a t e d by r e f e r e n c e 
to Parsons' argument f o r the n e c e s s i t y o f i n c l u d i n g an element 
o f u l t i m a t e ends and why these must be i n t e g r a t e d t o form a 
coherent system. I n each case Parsons uses t he metaphor o f 
a l i n l c e d c h a i n o f u n i t a c t s . The end o f any one a c t i s , 
from t he p o i n t o f view o f the n e x t a c t i n the c h a i n , a means t o 
a f u r t h e r end and so on. So, i f we move a l o n g the c h a i n . 
Parsons argues t h a t ' l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y l e a d s sooner o r l a t e r 
t o an u l t i m a t e end' [~1937a; 236] . That i s , we come t o t h e 
te r m i n u s o f the c h a i n where t h e end i s n o t a means t o a 
f u r t h e r end b u t an end i n i t s e l f . However the i d e a o f an 
end i n i t s e l f i s n o t something t h a t can be encompassed by 
the elements o f the u n i t a c t , t h a t i s , t he norm o f i n t r i n s i c 
- 163 
r a t i o n a l i t y , , T h i s can o n l y a p p l y t o the means-end r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
i t cannot a p p l y t o the s i t u a t i o n where an end i s d e s i r a b l e 
i n i t s e l f r a t h e r t h a n a means/cause o f a f u r t h e r e n d / e f f e c t . 
Hence a d i f f e r e n t concept, the element o f u l t i m a t e end, must 
be i n c l u d e d , 
A s i m i l a r ' a n a l y t i c a l l o g i c ' [ l 937a; 231] i s used t o j u s t i f y 
t h e argument t h a t the u l t i m a t e ends o f a p l u r a l i t y o f c h a i n s 
must be i n t e g r a t e d t o g e t h e r t o form a coherent system [l937as 
231-21o From the frame o f r e f e r e n c e we assume t h a t ends are 
a c a u s a l f a c t o r i n a c t i o n , t h i s a p p l y i n g t o u l t i m a t e ends. 
Parsons i s concerned w i t h the s i t u a t i o n i n T / h i c h t h e a c t o r i s 
fac e d w i t h a c h o i c e between two a l t e r n a t i v e u l t i m a t e ends. To 
make the c h o i c e t he a c t o r must r e f e r t o some c r i t e r i o n o r 
standaz'd by w h i c h t he d e c i s i o n can be made. The argument i s 
t h a t t h i s b a s i s o f choi c e must l i e e i t h e r i n the means and 
c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n o r i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f u l t i m a t e ends 
themselves. Parsons c l a i m s t h a t i f i t l i e s i n the f o r m e r , 
i f t h e a c t o r chooses between u l t i m a t e ends on the b a s i s o f means 
a v a i l a b l e o r c o n d i t i o n s a p p l y i n g , t h e n we v i o l a t e t h e assumption 
o f t he frame o f r e f e r e n c e , the p u r s u i t o f an end i s u n i m p o r t a n t 
i f ends are o n l y chosen on t h e b a s i s o f whether means are 
a v a i l a b l e o r c o n d i t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e i t s a t t a i n m e n t . T h i s 
would 'reduce' ends t o means and c o n d i t i o n s . Thus the 
st a n d a r d o f c h o i c e must l i e i n the element o f u l t i m a t e end 
i t s e l f , t h a t i s , the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f u l t i m a t e ends i n a system 
o f p r i o r i t i e s . 
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1 „ 0. e i t h e r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e 
a n a l y t i c a l concept o f l o g i c a l a c t i o n are 
accepted;, i n c l u d i n g the s y s t e m a t i c r e l a t i o n 
o f ends t o each o t h e r , o r the assumptions 
are a g a i n v i o l a t e d ' [l 937a; 231 -2] „ 
Again i t should be remembered t h a t we are n o t here concerned 
w i t h whether Parsons' ' l o g i c ' i s c o r r e c t b u t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e 
p o i n t t h a t he j u s t i f i e s the i n c l u s i o n o f elements o f a c t i o n by 
the appeal t o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y . 
The second aspect o f Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n r e l e v a n t t o 
the problem a t hand i s t h a t as w e l l as the l i m i t a t i o n o f h i s 
argument t o a b s t r a c t t y p e s o f r a t i o n a l a c t i o n on c e r t a i n l e v e l s 
o f system c o m p l e x i t y Parsons f u r t h e r uses t he assumption o f 
• i n t e g r a t i o n ' as p a r t o f h i s argument. That i s he employs a 
' l i m i t i n g t y p e ' i n w h i c h the a c t i o n system i s ' p e r f e c t l y 
i n t e g r a t e d ' . Of t h i s Parsons says; 
'Of course i t i s c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d -ftiat 
" i n t e g r a t i o n " i n t h i s complete sense 
a p p l i e s o n l y t o the a b s t r a c t s o c i e t y ; i n 
t h i s as i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s i t i s a l i m i t i n g 
case. C e r t a i n l y n e i t h e r P a reto n o r the 
p r e s e n t a u t h o r means t o i m p l y t h a t c o n c r e t e 
s o c i e t i e s are i n g e n e r a l even a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
p e r f e c t l y i n t e g r a t e d i n t h i s sense, or t h a t 
t h e i r members are n o r m a l l y , t he m a j o r i t y , 
conscious t h a t t h e r e i s any system o f common 
ends' / l 937a; 2^-7-8] . 
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From t h i s remark i t can be seen t h a t Parsons uses ' i n t e g r a t i o n ' 
i n a t w o f o l d way. The f i r s t sense we might c a l l the 
l o g i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f any i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r ' s u l t i m a t e - e n d 
system. TJhen Parsons assumes t h i s he i s assuming t h a t t he 
a c t o r has a ' c l e a r , l o g i c a l l y p r e c i s e f o r m u l a t i o n o f a system 
o f ends' £l 937a: 25^] » Hence one o f the two p o s s i b l e types o f 
d e v i a t i o n from t h e i n t e g r a t e d t y pe n o t e d by Parsons i s 'the 
f a i l u r e o f the u l t i m a t e - e n d systems o f i n d i v i d u a l s t o r e c e i v e 
any p r e c i s e f o r m u l a t i o n a t a l l ' Tl937a!255j ° 
The second sense o f i n t e g r a t i o n o n l y becomes r e l e v a n t 
i n the s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n and we can c a l l i t s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n . I n t e g r a t i o i i here r e f e r s t o the harmonious 
coherence o f t h e a c t i o n systems o f the p l u r a l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s 
who form the system. Parsons g i v e s the C a l v i n i s t s o f C a l v i n ' s 
Geneva and t h e i r p u r s u i t o f the common end o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t he 
Kingdom o f God on E a r t h as 'a c o n c r e t e example w h i c h comes 
r e l a t i v e l y c l o s e t o the e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n s o f the theorem' 
[ l 937a: 2481 . A g a i n the second form o f d e v i a t i o n from t h e 
i n t e g r a t e d case Parsons d e s c r i b e s as con f l i c t . £l 937a: 2 ^ 5 ] . 
So as w e l l as l i m i t i n g h i s argument t o the r a t i o n a l t y pe 
on s p e c i f i e d l e v e l s o f system c o m p l e x i t y Parsons f u r t h e r 
s p e c i f i e s t h a t such a c t i o n systems are i n t e g r a t e d i n t h e above 
r e s p e c t s . 
I t has been necessary t o make t h i s p o i n t as i t i s an 
i m p o r t a n t p r e c o n d i t i o n o f the t h i r d aspect o f Parsons' j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r t he n e c e s s i t y o f the elements o f a c t i o n . T h i s i s an 
argument based on t h e f u n c t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y o f the elements. 
166 -
Here t h e pa r a d i g m i c form o f Parsons' r e a s o n i n g would be; 
i f we have an a c t i o n system which i s (a) r a t i o n a l (b) o f x 
degree o f c o m p l e x i t y i n i t s c o m b i n a t i o n o f u n i t a c t s and ( c ) 
p e r f e c t l y i n t e g r a t e d , t h e n , what f u n c t i o n a l problems does 
such a system face? Having l o c a t e d the problem and on the 
grounds t h a t such a system o f u n i t s i s c o n c r e t e l y p o s s i b l e t he 
a d d i t i o n a l elements o f a c t i o n become the f u n c t i o n a l l y 
necessary s o l u t i o n t o these problems. V/ithout these elements 
an a c t i o n system o f t h i s t y p e , degree o f c o m p l e x i t y and i n t e -
g r a t i o n would n o t be p o s s i b l e . 
T h i s form o f r e a s o n i n g l i e s b e h i n d Parsons' d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the t e c h n i c a l and economic aspects o f the norm o f 
i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y , £l 937as 233-5J which i t w i l l be 
remembered 'emerges' on the l e v e l o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n 
system. 
'But as soon as a system o f a c t i o n i s 
c o n s i d e r e d a c o m p l i c a t i o n i s i n t r o d u c e d . 
The e x i s t e n c e o f a p l u r a l i t y o f ends i m p l i e s 
t h a t c e r t a i n means are p o t e n t i a l means t o 
more t h a n one end. Then i n so f a r as these 
means are scar c e , r e l a t i v e t o t h e i r p o t e n t i a l 
uses, the a c t o r i s fac e d w i t h a d i f f e r e n t 
o r d e r o f problem from t h a t o f m a x i m i s i n g 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l e f f i c i e n c y , c h o o s i n g t he means 
"best adapted" t o a s i n g l e g i v e n end. T h i s 
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problem i s t h a t o f the a l l o c a t i o n o f 
scarce means as between t h e i r v a r i o u s 
p o t e n t i a l uses. T h i s i s what may most 
u s e f u l l y be r e f e r r e d t o as the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
economic element o f l o g i c a l a c t i o n . I t 
must be borne i n mind t h a t i n ev e r y c o n c r e t e 
economic a c t i o n a t e c h n o l o g i c a l element i s 
by d e f i n i t i o n i n v o l v e d ' [ l 937a; 233] ° 
Note t h a t here Parsons argues t h a t when we c o m p l i c a t e t he p i c t u r e 
i f he a c t s r a t i o n a l l y , t h i s i s the r o l e o f l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y 
mentioned above, take account o f t h e t e c h n i c a l e f f i c a c y o f a 
g i v e n means t o achieve an end b u t a l s o the f u r t h e r problem t h a t 
he must t a k e i n t o account t h a t t h i s means c o u l d a l s o be 
t h i s problem s i t u a t i o n i s t o i n t r o d u c e the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the t e c h n i c a l and economic aspects o f the norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y as 
necessary elements o f the i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n system. 
However the most e x p l i c i t example o f t h i s argument by 
f u n c t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y i s when Parsons t u r n s t o the case o f the 
s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n (1937as 235-238} , L e t us f i r s t o f a l l 
note the assumptions i n terms o f whic h he i s w o r k i n g . (a) We 
must f i r s t o f a l l assume t h a t a c t o r ' s are a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y i n 
two senses, f i r s t l y t h e y are a t t e m p t i n g t o a t t a i n ends by 
employing t he most t e c h n i c a l l y and e c o n o m i c a l l y e f f i c i e n t means 
p o s s i b l e . Secondly we are assuming l o g i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f 
a d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n a l problem a r i s e s . Not o n l y must the a c t o r , 
employed i n a t t a i n i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e end. Parsons' response t o 
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t h i s a c t i o n s t h a t each a c t o r ' s ends are c l e a r l y f o r m u l a t e d , 
he has s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e knowledge o f the c a u s a l 
e f f i c a c y o f means and an e x p l i c i t o r g a n i z a t i o n o f h i s 
p r i o r i t i e s . ( b ) 1/e are assuming t h a t t h e r e are a p l u r a l i t y o f 
such r a t i o n a l a c t o r s and the s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n i s 
p e r f e c t l y i n t e g r a t e d i n the sense o f s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
I t i s i n terms o f these assumptions t h a t Parsons 
p o s t u l a t e s t h a t c e r t a i n problems w i l l i n h e r e n t l y a r i s e \\rhich, 
o v e r a l l , can be summarized as the Hobbesian problem o f o r d e r . 
The f i r s t o f these i s d e s c r i b e d as 1 „ . . a problem o f a l l o c a t i o n 
o f r e c o u r s e s n o t onl}*- as between d i f f e r e n t ends o f the same 
i n d i v i d u a l b u t a l s o as between those o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s ' , 
f l 937a; 235] • 
One p o s s i b i l i t y here i s t h a t such a d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
re c o u r s e s i s s i m p l y a f u n c t i o n o f each i n d i v i d u a l a c t i n g 
r a t i o n a l l y i n the above senses. I n t h i s case no f u r t h e r 
elements would be necessary. But Parsons f e e l s t h a t t h i s 
p o s s i b i l i t y i s an u n r e a l one, f o r i n terms o f the elements so 
f a r i n t r o d u c e d t h i s ; 
' g i v e s no e x p l a n a t i o n o f why t h e r e should 
be any l i m i t a t i o n on the means by which any 
one i n d i v i d u a l o r group can push h i s c l a i m s 
t o command over r e c o u r s e s a t the expense o f 
o t h e r ' s c l a i m s . For i n the absence o f such 
l i m i t a t i o n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o p r e v e n t t he whole-
s a l e employment o f a v e r y i m p o r t a n t c l a s s o f such 
means which may be summed up as c o e r c i v e ' [l937a;235j • 
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T h i s indeed i s d i r e c t l y s t a t e d as the second problem 
a r i s i n g ; 
'.,. the reiour6es a v a i l a b l e as seen from 
the p o i n t o f view o f any one i n d i v i d u a l 
i n c l u d e n o t o n l y h i s own powers and the 
non-human environment b u t a l s o t h e 
p o t e n t i a l s e r v i c e s o f o t h e r s . Thus among 
t h e means t o anyone's ends are t h e a c t i o n s 
o f o t h e r s ' f l 937a; 235] . 
The consequences o f these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are t w o f o l d . F i r s t 
o f a l l t h i s c o m p l i c a t i o n must be f o r m u l a t e d as an element, a 
f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f the norms o f i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y 
must be made t o cover t h i s t h i r d ' o r d e r o f problems'. The 
a c t o r i s f a c e d w i t h n o t o n l y problems o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l and 
economic r a t i o n a l i t y b u t a l s o p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y ; o f how 
t o c o n t r o l o t h e r s and p r e v e n t h i m s e l f from b e i n g c o n t r o l l e d . 
Now t h i s i s from the p o i n t o f view o f the a c t o r . Hox\rever t h i s 
i s l a r g e l y c o i n c i d e n t a l , i t a r i s e s because x^ re have been 
o p e r a t i n g i n terms o f the i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n system. When we 
move t o the s o c i a l system o f a c t i o n t h i s becomes the p e r s p e c t i v e , 
the p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e f o r the problems o f a c t i o n systems. As 
such a second consequence i s p r i m a r y i n Parsons' mind. Once we 
i n t r o d u c e p o l i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y i t becomes a deep f u n c t i o n a l 
problem f o r the s o c i a l system. 
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',,. t h e r e must be some c o n t r o l over the 
e x e r c i s e by some individ.ua.ls o f c o e r c i v e 
power over o t h e r s , i f t h e r e i s t o be 
s o c i a l o r d e r a t a l l ' f l 937a: 236] . 
Otherwise the s o c i a l o r d e r becomes a c o n t i n u a l s t r u g g l e f o r 
power. I t i s here t h a t Parsons p o s t u l a t e s the f u r t h e r elemen 
o f the i n t e g r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l ' s u l t i m a t e end systems i n a 
common system, as a s o l u t i o n t o t h i s f u n c t i o n a l problem 
d 937a: 238] . 
Again i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o no t e t h a t t h e a c t i o n system i s 
the p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e , 
'.,, i n any s o c i e t y t h e r e must o b v i o u s l y be 
some mechanism by which are s e t t l e d t h e r e l a t i v e 
c l a i m s o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s t o command over 
d i s p o s a b l e , scarce non human re£our6es' fl937a: 
235] • 
'For an economic process ( o f a l l o c a t i o n ) t o take 
p l a c e w i t h i n a s o c i e t y t h e r e must be some 
mechanisms by which a r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e 
s e t t l e m e n t o f the power r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
i n d i v i d u a l s and groups i s a t t a i n e d ' [l937a:236]. 
I n each case t he n e c e s s i t y o f the mechanism (wh i c h Parsons 
supposes t o be a common u l t i m a t e end system) i s from t he p o i n t 
o f view o f the ' s o c i e t y ' , t h e system o f u n i t a c t s formed by a 
p l u r a l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i o n systems. 
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So a l o g i c based on f u n c t i o n a l problems o f a c t i o n systems 
i s one i m p o r t a n t component o f Parsons argument f o r the i n c l u s i o n 
o f elements i n the s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n , He can now t u r n t o 
the second questions i n what sense are these s t r u c t u r a l 
elements? From the above we can now rephrase t h i s and ask 
how do the elements s o l v e t h e f u n c t i o n a l problems which t o an 
i m p o r t a n t degree j u s t i f y them? 
T h i s w i l l have t o be f u r t h e r d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r I I I 
b u t c e r t a i n p o i n t s can be e s t a b l i s h e d now., The most i m p o r t a n t 
p o i n t i s t h a t as w e l l as i d e n t i f y i n g elements s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
i n v o l v e s t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t o a s t r u c t u r e o f elements, 
Bershady has expressed t h i s w e l l s 
'One way t o b r i n g the phenomenal w o r l d under 
r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l i s t o break these complex 
events i n t o t h e i r elements, t o seek t o f i n d , 
w i t h i n the phenomena themselves, the components 
which make them up. The a n a l y s i s o f an 
event s p l i t s t he event i n t o i t s component 
p a r t s . Once we have these p a r t s we are t h e n 
able t o reproduce the event and, by so d o i n g , 
r e v e a l i t s s t r u c t u r e , f o r not o n l y i s t h e 
event reproduced i n i t s t o t a l i t y b u t i n the 
o r d e r e d sequence o f i t s elements' (1973:39). 
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I n t he example o f s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d here 
t h i s i s most e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d when Parsons says, w i t h 
r e f e r e n c e t o the t e c h n i c a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l aspects o f the 
norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y : 
'But w h i l e each may serve as a means t o 
the o t h e r t h e y s t a n d i n a k i n d o f h i e r a r c h i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o each o t h e r - each w i t h a 
w i d e n i n g o f the range o f c o n d i t i o n s i n v o l v e d , 
becoming a c o n d i t i o n o f t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f the 
one b e f o r e i t . Thus so l o n g as o t h e r ends are 
n o t i n v o l v e d t e c h n o l o g i c a l ends are s e l f -
s u f f i c i e n t . But as soon as o t h e r uses b e g i n 
t o compete f o r the p o t e n t i a l means as a techno-
l o g i c a l end, t h e i r "economy" comes t o be a 
necessary c o n d i t i o n o f the r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e i r 
employment f o r the end i n q u e s t i o n . The w i d e r 
c o n t e x t i n a sense s u b o r d i n a t e s t he t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
element o f e f f i c i e n c y t o the economic„ S i m i l a r l y 
"economy" i n r e l a t i o n s t o o t h e r persons i n v o l v e s 
the s e t t l e m e n t o f the power r e l a t i o n s t o them. 
U n t i l these are s e t t l e d i t i s i r r a t i o n a l t o concern 
o n e s e l f w i t h t h e i r p o t e n t i a l s e r v i c e s i n an economic 
c o n t e x t alone' [ l 937a: 2k0-1] . 
So the elements o f an a c t i o n system are l i n k e d t o g e t h e r i n a 
h i e r a r c h y o f c o n t r o l . C o n t r o l i s necessary i n t h a t i n o r d e r t o 
have x (say, t e c h n o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y ) we must have y (say, 
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economic r a t i o n a l i t y ) h u t t h e n y l i m i t s and ' s u b o r d i n a t e s ' the 
range o f x« Coming back t o the n o t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
o f a c t i o n systems we can see t h a t a l t h o u g h the problem i s how 
u n i t s o f a c t i o n form e m p i r i c a l systems the s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 
i s n o t conducted i n these terms. Rather elements o f a c t i o n 
p r o v i d e t h e means o f s o l v i n g t h i s problem. But n o t i n terms o f 
a n a l y t i c a l laws, r a t h e r , i n terms o f a more s u b s t a n t i v e h i e r a r c h y 
o f c o n t r o l between elements. I t i s t h i s , the s t r u c t u r e o f a system 
o f elements w h i c h i s the s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n . T h i s theme w i l l 
be t a k e n up a g a i n i n c h a p t e r I I I i n the c o n t e x t o f the concept 
o f t he s u b j e c t i v e ' s t a t e o f mind' and Parsons* t r e a t m e n t o f the 
problem o f s o c i a l c a u s a t i o n as the problem o f c o n t r o l . 
3. The l o g i c a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n o f g e n e r a l concepts. 
I have so f a r c o n s i d e r e d what Parsons means by t h e o r y as 
composed o f g e n e r a l concepts o f e m p i r i c a l r e f e r e n c e . The f i n a l 
component o f h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e o r y i s t h a t these g e n e r a l 
concepts are l o g i c a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d . To some degree t h i s s i m p l y 
means t h a t s c i e n t i f i c knowledge must be governed by l o g i c a l 
r e a s o n i n g [~1937a:l8ll . However, Parsons c l e a r l y p u t s a 
somewhat s t r o n g e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on the phrase " l o g i c a l i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n " . 1/hat i s i m p l i e d here i s the systemacy o f s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge, a key component o f Parsons' t h i n k i n g n o t o n l y i n h i s 
(231 
l a t e r work b u t from i t s i n c e p t i o n . v J > Thus i n h i s f i r s t p u b l i -
c t i o n he says; 
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'The term " t h e o r y " , however, i s used i n a 
d i f f e r e n t and more g e n e r a l sense t h a n t h a t 
common i n economic s c i e n c e , t o mean, n o t 
merely a system o f e q u i l i b r i u m , b u t any 
c o n s i s t e n t and u n i f i e d system o f concepts t o 
be used i n the a n a l y s i s o f s o c i a l phenomena' 
(1928s643-^). 
There are two c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h Parsons advocates the l o g i c a l 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f concepts. The f i r s t i s the i n t e g r a t i o n 
o f concepts i n t o a l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d t h e o r e t i c a l system, the 
second the s y s t e m a t i c i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f such t h e o r e t i c a l 
systems. I w i l l take these i n t u r n . 
To a g r e a t e r o r l e s s e r degree the g e n e r a l concepts which 
make up a body o f t h e o r y w i l l form an i n t e g r a t e d 'system' 
[ l 937a; 7} . They w i l l s tand i n 'mutual l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s ' so 
t h a t 'any s u b s t a n t i v e change i n the statement o f one i m p o r t a n t 
p r o p o s i t i o n o f the system has l o g i c a l consequences f o r the 
statement o f the o t h e r s ' |/I937a;7] » A l l t h a t Parsons i s s a y i n g 
h e r e , i t seems, i s t h a t a body o f concepts should be i n t e r n a l l y 
c o n s i s t e n t . However as was mentioned above by l o g i c a l i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s meant moie t h a n j u s t l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g . For as 
w e l l as concepts b e i n g m u t u a l l y c o n s i s t e n t the system t h e y form 
sh o u l d be/tends t o be ' l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d ' [l 937a;9] . Each o f 
th e i m p l i c a t i o n s o r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f any one concept o r 
p r o p o s i t i o n i s expressed e x p l i c i t l y i n a n o t h e r component o f the 
system. Parsons' f a v o u r i t e example o f a l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d system 
i s a system o f simultaneous e q u a t i o n s ; 
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'Such a system i s d e t e r m i n a t e , i,e„, c l o s e d , 
when t h e r e are as many independent e q u a t i o n s 
as t h e r e are independent v a r i a b l e s . I f t h e r e 
are f o u r e q u a t i o n s and o n l y t h r e e v a r i a b l e s , 
and no one o f the e q t i a t i o n s i s d e r i v a b l e from 
the o t h e r s by a l g e b r a i c m a n i p u l a t i o n t h e n 
t h e r e i s ano t h e r v a r i a b l e m i s s i n g 1 £l937a;l6] , 
I t i s o f no t e t h a t i n the above p a r a g r a p h I b r a c k e t e d t o g e t h e r 
the phrases E s h o u l d be' and 'tends t o be'. There i s a 
d i s t i n c t a m b i g u i t y i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g here as t o whether t h e 
l o g i c a l c l o s u r e o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system i s a n o r m a t i v e i d e a l 
w h i c h Parsons adheres t o o r an e m p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n about 
the development o f s c i e n c e . Thus a t one p o i n t he says ' 0,o 
i t i s i n the n a t u r e o f the case t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l systems 
should a t t e m p t t o become " l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d " ' f l 9 3 7 a ; 9 ] w h i l s t 
a t another p o i n t ' I t has been s t a t e d i n t h e f i r s t c h a p t e r t h a t 
a l l systems o f s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y t e n d t o become l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d ' 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 7 o ] « A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s a m b i g u i t y here Parsons seems t o 
f a v o u r t he l a t t e r view, l o g i c a l c l o s u r e i s an e m p i r i c a l phenomenon. 
He speaks o f 'the i n h e r e n t n e c e s s i t y o f a system t o become 
l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d ' El937as17] and j u s t i f i e s t h i s by a s s e r t i n g 
t h a t t h i s tendency i s a 's p e c i a l case' o f 'the most g e n e r a l n a t u r e 
o f reason i t s e l f [i937a;2"f] , I t seems t o me t h a t t h e v e r y 
b r e a d t h and dep t h o f t h i s c l a i m makes t h e e m p i r i c a l s t a t u s o f the 
i d e a o f l o g i c a l c l o s u r e r a t h e r q u e s t i o n n a b l e , I n o t h e r words 
whether t h e o r e t i c a l systems tend o r n o t t o l o g i c a l c l o s u r e i s 
v e r y much a m a t t e r o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , T7e can i n s t a n c e Parsons' 
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a n a l y s i s o f the development o f Durkheim's work. { [l937&% 
Chapter 8-1 l ] , a siimmary statement i s g i v e n on pp.30^-) , 
As i s w e l l known the main theme o f Parsons' account i s 
t h a t 
' I n Durkheim... t h e r e i s a fundamental change, 
from one set o f s h a r p l y f o r m u l a t e d ideas t o 
another' fl 937a? 30k\ . 
Parsons' argument hangs on t h i s t r a n s i t i o n from a p o s i t i v i s t i c 
t o a v o l u n t a r i s t i c t h e o r y o f a c t i o n , a l t h o u g h Durkheim d i e d 
b e f o r e f u l l y e l a b o r a t i n g the l a t t e r . I n t h i s t h e l o g i c a l 
c l o s u r e o f the p o s i t i v i s t i c stage i n t o a ' r e l a t i v e l y w e l l -
i n t e g r a t e d g e n e r a l system o f t h e o r y ' f l 937a.; 30*tl p l a y s an 
i m p o r t a n t p a r t . For i t i s when the ' e a r l y e m p i r i c a l work' 
i s s y s t e m a t i z e d t h a t the i n a d e q u a c i e s o f the p o s i t i v i s t i c 
t h e o r e t i c a l base came t o the f o r e and the process o f 
t r a n s i t i o n b e g i n s . 
However r e c e n t c r i t i c s , n o t a b l y Giddens (1972) and Pope 
/ \(2k) 
(1973) have c h a l l e n g e d t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r g u i n g , f o r 
example, t h a t elements o f the ' l a t e r ' p o s i t i o n such as the 
v o l u n t a r y c o n s t r a i n t o f an i n t e r n a l i s e d r u l e are t o be found 
i n DLirkheim's p r e - D i v i s i o n o f Labour i n S o c i e t y w r i t i n g s . 
Pope even goes so f a r as t o c l a i m t h a t Durkheim was never 
a p o s i t i v i s t i n Parsons' sense, a view which I f i n d u n c o n v i n c i n g . 
A more i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i s made by Giddens, namely, i t i s Parsons 
penchant f o r w e l d i n g ideas t o g e t h e r i n a t h e o r e t i c a l system which 
- 177 -
n e c e s s i t a t e s the t r a n s i t i o n t h e s i s , He might suggest t h a t 
Durkheim was s i m p l y n o t a p a r t i c u l a r l y systemic t h i n k e r i n the 
sense o f l o g i c a l c l o s u r e , /^e can f i n d t h e o r e t i c a l a spects 
o f ' p o s i t i v i s m 1 1 , ' i d e a l i s m ' and ' v o l u n t a r i s m ' t h r o u g h o u t 
Durkheim's work wh i c h arc never f o r g e d i n t o an i n t e r n a l l y 
c o n s i s t e n t system h u t which are adequate t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e 
e m p i r i c a l work Durkheim engaged i n . 
From t h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n we can r e t u r n t o the a m b i g u i t y 
above and suggest t h a t t he i d e a o f a l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d t h e o r e t i c a l 
system i s t o Parsons a n o r m a t i v e i d e a l b u t one which i s 
i m p o r t a n t t o him f o r good reasons so t h a t as a consequence o f 
t h i s i t tends t o be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an e m p i r i c a l phenomenon, 
These good ( t o Parsons, t h a t i s ) reasons are s e v e r a l b u t we can 
d i v i d e them i n t o two groups. The f i r s t i s t o do w i t h t he 
r o l e o f l o g i c a l c l o s u r e i n the development o f s c i e n c e , the second 
w i t h the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o l e o f l o g i c a l closure„ 
The r o l e o f l o g i c a l c l o s r i r e i n the development o f science 
can be s u b d i v i d e d i n t o two, i t s p l a c e i n the exposure o f 
(25) 
r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s and o f i n t e r n a l contradictions„ v 
Parsons summarises the f i r s t i n the f o l l o w i n g ways 
' I f the e x p l i c i t p r o p o s i t i o n s o f a system 
do not c o n s t i t u t e a l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d system 
i n t h i s sense i t may be i n f e r r e d t h a t t he 
arguments invoiced r e s t f o r t h e i r l o g i c a l 
cogency on one o r more u n s t a t e d assumptions. 
I t i s one o f t h e prime f u n c t i o n s o f l o g i c a l 
c r i t i c i s m o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems t o a p p l y 
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t h i s c r i t e r i o n [ l o g i c a l c l o s u r e 7 and i f 
gaps are found, t o uncover the i m p l i c i t 
assumptions' Cl937a:10~|. 
I n t h e work o f 'mediocre proponents o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system' 
t l 937a: 1 8] such u n s t a t e d assumptions are d o g m a t i c a l l y i g n o r e d 
o r d e n i e d . But 'the a b l e s t and most cl e a r - h e a d e d p r o p o n e n t s ' 
f l 937a: 18] make them e x p l i c i t as r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s . I t i s 
by l o g i c a l c l o s u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems t h a t these are b r o u g h t 
o u t . F u r t h e r when such r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s are t r a n s l a t e d i n t o 
p o s i t i v e concepts the s t a t u s o f b o d i e s o f t h e o r y as systems i s 
ag a i n r e l e v a n t , f o r i t has, as a component o f a system, 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the o t h e r components. 
The p l a c e o f l o g i c a l c l o s u r e i n the exposure o f i n t e i - n a l 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i s a g a i n e x e m p l i f i e d by Parsons' a n a l y s i s o f the 
' u t i l i t a r i a n dilemma'. H i s i n t e n t i o n here i s to l o c a t e 
i n h e r e n t problems w i t h i n a p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . T h i s 
i s done v i a u t i l i t a r i a n i s m as a subsystem o f p o s i t i v i s m . Parsons 
f o r m u l a t e s t h e c e n t r a l concepts o f u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n t o an i n t e r n a l ! 
c o n s i s t e n t c o n c e p t u a l scheme summed up as 'atomism, r a t i o n a l i t y , 
e m p i r i c i s m and randomness o f ends' f l 9 3 7 a : 6 o ] . I t i s when t h i s 
i s done, when u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s r e n d e r e d i n t o a t h e o r e t i c a l 
system t h a t the i n t e r n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n s n o t e d above come t o l i g h t . 
The second group o f reasons why Parsons emphasizes the 
l o g i c a l c l o s u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems are e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i n 
n a t u r e , t h a t i s , they are concerned w i t h the grounds on w h i c h 
i t can be c l a i m e d t h a t concepts o r p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e v a l i d 
knowledge. I t was n o t e d above t h a t by l o g i c a l closu.ro Parsons 
means t h a t t h e i m p l i c i t p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s and r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f any 
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one concept o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system are made e x p l i c i t i n a 
f u r t h e r component and t h a t t h i s a p p l i e s t h r o u g h o u t the system, 
/mother aspect o f t h i s i s t h a t the system i s d e t e r m i n a t e . 
'That i s , i n a l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d system 
a l l the p r o p o s i t i o n s i n the system a r e , on 
the one hand, i n t e r d e p e n d e n t i n t h a t each 
has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the o t h e r s and, on 
t h e othen?, t h e system i s d e t e r m i n a t e i n 
t h a t each o f these i m p l i c a t i o n s f i n d s i t s 
statement i n a n o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n i n t h e same 
system' [ l 9 3 7 a : 7 o ] . 
I n o t h e r words the consequences o f any change i n the system 
are p r e d i c t a b l e . So i n a simple economic example a t h e o r e t i c a l 
model o f an economy would be l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d and d e t e r m i n a t e 
i f we were able t o t r a c e the consequences o f a change i n demand 
f o r good x on the s u p p l y o f t h a t good and on the demand f o r and 
s u p p l y o f o t h e r goods i n c l u d e d i n the model. 
Mow one t o s t o f whether a concept o r p r o p o s i t i o n i s v a l i d 
i s e m p i r i c a l v c r i f i c t i o n w h i c h i s , as we have seen, i n s i s t e d 
upon by Parsons. However e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n cannot st a n d 
alone as a c r i t e r i o n o f v a l i d i t y . T h i s i s because o f the 
a b s t r a c t n a t u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l concepts d i s m i s s e d above. There 
i t was n o t e d t h a t b o t h i n d e s c r i p t i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n knowledge 
stands as a p a r t i a l a b s t r a c t i o n from the t o t a l i t y o f e m p i r i c a l 
phenomena. F u r t h e r the p a r t i a l i t y o f knowledge does n o t l i e 
i n i t s l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n t o s p e c i f i c c l a s s e s o f c o n c r e t e 
phenomena, r a t h e r i t i s l i m i t e d t o aspects o f c o n c r e t e phenomena. 
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The consequence o f t h i s i s i n d i c a t e d when Parsons says; 
•A lav/ i s a u n i f o r m i t y i n the f a c t s , b u t 
si n c e the f a c t s are "a s p e c t s " o f t h e 
c o n c r e t e phenomena seen i n terms o f a 
c o n c e p t u a l scheme a law i s n o t a g e n e r a l i z a -
t i o n o f the necessary c o n c r e t e b e h a v i o u r o f 
these phenomena' [1 937a; 18*0 . 
A law, concept o r whatever, t h e n , does n ot sta n d i n d i r e c t 
correspondence w i t h e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , i t t h e r e f o r e cannot be 
assessed by the simple comparison o f t h e o r y and r e a l i t j ^ , whether 
what happens i n r e a l i t y conforms t o the t h e o r y . I t i s i n the n a t u r e 
o f t he case t h a t t h i s w i l l never occur except i n t h e most 
e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s because o f the a b s t r a c t n a t u r e 
o f t h e o r y . 
Parsons expresses t h i s by i n s i s t i n g upon a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the e m p i r i c a l and l o g i c a l c l o s u r e o f a t h e o r e t i c a l 
system ( e . g . f l 937a: 10, 70, 185, 476, 7 5 7 ] ) . To say t h a t a 
t h e o r e t i c a l system i s l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d does n ot mean t h a t i t 
i s e m p i r i c a l l y c l o s e d , t h a t i s , t h a t i t can d e s c r i b e and 
e x p l a i n a l l the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a g i v e n e m p i r i c a l phenomena. 
T h i s i s the f a l l a c y o f e m p i r i c i s m . A l o g i c a l ^ c l o s e d t h e o r y 
can o n l y be d e t e r m i n a t e w i t h i n i t s c o n c e p t u a l l i m i t a t i o n s , 
d e s c r i p t i v e and e x p l a n a t o r y , which r e s t r i c t i t t o aspects o f 
c o n c r e t e phenomena. 
181 -
The t e s t o f e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n t h e n must be p u t 
i n t o a wider- c o n t e x t as a c r i t e r i o n o f v a l i d i t y . Such a 
c o n t e x t has two f a c e t s s t he l o g i c a l c l o s u r e o f a t h e o r e t i c a l 
system i t s e l f becomes a c r i t e r i o n o f v a l i d i t y and such 
t h e o r e t i c a l systems must be s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o each othe: 
The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r o l e o f l o g i c a l c l o s u r e i s e x e m p l i f i e d 
i n Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n o f Leber's c r i t i q u e o f the i n t u i t i o n i s t 
s chool o f i d e a l i s m . Parsons says t h a t t h e i n t u i t i v e grasp 
o f meaning ' i s a t most o n l y one element i n the p r o o f o f the 
v a l i d i t y o f knowledge and cannot i t s e l f be t r u s t e d . I t must 
be checked by r e f e r e n c e t o a r a t i o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t system o f 
concepts' fl937a;5883 . Parsons makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s 
not r e s t r i c t e d t o the u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f meaning; 
'This s i t u a t i o n a l s o i s no d i f f e r e n t from 
t h a t e x i s t i n g i n the p h y s i c a l sciences„ 
There immediate sense i m p r e s s i o n s cannot 
be t r u s t e d w i t h o u t t h e o r e t i c a l , c o n c e p t u a l 
c r i t i c i s m . T/hen a s t i c k i s t h r u s t i n t o a 
p o o l o f s t i l l w a t e r t h e r e can be no doubt 
t h a t t h e ob s e r v e r "sees" t h a t the s t i c k i s 
bent a t the wa t e r l i n e ; h i s sense i m p r e s s i o n 
i s t h a t o f a "bent s t i c k " . When he judges 
t h a t the i m p r e s s i o n i s an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n , 
i t does n o t mean t h a t he does n o t r e a l l y see 
what he d e s c r i b e s , b u t t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n i s 
c o r r e c t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o a g e n e r a l system 
o f t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge' [ i 937a; 588-589] „ 
- 182 -
Here t h e n t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s c i e n t i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n i s 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n p a r t by ' r e f e r e n c e ' t o 'a r a t i o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t 
system o f concepts' o r 'a g e n e r a l system o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
knowledge'. The term ' r e f e r e n c e ' , o r ' t h e o r e t i c a l , 
c o n c e p t u a l c r i t i c i s m ' means t h a t t h e concept o r p r o p o s i t i o n 
must be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the t h e o r y as a whole, as a more o r l e s s 
c l o s e d system. 
'Thus the element o f " n e c e s s i t y " i n s c i e n t i f i c 
law i n h e r e s o n l y i n i t s l o g i c . As such, a law 
can have no e x c e p t i o n s . Uhat i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d 
an " e x c e p t i o n " i s rea.113/- "the s u p e r p o s i t i o n o f the 
e f f e c t o f ano t h e r law on t h a t o f the f i r s t " . I n 
t h a t sense a l l s c i e n t i f i c laws have e x c e p t i o n s . 
But t h i s l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y , what has been c a l l e d , 
above, " l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m " must, j u s t on t h i s 
account, n o t be c a r r i e d over i n t o c o n c r e t e 
phenomena. The l o g i c a l l y c l o s e d system o f 
s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y must n o t a r b i t r a r i l y be made 
an e m p i r i c a l l y c l o s e d system' f l 9 3 7 a s l 8 5 j . 
So t h e a b s t r a c t n a t u r e o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge means t h a t 
e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n must always be c a s t i n terms o f the 
c o n f i n e s o f a t h e o r e t i c a l system and t h a t the systemacy, t h e 
i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t e n c y , o f a body o f t h e o r y i s i t s e l f i n 
p a r t a c r i t e r i o n o f v a l i d i t y . 
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From what has been s a i d i t i s c l e a r t h a t i n o r d e r t o 
und e r s t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between even a p e r f e c t l y c l o s e d 
system o f t h e o r y and any g i v e n r e a l i t y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 
t h a t system t o o t h e r b o d i e s o f knowledge must a l s o be under-
stood,, 
•The u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o m p l e t e l y c o n c r e t e 
phenomena, so f a r as t h e y are a c c e s s i b l e t o 
science a t a l l , would i n v o l v e a p p l i c a t i o n o f 
the p r i n c i p l e s o f a l l t h e b a s i c s c i e n c e s ' 
(1932:338) . 
"The t o t a l c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y i s t o be con c e i v e d 
..„ as the r e s u l t o f t h e s y n t h e s i s o f a l l t h e 
d i f f e r e n t groups o f f o r c e s concerned' (193^a;537)« 
The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e o r e t i c a l systems t h e n becomes a 
p r i m a r y problem. T h i s i s i l l u s t r a t e d by one o f Parsons' 
p r e o c c u p a t i o n s i n h i s e a r l y work, t he r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 
economics and s o c i o l o g y . The e m p i r i c i s t ( i n Parsons' sense) 
n a t u r e o f o r t h o d o x economics ( f o r example, M a r s h a l l 9 Robbins) 
has a l r e a d y been no t e d ; the economists assumed t h a t t h e i r 
t h e o r e t i c a l models bore a more o r l e s s d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
an area o f c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y : t h e 'economy'. Of course t he 
problem was the l a c k o f f i t between t he t h e o r y and the c o n c r e t e 
r e a l i t y . The us^la l response t o t h i s was t o invo k e t h e c e t e r i s 
p a r i b u s c l a u s e , t h e n the model d e s c r i b e s and e x p l a i n s c o n c r e t e 
economic l i f e i n so f a r as o t h e r t h i n g s remained e q u a l , w h i c h t h 
r a r e l y d i d . I t i s the s t a t u s o f these ' o t h e r t h i n g s ' , 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y the u b i q u i t o u s ' s o c i a l f a c t o r s ' , w h i c h w o r r i e s 
Parsons o To him the economist t y p i c a l l y r e l e g a t e s these t o 
' s p e c i f i c e m p i r i c a l ad hoc q u a l i f i c a t i o n s on a s e r i e s o f 
p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t s ' ( I 937b i k - 7 7 ) One e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s 
t y p i c a l p a t t e r n i s A. Lflwe's book Economics and S o c i o l o g y w h i c h 
Parsons r e v i e w e d i n 1937- (1937b) . L6Ve r e c o g n i z e d t h a t ' I t 
i s n ecessary t o p l a c e t h e c a t e g o r i e s o f economic t h e o r y i n a 
g e n e r a l i z e d s e t t i n g o f t h e o r y i n o r d e r t o l e n d them c o n c r e t e 
r e l o v a n c e 1 , (Parsons: 1937b;477)» ¥ith t h i s Parsons 
h e a r t i e r agrees b u t d i s a g r e e s w i t h L6*we's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f what 
t h a t s e t t i n g amounts t o . To L6*we economics as 'an a b s t r a c t 
a n a l y t i c a l system o f g e n e r a l a p p l i c a b i l i t } / " ' (Parsons s 1937bs48o) 
must always be supplemented by ' s o c i o l o g i c a l m i d d l e p r i n c i p l e s ' . 
These are e s s e n t i a l l y the h i s t o r i c a l l y v a r i a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s e t t i n g s i n which economic processes work. T h i s p u t s s o c i o l o g y 
i n an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t c l a s s t o economics, i t has t h e t a s k 
n o t o f b u i l d i n g a g e n e r a l t h e o r y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l s o c i e t i e s b u t 
o f mapping t he s o c i a l f e a t u r e s p e c u l i a r t o d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l -
s o c i e t i e s . ¥ith t h i s Parsons d i s a g r e e s ( t h o u g h he does n o t 
say why) and asks i s i t n o t p o s s i b l e t o conceive o f s o c i o l o g y 
as o f the same s t a t u s as economics? H i s c l a i m i s t h a t t h i s can 
be done i f t h e sciences are u n d e r s t o o d as a b s t r a c t i n the sense 
t h a t t h e y are concerned w i t h aspects n o t c o n c r e t e areas o f r e a l i 
and i f these a s p e c t s , c o n c e p t u a l i s e d as a n a l y t i c a l elements are 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e l a t e d by a system o f a n a l y t i c a l s c i e n c e s 
f l 937a: 757-775] . 
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'Thus the p r i n c i p l e employed i s t o 
c l a s s i f y a n a l y t i c a l sciences accoi-ding t o 
w h i c h s t r u c t u r a l element o r group o f elements 
o f a g e n e r a l i z e d system o f a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s 
t he focus o f a t t e n t i o n o f the science i n 
q u e s t i o n ' [ l 937a: 766] . 
I t i s unnecessary here t o go i n t o the d e t a i l s o f t h i s c l a s s i f i -
c a t i o n o f t h e s c i e n c e s . A p a r t from what has been s a i d about 
the n e c e s s i t y f o r siich a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i t s b a s i s i n 
a n a l y t i c a l elements o n l y one p o i n t i s o f r e l e v a n c e . I f each 
science o f a c t i o n i s a p a r t o f a system o f s c i e n c e s t h e n as w e l l 
as b e i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w i t h each o t h e r the sciences ' e n j o y a 
degree o f independence o f each o t h e r ' / l 9 3 7 a : 7 6 5 j . T h i s 
independence i s seen by Parsons t o r e s t on the emergent p r o p e r t i e s 
o f o r g a n i c systems. 
'The main p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t , w i t h i n c r e a s i n g 
c o m p l e x i t y o f c o n c r e t e systems, t h e r e appear 
s u c c e s s i v e l y new emerging p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h g i v e 
r i s e t o new t h e o r e t i c a l problems n o t r e l e v a n t 
t o the more ele m e n t a r y systems' fl937as765} . 
T h i s i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t i t i s a l i n k between the s y s t e n i i c y 
o f t h e o r y and the s y s t e m i c y o f r e a l i t y . I n o t h e r words we have 
the b e g i n n i n g s o f a f i n a l reason f o r why Parsons s t r e s s e s the 
systemic n a t u r e o f t h e o r y . I t i s a more o n t o l o g i c a l under-
p i n n i n g , the o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f r e a l i t y . I t s h o u l d be 
i m m e d i a t e l y s t r e s s e d t h a t t h i s does n o t mean t h a t Parsons c l a i m s 
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t h a t t h e o r y should be systemic because r e a l i t y i s sy s t e m i c . 
However Parsons* o r g a n i c i s t metaphysics w h i c h we have a l r e a d y 
noted w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f t h e sciences a l s o 
a p p l i e s t o t h e sciences themselves. Knowledge i s o r g a n i c , i t 
i s always p a r t o f and r e l a t e d t o a l a r g e r whole. T h i s can 
be seen a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s . "[Then b r i e f l y d i s c u s s i n g t he 
r e l a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y and science Parsons remarks? 
'The g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t i t i s i n 
the n a t u r e o f reason t o s t r i v e f o r a 
r a t i o n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t account o f a l l 
e x p e r i e n c e wh i c h comes w i t h i n i t s range 
a t a l l . I n so f a r as b o t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
and. s c i e n t i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n s are b r o u g h t t o 
the a t t e n t i o n o f the same mind, t h e r e i s i n 
the n a t u r e o f t h e case, a tendency t o b r i n g 
them i n t o r e l a t i o n s o f l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y 
w i t h one a n o t h e r . I t l i k e w i s e f o l l o w s t h a t 
t h e r e are no l o g i c a l l y w a t e r t i g h t compartments 
i n human e x p e r i e n c e . R a t i o n a l knowledge i s 
a s i n g l e o r g a n i c w h o l e 1 [ l 9 3 7 a : 2 l ] . 
T / i t h i n s cience the t h r e e g r e a t groups o f scie n c e s ' a l l 
c o n s t i t u t e p a r t s o f a c o n s i s t e n t whole o f o b j e c t i v e knowledge' 
f l 937a: 7641 . At a f u r t h e r stage, w i t h i n t h e science o f a c t i o n , 
the s t r e s s on the i n t e r n a l l y c o n s i s t e n t system o f knowledge i s 
found a g a i n , 
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'The keynote t o be emphasised i s perhaps 
g i v e n i n the s u b t i t l e o f the book; i t i s a 
st u d y i n s o c i a l t h e o r y , n o t t h e o r i e s . I t s 
i n t e r e s t i s n o t i n the seperate and d i s c r e t e 
p r o p o s i t i o n s t o be found i n the works o f these 
men, b u t i n a s i n g l e body o f systemic t h e o r e -
t i c a l r e a s o n i n g . . o o ' f l 937a; x s i ] . 
F i n a l l y t ho o r g a n i c n a t u r e o f knowledge a c t s as an i n t e r p r e t i v e 
theme f o r Parsons' book; 
'Perhaps one more word w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be p e r m i t t e d . T h i s s t u d y 
i s c o n ceived t o be an. o r g a n i c whole, concerned 
w i t h i d eas which are l o g i c a l l y i n t e r r e l a t e d and 
permeate the whole s t u d y . The r e a d e r should 
keep t h i s i n mind i n w e i g h i n g whatever c r i t i c a l 
remarks he may be i n c l i n e d t o make. P a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n a study o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r , i t i s l e g i t i m a t e t o 
ask t h a t a f a c t s t a t e d o r a statement rna.de be 
ta k e n n o t o n l y i n i t s immediate i n t r i n s i c 
c h a r a c t e r and meaning b u t a l s o i n r e l a t i o n t o the 
t o t a l s t r u c t u r e o f which i t forms a p a r t ' [ l937a.:15j . 
These statements soern t o i n d i c a t e t h a t Parsons' o r g a n i c i s m 
permeates t h r o u g h o u t h i s t h i n k i n g and as a r e s u l t i s a t h i r d 
r eason why f o r him t h e o r y i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by i t s systemic 
c h a r a c t e r , 
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D 0 Conclusion 
The aim of t h i s chapter has been to give an account of 
Parsons' methodology of science i n general as that i s developed 
i n The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l Action,, T h i s i s p e r t i n e n t as s e v e r a l 
f e a t u r e s of t h i s are i n t e g r a l to h i s approach to methodological 
problems p e c u l i a r to a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n . I n p a r t i c u l a r 
empiricism i s to Parsons a deep-seated e r r o r which has contributed 
to the b i f u r c a t i o n of s c i e n c e and a c t i o n , A n o n - e m p i r i c i s t 
s c i e n c e 9 i n which the a b s t r a c t s t a t u s of knowledge i s recognized 
and incorporatedj i s one component of Parsons" attempt to over-
come the problems i n a s c i e n c e of action„ Two aspects of t h i s 
methodology can be summarily emphasized as a prelude to chapter 
I I I i n which t h i s attempt w i l l be reviewed 0 
1o D e s c r i p t i o n of the world i s always conceptually shaped by a 
frame of r e f e r e n c e and c l a r i t y on t h i s l e a d s to awareness of 
what are r e l e v a n t f a c t s f o r a t h e o r y / s c i e n c e and the scope and 
l i m i t a t i o n s thereof,, The question which i s l e f t open from the 
above d i s c u s s i o n i s how frames of r e f e r e n c e have t h i s c a p a c i t y to 
act as a c r i t e r i o n of relevance and judge of competance? I t 
has been shown that i n h i s concept of secondary frames of 
r e f e r e n c e (and i n h i s theory of the development of s c i e n c e ) Parsons 
e l i m i n a t e s c u l t u r a l v a l u e s as sources of s c i e n t i f i c s i g n i f i c a n c e 0 
T h i s w i l l be taken up again l a t e r but f o r the moment i t i s to be 
noted that Parsons employs two e x t r a - v a l u e sources of s i g n i f i c a n c e 0 
F i r s t l y , problems generated by explanatory theory " c a l l f or" 
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of c e r t a i n f a c t s . But such f a c t s are not 8 raw 
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data', they are s e l e c t i v e l y organized by primary and secondary 
frames of r e f e r e n c e 0 I n the l a t t e r , concepts are 'shorthand 
l a b e l s " f o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the phenomena,, But primary 
concepts do not summarize experience, they are the means by which 
experience i s p o s s i b l e i n the c l a s s i c a l Kantian sense 0 Here 
then i s the second source of s i g n i f i c a n c e , a primary frame of 
refere n c e d e f i n e s the parameters of a f a c t u a l world and a c t s as 
a standard by which i t can be s a i d that a given explanatory theory 
can or cannot c l a i m competance 0 But t h i s d e s c r i b e s the f u n c t i o n 
of primary frames of r e f e r e n c e , what of t h e i r content? Parsons 
never provides a j u s t i f y i n g argument f o r the p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u e n t 
of the a c t i o n frame of r e f e r e n c e , r a t h e r t h i s "way of thi n k i n g " 
i s asserted as an a p r i o r i n e c e s s i t y , an a s s e r t i o n which r e s t s on 
a c e r t a i n metaphysic of the nature of the world of a c t i o n e T h i s 
metaphysic of voluntarism w i l l be o u t l i n e d i n chapter I I I a 
2o Explanation n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s general concepts which f a l l 
i n t o two c l a s s e s , u n i t s and elements which are of p a r a l l e l and 
complementary s t a t u s i n a t h e o r e t i c a l systems J.S, M i l l 5 s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between concrete corfepts as r e f e r r i n g to things and 
a b s t r a c t concepts which r e f e r to a t t r i b u t e s of things expresses 
the b a s i c d i f f e r e n c e between u n i t s and elements but care must be 
taken here as a f u r t h e r Parsonian concern i s involved,, U n i t 
concepts are concrete i n the sense of d e s c r i b i n g things but 
a b s t r a c t i n that the thing i s divorced from i t s organic context. 
Moreover, to attempt to maintain that organic system i n u n i t 
terms l e a d s i n e v i t a b l y to the r e i f i c a t i o n of one s e t of r e l a t i o n s 
i n a p o t e n t i a l l y v a r i a b l e situation,, To maintain the organic 
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q u a l i t y of systems yet avoid t h i s p i t f a l l Parsons engages i n 
what I have c a l l e d s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s 0 T h i s i s a b s t r a c t i n 
M i l l ' s sense, the components of such an a n a l y s i s are elements of 
any and a l l a c t i o n systems, yet i t i s concrete i n what Sosensky 
(1964s47) c a l l s the Hegelian senses 'one must consi d e r the 
i n d i v i d u a l element i n i t s m i l i e u of r e l a t i o n s and connections'„ 
Parsons' general theory of a c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y of t h i s nature, 
i t i s a s t r u c t u r e of elements,, a scheme of concepts which i ) 
c l a i m to be general a t t r i b u t e s of a c t i o n systems and i i ) has an 
organized p a t t e r n or, as Parsons r a t h e r m i s l e a d i n g l y puts i t , i t i s 
' l o g i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d 0 0 Againnothing has so f a r been s a i d on the 
content of t h i s general theory, i n chapter I I I t h i s w i l l again 
be l i n k e d with Parsons' v o l u n t a r i s t i c m e t a p h y s i c 
These, then, are the major p o i n t s of Parsons' general 
methodology by which the problems of a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n are to 
be broachedo These problems a r i s e i n the two major i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t r a d i t i o n s of p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m . From h i s c r i t i c a l 
r e a c t i o n to these Parsons develops h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c position,, 
T h i s forms the second component alongside the general methodology 
of sc i e n c e i n Parsons' approach to a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n , i t provides 
the content of the frame of reference and s t r u c t u r e of action,, 
Chapter I I I w i l l o u t l i n e Parsons' account of p o s i t i v i s m , i d e a l i s m 
and voluntarism and then turn to three methodological problems 
of a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n examining how Parsons engages with them 
and the place of h i s general method and v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic 
i n that p r o c e s s 0 
I I I o The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l Action Bg 
Methodological Problems of a Science of Action., 
A« Idealism,, P o s i t i v i s m and Voluntarism 
So f a r I have been i n the main concerned with what, to 
Parsons, are the l o g i c a l requirements of sc i e n c e i n g e n e r a l 0 
S c i e n t i f i c knowledge,, whatever i t s subj e c t matter, i s charac= 
t e r i s e d by i t s t h e o r e t i c a l nature i n one or more of the above 
senses o At one point fj 937as 25=26j Parsons d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
between two contexts i n which methodological questions a r i s e 0 
There are those questions which are concerned with the 
l o g i c a l requirements of any science and those which a r i s e not 
from the l o g i c of sc i e n c e i n general but from the p e c u l i a r i t i e s 
of a p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t matter <, Two p o i n t s are r e l e v a n t here 0 
F i r s t l y , Parsa ns i s c l e a r that the f i r s t group are l o g i c a l l y 
p r i o r to the second, that i s , the l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge hold i r r e s p e c t i v e of su b j e c t matter, any 
problems which a r i s e out of the su b j e c t matter are subordinate 
to the requirements of scien c e i n g e n e r a l 0 Secondly, Parsons 
i s e x p l i c i t that i t i s the ' s u b j e c t i v e ' c h a r a c t e r of the su b j e c t 
matter 'which r a i s e s the c e n t r a l methodological problems p e c u l i a r 
to the s c i e n c e s concerned with human a c t i o n ' [ i 9 3 7 a s 2 6 j c 
"There i s a " s u b j e c t i v e aspect" of human 
action,, I t i s manifested by l i n g u i s t i c 
symbols to which meaning i s attached,, 
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T h i s s u b j e c t i v e aspect i n v o l v e s the reasons 
we ou r s e l v e s a s s i g n f o r a c t i n g as we do. No 
sci e n c e concerned with human a c t i o n can, i f 
i t would penetrate beyond a s u p e r f i c i a l l e v e l , 
evade the methodological problems of the 
relevance of f a c t s of t h i s order to the 
s c i e n t i f i c explanation o f the other f a c t s of 
human a c t i o n 0 T h i s study w i l l be i n t e n s i v e l y 
concerned with them" [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 6 j „ 
The methodological problems of a scien c e of a c t i o n then centre 
on the question of s u b j e c t i v i t y i n p a r t i c u l a r 0 
T h i s becomes the c e n t r a l i s s u e because i n many schools of 
thought what Parsons d e f i n e s as the c o n s t i t u e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of s c i e n c e , i t s a b s t r a c t t h e o r e t i c a l nature, i s seen as 
incompatible with t h i s p e c u l i a r q u a l i t y of the s u b j e c t matter, 
i t s s u b j e c t i v e n a t u r e 0 Of course Parsons i s profoundly aware 
of t h i s , indeed i t i s one focus of h i s d i s c u s s i o n and c r i t i c i s m 
of p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m 0 For both of these t r a d i t i o n s , i n 
the l a s t a n a l y s i s at l e a s t , regard t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e and the 
s u b j e c t i v i t y of a c t i o n as incompatible„ They do so i n opposite 
ways, the p o s i t i v i s t accepting s c i e n c e and r e j e c t i n g s u b j e c t i v i t y , 
the i d e a l i s t accepting s u b j e c t i v i t y and r e j e c t i n g s c i e n c e . 
1 o I d e a l i s m o 
Parsons" d i s c u s s i o n o f the methodological aspect of 
i d e a l i s m ^ ^ i s e x p l i c i t and focuses on the problem at hand heres 
ri  
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the r e l a t i o n of t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e and a c t i o n jj 937as 473=48?] „ 
To the i d e a l i s t the two are fundamentally i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 0 I n 
Parsons' account t h i s p o s i t i o n roots i n the v a r i o u s aspects of 
the Kantian dualism,. I n h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
grounds of Newton's sc i e n c e of nature Kant had r e l a t i v i z e d the 
p h y s i c a l system by reducing p h y s i c a l bodies and events to the 
s t a t u s of 'phenomena"0 The world of phenomena i s governed 
by determinate laws but t h i s does not exhaust the world as sucho 
For alongside the world of phenomena i s the 'noumenal' world, 
to which the i d e a of determinism i s i n a p p l i c a b l e , t h i s being 
the realm of freedom 0 When t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l system i s 
applied to the " s c i e n t i f i c ' ( i n the widest sense) study of man 
there i s a tendency to equate the phenomenal aspect of man with 
h i s s t a t u s as a p h y s i c a l body and b i o l o g i c a l organism and the 
noumenal aspect with man as 'an a c t i v e , purposive being, an 
a c t o r 8 [ I 9 3 7 a s 4 7 5 ] » On these grounds then we have an 
i n i t i a l o pposition between nature as governed by laws and man, 
as actor, who i s f r e e c 
T h i s forms the b a s i s f o r the view that s c i e n t i f i c 
understanding i n terras of general a n a l y t i c a l theory i s 
i n a p p l i c a b l e to human action,, But the opposition i s r e i n f o r c e d 
by other f a c t o r s . There i s f i r s t l y the p a r a l l e l t r a d i t i o n of 
h i s t o r i c i s m , the s t r e s s on 'the concrete uniqueness and 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y of a l l things human' [} 937as 477] and the consequent 
Rankean i n j u n c t i o n 'to render the past wie es e i g e n t l i c h gewesen 
ist„ that i s , i n a l l i t s concrete d e t a i l ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 7 7 j 0 H i s t o r y 
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then becomes "the i n d i s p e n s i b l e road to f u l l n e s s of 
knowledge" [1937as477] . T h i s theme i n German thought l e a d s 
to "a negation of theory i n general" j l 9 3 7 a s 4 7 7 j , but of course 
t h i s was not the only component of i d e a l i s m , A f u r t h e r 
element s the philosophy of h i s t o r y as i n the Hegelian system 5 
does involve "theory 1 but i n a d i f f e r e n t sense from Parsons'. 
Theory i s not composed of general concepts f o r the a n a l y s i s 
o f h i s t o r i c a l events and periods i n the manner described i n 
s e c t i o n I I but "a u n i f i e d conception of human l i f e and h i s t o r y 
as a whole 8 [ l 9 3 7 a ? 4 7 9 ] <> The Hegelian v a r i a n t , the b e l i e f 
i n one c u l t u r a l G e i s t being o b j e c t i f i e d i n H i s t o r y breaks down 
and the emphasis turns to d i s c r e t e c u l t u r a l wholes but t h i s 
i s immaterial. What i s r e l e v a n t i s the "organic" nature of 
c u l t u r a l t o t a l i t i e s o I t i s t h i s which on the one hand provides 
the o r g a n i z i n g 9 t h e o r e t i c a l , p r i n c i p l e i n knowledge r a t h e r than 
the search f o r laws and i t i s t h i s which the i d e a l i s t views 
as destroyed by the a n a l y t i c methods of s c i e n c e . As Parsons 
notes i d e a l i s t organicism i s not p r i m a r i l y a matter of the use 
of organic analogies f l 9 3 7 a s 4 8 l j but much more importantly r e l a t e 
to the question of c a u s a l and meaningful r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Science 
i s "mechanistic" i n the sense that i t r e l a t e s f a c t s together 
i n terms o f cause and e f f e c t but such r e l a t i o n s h i p s are 
i n a p p l i c a b l e to human a c t i o n . The r e l a t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e l y 
b e l i e v e d norms or a n t i c i p a t e d ends to a c t i o n i s not c a u s a l but 
meaningfulp an a c t i s pa r t of the l o g i c a l u n i t y of a l a r g e r whole 
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So the i d e a of a scien c e of a c t i o n i s doubted by the 
i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n i n that the p o s s i b i l i t y of general a n a l y t i c a l 
theory i s rejected,. T h i s i s manifested i n the d i v i s i o n between 
the s c i e n c e s of nature and the d i s c i p l i n e s concerned with 
human a c t i o n and c u l t u r e , the G e i s t e s w i s s e n s c h a f t e n a The 
former employing general theory, the l a t t e r a methodology 
centred on h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h and understanding of meaning. 
Parsons' r e a c t i o n to t h i s i s not to doubt that the 
problems r a i s e d by the i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s are r e a l but to argue 
that they do not n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d to the con c l u s i o n s drawn, 
that i s , the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of general a n a l y t i c a l theory i n 
the f i e l d of a c t i o n D However, t h i s has been the case i n the 
past because of a methodological flaw i n both the i d e a l i s t 
t r a d i t i o n and the conception of general theory o f f e r e d by the 
p o s i t i v i s t t r a d i t i o n . T h i s i s the curse of empiricism which 
i s common to both [l 937^8 kj6] and which makes them 
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e so long as i t remains 0 
"What i s perhaps the deepest methodological 
b a s i s of t h i s c o n f l i c t has l a i n i n the 
empiricism common to both great t r a d i t i o n s 
of thoughto As long as t h i s p e r s i s t s the two 
are, indeed, i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i f any attempt i s 
made to apply them to the same concrete s u b j e c t 
matter" [l937as476] . [1  s k7 j 
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The problems posed by i d e a l i s m then are to be overcome by 
r e v i s i n g the empiricism of the p o s i t i v i s t i c conception of theory„ 
I n other words the p o s s i b i l i t y of a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n which 
'provides a bridge between the apparently i r r e c o n c i l a b l e 
d i f f e r e n c e s between the two t r a d i t i o n s , making i t p o s s i b l e , i n a 
c e r t a i n sense, to "make the best of both worlds' £ l 9 3 7 a s 4 8 6 ] r e s t s 
on a c o r r e c t view of the nature of theory i n science,, T h i s has 
been described i n s e c t i o n I I and the view there o u t l i n e d forms 
the f i r s t plank i n Parsons' attempted r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of s c i e n c e 
and action„ 
2, Positivism,, 
I n the case of p o s i t i v i s m the methodological dilemma i s to 
some extent obscured i n The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n f o r two 
reasonso F i r s t of a l l Parsons d i s c u s s e s p o s i t i v i s m i n substantive 
(2) 
terms, as a conception of a c t i o n , r a t h e r than as a methodology,, v ' 
The l a t t e r , p o s i t i v i s m as a l o g i c a l account of and j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c knowledge remains i m p l i c i t <, Secondly, Parsons' 
a t t e n t i o n i s d i r e c t e d toward u t i l i t a r i a n i s m as a sub-type of the 
p o s i t i v i s t system,, The p e c u l i a r i t y of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m as a v a r i a n t 
of p o s i t i v i s m i s the strong place i t g i v e s to the s u b j e c t i v i t y of 
a c t i o n . T h i s means that the i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of s c i e n c e and a c t i o n 
from the p o s i t i v i s t i c point of view remains latent„ However i n 
another sense Parsons' a n a l y s i s of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m h i g h l i g h t s t h i s 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y f o r as a type of p o s i t i v i s t theory u t i l i t a r i a n i s m 
i s h i g h l y unstable and i t s i n s t a b i l i t y l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n the area 
of the s u b j e c t i v i t y of action,, As a p o s i t i v i s t theory u t i l i t a r i a n -
ism i s only able to cope w i t h s u b j e c t i v i t y i n a l i m i t e d way (the 
norm of r a t i o n a l i t y ) and on the b a s i s of c r u c i a l assumptions (the 
randomness yet n a t u r a l i d e n t i t y of e n d s ) 0 Once these l i m i t a t i o n s 
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and assumptions are questioned the problem of the s u b j e c t i v i t y of 
a c t i o n comes to the f o r e c 
To the p o s i t i v i s t the s u b j e c t i v e aspect of a c t i o n l i e s 
outside the realm of s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e f o r two reasons<, 
F i r s t l y , on the grounds that s u b j e c t i v e phenomena cannot be regarded 
as f a c t u a l , t h i s i s what Parsons terms the b e h a v i o u r i s t problem v ' 
F a c t s must be things i n the sense of m a t e r i a l 
e n t i t i e s and t h e i r behaviour j l937a;117j ° Here the problem l i e s 
on the l e v e l of d e s c r i p t i o n . The second problem l i e s on the 
l e v e l of explanation, the p o s i t i v i s t doubts that s u b j e c t i v e 
phenomena can be causes of a c t i o n c Thus Parsons r e f e r s to 
' o o o the i m p l i c a t i o n of a r i g i d l y p o s i t i v i s t i c 
philosophy ( i n our sense) that "ends" cannot 
be r e a l (not epiphenomenal) c a u s a l elements 
of a c t i o n c T h i s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d at length" 
[ l937as22j „ 
To the p o s i t i v i s t s u b j e c t i v e phenorre na are " r e f l e c t i o n s 8 of the 
r e a l c a u s a l elements, the conditions of actions 
0 o o o f o r i n so f a r as the "c o n d i t i o n s " 
u l t i m a t e l y form the s o l e determinants o f 
a c t i o n the s u b j e c t i v e aspect becomes merely 
a r e f l e c t i o n of the " f a c t s " ? i t i s p u r e l y 
epiphenomenalo Thus a l l p o s i t i v i s t i c 
r i v e r s u l t i m a t e l y flow int o the same sea, 
that of mechanistic determinism 0 £l 937as 1 2 0-l] 0 
198 -
I t i s i n t h i s sense that Parsons says that 0 a p o s i t i v i s t i c 
p o s i t i o n always reduces the explanation of a c t i o n to n a t u r a l 
s c i e n c e terms' [l 937as 762} » F u r t h e r from t h i s he a c t u a l l y 
makes the strange admission thats 
' I t i s a l e g i t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n from the 
a n a l y s i s of t h i s study that i n the sense 
of having independent c a u s a l importance 
there can i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s be no such 
thing as a r a d i c a l l y p o s i t i v i s t i c theory 
of a c t i o n ' [I937as762] „ 
T h i s then i s a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n that i n p o s i t i v i s t i c terms a 
sci e n c e of a c t i o n i s p r o b l e m a t i c 0 
However Parsons does not i n f a c t confront the problems 
posed by p o s i t i v i s m i n d i r e c t terms„ He r a t h e r negates them 
as problems by e x p l a i n i n g them away as dogmas £i 937as 29^7 ° 
I n Parsons' eyes the above methodological problems are 
themselves epiphenomenal r e f l e c t i o n s of p o s i t i v i s t i c 
' o b j e c t i v i s m ' or 'materialism', the o n t o l o g i c a l assumption 
that a l l s c i e n c e must employ the subs t a n t i v e concepts of the 
p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , what Parsons lumps together as h e r e d i t y and 
environment as the con d i t i o n s of action,, 
"Like many of h i s predecessors Pareto s e t 
out to make economics and sociology p o s i t i v e 
s c i e n c e s on the model of the p h y s i c a l sciences„ 
But he did t h i s w i t h a d i f f e r e n c e 0 A great 
deal of the e a r l i e r p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e contained 
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as substantive d o c t r i n e s those which can 
be roughly summed up as c o n s t i t u t i n g 
" s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m " , which were h e l d 
to be not merely working hypotheses or 
approximations but necessary t r u t h s 
about the concrete world. They were 
t r u t h s of such a b a s i c c h a r a c t e r that 
no theory which did not accept them could 
hope to be s c i e n t i f i c - i n f a c t they were 
he l d to be methodologically necessary,, 
That i s , most of the e a r l i e r methodology of 
sc i e n c e , e s p e c i a l l y p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e , was 
r a d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i v i s m 9 . ^1937as 
l 8 0 ~ l ] . 
I n c o n t r a d i c t i o n to ' s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m 8 Parsons' 
o n t o l o g i c a l assumptions are that s u b j e c t i v e phenomena are r e a l 
and cannot be reduced to m a t e r i a l phenomena. T h i s then forms 
second plank i n Parsons' p o s i t i o n , the o n t o l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n of 
the r e a l i t y of the s u b j e c t i v e . To him t h i s does not mean a 
r e v e r s i o n to i d e a l i s m but r a t h e r 
' I t w i l l not, however, do merely to say that 
both the p o s i t i v i s t i c and the i d e a l i s t i c 
p o s i t i o n s have c e r t a i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n s and there 
i s a sphere i n which each should be recognized. 
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I t i s necessary, r a t h e r , to go beyond such 
e c l e c t i c i s m , to attempt, at l e a s t i n o u t l i n e , 
an account of the s p e c i f i c modes of i n t e r ~ 
r e l a t i o n of the two„ I t i s i n t h i s 
connection that the v o l u n t a r i s t i c theory of 
a c t i o n assumes a place of c e n t r a l importance° 0 
[ l937as486] . 
T h i s r a i s e s the question of the exact meaning of the 
0 v o l u n t a r i s t i c ' theory of a c t i o n , an i n q u i r y which forms the next 
task of t h i s discussion,, 
3° Voluntarism,, 
One of the most s u r p r i s i n g things about The St r u c t u r e of 
S o c i a l Action i s i t s l a c k of d i s c u s s i o n of quite what i s meant 
by the term 'voluntarism8„ T h i s i s de s p i t e the claim that i t 
i s "only on the b a s i s of something a k i n to the v o l u n t a r i s t i c 
theory of a c t i o n propounded here i s i t i s p o s s i b l e to escape the 
p o s i t i v i s t - i d e a l i s t dilemma so long as the a c t i o n schema i s 
adhered to at a l l ' [1937askk8] „ The l a c k of any extended 
d i s c u s s i o n can l e a d to what might be termed a common sense 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what the term c o n n o t e s 0 ( k ) By t h i s i s 
meant a theory which s t r e s s e s that human behaviour i s to a 
s i g n i f i c a n t degree the r e s u l t a n t of the i n t e n t i o n s of a 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s o reasoning being 0 Each of the underlined 
words i s important„ I f behaviour i s i n t e n t i o n a l then the 
course i t takes i s d i r e c t e d by a conception of a future s t a t e 
of affairs„ whether or not that future s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s 
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a c t u a l l y r e a l i z e d i s not i n p r i n c i p l e s i g n i f i c a n t , the point 
i s that the behaviour i s d i r e c t e d by i t . Secondly, human 
beings are s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i n the l i t e r a l sense, that i s , have 
an understanding of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e as concrete people, some-
thi n g more than aggregates of b o d i l y movements. F i n a l l y such an 
i n t e n t i o n a l , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s being i s capable of reason, which 
does not i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e s i g n i f y any p a r t i c u l a r form of 
reason, but the c a p a c i t y f o r r u l e governed thought and r e f l e c t i o n . 
T h i s seems to be a l e g i t i m a t e c o n s t r u c t i o n of what we would 
prima f a c i e expect from a theory to which the a d j e c t i v e 
' v o l u n t a r i s t i c ' i s attached. However although t h i s i s one strand 
i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g i t does not seem to me to be the dominant one 
by any means. What fo l l o w s i s an a l t e r n a t i v e rendering of 
what Parsons means by the voluntarism of the theory of a c t i o n . 
T h i s can be approached v i a a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of a 
d i s t i n c t i o n drawn by Parsons between i d e a l i s t i c and v o l u n t a r i s t i c 
t h e o r i e s of a c t i o n , a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n as both, i n c o n t r a s t 
to p o s i t i v i s m , s t r e s s the r o l e of norms and ends i n a c t i o n . The 
point of note here i s that i d e a l i s t t h e o r i e s t r e a t a c t i o n as 
"emanations' of such norms and ends w h i l s t voluntarism regards 
them ' i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n ' to a c t i o n . The former p o s i t i o n i s 
summarized ass ' I n an i d e a l i s t theory " a c t i o n " becomes a process 
of "emanation", of " s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n " of i d e a l or normative 
f a c t o r s . Spatiotemporal phenomena became r e l a t e d to a c t i o n only 
as symbolic "modes of expression" or "embodiments" of "meanings" 0 
[ I 9 3 7 a s 8 2 ] o 
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The c o n t r a s t i s i l l u s t r a t e d by a remark Parsons makes about 
Durkheim i n h i s l a s t , i d e a l i s t , stages 'The e f f e c t of t h i s 
i d e a l i s t tendency o f Durkheim's thought i s to regard the aim 
of sociology as that of studying the systems of value ideas 
i n themselvesq whereas the p o s i t i o n put forward above c a l l s f o r 
a quite d i f f e r e n t study, that of these systems i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n 
to a c t i o n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 4 6 ] 0 
T h i s i d e a l i s t p o s i t i o n i s r e j e c t e d by Parsons, to t r e a t v a l u e s i n 
t h i s way i s to t r e a t them as ' e t e r n a l o b j e c t s ' , / l 
unchanging systems of meaning which p e r s i s t over time embodied 
i n c u l t u r a l a r t e f a c t s and h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s 0 Parsons' comment 
i s s 'Such e n t i t i e s cannot be the obj e c t of an explanatory 
scie n c e at all„ For an explanatory s c i e n c e must be concerned 
with events, and events do not occur i n the world of e t e r n a l 
o b j e c t s ' //8 937as445] « 
As Parsons says then v a l u e s , norms and ends must be t r e a t e d 0 i n 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n ' 0 Now there are two ways i n which 
t h i s phrase can be i n t e r p r e t e d which are i n f a c t mentioned by 
Parsons i n a footnote to the quotation immediately above 0 He 
sa y s 8 'This does not mean that an e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e must have a 
h i s t o r i c a l ^ g e n e t i c o r i e n t a t i o n , as opposed to the development of 
a g e n e r a l i z e d t h e o r e t i c a l system' [I937as445]<> 
Here then the i d e a of norms e t c , i n r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d e i t h e r according to a 'his t o r i c a l - g e n e t i c o r i e n t a t i o n 0 
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or i n terms of a 'generalized t h e o r e t i c a l system' 0 Whilst 
Parsons does not elaborate on the former i t can be construed 
as a p o s i t i o n which focusses on how norms o r i g i n a t e and develop 
i n concrete h i s t o r i c a l processes over time 0 A p o s s i b l e 
concomitant of t h i s might be a concern with how i n t e n t i o n a l , 
s e l f - c o n s c i o u s j reasoning a c t o r s c o n s t r u c t , i n t e r p r e t and change 
norms and v a l u e s i n t h e i r action,, Whatever might be meant by 
' h i s t o r i c a l - g e n e t i c ' , and these are my suggestions here, Parsons 
r e j e c t s t h i s f o r the second,, Here the i d e a of norms i n 
r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n i s c a s t i n terms of norms as one element of 
a g e n e r a l i z e d t h e o r e t i c a l system of elements„ When Parsons 
speaks of Durkheim as a v o l u n t a r i s t r a t h e r than an i d e a l i s t he 
r e f e r s to ° 0 o„ the movement of h i s thought i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
a v o l u n t a r i s t i c theory of a c t i o n , i n v o l v i n g a system of ul t i m a t e 
v a l u e s , but studying them i n t h e i r complex r e l a t i o n to other 
elements of a c t i o n ' [l937as4673 a Here then a v o l u n t a r i s t i c 
theory seems to be one which i n c l u d e s the important c a u s a l 
v a r i a b l e s emphasized by both the p o s i t i v i s t i c and i d e a l i s t i c 
traditions„ 
I n h i s short 'schematic o u t l i n e ' of the v o l u n t a r i s t i c theory 
Cl937as8 l -2 ] Parsons c h a r a c t e r i z e s the theory i n t h i s way, as 
i n c l u d i n g the normative elements s t r e s s e d by i d e a l i s m and the 
c o n d i t i o n a l elements of p o s i t i v i s m i n interdependent relationship„ 
Again i n h i s 'summary o u t l i n e ' of the v o l u n t a r i s t i c theory 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y [l 937as718=719] ) Parsons c a s t s h i s statement i n 
terms of elements as 'permanently v a l i d p r e c i p i t a t e s ' of 
p o s i t i v i s m , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m and i d e a l i s m each of which c o n t r i b u t e s 
an important group of elements to the o v e r a l l t h e o r e t i c a l 
system,, 
Now by c a s t i n g the matter i n these terms Parsons i s 
able to "make the best of both worlds' but i n a way which 
by h i s own standard i s not convincing,, For as we have noted 
he s t a t e s that i t i s necessary to go beyond e c l e c t i c i s m , 0Qn 
account of the s p e c i f i c modes of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the two' t r a d i t i o n s i s required,, Yet as so f a r d i s c u s s e d t h i s 
has not been done, a l l that has been s a i d i s that the v o l u n t a r i -
s t i c theory w i l l i n clude component elements from both t r a d i t i o n s and 
regard them as interdependent„ F u r t h e r to say t h i s i s to 
make the term 'voluntarism' something of a conumdrum0 I n order 
to i n q u i r e i n t o Parsons' s y n t h e s i s of these elements and see 
why t h i s i s c a l l e d v o l u n t a r i s t i c we have to c a s t the d i s c u s s i o n 
i n more metaphysical terms, f o r here we move into Parsons' 
b a s i c philosophy of the u l t i m a t e meaning and nature of s o c i a l 
l i f e , . T h i s can be o u t l i n e d i n terms of i ) the dualism of the 
normative and the conditional, i i ) t h e i r inherent c o n f l i c t i i i ) ^ 
the n e c e s s i t y of ' e f f o r t ' . 
Parsons' d i s c i s s i o n of a c t i o n i n terms of a multitude of 
interdependent elements can obscure the f a c t that u n d e r l y i n g t h i s 
i s a b a s i c dualism between two orders of such elements, the 
'normative' which i n c l u d e s the v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s and types 
of u l t i m a t e ends and norms and the ' c o n d i t i o n a l ' which i n c l u d e s 
the c a t e g o r i e s of h e r e d i t y and environment and the two g e n e r a l i z e d 
means; power and wealth. For the moment ray d i s c u s s i o n w i l l 
l i m i t i t s concern to the c o n d i t i o n a l i n so f a r as i t i s composed 
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of h e r e d i t y and environment 0 The pla c e of the g e n e r a l i z e d 
means w i l l be taken up s h o r t l y as a p a r t i c u l a r problem, f o r the 
moment they w i l l be disregarded. 
At one point Parsons r e f e r s to the d i v i s i o n between the 
normative and the c o n d i t i o n a l as 'the great dichotomy of t h i s 
study' [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 6 4 3 o T h i s phrase i s used i n h i s summary of 
Durkheim and again the same dualism can be found i n the co n c l u s i o n s 
drawn from the a n a l y s i s of the work of Pareto [] 937as 243=30oJ and 
Weber [l 937as 6 8 3 - 6 8 6 1 0 T h i s i s exemplified by the f o l l o w i n g 
statement i n which Parsons sums up one of the ways i n which 
° o o o Weber's whole position i s d e f i n i t e l y and fundamentally a 
v o l u n t a r i s t i c theory of a c t i o n , and n e i t h e r a p o s i t i v i s t i c nor 
an i d e a l i s t i c theory' [ l 9 3 7 a s 6 8 3 ] . 
' I n the f i r s t p l a c e , h i s treatment of 
c a p i t a l i s m , of Pr o t e s t a n t i s m and c a p i t a l i s m 
and more g e n e r a l l y of the s o c i a l r o l e o f 
r e l i g i o u s ideas i s understandable only on t h i s 
b a s i s o The r o l e both of ide a s and of the 
u l t i m a t e v a l u e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them i s 
fundamental to Weber's thought. But e q u a l l y 
so i s the f a c t that these elements do not 
stand alone but i n complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s with 
other independent f a c t o r s . Without the 
independence o f h e r e d i t y and environment, 
without the complex i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of u l t i m a t e 
v a l u e s , i d e a s , a t t i t u d e s , norm of d i f f e r e n t s o r t s 
with each other and with h e r e d i t y and environment, 
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concrete s o c i a l l i f e and a c t i o n as we 
e m p i r i c a l l y know i t , and as Weber t r e a t s 
i t , i s simply not conceivable or thinkable 
at a l l " j/l937as683] . 
T h i s n i c e l y expresses the Parsonian, i f not the Weberian, (5) 
dualism of normative and c o n d i t i o n a l 0 On the one s i d e , the 
normative expresses the i d e a l s and v a l u e s to which men a s p i r e , 
on the other s i d e the r e a l i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r h e r e d i t a r y 
endowment and environmental situation,, 
But to Parsons the normative and the c o n d i t i o n a l forms 
a "great dichotomy" because of t h e i r i n e v i t a b l e conflict„ T h i s 
forms the second aspect of the un d e r l y i n g metaphysic 0 The 
normative, the " i d e a l norm of what a c t i o n should be" //1937as298j 
i s always counterposed against the c o n d i t i o n a l as a 8 set of 
r e s i s t a n t and divergent and other non= normative f a c t o r s 0 £l937a? 
2983 o Here we see a more sub s t a n t i v e v e r s i o n of the i n j u n c t i o n 
to i n c l u d e both the normative and the c o n d i t i o n a l as "elements 
i n a t h e o r e t i c a l system'„ 
' o o o o while the norm c o n s t i t u t e s one s t r u c t u r a l 
element i n the concrete a c t i o n i t i s only one D 
There are o b s t a c l e s and r e s i s t a n c e s to i t s 
attainment which must be overcome and are, 
i n f a c t , only p a r t i a l l y overcome„ Hence the 
f a i l u r e of the a c t u a l course o f a c t i o n to 
correspond e x a c t l y with that p r e s c r i b e d by the 
norm i s not proof that the l a t t e r i s unimportant 
but only that i t i s not alone important' (l937as 
251] o 
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S o c i a l l i f e then i s represented as an e t e r n a l struggle to 
achieve v a l u e s i n the context of a stubborn and r e s i s t a n t 
n a t u r a l world„ 
'Action must always be thought of as 
i n v o l v i n g a s t a t e of t e n s i o n between two 
d i f f e r e n t orders o f elements, the normative 
and the c o n d i t i o n a l 0 As process, a c t i o n 
i s , i n f a c t , the process of a l t e r a t i o n of 
the c o n d i t i o n a l elements i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of conformity with norms „ E l i m i n a t i o n of 
the normative aspect a l t o g e t h e r e l i m i n a t e s 
the concept of a c t i o n i t s e l f and l e a d s to 
the r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s t i c position,, 
E l i m i n a t i o n of co n d i t i o n s , of the t e n s i o n 
from that s i d e , e q u a l l y e l i m i n a t e s a c t i o n 
and r e s u l t s i n i d e a l i s t i c emanationism' 
L l 9 3 7 a s 7 3 2 ] . 
As t h i s passage i n d i c a t e s i t i s the struggle of mind and body, 
t h i s f a i t h i n 'the power of man to c o n t r o l h i s own d e s t i n y 
apart from the con d i t i o n s of h i s h e r e d i t y and environment' 
[H 9 3 7 a s l 6 6 ] that forms one aspect of Parsons' s y n t h e s i s of 
i d e a l i s m and positivism,, T h i s i s made e x p l i c i t when Parsons 
w r i t e s s 
'Just as p o s i t i v i s m e l i m i n a t e s the c r e a t i v e , 
v o l u n t a r i s t i c c h a r a c t e r of a c t i o n by di s p e n s i n g 
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with the a n a l y t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f v a l u e s , and 
the other normative elements by making them 
epiphenomena, so i d e a l i s m has the same e f f e c t 
f o r the opposite reason • i d e a l i s m e l i m i n a t e s 
the r e a l i t y of the o b s t a c l e s to the r e a l i z a t i o n 
of v a l u e s 5 [i 937as 446] , 
However t h i s c o n f l i c t of the p o s i t i v i s t i c and i d e a l i s t elements 
i n a c t i o n i s only the f i r s t aspect of t h e i r s y n t h e s i s , the second 
r e l a t e s to how t h i s c o n f l i c t i s resolved,. 
T h i s i s the f i n a l aspect of Parsons 0 v o l u n t a r i s t i c meta= 
p h y s i c , what he c a l l s "effort'„ At one point t h i s i s 
desc r i b e d as 'the c e n t r a l f e a t u r e " of a v o l u n t a r i s t i c conception 
of a c t i o n [l937as446] and i t i s i n connection with t h i s that he 
most of t e n speaks of the ' a c t i v e 0 , " c r e a t i v e ' and ' v o l u n t a r i s t i c ' 
c h a r a c t e r of a c t i o n , (E„g, [l937as386, 44o] ) „ However i t i s 
e s s e n t i a l to put these terms i n t o the context of what has 
al r e a d y been s a i d . The i d e a of e f f o r t , Parsons says, i s 'the 
mediating l i n k ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 5 3 l between the normative and the 
c o n d i t i o n a l . I t i s ',,, a name f o r the r e l a t i n g f a c t o r between 
the normative and the c o n d i t i o n a l elements of a c t i o n ' which 
' s e r v e s , , , to bind them together 0 [ l 9 3 7 a s 7 1 9 l o I t does t h i s 
i n the f o l l o w i n g way. Once again the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the 
a c t o r to norms i s a c r u c i a l problem. For on one side of Parsons 
dualism, the c o n d i t i o n a l , the i n f l u e n c e of h e r e d i t y and 
environment on a c t i o n i s non-problematical, men are caused to a c t 
i n a given way by these elements i n an automatic f a s h i o n . On 
the other s i d e , however, the i d e a of e f f o r t ' 0 , 0 i s n e c e s s i t a t e d 
by the f a c t that norms do not r e a l i z e themselves a u t o m a t i c a l l y , 0 o 
ri93 j 
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fl937a?719]• Parsons remarks? 8Not e x p l i c i t i n Pareto i s 
the t h i r d element of the " e s s e n t i a l s " of a v o l u n t a r i s t i c 
conception of a c t i o n which i s l o g i c a l l y r e q u i r e d , an 
element of " e f f o r t " by v i r t u e of which the normative s t r u c t u r e 
becomes more than a mere i d e a or ideology without c a u s a l 
r e l e v a n c e 8 //1937as298] . 
T h i s question of the determination of a c t i o n by norms and ends 
w i l l be taken up i n d e t a i l l a t e r but i t i s e s s e n t i a l here to 
e s t a b l i s h some r e l e v a n t p o i n t s 0 For the c r u c i a l i s s u e here i s 
to p l a c e t h i s i d e a of the 8 non=automatic 8 e f f i c a c y of norms i n 
the context o f the r e s i s t a n c e of c o n d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s . To Parsons 
the norm i s not a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e a l i z e d p r e c i s e l y because of the 
c o n f l i c t i n g c h a r a c t e r of the normative and the conditional„ 
'The e x i s t e n c e of t h i s r e s i s t a n c e and i t s (even p a r t i a l ) over= 
coming i m p l i e s another element, " e f f o r t " , which has no pl a c e i n 
e i t h e r of the other two views i , e 9 p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m 8 
To implement a norm i s then a str u g g l e which r e q u i r e s an e f f o r t 
• I n s p i t e o f the p o s s i b i l i t y t h at norms, 
i n c l u d i n g e t h i c a l i d e a l s , may be t r e a t e d as 
e m p i r i c a l phenomena by the observer, i t must 
never be forgotten that they are phenomena of 
a very p e c u l i a r s o r t = that they are to the 
[i 937a: 251] . 
of the " w i l l " |l937as446] of the a c t o r . 
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a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s norms 0 i d e a l s 0 What i s 
observable about them i s not the s t a t e of 
concrete e x i s t e n c e to which the y as 
pr o p o s i t i o n s r e f e r , but the f a c t that the 
i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g look upon such a p u t a t i v e 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s as d e s i r a b l e and hence they 
can i n a s i g n i f i c a n t degree be thought of as 
s t r i v i n g to a c t u a l i z e i t c But whether, and 
the degree i n which, i t i s a c t u a l i z e d i s not a 
question the s o l u t i o n of which i s given i n the 
mere e x i s t e n c e of i d e a l norms as such, but 
remains a problem,, I t depends upon the e f f o r t 
of the i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g as w e l l as upon the 
cond i t i o n s i n which they a c t " ["1937as396j„ 
What i s pr o b l e m a t i c a l to Parsons about the r e l a t i o n of men to 
norms i s how men are stim u l a t e d to struggle to achieve i d e a l s 
i n the face of an a n t a g o n i s t i c environment which r e q u i r e s no 
s t i m u l a t i o n 0 
I d e a l i s m and p o s i t i v i s m are inadequate h e r e 0 To the 
i d e a l i s t 5 the mere e x i s t e n c e of the norm, that i s i t s r e c o g n i t i o n 
by the a c t o r as binding, i m p l i e s automatic conformity w i t h i t 0 
[l937as25l] o Here the r e s i s t e n c e i s missingo To the 
p o s i t i v i s t norms are but c o g n i t i v e r e f l e c t i o n s of the e x t e r n a l 
f o r c e s of the c o n d i t i o n a l w o r l d 0 The l a t t e r Parsons i s 
w i l l i n g to admit to a degree (see below) but not when i t i s 
g e n e r a l i z e d as i n Durkheim's p o s i t i v i s t i c phase 0 A c o g n i t i v e 
understanding o f normative elements such as u l t i m a t e ends or 
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n o n - r a t i o n a l norms i s not enough to account f o r why men s t r i v e 
to a t t a i n such s c i e n t i f i c a l l y u n v e r i f i a b l e s t a t e s of a f f a i r s . 
I t i s i n t h i s context that the f o l l o w i n g statement should 
be placeds 
'A normative o r i e n t a t i o n i s fundamental to the 
schema of a c t i o n i n the same sense that space i s 
fundamental to that of the c l a s s i c a l mechanics; 
i n terms of the given conceptual scheme there 
i s no such t h i n g as a c t i o n except as e f f o r t 
to conform with norms j u s t as there i s no 
such t h i n g as motion except as change of l o c a t i o n 
i n space 5 [1937as76-7] . 
The " a c t i v e 1 , ' c r e a t i v e ' , 9 v o l u n t a t i s t i c 8 c h a r a c t e r of a c t i o n to 
Parsons r e s t s u l t i m a t e l y on the problem of the mechanisms which 
s t i m u l a t e conformity with norms. At the present time t h i s i s 
simply l a b e l l e d ' e f f o r t ' , a l a r g e l y unanlyzed category, f o r 
example Parsons at one point compares i t with 'energy' i n 
p h y s i c s p937a:71^1 . Here I w i l l l e a v e i t u n t i l the l a t e r 
d i s c u s s i o n of normative determinism. 
I n the above d i s c u s s i o n voluntarism has been c a s t i n terms 
of an a n t a g o n i s t i c dualism between the normative and the b i o -
p h y s i c a l world c a l l e d by Parsons the c o n d i t i o n a l elements of 
h e r e d i t y and environment. However the concept of c o n d i t i o n s a l s o 
i n c l u d e s a d i f f e r e n t group of elements which Parsons r e f e r s to as 
the g e n e r a l i z e d means or i n t e r e s t s . The same p a t t e r n of 
a n t a g o n i s t i c dualism, t h i s time between norms and i n t e r e s t s , 
- 212 -
runs throughout The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l Action ( e 0 g 0 [l937as 
255, 465, 661, 685])o The concept of i n t e r e s t here d e r i v e s 
from Hobbes £l937as89jo I f we assume that a l l men are 
attempting to a t t a i n ends then as such they must seek c o n t r o l 
over the means to achieve ends 0 For Hobbes a man 0s power i s 
defined as " h i s present means to obtain some future apparent 
good 0 [l937as89]o One important aspect of t h i s i s the c o n t r o l 
of other men, On t h i s b a s i s there are two ' g e n e r a l i z e d 
means'' [1 937as 262] , f o r c e and fraud which are grounded i n 
c o e r c i v e power and wealth which i s the b a s i s of economic power. 
To pursue one's i n t e r e s t then i s to seek power v i a the c o n t r o l 
of the g e n e r a l i z e d means, co e r c i o n and wealth,, 
The s i g n i f i c a n t question here i s why men pursue t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t S o One s t r a n d i n Parsons t h i n k i n g suggests that 
t h i s roots i n 'human n a t u r e ' 8 For example he seems to follow 
Durkheim i n the view that without moral r e g u l a t i o n 'human 
ap p e t i t e s and i n t e r e s t s are i n h e r e n t l y u n l i m i t e d ' [t 937as335J ° 
T h i s i s suggested but i s not i n the main Parsons' proper 
p o s i t i o n , i n h i s own terms i t would be a p o s i t i v i s t i c reduction,, 
Much more important i s the view that the p u r s u i t of i n t e r e s t i s 
an inherent product of a c t i o n systems 0 
9 o o o i t i s inherent i n the very e x i s t e n c e of 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s themselves that the a c t i o n s of 
men should be p o t e n t i a l means to each other's 
endso Hence as a proximate end i t i s a 
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d i r e c t ^ y ^ c o r o l l a r y of the p o s t u l a t e of 
r a t i o n a l i t y that a l l men should d e s i r e and 
seek power over one another" [l937as93] <> 
The c r u c i a l phrase here i s that the p u r s u i t of i n t e r e s t s 8 i s 
a d i r e c t c o r o l l a r y of the po s t u l a t e of rationality"„ By the 
l a t t e r i s meant the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y , a standard of s e l e c t i o n 
of means based on the c a u s a l e f f i c a c y of means to b r i n g about 
ends. I t i s on the b a s i s of t h i s norm that the p u r s u i t of power 
i s inherent i n a c t i o n systems, to c o n t r o l other men i s an e f f i c i e n t 
cause/means of a c h i e v i n g an e f f e c t / e n d 0 I n s o f a r as the a c t o r i s 
a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y i n t h i s sense " i t would always be i r r a t i o n a l 
not to maximize wealth and power" £l937as262] 0 
Now t h i s l e a d s to a s i t u a t i o n o f apparent paradox,, On 
the one hand Parsons p o s i t s an inherent c o n f l i c t of norms and 
i n t e r e s t s o From the point of view of a system of norms and 
val u e s there i s always "the c e n t r i f u g a l "bombardment of i n t e r e s t s 
and a p p e t i t e s " , t h e i r tendency to escape normative c o n t r o l s " 0 
|.1937as685] o When Parsons compares ¥eber and Durkheim he 
f i n d s ' I n both cases a l e g i t i m a t e order i s c o n t r a s t e d x*ith a 
s i t u a t i o n of the u n c o n t r o l l e d p l a y of i n t e r e s t s ' [l937as66lj 0 
But on the other hand i n t e r e s t s and the n e c e s s i t y to pursue them 
are a product of a type of norm 0 
However i f we go a l i t t l e f u r t h e r the paradox i s r e s o l v e d . 
T h i s i s achieved by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the i n t e r e s t e d and 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d a t t i t u d e of the a c t o r towards the norm, whether 
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the norm i s followed f o r motives of personal advantage or 
moral obligation,, [l937as66l] 0 
"Thus i n every s o c i e t y there i s such a body 
of normative r u l e s of a c t i o n , the embodiment 
of u l t i m a t e common values,, I n one main 
aspect the i n t e g r a t i o n of the so c i e t y i s 
to be measured i n terms of the degrees to 
which these r u l e s are l i v e d up to from 
motives of moral obligation,, But be s i d e s 
t h i s there i s always the motive of 
" i n t e r e s t " which, looking upon r u l e s as 
e s s e n t i a l l y c o n d i t i o n of a c t i o n , a c t s i n 
terms of the comparative personal advantage 
of obedience or disobedience and acceptance 
of the san c t i o n s which w i l l have to be 
suff e r e d " 6937as4 o 4 j 0 
The dualism then i s i n a t t i t u d e s to r u l e s or motives f o r 
obedienceo The inherent c o n f l i c t of norms and i n t e r e s t s a r i s e s 
from the prospect that the normative s t a t u s of a r u l e w i l l be 
undermined, that i t i s regarded i n s t r u m e n t a l l y as a means or 
co n d i t i o n of an end r a t h e r than a d e f i n i t i o n of how an end 
should be achieved,, The consequence of the degeneration of norms 
to means and conditions i s to r a i s e the Hobbesian spectre which 
as we have seen i s the b a s i s f o r Parsons' p o s t u l a t i o n of 
common v a l u e s , the p u r s u i t of i n t e r e s t i n s o c i e t y must always 
be controlled,, 
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We can note here that the problem of power/interests i s 
l o c a t e d by Parsons i n the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y and a c t o r s ' 
a t t i t u d e s to norms<, We can c o n t r a s t t h i s w ith an approach 
which focuses on the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the sources of power, 
the g e n e r a l i z e d means, themselves 0 I n t h i s approach i f i t 
be the case that such means are d i f f e r e n t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d i n 
a population then d i f f e r e n t a c t o r s have d i f f e r e n t degrees of 
ac c e s s to the means of control„ From t h i s groups are seen 
as forming around the de facto sources of power and the 
problem of power i n s o c i e t y i s one of the r e l a t i o n s between 
groupso 
Parsons approach d i f f e r s from t h i s i n that the s t a r t i n g 
point i s the a c t o r ' s a t t i t u d e to sources of power and the 
problem l i e s i n how the s o c i e t y as a whole copes with the 
problem of power. The problem i s a f u n c t i o n a l problem of 
s o c i a l systems and i n t h i s sense i s c o n d i t i o n a l , a u n i v e r s a l 
c o n d i t i o n which a l l groups must f a c e 0 S o c i a l l i f e i s not a 
struggle between groups but the struggle of groups to overcome 
the f u n c t i o n a l problems of t h e i r continuing existence„ 
T h i s brings us back to voluntarism as a system of theory 
which i n c o r p o r a t e s the main conceptual elements of p o s i t i v i s m 
and i d e a l i s m i n t h e i r interdependent r e l a t i o n s h i p 0 Prima f a c i e 
t h i s appears to be e c l e c t i c i s m d e s p i t e Parsons' claims to the 
contrary,, However the way i n which he approaches conditions 
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as i n t e r e s t s g i v e s a c l u e to the s t r a t e g y by which t h i s 
e c l e c t i c i s m i s to be overcome„ As against the i d e a l i s t ' s 
appeal to events as 'emanations" of c u l t u r a l v a l u e s and 
f 
alongside the p o s i t i v i s t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of causes of a c t i o n 
Parsons i n v e s t i g a t e s the f i t and correspondence between i d e a l 
v a l u e s and c o n d i t i o n s conceived as r e a l i s t i c i mperatives on 
the f u n c t i o n i n g of a c t i o n systems. I n other words the antagonism 
of the d u a l i t y i s r e s o l v a b l e , a compromise can be reached 
between v a l u e s and the r e a l i t i e s of l i f e , n a t u r a l and s o c i a l . 
The t h e o r e t i c a l s y n t h e s i s of p o s i t i v i s m and i d e a l i s m then takes 
the form of a concern with the conditions n e c e s s a r y f o r and 
processes by which v a l u e s and f u n c t i o n a l imperatives are 
synthesized i n concrete events,, 
The v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic then s u p p l i e s the content 
of Parsons s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n i n welding together 
the general elements of a c t i o n , the "permanently v a l i d 
p r e c i p i t a t e s " of i d e a l i s m and p o s i t i v i s r a 0 But more than t h i s , 
Parsons" general theory i s a s t r u c t u r a l a n a l y s i s , or b e t t e r , 
an a n a l y s i s of the s t r u c t u r e of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a n a l y t i c a l 
elements. The p a r a l l e l with the v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic 
again e n t e r s i n , voluntarism focuses on the problem of how, 
through ' e f f o r t ' the a n t a g o n i s t i c dualism of norms and c o n d i t i o n s 
i s r o u t i n e l y overcome, the mechanisms by which the elements of 
a c t i o n are organized. 
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n now turns to examining three long standing 
and r e c u r r e n t problems i n a s c i e n c e of actions the nature of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y , normative determinism and the place of value„ 
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I w i l l be concerned with how Parsons broaches these problems 
i n h i s p r o j e c t f o r a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n and my c l a i m w i l l be 
that they are defined and r e s o l v e d w i t h i n the confines of 
Parsons' conception of s c i e n c e and h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic a 
B o The Concept of the Sub.jective Point of View of the Actor 
Throughout The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n the s u b j e c t i v i t y 
of a c t i o n i s a c o n s t a n t l y r e c u r r i n g theme„ Parsons u s u a l l y 
expresses t h i s i n terms of the ' c e n t r a l i t y ' [l937as67j, 
' d e c i s i v e n e s s ' [l937a?6l] and ' i n d i s p e n s i b i l i t y ' [l937as715] 
of 'the s u b j e c t i v e point of view, i o e 0 that of the a c t o r ' 
[1937as 77] . 
' o o o the frame of r e f e r e n c e of the schema 
i s s u b j e c t i v e i n a p a r t i c u l a r sense, That 
i s , i t d e a l s with phenomena, with things and 
events as they appear from the point of view 
of the a c t o r where a c t i o n i s being analyzed 
and considered' [l937agU6] . 
L e s s f r e q u e n t l y Parsons r e f e r s to s u b j e c t i v i t y v i a the method 
of Verstehen which i s s a i d to be a 'fundamentally important 
concept' [1937as583] » having 'the s u b j e c t i v e aspect of a c t i o n ' 
as i t s o b j e c t [l937as585] . 
These p o i n t s are i n i t i a l l y r e l e v a n t f o r the c l o s e l i n k s 
which are i n f e r r e d between Parsons' conception of the 
s u b j e c t i v i t y of a c t i o n and Weber's ide a s about the meaningfulness 
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of a c t i o n to the p a r t i c i p a t i n g a c t o r Q When Parsons 
emphasises s u b j e c t i v i t y he in t i m a t e s that he wishes to continue 
Weber9 s emphasis on the importance of the meaning a t t r i b u t e d 
to the a c t i o n by the a c t o r to the s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n and 
explanation of a c t i o n c Indeed t h i s i s e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e d to 
be the case by Parsons, Weber's concept of a c t i o n i s s a i d 
to be " c l o s e l y s i m i l a r " [l937as64o] and 8 s u b s t a n t i a l l y the 
concept d e a l t with through t h i s study" [l937a8 642~J „ 
T h i s c l a i m g i v e s r i s e to a number of prima f a c i e problems, 
f o r example, i f Parsons" s c i e n c e o f a c t i o n g i v e s a prime place 
to a c t o r ' s meanings how i s the t h e s i s of convergence between 
Weber and Durkheim to be co n v i n c i n g l y argued, f o r s u r e l y t h i s i s 
a c r u c i a l point of d i f f e r e n c e between the two? (6) Yet a 
cursury reading of Parsons' a n a l y s i s of Durkheim's work i s enough 
to show that he does not simply drop the s t r e s s on s u b j e c t i v i t y 
t h e r e o I t i s not a case p a r a l l e l to a recent work by 
F l e t c h e r (1971 p a r t 2) i n which Weber i s presented as emphasising 
the s u b j e c t i v e aspect of s o c i e t y , Durkheim the o b j e c t i v e , the 
two being complementary 0 Rather the s u b j e c t i v e point of view 
i s q u i t e c e n t r a l to Parsons" d i s c u s s i o n of Durkheims as w i l l be 
made c l e a r i n a l a t e r section,, I t i s not the i n t e n t i o n here to 
d i s c u s s the convergence thesis„ I n s t e a d i t i s proposed to 
in q u i r e more c l o s e l y into Parsons" notion and employment o f the 
s u b j e c t i v e point of view of the a c t o r 0 O v e r a l l the cla i m w i l l 
be put forward that although a c t o r " s meanings do have a pa r t to 
play i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g i t i s a r e l a t i v e l y minor p a r t and quite 
secondary to a very d i f f e r e n t conception of s u b j e c t i v i t y which i s 
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h i s c e n t r a l idea,, I f t h i s can be shown then such problems 
as Parsons" d i s c u s s i o n of Durkheim and the s u b j e c t i v e point 
of view might seem l e s s of a puzzle„ 
I t i s r e l e v a n t to note here that considerable disagreement 
e x i s t s i n the secondary l i t e r a t u r e over what Parsons means by 
'the s u b j e c t i v e point of view of the actor'« By f a r the most 
common view i s that Parsons continues the Weberian emphasis on 
the meaningfulness of a c t i o n to the participant„ T h i s i s 
n i c e l y exemplified by Rocher (l97^s28=9)g 
' S o c i a l a c t i o n 0 „ o i s a l l human behaviour 
motivated and d i r e c t e d by the meanings which 
the a c t o r d i s c e r n s i n the e x t e r n a l world, 
meanings which he takes account of and to 
which he respondSo So the e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e 
of s o c i a l a c t i o n i s the a c t o r ' s s e n s i t i v i t y 
to the meanings of the people and things 
about him, h i s perception of these meanings 
and h i s r e a c t i o n s to the messages they 
convey c 
Since i t i s p r i m a r i l y defined by i t s 
meaningfulness, s o c i a l a c t i o n must be 
i n t e r p r e t e d from the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v e 
point of view" 0 
However Rocher a l s o notes that i n Parsons" hands the i d e a o f 
s o c i a l a c t i o n "allows of no p r e c i s e and s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n , o f t e n 
to the d e s p a i r of Parsons' r e a d e r s ' (197^2 28) notably Sorokin 
who c a s t i g a t e s Parsons on the vagueness of d e f i n i t i o n o f h i s 
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b a s i c concepts (1966s411=19) 0 On the other hand Dawe 
(19708209) sees s u b j e c t i v e meaning as an i n s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e 
i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g because i t i s placed i n the o v e r a l l context 
of a systems approach to sociology focused on the problem of 
order. Then the s u b j e c t i v e aspect of a c t i o n i s but the 
i n t e r n a l i z e d r e f l e c t i o n of the e x t e r n a l and c o n s t r a i n i n g 
c e n t r a l value system. 
So quite what 'the s u b j e c t i v e point of view of the a c t o r ' 
amounts to r e q u i r e s examination, I w i l l begin by d i s c u s s i n g 
Parsons' a n a l y s i s of Pareto's concepts of l o g i c a l and non-
l o g i c a l a c t i o n fl937as Chapter 5J o The question at i s s u e w i l l 
be i n what sense these concepts are analysed 'from the s u b j e c t i v e 
point of view of the a c t o r ' , I n both cases an attempt w i l l be 
made to show that the meaning of a c t i o n to the a c t o r i s 
p e r i p h e r a l to Parsons' main concerns„ Also from t h i s 
d i s c u s s i o n p o i n t e r s w i l l emerge which w i l l enable the i n q u i r y to 
progress i n t o what Parsons means by the s u b j e c t i v e point o f view, 
1, S u b j e c t i v i t y i n the context of l o g i c a l and n o n - l o g i c a l 
a c t i o n . 
I t i s most important to note that the concept of l o g i c a l 
a c t i o n i s defined s o l e l y i n terms of the norm employed by the 
ac t o r i n s e l e c t i n g means to ends and the s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r of 
that norm, Sos "Action i s according to Pareto, l o g i c a l i n 
so f a r as i t conforms with a c e r t a i n type of norm' £l 937as 191 jf ° 
T h i s norm i s what Parsons c a l l s the norm of i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y 
[l937as210^. Means are s e l e c t e d to a t t a i n an end s t r i c t l y on 
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the b a s i s of the i n t r i n s i c c a u s a l connections between the 
means (cause) and the end ( e f f e c t ) £l937asl87]0 So i n the 
case of l o g i c a l a c t i o n s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e knowledge of 
i n t r i n s i c c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s form the b a s i s on which the a c t i o n 
i s meaningful to the a c t o r [l937as6l] „ By s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 
here i s meant the a c t o r ' s knowledge of matters of f a c t and 
l o g i c a l reasoning [l937as197] » 
Now from a number of statements i t would seem that an 
explanation of a c t i o n i n terms of t h i s concept would involve 
r e f e r e n c e to the a c t o r ' s s c i e i t i f i c knowledge of the r e l a t i o n s 
o f means and ends as causes and e f f e c t s . ° 0 o o t h e understanding 
of l o g i c a l reasoning i s the best means of e x p l a i n i n g a c t i o n 
so f a r as i t i s l o g i c a l O O o 0 ' (1 937as 1 9^] ° 
However at one point Parsons sayss 
'Hence the t h e o r i e s Pareto i s i n t e r e s t e d i n 
are those which depart from the standard of 
logico-experimental s c i e n c e , f o r conformity 
with i t immediately makes the theory i n 
question a m a n i f e s t a t i o n only of the l o g i c a l 
elements' (1937as 1 97] ° 
Now t h i s i s d i s t i n c t l y odd 0 For so f a r i n Parsons' account 
we have been l e d to b e l i e v e that i n l o g i c a l a c t i o n the a c t i o n 
i s a f u n c t i o n of the a c t o r a c t i n g i n accordance with a 
s c i e n t i f i c theory. Yet here the theory i s s a i d to be a 
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"manifestation" of something e l s e , l a b e l l e d " l o g i c a l elements' 8 
Here the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d e f i n i t i o n of l o g i c a l a c t i o n s o l e l y 
i n terms of the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y becomes evident. By 
d e f i n i t i o n a l o g i c a l act i s one i n which the a c t i on conforms 
to the norm of i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y , that i s , the a c t o r has 
v e r i f i a b l e knowledge of c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and a c t s i n 
accordance with that knowledge i n employing means which w i l l 
cause h i s end to come about. To Parsons what t h i s means i s 
that the actorfe knowledge i s 'an adequate expression of the 
r e a l determinants of a c t i o n ' £l 937as 213] . These r e a l 
determinants are 'the f a c t s of the e x t e r n a l world to the a c t o r ' 
[l937as2l4] o What i s being s a i d then i s that the ' r e a l 
f o r c e s ' [l937as2l4] determining the a c t i o n e x i s t i n the e x t e r n a l 
world, the s u b j e c t i v e aspect i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n , i n t h i s case 
an accurate p i c t u r e , of these determinants. So the 'source' 
of the a c t o r ' s knowledge i s 'the a c t o r ' s accurate observation 
of the f a c t s of h i s e x t e r n a l world', 'a statement of f a c t 
manifests an aspect of the e x t e r n a l world 1 £i 937as 2 1 „ The 
a c t o r ' s knowledge can be taken as a c a u s a l f a c t o r i n l o g i c a l 
a c t i o n only i n so f a r as i t i s such a r e f l e c t i o n . T h i s t o p i c , 
the r a t i o n a l i t y of a c t i o n , w i l l be taken up again l a t e r , I w i l l 
at the moment turn to n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n . 
As i n the case of l o g i c a l a c t i o n Parsons uses Pareto to 
c o n s t r u c t a type model of n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n i n terms of a 
means-end a n a l y s i s which depends on the s u b j e c t i v e point of 
view of the a c t o r . T h i s i s somewhat t e n t a t i v e as the model i s 
r e s i d u a l to the model of l o g i c a l a c t i o n . I t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
f e a t u r e s are that the norm l i n k i n g means and ends i s non-
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v e r i f i a b l e by s c i e n t i f i c methods \) 937as 208-1 i j and can a c t 
as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of or u l t i m a t e end of the a c t i o n (l937a$ 
205=8], which i s not the case i n l o g i c a l a c t i o n 0 Furthermore 
the end can be a non-observable s t a t e of a f f a i r s [i 937as 20^=5] 
The i n i t i a l point to note here i s that t h i s model would seem 
to n e c e s s i t a t e the observer t a k i n g account of the meaning of 
the a c t i o n to the a c t o r . F o r here r a t h e r than means standing 
i n a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n to ends they are s e l e c t e d by r e f e r e n c e 
to the norm of symbolic appropriateness. Means are s e l e c t e d 
as symbolic expressions of a meaning, the end J\ 937as210=1 i j . 
Such an approach would seem to n e c e s s i t a t e t a k i n g i n t o account 
the a c t o r ' s understanding of 'appropriateness' f o r example, 
However much of what Parsons says c a s t s doubt on this„ 
T h i s can be seen i n two contexts. F i r s t l y Parsons c a l l s the 
reader's a t t e n t i o n to the 'two d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s on which t h i s 
schema of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n symbol-meaning r e l a t i o n s h i p may be 
employed' [l937a:21ll . The f i r s t i s where the a c t o r ' s a c t i o n 
'may be h e l d to have an e x p l i c i t l y conscious symbolic meaning 
to the a c t o r ' [l937as21ll , The second; 'But at the same time 
i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e f o r the symbol-meaning schema to be a 
convenient t o o l of understanding f o r the observer on occasions 
when i t i s not e x p l i c i t l y conscious to the a c t o r ' £l937a:21l] . 
Now to say t h i s i s not incompatible i n i t s e l f w i th an a n a l y s i s 
i n terms o f s u b j e c t i v e meaning, one task of such an a n a l y s i s 
would be to b r i n g out and c l a r i f y d i f f u s e and vague i n t e n t i o n s 
r u l e s , e t c . However to be c o n s i s t e n t i t would not be of the 
so r t s the a c t o r t h i n k s he i s doing x but when I as observer 
analyse h i s a c t i o n I f i n d he i s doing y. I n t h i s case the 
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a n a l y s i s i s s u r e l y not i n terms of s u b j e c t i v e raeaningo Yet 
t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what Parsons says i n exemplifying the second 
l e v e l of employment of the symbol-meaning schema? 
"Thus i n magic the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v e 
a t t i t u d e i s g e n e r a l l y c l o s e to that of 
b e l i e f i n the i n t r i n s i c e f f i c a c y of the 
operation, but to the observer i t i s more 
conveniently i n t e r p r e t e d as an expre s s i o n 
of h i s sentiments' [i937ag21l] (See a l s o 
[l937a8 258-9, ^20])o 
The second source of doubt as to the relevance of s u b j e c t i v e 
meaning to Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n of n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n i s h i s 
comments on Pareto's ABC scheme. Parsons' fo l l o w s Pareto's 
a n a l y s i s of n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n i n terms ofg 
A = a " s t a t e of mind" 
B - overt a c t i o n 
C = the a c t o r ' s theory of the a c t i o n 
[l937a»19al • 
Two po i n t s are of note here. F i r s t l y , the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
A and C, C can be c a l l e d the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v e l y meaningful 
understanding of h i s a c t i o n but t h i s i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from h i s 
8 s t a t e of mind'o Secondly, what i s s a i d o f the r e l a t i o n s o f A, 
B and C should be noted. Although Parsons says that they stand 
i n r e l a t i o n s of 'mutual interdependence' t h i s by no means 
i m p l i e s that a l l three are of equal c a u s a l weight. Indeed j u s t 
the opposite, Parsons s t r e s s e s that i t i s because the c a u s a l 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p s between C and B and C and A are weak that Pareto 
takes C f o r a n a l y s i s 0 That i s the a c t o r ' s t h e o r i e s are l e a s t 
important of the three <, 
From the above remarks i t can be s a i d that to render the 
concept of the s u b j e c t i v e point of view of the a c t o r as the 
s u b j e c t i v e meaning of the a c t i o n seems d o u b t f u l 0 We can 
pursue these doubts by f o l l o w i n g c l o s e l y Parsons arguments on 
•a range of methodological problems 0 [l937as212] which the 
in t r o d u c t i o n of the symbol-meaning r e l a t i o n s h i p s b r i n g s i n t o 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of type models of u n i t a c t s [1937as2112=7] 0 
These problems centr e on "the question o f the o b s e r v a b i l i t y 
of the meanings o f symbols 8 [l937as212] „ T h i s seems to be 
the problem of how i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r an observing s c i e n t i s t 
to 'understand 1' the meaning of a c t i o n to the a c t o r i n an 
o b j e c t i v e way 0 T h i s i s not, however, how Parsons sees the 
problem e Rather he assumes that t h i s i s not a problem, P a r e t o 5 
e m p i r i c a l procedure presupposes that the meanings of symbolic 
expressions can be t r e a t e d as v e r i f i a b l e f a c t s Q Parsons' 
i n t e r e s t i s i n the question of the meaning o f symbols 'on a 
s t i l l deeper l e v e l ' [l937as21l2] 0 I n pushing to t h i s second 
l e v e l Parsons uses Pareto and I w i l l report h i s argument here. 
To Pareto a l l that i s necessary to 'understand' l o g i c a l a c t i o n 
i s the 'understanding' of the a c t o r ' s ' p r o c e s s of reasoning"„ 
However the understanding of non=logical a c t i o n i n v o l v e s 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a f u r t h e r ' e n t i t y ' b e s i d e s the a c t o r ' s 
process of reasoning, h i s ' s t a t e of mind' 0 To Parsons t h i s 
poses the fo l l o w i n g problem» Does Pareto's argument imply 
that 'the meanings of the symbols are i r r e l e v a n t to the 
understanding of a c t i o n , that the r e a l source of i t l a y i n a 
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l a y i n a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t order of element?" //I937as213] . 
As Parsons says t h i s i s "strongly suggested 0 by the ABC scheme. 
There C, the a c t o r ' s s y m b o l i c a l l y represented theory i s s a i d 
to be the 'mani f e s t a t i o n 8 of A, the ' s t a t e of mind'. To 
Parsons t h i s r a i s e s the questions of the meaning of the term 
'manifestation'. He approaches t h i s by c o n s i d e r i n g 'the s t a t u s 
of the normative elements of a c t i o n ' [ l937as213] . I f a c t i o n 
conforms to a norm then, says Parsons, i t can be s a i d t hat i t i s 
determined by the norm. I n l o g i c a l a c t i o n t h i s i s true by 
d e f i n i t i o n , thus an understanding of the norm i s adequate to 
understand the a c t i o n , there i s no need to introduce any 
f u r t h e r e n t i t y to e x p l a i n the a c t i o n Q I t i s important to 
remember why t h i s i s the case, to understand the theory i s 
enough because the theory i s an 'adequate expression of the 
r e a l determinants of a c t i o n ' , the ' f a c t s of the e x t e r n a l world'. 
However non=>logical a c t i o n , l a r g e l y because i t i s defined 
r e s i d u a l l y o f t e n d i s p l a y s a discrepancy between the norm and the 
a c t u a l course o f a c t i o n . Parsons asks whether t h i s i s not the 
reason why an understanding of the theory i s inadequate to 
understand the a c t i o n , as there i s a discrepancy something e l s e 
must be added. Parsons admits that t h i s i s a reason but not 
the c r i t i c a l one, f o r i t i s j u s t as p o s s i b l e to co n s t r u c t a 
model of n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n i n which the theory and the a c t i o n 
c o i n c i d e , i n which the theory 'adequately expressed the r e a l 
determinants of the a c t i o n ' , as i t i s i n the type model of 
l o g i c a l a c t i o n . 
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What marks the d i f f e r e n c e between l o g i c a l and non= 
l o g i c a l a c t i o n i s not that i n the f i r s t the a c t i o n conforms to 
the norms, i n the second i t does not, but the followings 
" I n t h i s connection there i s , indeed a reason 
f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the k i n d of f o r c e s which are 
determinant of n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n from those 
formulated i n the concept of l o g i c a l a c t i o n , 
but i t i s a d i f f e r e n t reason from that applying 
to the s i t u a t i o n where the predominant fe a t u r e 
i s the discrepancy of theory and p r a c t i c e 0 
I t i s not, as i t was there, a matter of the 
c h a r a c t e r of the r e l a t i o n s between the symbols 
c o n s t i t u t i n g the theory and the r e a l f o r c e s , 
f o r these symbols are adequate expressions 
of the r e a l forces„ I t i s , r a t h e r , a 
d i f f e r e n c e i n the c h a r a c t e r of the e n t i t i e s 
to which the symbols r e f e r D I n the l o g i c a l 
case i t was the f a c t s of the e x t e r n a l world 
to the a c t o r 0 I n the n o n - l o g i c a l case i t i s 
i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e the a c t o r ' s own 
sentimentsc ["!937as2l4]o 
So the d i s t i n c t i o n between A and C i n n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n i s 
not introduced because the s t a t e of mind and the theory are 
d i f f e r e n t "orders of element', A as an ' i n s t i n c t 0 f o r example, 
but to emphasise that they are the same, both " s u b j e c t i v e 0 i n 
c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to the case of l o g i c a l action,, There the 
a c t o r ' s theory i s an expression of the ' r e a l f o r c e s ' i n the sense 
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of a r e f l e c t i o n of the o b j e c t i v e world* I n n o n - l o g i c a l 
a c t i o n the t h e o r i e s are an expression i n the sense of the 
r e a l i z a t i o n of the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v e sentiments and 
underlying u l t i m a t e ends D 
We can see from t h i s what Parsons means by h i s second 
l e v e l of understanding o f the meaning of symbols 0 I t i s not 
that he wishes to include the a c t o r ' s meaning i n the 
explanation of a c t i o n , r a t h e r what i s i n s i s t e d upon i s that 
n o n ^ l o g i c a l a c t i o n i s a fun c t i o n of f o r c e s i r r e d u c i b l e to the 
e x t e r n a l world, which are s u b j e c t i v e i n t h i s sense» T h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r p a r t o f the d i s c u s s i o n can be concluded by drawing 
a t t e n t i o n to two d i s t i n c t i o n s which are made by Parsons i n h i s 
a n a l y s i s of Pareto's l o g i c a l and n o n - l o g i c a l action,, 
F i r s t l y , Parsons i s at pains to i n s i s t upon the d i s t i n c -
t i o n between what might be c a l l e d o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e 
determinants of action,, At the moment these can be s a i d to 
be f a c t o r s which on the one hand can be l o c a t e d i n the world 
e x t e r n a l to the a c t o r and those which are i n t e r n a l or 
c o n s t i t u t i v e of the a c t o r 0 Secondly, the above remarks have 
detected two senses i n which Parsons speaks of the s u b j e c t i v i t y 
of action,, On the one hand a c t i o n i s s u b j e c t i v e i n tiie sense 
that i t i s meaningful to the act o r , on the other, a c t i o n i s 
s u b j e c t i v e i n that i t i s determined by 'forces" or f a c t o r s 
i r r e d u c i b l e to the a c t o r ' s e x t e r n a l world, components of the 
a c t o r ' s ' s t a t e of mind'„ 
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These d i s t i n c t i o n s point the way forward f o r t h i s 
i n q u i r y i n two d i r e c t i o n s o The i m p l i c a t i o n s and employment 
of the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t o r ' s meanings and the s t a t e of 
mind must be followed up 0 T h i s w i l l be the next topic to 
be di s c u s s e d and i t w i l l h o p e f u l l y provide a i d i n p i n p o i n t i n g 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between the e x t e r n a l world and the ac t o r , the 
main problem here being what Parsons means by the concept of the 
a c t o r B 
2 D S u b j e c t i v i t y and the c o n c r e t e - a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , , 
As I have noted i n the above remarks Parsons sometimes 
r e f e r s to the s u b j e c t i v i t y of a c t i o n i n the sense of the meaning 
of the a c t i o n to the a c t o r but al s o i n terms of the a c t o r ' s 
5 s t a t e of mind 5o T h i s phrase occurs f r e q u e n t l y i n The 
Str u c t u r e of S o c i a l Actions 
'One of the p r i n c i p a l f e a t u r e s of the 
conceptual scheme analysed i n t h i s study, 
the theory of a c t i o n , i s that i t i s couched i n 
terms of s u b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i e s , that i s 
ca t e g o r i e s r e f e r r i n g to aspects or p a r t s of, 
or elements i n , the " s t a t e of mind" of the 
act o r ' [I937as82j . (See alsos / l 937as42 , 
247, 295} ) * 
Now i t could be the case that t h i s i s a pur e l y semantic 
d i f f e r e n c e but the above d i s c u s s i o n of Pareto's concept of non-
l o g i c a l a c t i o n c a s t s severe doubt on t h i s e Hence my d i s c u s s i o n 
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w i l l p r o c e e d on t he a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e two a r e d i s t i n c t , an 
a s s u m p t i o n w h i c h w i l l be c o n f i r m e d by what follows,, The q u e s t i o n 
i s t h e n how a r e t h e s e two c o n c e p t i o n s o f s u b j e c t i v i t y r e l a t e d to 
ea c h o t h e r and employed by P a r s o n s ? To answer t h i s q u e s t i o n 
we c a n t u r n to h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between two d i f f e r e n t ' l e v e l s ' on 
w h i c h the c o n c e p t u a l scheme he d e v e l o p s c a n be employed, t h e 
c o n c r e t e and t h e a n a l y t i c a l [l 937as 48=5ll „ 
I n P a r s o n s 1 a c c o u n t t h e m a n i f e s t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e 
c o n c r e t e and a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l s o f employment o f the s u b j e c t i v e 
c a t e g o r i e s o f t h e t h e o r y o f a c t i o n i s i n terms o f t h e i r methodo-
l o g i c a l function,, The f u n c t i o n o f the a c t i o n schema i n i t s 
c o n c r e t e s e n s e i s d e s c r i p t i v e ? 'The f u n c t i o n o f t h i s c o n c r e t e u s e 
o f the a c t i o n schema i s p r i m a r i l y descriptive„.„ But, i n t h i s 
c o n t e x t , the a c t i o n schema s e r v e s o n l y to a r r a n g e the d a t a i n 
a c e r t a i n o r d e r , not to s u b j e c t them to the a n a l y s i s n e c e s s a r y 
f o r t h e i r e x p l a n a t i o n ' 5937ai^8j<, 
What i s o f i n t e r e s t h e r e i s t he meaning o f the s u b j e c t i v i t y 
o f c o n c e p t s i n t h i s c o n c r e t e s e n s e . From t h e examples P a r s o n s 
g i v e s i t c a n be s a i d t h a t a c t i o n c o n c e p t s r e f e r to the meaning o f 
a c t i o n to the a c t o r , Thus w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the co n c e p t 'end' 
P a r s o n s s a y s s 
•Thus by t h e c o n c r e t e end i s meant the 
t o t a l a n t i c i p a t e d f u t u r e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s 
so f a r as i t i s r e l e v a n t to t h e a c t i o n frame 
o f r e f e r e n c e s F o r i n s t a n c e , a s t u d e n t may 
have as h i s immediate end the w r i t i n g o f a p a p e r 
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on a given s u b j e c t . Though at the 
i n c e p t i o n of a course of a c t i o n he w i l l 
not be i n a p o s i t i o n to v i s u a l i z e i n 
d e t a i l ( t h i s i s true of many concrete 
ends) he w i l l have a general idea, a 
f o r e c a s t of i t i n general terms. But 
t h i s v i s u a l i z e d product, perhaps being 
"handed i n " , i s the concrete end' 
[l937as48] o 
S i m i l a r l y with r e f e r e n c e to the concept of ' s i t u a t i o n ' s 
'From the point of view of a s i n g l e 
concrete a c t o r i n a concrete s i t u a t i o n the 
e f f e c t s , both present and a n t i c i p a t e d , of the 
a c t i o n of others belong i n the s i t u a t i o n , 
and thus may be r e l a t e d to the a c t i o n of 
the i n d i v i d u a l i n question i n the r o l e of 
means and c o n d i t i o n s ' [l937as503« 
Here then the concept of s i t u a t i o n i s framed i n terms of i t s 
s i g n i f i c a n c e or relevance to the concrete a c t o r , 
However as was noted above the employment of the a c t i o n 
schema i n a concrete sense i s f o r d e s c r i p t i v e purposes, when the 
purpose i s to e x p l a i n a c t i o n the s u b j e c t i v e concepts are employed 
i n an a n a l y t i c a l sense. 
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"For the purpose of explanation a f u r t h e r 
step i n a b s t r a c t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y n e c e s s a r y . 
I t c o n s i s t s i n g e n e r a l i z i n g the conceptual 
scheme so as to b r i n g out the f u n c t i o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s involved i n the f a c t s a l r e a d y 
d e s c r i p t i v e l y arranged 8 tl937as49] 0 
By t h i s r a t h e r opaque passage Parsons means the following,. The 
problem i s how s u b j e c t i v e concepts such as end or norm can be 
employed f o r explanatory purposes. They can be so used by 
regarding such concepts as c a u s a l elements of the a c t i o n 0 T h i s 
i s what Parsons means by b r i n g i n g out the " f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s 
involved i n the f a c t s 8 s what the f a c t s are a f u n c t i o n of„ But 
as he notes t h i s i n v o l v e s a 8 f u r t h e r step i n a b s t r a c t i o n 8 , the 
concepts must be 8 g e n e r a l i z e d " 0 T h i s word has two senses h e r e c 
F i r s t of a l l the f a c t s d e s c r i p t i v e l y arranged must be regarded 
as cases or i n s t a n c e s of general causes, of the elements or 
p r o p e r t i e s of action,, Secondly, these c a u s a l elements are 
p r o p e r t i e s of a c t i o n systems as wholes, the problem i s of 
e s t i m a t i n g the r o l e of the element "norm 8, f o r example, i n a 
8 t o t a l system of a c t i o n 0 [ l 9 3 7 a s 5 0 ] o T h i s i s what Parsons 
r e f e r s to when he sayss 
8 o o o a new l o g i c a l s i t u a t i o n a r i s e s when 
the attempt i s made to g e n e r a l i z e about 
t o t a l systems of a c t i o n i n terms of the 
f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of the f a c t s 
s t a t e d about them 8 fl937as5q] 0 
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Quite what i s involved here and what i s meant by the a n a l y t i c a l 
sense of s u b j e c t i v i t y i s best e l u c i d a t e d by u s i n g examples from 
Parsons' t e x t 0 I w i l l i n v e s t i g a t e the concrete and a n a l y t i c a l 
senses of 'end' 5 'norm' and ' s i t u a t i o n ' 0 
i 0 Concrete and a n a l y t i c a l meanings of end and norm 0 
As we have a l r e a d y noted by a concrete end Parsons intends 
'the t o t a l a n t i c i p a t e d future s t a t e of a f f a i r s ' £l937ag487 o Here 
i t i s the a c t o r who a n t i c i p a t e s t h i s f u t u r e s t a t e of a f f a i r s 0 
Parsons asks whether t h i s concrete end can be regarded as causing 
the action? He t h i n k s not, f o r c e r t a i n aspects of t h i s f u t u r e 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s would have come about anyway, without the 
i n t e r v e n t i o n of the a c t o r and h i s p u r s u i t of h i s end e 'But i t 
i s quite c l e a r t h a t not t h i s t o t a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s but only 
c e r t a i n aspects or f e a t u r e s of i t can be a t t r i b u t e d to 0 0 0 the 
agency of the a c t o r ' &937as49] „ 
Parsons e x e m p l i f i e s t h i s point by r e f e r e n c e to the r o l e of 
h e r e d i t y and environments 
'The o o o elements of h e r e d i t y and environment 
p l a y a p a r t i n determining the concrete ends 
of a c t i o n . Such a concrete end i s an a n t i -
c i p a t e d concrete s t a t e of a f f a i r s , i n v o l v i n g 
elements of the e x t e r n a l environment and of 
h e r e d i t y ' |l937as700] 0 
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For example, the h e d o n i s t i c p r i n c i p l e of pl e a s u r e must be regarded 
as a h e r e d i t y element i n the c a u s a t i o n of the future s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s which serves as the concrete end D 
"Pleasure as an end of a c t i o n was p l a u s i b l e 
because the p s y c h o l o g i c a l mechanisms that 
produce p l e a s u r a b l e f e e l i n g s i n c e r t a i n 
circumstances are, i n f a c t , expected to 
operate i n the process l e a d i n g to the 
d e s i r e d s t a t e of affairs» 0 0 0 P l e a s u r e i s a 
feature of the organism which we know by 
experience we can count on to operate i n 
c e r t a i n ways, 1 0 » 1 £l 937as 70cTf o 
So the psycho-organic mechanisms of ple a s u r e p l a y a p a r t i n 
b r i n g i n g about the concrete end yet t h e i r c a u s a l r o l e operates 
independently of the a c t o r ' s a n t i c i p a t i o n of the concrete end a 
As a consequence of t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n the concept o f end 
i n i t s a n a l y t i c a l sense must be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from the concrete 
sense e 
"An end, then, i n the a n a l y t i c a l sense 
must be defined as the d i f f e r e n c e between 
the a n t i c i p a t e d f u t u r e s t a t e of a f f a i r s and 
that which i t could have been p r e d i c t e d 
would ensue from the i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n 
without the agency o f the a c t o r having 
intervened" (l937as49j „ 
r i937as700j 
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The f a c t that the concrete end was meaningful, a s u b j e c t i v e 
a n t i c i p a t i o n on the part of the a c t o r , then becomes i r r e l e v a n t 0 
Parsons 0 problem i s to l o c a t e the f a c t o r s which cause the s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s to a c t u a l l y come about„ Some of these are organic 
f a c t o r s such as pleasure mechanisms e Others can be a t t r i b u t e d to 
the s u b j e c t i v e element 'end'. Yet i t seems c l e a r that end i n t h i s 
a n a l y t i c a l sense i s something other than the a c t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n , 
h i s a n t i c i p a t i o n of the future s t a t e of a f f a i r s s Indeed i n some 
p l a c e s i t seems that Parsons i s saying that the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v e 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of the concrete end i s p a r t and p a r c e l of what the 
a n a l y t i c a l concept of end i s intended to explains 
' I t i s again evident how confusing i s the 
e m p i r i c a l b i a s which i d e n t i f i e s ends i n 
the a n a l y t i c a l sense with concrete ends. 
Of course i n t o what people c o n c r e t e l y 
want, elements of both h e r e d i t y and environ-
mental determinism enter, "Ends" as a 
c a u s a l element i n a c t i o n cannot be a 
concrete category' [l937as383] „ 
Here, 'what people c o n c r e t e l y want', t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e l y meaningful 
purposes, are determined i n par t by organic elements and, presumably, 
by the s u b j e c t i v e element of end. We can conclude then that the 
s u b j e c t i v i t y of the a n a l y t i c a l concepts of the theory of a c t i o n 
must be understood i n a sense other than the a c t o r ' s meaning, ends 
are a component of what Parsons terms 'the s t a t e of mind'„ 
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I f we turn now to the concept of norm a s i m i l a r p a t t e r n of 
argument emerges. Parsons g i v e s the statement ' S o l d i e r s should 
obey the orders of t h e i r commanding o f f i c e r s ' as an example of 
a concrete norm [l937as75] * The question i s whether a norm i n 
t h i s sense can be t r e a t e d as a cause of a c t i o n , that i s , as a cause 
of s o l d i e r s obeying t h e i r commanding o f f i c e r s ? Again Parsons 
r e p l i e s that the a c t i o n , obedience, i s a f u n c t i o n of both the 
norm and other c a u s a l elements. He g i v e s as an example the 
s o l d i e r ' s end, he might be obedient i n order to achieve a given 
m i l i t a r y o b j e c t i v e , t h i s would be a f u r t h e r s u b j e c t i v e element. 
But 'On the other hand, the r e c o g n i t i o n of the concrete norm may 
depend i n p a r t on non=normative elements such as, f o r i n s t a n c e , as 
a h e r e d i t a r y tendency to submissions' £l937as75j • S i m i l a r l y s 
' . <, . i t i s not to be forgotten that there may w e l l be h e r e d i t a r y 
elements which " d r i v e " behaviour i n conformity with a r a t i o n a l 
norm,...' £l937as70l]. 
Now to Parsons an explanation of a c t i o n i n terms of norms i n the 
concrete sense does not d i s c r i m i n a t e between such c o m p l i c a t i o n s . I f 
a s o l d i e r obeys a concrete norm t h i s might have nothing to do w i t h 
the f a c t that obedience to command can 'involve a sentiment that 
obedience i s an end i n i t s e l f Ll937as75l«> Hence i n t h e i r 
a n a l y t i c a l sense, norms as causes of a c t i o n , the concept o f norm 
must be r e s t r i c t e d to such a sentiment that acourse of a c t i o n i s 
d e s i r a b l e i n i t s e l f . 
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Again then the movement from the concrete to the a n a l y t i c a l 
l e v e l of concepts i n v o l v e s a move from the a c t o r ' s understanding 
of a r u l e of conduct to a d e f i n i t i o n or d e l i n e a t i o n of a general 
property of a c t i o n which i s to be t r e a t e d as a cause of a c t i o n . 
To l a b e l such elements ' s u b j e c t i v e 8 seems to imply something 
other than a c t o r s ' meanings. 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between the concrete and the a n a l y t i c a l 
i s a f e a t u r e o f Parsons' a n a l y s i s of the ' u t i l i t a r i a n dilemma'. 
[1937a:60=9] » A d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s can serve to emphasise some 
of the p o i n t s i n the foregoing remarks and l e a d i n t o the concrete 
and a n a l y t i c a l senses of the ' s i t u a t i o n ' of a c t i o n . 
i i ) The concrete and the a n a l y t i c a l i n the ' u t i l i t a r i a n dilemma' 
To Parsons u t i l i t a r i a n i s m (7) as a theory of a c t i o n i s a sub-
type of p o s i t i v i s m . To him i t i s marked by i t s i n s t a b i l i t y i n 
tha t two of i t s d e f i n i n g conceptual f e a t u r e s , the randomness of 
ends and the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y , are su b j e c t to prima f a c i e 
problems. Parsons' t h e s i s i s that when these problems are posed 
w i t h i n a p o s i t i v i s t i c framework the s t a t u s of ' s u b j e c t i v i t y ' 
becomes problematic [t 937a: 67-83 . When u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i s 
developed into r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m the n e c e s s i t y f o r the s u b j e c t i v e 
aspect of a c t i o n disappears. As such Parsons' argument i s 
r e l e v a n t here from the point of view of the nature of s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
The question i s s what p r e c i s e l y i s i t that i s l o s t when 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m breaks down into r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m ? 
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To begin with we must consider what s u b j e c t i v i t y means i n 
terms of u t i l i t a r i a n p o s i t i v i s m . Here the s u b j e c t i v e point of 
view of the a c t o r r e s t s on 'the analogy between the s c i e n t i f i c 
i n v e s t i g a t o r and the a c t o r i n ordinary p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s ' 
[l 937a; 58] , the a c t o r ' s s u b j e c t i v i t y i s l i m i t e d to the norm of 
r a t i o n a l i t y . T h i s means that the a c t o r i s p i c t u r e d as pursuing 
ends by adopting the means which i n terms of h i s s i t u a t i o n and 
a v a i l a b l e knowledge are t e c h n i c a l l y most e f f i c a c i o u s to the end. 
The c r i t e r i o n of t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y i s s c i e n t i f i c v e r i f i c a t i o n , 
t h at means can be shown by the methods of s c i e n c e to be causes of 
the end s t a t e as e f f e c t . 
I n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m then s u b j e c t i v i t y i s l i m i t e d to the a c t o r ' s 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of h i s s i t u a t i o n and i t s i n t r i n s i c means/cause -
end/effect r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Two p o i n t s should be noted here. The 
f i r s t i s that t h i s l i m i t a t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y to the norm of 
r a t i o n a l i t y i s Parsons' c r i t e r i o n of a p o s i t i v i s t i c theory of a c t i o n . 
A theory i s p o s i t i v i s t i c i n so f a r as i t l i m i t s the s u b j e c t i v e 
point of view to the point of view of the ' s c i e n t i s t ' , a person 
who qua s c i e n t i s t can only meaningfully r e l a t e to the world around 
him i n terms of e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e knowledge of cause and 
e f f e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The second point i s that by the s u b j e c t i v e 
point of view here Parsons means the meaning of a c t i o n to the 
concrete a c t o r . 
'Then, from the point of view of the a c t o r , 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e knowledge of the 
s i t u a t i o n i n which he a c t s becomes the only 
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s i g n i f i c a n t o r i e n t i n g medium i n the a c t i o n 
system c I t i s that alone which makes of 
h i s a c t i o n an i n t e l l i g i b l e order r a t h e r than 
a response to the "meaningless" f o r c e s 
impinging upon him 0 I t should be remembered 
that the a c t o r i s here being considered as 
i f he were a s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t o r 0 T h i s 
throws the emphasis on the c o g n i t i v e elements 
i n the s u b j e c t i v e aspect of a c t i o n e The 
p e c u l i a r i t y of the point of view under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n now i s that i t i n v o l v e s 
e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y (more of t e n the 
l a t t e r ) the view that p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e 
c o n s t i t u t e s man's s o l e p o s s i b l e s i g n i f i c a n t 
c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n to e x t e r n a l (non ego) 
r e a l i t y , man as a c t o r that i s ' / l 937a?6 l ] „ 
The manifest weaknesses of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m as a conceptual 
scheme are twofold* F i r s t l y , there i s the p o s t u l a t e of the 
randomness of ends, Here the ends which the a c t o r so r a t i o n a l l y 
pursues are p r i v a t e to each a c t , s p r i n g i n g from some mysterious 
source (such as Hobbes' 'passions' Il937as9Q]) and consequently 
having no i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y i n terms of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge 0 The 
second i s to account f o r departures from the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y , 
the problem of irrationality„ Parsons' c l a i m i s that when these 
problems are faced w i t h i n a p o s i t i v i s t i c framework then the 
s u b j e c t i v i t y of a c t i o n disappears? 
"Thus the u t i l i t a r i a n dilemma i s broadened 
into a more i n c l u s i v e form„ I t may, i n 
t h i s form, be s t a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g 
propositions I n so f a r as the u t i l i t a r i a n 
p o s i t i o n i s abandoned i n e i t h e r of i t s two 
major t e n e t s , the only a l t e r n a t i v e on a 
p o s i t i v i s t i c b a s i s i n the explanation of 
a c t i o n l i e s i n the conditions of the s i t u a ~ 
t i o n o f a c t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y r a t h e r than 
s u b j e c t i v e l y considered, which f o r most 
p r a c t i c a l purposes may be taken to mean i n 
the f a c t o r s of h e r e d i t y and environment i n the 
a n a l y t i c a l sense o f b i o l o g i c a l theory' [l937as 
67] . 
T h i s claim however should be t r e a t e d c a u t i o u s l y f o r throughout 
Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n runs the d i s t i n c t i o n between the concrete 
the a n a l y t i c a l o For example he sa y s 8 
'The p r i n c i p a l reason f o r the common f a i l u r e 
to see t h i s i m p l i c a t i o n of the u t i l i t a r i a n 
dilemma seems to l i e i n the f a c t that t h i n k e r s 
have been p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h what has 
been c a l l e d the concrete use of the a c t i o n 
schema and have f a i l e d to c a r r y t h e i r reasoning 
through s y s t e m a t i c a l l y to a general a n a l y t i c a l 
plane„ I n the l a t t e r terms i t i s inescapable 
[1937a: 67"] . 
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T h i s i s a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n because the movement from 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m to r a d i c a l v e r s i o n s of p o s i t i v i s m l e a d s to a 
departure from s u b j e c t i v i t y i n only one sense, the analytical„ 
The employment of the a c t i o n schema with i t s inherent s u b j e c t i v i t y 
i n the concrete sense remains i n r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m 0 
5 I t i s t rue that the f a c t s r e l e v a n t to the 
explanation of a c t i o n are always capable of 
statement i n terms at l e a s t of the concrete 
a c t i o n schema, a c t u a l l y i n the r a t i o n a l i s t i c c 
case, p o t e n t i a l l y i n the a n t i = i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c 
e o o * 0 [ l 9 3 7 a s 6 8 ] 0 
So i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n we must i n q u i r e what i s meant by s u b j e c t i v i t y 
i n these two senses i f we are to see quite what i s l o s t i n the move 
to r a d i c a l positivism,, I n what follows i t w i l l again be proposed 
that by the concrete sense of s u b j e c t i v i t y Parsons means a c t o r s " 
meaningso Then i t w i l l be suggested that as the move to r a d i c a l 
p o s i t i v i s m does not i n v o l v e the abandonment of s u b j e c t i v i t y i n t h i s 
sense then s u b j e c t i v i t y i n the a n a l y t i c a l sense must be something 
other than the meaning of a c t i o n to the a c t o r . 
The f i r s t weakness i n the u t i l i t a r i a n system i s the p o s t u l a t e 
of the randomness of ends 0 The p o s i t i v i s t i c response to t h i s 
Parsons c a l l s r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t i c positivism,, From t h i s point 
of view the a r a t i o n a l i t y (my term) of the a c t o r ' s ends i s u n s a t i s -
f a c t o r y , an account must be given of why the a c t o r pursues the 
ends he does 0 However w i t h i n the p o s i t i v i s t i c framework the only 
p o s s i b l e account i s to extend the notion of i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y 
from i t s s t a t u s as a norm r e l a t i n g means to ends to a c r i t e r i o n the 
a c t o r employs i n s e l e c t i n g the ends he w i l l pursue„ T h i s means 
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that the a c t o r bases h i s ends on h i s knowledge of the s i t u a t i o n 
i n which he a c t s 0 
" I f ends were not random, i t was because i t 
must be p o s s i b l e f o r the a c t o r to base h i s 
choice of ends on s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of 
some e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y 0 But t h i s tenet 
had the i n e v i t a b l e l o g i c a l consequence of 
a s s i m i l a t i n g ends to the s i t u a t i o n of a c t ion 0 <, o o 
F o r the only p o s s i b l e b a s i s of e m p i r i c a l know-
ledge of a future s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s p r e d i c t i o n 
on the b a s i s of knowledge of present and p a s t 
s t a t e s o o o Action becomes a process of 
r a t i o n a l adaption to these c o n d i t i o n s 0 The 
a c t i v e r o l e of the a c t o r i s reduced to one of 
the understanding of h i s s i t u a t i o n and f o r e c a s t 
t i n g of i t s f u t u r e course of development* 
£ l 9 3 7 a 8 6 3 - 4 j „ 
Now i t can be r e a d i l y granted that t h i s i s an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y concept 
t i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y but t h i s i s not the point at i s s u e here,, The 
point i s that the r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o s i t i v i s t i c framework as 
so f a r o u t l i n e d i s c a s t i n terms of the meaning of the a c t i o n to the 
a c t o r c What we have i s a model of a c t i o n i n which the a c t o r ' s 
knowledge of h i s s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to the ends he w i l l pursue 
and the means to be employed i s a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n a 
s c i e n t i f i c account of that action,, So the question a r i s e s i n what 
sense has s u b j e c t i v i t y been l o s t ? 
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I n answering t h i s question three p o i n t s are of r e l e v a n c e 0 
F i r s t of a l l Parsons" c l a i m i s that i t i s s u b j e c t i v i t y " i n the 
a n a l y t i c a l sense" which has been l o s t 0 I n opening h i s d i s c u s s i o n 
of r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m he sayss 
"Here the d i s t i n c t i o n between ends of a c t i o n 
i n the a n a l y t i c a l sense and the elements of 
a c t i o n belonging to the s i t u a t i o n i s v i t a l and 
e s s e n t i a l 8 / j 9 3 7 a s 6 3 ] » 
T h i s i s so because as we have seen the a c t o r i s s t i l l conceived as 
pursuing s u b j e c t i v e l y meaningful ends by the r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t i c 
p o s i t i v i s t o What Parsons i s concerned with i s the l o s s of the 
' a n a l y t i c a l independence' ( l 9 3 7 a s 6 3 j of ends by t h e i r being 
reduced to f o r e c a s t s of future s i t u a t i o n a l developments 0 
We can gain some id e a of what i s meant by ' a n a l y t i c a l ' here by 
moving to the second p o i n t 0 T h i s i s that Parsons equates the 
r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n w i t h the determination of a c t i o n 
by i t s conditions* 'The a c t i o n becomes determined e n t i r e l y by i t s 
c o n d i t i o n s o o t. o ' f l 9 3 7 a s 6 4 j s Now t h i s r e p r e s e n t s a p e r p l e x i n g jump 
i n the argument„ For i n terms of what we have s a i d the r a d i c a l 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o s i t i v i s t might be expected to e x p l a i n a c t i o n i n 
terms of the a c t o r ' s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of the c o n d i t i o n s i n which 
he a c t s . I n other words we might p o s i t a d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
c o n d i t i o n s and the a c t o r ' s knowledge of those c o n d i t i o n s and 
suggest that an explanation of the a c t o r ' s a c t i o n s would be phrased 
terms of the l a t t e r c However to Parsons, on the a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l 
t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t 0 The f u s i o n of the two i s 
i n d i c a t e d by the comment thats ' „ s s there i s no other determinant 
of h i s a c t i o n than knowledge and the con d i t i o n s through t h i s 
knowledge' [l937as6ii] „ What t h i s means i s that the a c t o r ' s 
meaningful knowledge i s not a r e l e v a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n to Parsons" 
a n a l y t i c a l sense of s u b j e c t i v i t y , , As i n the case of Pareto's 
l o g i c a l a c t i o n above, the a c t o r ' s knowledge i s taken to be a 
r e f l e c t i o n of the " r e a l " determinants, the co n d i t i o n of a c t i o n D 
(8 ) What Parsons o b j e c t s to about r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t i c 
p o s i t i v i s m i s not that a c t o r ' s meanings have been l o s t but that 
the determinants of these meanings and the a c t i o n i t s e l f are 
b i o l o g i c a l 0 
T h i s i s the t h i r d point, the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of j u s t what 
the conditions of a c t i o n are» 
' The independence of ends disappears and 
they are a s s i m i l a t e d to the co n d i t i o n s of 
the s i t u a t i o n , that i s , to elements analyzable 
i n terms of non~subjective c a t e g o r i e s , 
p r i n c i p a l l y h e r e d i t y and environment i n 
the a n a l y t i c a l sense of b i o l o g i c a l theory" 
[ l 9 3 7 a § 6 4 ] o 
The l o s s of s u b j e c t i v i t y i n the a n a l y t i c a l sense then means the 
explanation of a c t i o n i n terms of i t s b i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s 0 
From what has been s a i d we can say that s u b j e c t i v i t y i s something 
other than these b i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s 0 However i t a l s o appears 
again that s u b j e c t i v i t y i n the a n a l y t i c a l sense i s something other 
than a c t o r ' s meanings 0 For s u b j e c t i v i t y i n t h i s sense, the 
concrete sense, remains i n r a d i c a l r a t i o n a l i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m , 
whatever i t s d e f i c i e n c i e s 0 
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The second departure from u t i l i t a r i a n i s m Parsons c a l l s 
r a d i c a l a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c positivism,, T h i s develops 
out of the problem of departure from the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y , , 
How i s i t that human a c t i o n does not f u l l y conform with the 
p o s i t i v i s t i c model of the s c i e n t i s t ? Within a p o s i t i v i s t i c 
framework t h i s i s conceived i n terms of ' f a l l i n g short' of 
the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y , . The p o s s i b i l i t y of the ac t o r 
a c t i n g by reference to an a l t e r n a t i v e norm to that of 
i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y l i e s outside the p o s i t i v i s t schema,, 
Hence Parsons d e s c r i b e s the p o s i t i v i s t i c approach to departures 
from the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y i n terms of the a c t o r ' s ignorance 
of f a c t s r e l e v a n t to h i s a c t i o n or e r r o r i n reasoning from the 
f a c t s . I t i s not the object of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n to defend such 
a p o s i t i o n but again i t i s p e r t i n a n t to note that the concepts 
of ignorance and e r r o r r e f e r to the meanings of a c t i o n to the 
a c t o r . Only i n terms of the a c t o r ' s knowledge being s i g n i f i c a n t 
to h i s a c t i o n do ignorance and e r r o r themselves have any 
significance,, So again s u b j e c t i v i t y i n the sense of a c t o r ' s 
meanings continues over from u t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n t o r a d i c a l a n t i -
i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t i c positivism,. The same p a t t e r n s as i n the 
r a t i o n a l i s t i c case f o l l o w s . Parsons' preoccupation i s w i t h the 
a n a l y t i c a l elements by which t h i s concrete sense of s u b j e c t i v i t y 
can be explained? 
"Since s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s held to be 
man5 s only s i g n i f i c a n t c o g n i t i v e r e l a t i o n 
to e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , then there are open 
only two a l t e r n a t i v e s i n e x p l a i n i n g why 
the a c t o r i n question was the v i c t i m of 
ignorance or e r r o r or both. E i t h e r t h i s 
s u b j e c t i v e fact [ i n the concrete sense I 0 P < T J 
may be the r e f l e c t i o n of elements i n the 
s i t u a t i o n which are i n t r i n s i c a l l y incapable of 
being understood i n s c i e n t i f i c terras „o» or, 
on the other hand they can be explained' 
[ I 9 3 7 a » 6 6 j o 
So ignorance and e r r o r , as concrete ' s u b j e c t i v e f a c t s ' , that i s , 
as concepts r e f e r r i n g to a c t o r ' s meanings, are not of explanatory 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o Rather they are something to be explained. 
Parsons' o b j e c t i o n to a n t i = i n t e l l e c t u a l i s t p o s i t i v i s m i s again 
that i t s explanation of ignorance and e r r o r i s not i n terms of 
an a n a l y t i c a l concept of subjectivity» 
' I f the explanation of i r r a t i o n a l i t y on a 
p o s i t i v i s t i c b a s i s must l i e i n f a c t o r s not 
i n f a c t known, but i n t r i n s i c a l l y capable of 
being known s c i e n t i f i c a l l y to the ac t o r , then 
these f a c t o r s must be found, on a n a l y t i c a l 
g e n e r a l i z a t i o n [my emphasis XcPTj to l i e i n 
c a t e g o r i e s capable of non=subjective 
formulation, that i s i n the c o n d i t i o n s of 
ac t i o n " f l 9 3 7 a s 6 7 j o 
- 247 = 
Once again these are i d e n t i f i e d as the b i o l o g i c a l concepts of 
h e r e d i t y and environment £l 937as 67J 0 So again i n h i s attempt 
to demonstrate the b i o l o g i c a l underpinnings of p o s i t i v i s t i c 
t h e o r i e s of a c t i o n Parsons makes manifest h i s l a c k of concern 
with s u b j e c t i v i t y i n the Weberian sense 0 
I n the above d i s c u s s i o n mention has been made of the 
s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s of action,, Now on the face of i t i t 
might be expected that t h i s term would be employed to d e s c r i b e 
the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s which face a given actor, as an environment 
over which he has, at any given point i n time, no c o n t r o l s Yet 
as has been noted i n h i s c a s t i g a t i o n of r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m 
f o r i t s b i o l o g i c a l explanation of a c t i o n Parsons equates t h i s 
w i t h an explanation i n terms of the condit i o n s of a c t i o n . T h i s 
g i v e s r i s e to something of a puzzles what i s meant by the 
concept of the s i t u a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s of a c t i o n ? Once again 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between concrete and a n a l y t i c a l i s of great 
s i g n i f i c a n c e to t h i s question,, 
i i i 0 Concrete and a n a l y t i c a l concepts of the situation,, 
Over the y e a r s Parsons 8 p o s i t i o n on the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of 
a c t i o n has worried a number of h i s commentators, ( E 0 g s C i c o u r e l 
( 1 9 6 4 S 2 3 9 ) 9 Smith (19732108,110-11), Whyte (1961?262=6) )„ 
Indeed t h i s problem has stimulated a number of c o n s t r u c t i v e 
responses to Parsons, These form two rough groupings„ On 
the one hand are those who follow Lockwood (1967) i n noting the 
l a c k of development i n Parsons of a theory of the substratum of 
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i n t e r e s t s which p a r a l l e l systems of norms as the c o n s t i t u e n t s 
of s o c i a l structure,, A f u r t h e r example o f t h i s response i s 
Mayhew who cla i m s ; 
' o „ 0 i n a c e r t a i n sense, a c t i o n theory l a c k s 
a theory of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e 0 I t has a 
theory of normative s t r u c t u r e and a theory 
of o r g a n i z a t i o n but i t provides an inadequate 
account of the p a t t e r n i n g of s t r u c t u r a l conditions" 
(1968s427=8). 
On the other hand phenomenologically i n c l i n e d s o c i o l o g i s t s have 
objected to the Parsonian tendency to pl a y down the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n of a c t i o n faced by the a c t o r and 
i t s p l a c e i n the c r e a t i o n of meaning,, (See, f o r example, 
Douglas (19713 32) ) 0 A l l of t h i s i s n i c e l y summarized by 
Goodwin's comment on an (admitted) e r r o r by T i r y a k i a n i n 
rewording the t i t l e of The St r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n to The S o c i a l 
S t r u c t u r e of Action,, She sayss 
' T i r y a k i a n ' s " e r r o r " c l a r i f i e d almost ten 
yea r s of concern over what i t was that was 
wrong with Parsons' argument i n The St r u c t u r e of 
S o c i a l A c t i o n 0 What was ( i s ) wrong with the 
argument of Parsons i s i n d i c a t e d i n T i r y a k i a n " s 
" e r r o r " : the s t r u c t u r e u n d e r l y i n g s o c i a l 
a c t i o n , f o r Parsons, i s not " s o c i a l " at a l l 
( a s exemplified, f o r example, ( s i c ) i n Parsons' 
d i s c u s s i o n of " c o n d i t i o n s " v i s - a - v i s a c t i o n i n 
The St r u c t u r e of S o c i a l Action) » 0 ( 1 9 7 1 S 3 1 0 ) o 
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None of these commentators though have looked c a r e f u l l y at 
what Parsons says about the conditions of action,, T h i s i s 
p e r t i n a n t here as i t shows again the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the 
c o n c r e t e / a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n and poses a problem 8 to be 
taken up s h o r t l y , the s o l u t i o n of which f u r t h e r s the i n q u i r y 
i n hand here? what Parsons means by the s u b j e c t i v e point of 
view of the actor,, 
Parsons co n s i d e r s the s t a t u s of the concept of the s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s or environment of the a c t o r at s e v e r a l p o i n t s i n 
The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n (For example Ll937as50 s 81, 
202, 364, 370, 428})„ I n each case he draws a r a d i c a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the concrete and the a n a l y t i c a l senses of 
c o n d i t i o n s claiming that c o n c r e t e l y the concept of s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s i s l e g i t i m a t e but a n a l y t i c a l l y illegitimate„ 
Parsons i s quite w i l l i n g to admit that ' i t cannot be 
doubted that the concrete a c t o r i s placed i n a concrete s o c i a l 
m i l i e u 5 /l937as8lj„ That i s , other i n d i v i d u a l s and t h e i r a c t i o n s 
£l937as50, 202, 370] , s o c i a l r u l e s //I937as370j systems of ideas 
fl937as428j and the " t o t a l concrete s o c i e t y ' [l937as3647 can 
be i n t e r p r e t e d as c o n d i t i o n s to be taken account of by any one 
a c t o r c The l a s t sentence contains a c r u c i a l ambiguity which 
c e n t r e s on the problem of quite who i s i n t e r p r e t i n g the a c t i o n 
of others e t c I f the concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i s employed. 
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i s i t the a c t o r ' s d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n that the concept 
r e f e r s to, the a c t o r ' s understanding of other a c t o r s , r u l e s and 
ideas as c o n d i t i o n s of h i s own a c t i o n ? Or, does the concept 
embody the observer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e a l i s t i c 
s i t u a t i o n which a c t u a l l y f a c e s the a c t o r as a system of conditions 
which are beyond h i s c o n t r o l but must be taken account of? From 
the point of view of a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n which p o s i t s the 
importance of the meaning of a c t i o n to the a c t o r the f i r s t 
employment must obviously be stressed,, Yet the p o s i t i o n i s not 
quite so simple as t h i s , f o r the two senses of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
are i n t i m a t e l y related„ I f we approach the question i n terms 
of the meaning of the s i t u a t i o n to the a c t o r i t must be remembered 
that the a c t o r ' s d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n i s a d e f i n i t i o n of 
something,, i t i s not an imaginary fa n t a s y which i s conjured up i n 
a vacuum D The a c t o r ' s d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n a r i s e s i n a 
d e f i n i t e context which poses concrete problems f o r him, makes 
demands on him and l i m i t s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to him D To 
forget t h i s point l e a d s to a p o s i t i o n to my mind e f f e c t i v e l y 
destroyed by Marx, i d e a s , meanings, d e f i n i t i o n s must be s e t i n 
the context o f t h e i r o r i g i n i n p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y 0 So, f o r 
example, i f a c t o r s define t h e i r world as a c o n d i t i o n a l one, a 
world beyond t h e i r c o n t r o l whose c o n s t r a i n t s are f e l t as 
binding t h i s cannot be taken as the terminus of the question 
but as a problem to be investigated„ From the above paragraph 
i t might appear that the second sense of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , as 
defined by the observer, i s being advocated,, However t h i s view 
again must be q u a l i f i e d by the o t h e r c For o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s 
are c o n d i t i o n s f o r somebody, the point being that d i f f e r e n t 
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people face d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n a l worlds 0 
Then an account of a c t i o n i n terms of the concept of s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s must s p e c i f y which "act o r ' s point of view' the 
concept r e f e r s t o 0 I t must s t a t e that t h i s i s the c o n d i t i o n a l 
world f o r t h i s a c t o r . 
T h i s short departure from the main i n q u i r y i s included to 
support the claim argued above, that the a c t i o n schema employed 
i n the concrete sense i s s u b j e c t i v e i n the sense of a c t o r ' s 
meaningso Although the above remarks are b r i e f and f a i l to 
cope at a l l f u l l y w i t h the problems r a i s e d by the concept of 
s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i n the context of a s t r e s s on the s u b j e c t i v e 
meaning of a c t i o n to the a c t o r enough has been s a i d to support 
the view that i n a concrete sense the a c t i o n schema can 
incorporate the concept of the s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of action,. 
We can now r e t u r n to Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n of the concept 
of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , but now considered analytically„ As has 
been mentioned Parsons r e j e c t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of an a n a l y t i c a l 
concept of s o c i a l conditions„ To support t h i s he o f f e r s a 
number of reasons„ We can f i r s t of a l l note the ' v i c i o u s 
c i r c l e ' arguments 
'The s o c i a l environment of a c o n c r e t e l y a c t i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l i s thought of as a l l the c o n d i t i o n s 
r e l e v a n t to h i s a c t i o n which i n v o l v e other 
concrete individuals,,„ „ But t h i s c l e a r l y 
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cannot be g e n e r a l i z e d f o r t h e o r e t i c a l purposes 
= the r e s u l t i s a v i c i o u s c i r c l e . For i t 
would mean taki n g as the explanation of the 
a c t i o n of one i n d i v i d u a l , the very thing that 
i s to be explained i n the case of the others who 
c o n s t i t u t e the s o c i a l environment of the one 0 
I n other words, to e x p l a i n i n such terms the a c t i o n 
of any one, i t i s n e c e s s a r y to assume that the 
a c t i o n of a l l the others has a l r e a d y been 
explained, which i s to beg the question of a 
general t h e o r e t i c a l e xplanation of human a c t i o n 
altogether" [l937as364] . 
Now the f o r c e of t h i s argument i s not immediately evident„ What 
Parsons appears to be saying i s that i f we e x p l a i n the a c t i o n s 
of one a c t o r A by r e f e r e n c e to the c o n s t r a i n t s imposed upon him 
by other a c t o r s B and C, who c o n s t i t u t e conditions f o r a c t o r A, 
then we are making e i t h e r or both of two m i s t a k e s 0 F i r s t l y , we 
are involved i n an i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s , to e x p l a i n A by r e f e r e n c e 
to B and C i t i s necessary to e x p l a i n B and C by r e f e r e n c e to A 
and D as c o n d i t i o n s of B and C and then D by r e f e r e n c e to C and 
E and so on ad infinitum,, Yet t h i s does not seem to be n e c e s s a r y 
at a l l 0 I f the task i s to e x p l a i n A's a c t i o n s then the question 
why i t i s that B and C stand as c o n d i t i o n s f o r A, that i s , an 
explanation of t h e i r a c t i o n s , i s not at issue„ Of course i t 
may become pr o b l e m a t i c a l but then that would then be a d i f f e r e n t 
explanatory problem„ The second mistake i s that we have to 
assume that B and C's a c t i o n s have a l r e a d y been explained. 
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Again t h i s does not convince, f o r B and C 0 s a c t i o n s are not 
pr o b l e m a t i c a l , the explanation of A*s a c t i o n s by re f e r e n c e to 
the c o n d i t i o n s imposed by B and C should make no cla i m to be 
an explanation of B and C's a c t i o n s . 
The key to what Parsons i s d r i v i n g at l i e s i n the term 
" g e n e r a l i z e 0 i n the quotation above. H is aim i s to achieve 
8 a g e n e r a l i z e d t h e o r e t i c a l explanation of human a c t i o n " and to 
stand as an a n a l y t i c a l concept s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s must be capable 
of ' g e n e r a l i z a t i o n f o r t h e o r e t i c a l purposes'o I n other 
words the concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s must be an element of 
a c t i o n , as a c a u s a l f a c t o r i t must conceptualize a u n i v e r s a l 
property of a l l action,, But as such the v i c i o u s c i r c l e 
argument above i s s t i l l unconvincing. For i t i s qu i t e p l a u s i b l e 
to say that a l l a c t o r s face s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e i r a c t i o n , 
the r e l e v a n t point being that each a c t o r faces d i f f e r e n t 
c o n d i t i o n s . The concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s can be appli e d to 
each and any ac t o r but from each a c t o r ' s point of view the 
content and substance of the concept could change 0 So the cla i m 
that the concept cannot be g e n e r a l i z e d i n the sense of a 
u n i v e r s a l property of a c t i o n seems, at the moment, doubtful. 
We w i l l r e t u r n to t h i s point i n a moment„ I t i s p e r t i n a n t 
to note here that as such a general concept s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
only gains s i g n i f i c a n c e from the d i f f e r e n t points of view of 
d i f f e r e n t a c t o r s . Whether or not t h i s i s the s u b j e c t i v e 
point o f view of the a c t o r i s , as was noted above, a debatable 
point but i t i s p l a u s i b l e that t h i s s u b j e c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n can be 
incorporated. 
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To see why Parsons f e e l s that the concept of s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s cannot be g e n e r a l i z e d i n t h i s way we must move on 
to h i s second argument which I s h a l l l a b e l the "double-
counting' argument. Parsons sayss 'For what are, to one 
a c t o r , non-normative means and conditions are e x p l i c a b l e i n 
p a r t , at l e a s t , only i n terms of the normative elements of the 
a c t i o n s of others i n the system' /j937as5oJ. T h i s o b j e c t i o n 
to the concept of s o c i a l conditions on the a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l 
i s then that what to one a c t o r are c o n d i t i o n s are to other 
a c t o r s (who i n f a c t c o n s t i t u t e those c o n d i t i o n s ) ends or norms. 
I n other words to include s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s as a general 
property of a c t i o n i n v o l v e s double-counting, i n c l u d i n g as 
s o c i a l conditions that which i s a l r e a d y included as ends or 
norms. However to say t h i s r e q u i r e s a f u r t h e r step i n the 
argument and a second sense of g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . For the 
s i g n i f i c a n t question i s what i s i t that elements of a c t i o n are 
causes or p r o p e r t i e s of? Given the phrase the s u b j e c t i v e 
point of view of the a c t o r we might expect them to be 
p r o p e r t i e s of a c t o r ' s a c t i o n s . But i f t h i s i s the case then 
to say that s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s are, from another point of view, 
ends or norms, seems i r r e l e v a n t . However, i f elements are 
p r o p e r t i e s of systems of a c t i o n as wholes then the double 
counting argument c a r r i e s weight. Indeed t h i s i s j u s t Parsons' 
p o s i t i o n . 
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'For what are o b j e c t s of knowledge on the 
part of one concrete a c t o r may turn out, 
on the a n a l y s i s of the system as a whole 
to be a t t r i b u t a b l e to the "ends" or other 
s u b j e c t i v e elements i n r e l a t i o n to the a c t o r s 
taken together" L1 937a: 202} . 
"But i n e s t i m a t i n g the r o l e of normative 
elements i n the t o t a l system of a c t i o n i n 
which the p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r c o n s t i t u t e s a 
u n i t , i t would obviously be i l l e g i t i m a t e 
to i n clude these elements i n the s i t u a t i o n 
f o r the system as a whole" [/1937a:5oJ. 
We might add to the l a s t passages "despite the f a c t that to the 
a c t o r such normative elements are c o n d i t i o n s ' . The relevance 
of the v i c i o u s c i r c l e and double counting arguments now becomes 
c l e a r . For Parsons' point of reference here i s the concept of 
a system of a c t i o n and i t s general elements. From the point of 
view of such a system the c o n d i t i o n a l s t a t u s of a c t o r s to each 
other l e a d s to a v i c i o u s c i r c l e , the f a c t that the c o n d i t ions 
f o r one are d i f f e r e n t from the conditions f o r another means that 
the concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s cannot r e f e r to the system as 
a whole. I f i t were i t would have to be common to a l l the 
a c t o r s i n the system. 
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What then does Parsons mean by the s i t u a t i o n a l conditions 
of a c t i o n on the a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l ? As the above remarks on 
r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m suggest these are the bio=physical 
c o n s t i t u e n t s of human beings and t h e i r n a t u r a l world, summarized 
by Parsons as h e r e d i t y and environment (e.g. fl937as202, 700) ) . 
These two elements are fr e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d to as 'capable of 
non-subjective formulation' [l937as53j. As such i t i s these 
that form the e x t e r n a l , o b j e c t i v e vrorld a n a l y t i c a l l y speaking 
and to which the s u b j e c t i v e elements are con t r a s t e d . As yet 
no attempt has been made to s p e c i f y what i s involved i n t h i s 
a n a l y t i c a l conception of the s u b j e c t i v e point of view of the 
act o r other than to r e f e r to i t as a 8 s t a t e of mind 8. However 
i t can be repeated that t h i s s t a t e of mind i s something other 
than the meaning of a c t i o n to the a c t o r . T h i s has been 
r e i n f o r c e d by the d i s c u s s i o n of the s i t u a t i o n a l conditions of 
a c t i o n where Parsons has been found to depart e n t i r e l y from 
the concrete a c t o r ' s point of view i n favour of a concern with 
a n a l y t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of systems of a c t i o n . I t can be noted 
again that t h i s d i r e c t l y involved the dichotomous c o n t r a s t 
between what to the a c t o r are co n d i t i o n s of h i s a c t i o n and 
cond i t i o n s i n the a n a l y t i c a l sense, the con d i t i o n s of systems 
of a c t i o n as wholes. 
i v . The problematic c h a r a c t e r of the r e j e c t i o n of s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s . 
A f u r t h e r consequence of the above d i s c u s s i o n can be taken 
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up which w i l l serve e v e n t u a l l y to l e a d to a more p o s i t i v e 
d i s c u s s i o n of s u b j e c t i v i t y as the actor* s ' s t a t e of mind'. 
T h i s i s that i n r e j e c t i n g the concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
Parsons has abandoned a main theme i n the c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n 
of sociology which i s purportedly the main i n s p i r a t i o n 
behind The Str u c t u r e of S o c i a l Action. To say t h i s , of 
course, presupposes some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of that t r a d i t i o n but 
the theme i n question i s not, I think, p a r t i c u l a r l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c 
to me nor d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h . Indeed, as we s h a l l see 
s h o r t l y , i t i s recognized by Parsons h i m s e l f . T h i s theme i s 
the o b j e c t i v i t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
f a b r i c to the a c t o r s who p a r t i c i p a t e i n these r e l a t i o n s . I t 
i s expressed as both a problem f o r s o c i o l o g i c a l understanding 
and as an explanatory p r i n c i p l e . 
As a focus of i n t e r e s t the theme i s found most 
poignantly i n Weber's metaphor of the i r o n cage, most aggres-
s i v e l y i n Marx's w r i t i n g s on a l i e n a t i o n . The problematic i s 
perhaps l e s s manifest i n Durkheim yet as a s e l f - c o n f e s s e d 
r a t i o n a l i s t he i s concerned to employ h i s sociology to d i r e c t 
people away from the b l i n d , non-comprehending obedience to 
s o c i e t y . T h i s underlying problematic of c l a s s i c a l sociology 
becomes r e l e v a n t to t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i n that c e n t r a l concepts 
of the work of Marx, Weber and Durkheim are developed around 
t h i s phenomenon and point the way to an explanation of a c t i o n 
i n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l terms, that i s , i n terms of a conception 
of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e which i s e x t e r n a l and c o n s t r a i n i n g from 
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the point of view of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t a c t o r s 0 I n Marx 9 the 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of production, p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n s t i t u t i o n 
of p r i v a t e property and the s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of labour, 
form the 'conditions of e x i s t e n c e " of the classes,, Weber's 
sub s t a n t i v e d i s c u s s i o n of bureaucracy i s r e f l e c t e d f o r m a l l y i n 
what to the present w r i t e r i s h i s c e n t r a l s o c i o l o g i c a l concepts 
s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p (Webers 19^*78 Chapter 1 , S e c t i o n 3 ) „ T h i s , 
i t should be noted i s something more than an aggregate of s o c i a l 
a c t i o n s o As w e l l as a p l u r a l i t y of a c t o r s mutually t a k i n g 
account of each other the concept of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n v o l v e s 
an element of r e g u l a r i t y , of structure„ To penetrate t h i s 
q u a l i t y of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s Weber d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n to 
r u l e s of conduct and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n t e r e s t s (19^7* Chapter 
1, S e c t i o n s k and 5 )» Parsons argues that as Durkheim's 
work develops " 0 0 0 the problem of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , or of s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e i n any concrete sense, recedes more and more i n t o the 
background" [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 2 0 ] „ T h i s view has been contested s t r o n g l y , 
and to my mind, s u c c e s s f u l l y i n r e s p e c t s r e l e v a n t here, by 
Giddens ( 1 9 7 2 ) 0 
By r e j e c t i n g the notion of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s Parsons can 
be i n t e r p r e t e d as d i r e c t i n g h i s sociology away from the s o c i a l 
as s i t u a t i o n a l to the a c t o r . Yet what i s p e r p l e x i n g i s that 
at some p o i n t s i n The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n i t i s p r e c i s e l y 
t h i s which i s brought out„ 
I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of Weber"s d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l 
and s o c i a l s c i e n c e Parsons d i s p u t e s the l i n e he sees Weber drawing 
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between the n o n ~ s c i e n t i f i c motives f o r s c i e n c e 0 According 
to Parsons, Weber argues that s o c i a l s c i e n c e does not embody a 
motive of c o n t r o l , h i s r e p l y i s s 
"Indeed, with ref e r e n c e both to nature and 
to a c t i o n and c u l t u r e two main types of non= 
s c i e n t i f i c motives of c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t may 
be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o One i s the " i n s trumental" 
i n t e r e s t o T h i s i s manifested wheneverthe question 
a r i s e s of u s i n g elements of the s i t u a t i o n of 
a c t i o n as means, or adapting a c t i o n to them as 
conditionso But s u r e l y i n r a t i o n a l a c t i o n 
g e n e r a l l y the s o c i a l environment looms at 
l e a s t as l a r g e as does the natural„ P a r t i ~ 
c u l a r l y i n the f i e l d Weber had p r i m a r i l y i n 
mind, that of p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , t h i s seems 
I n p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , then, the concept of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s as 
e x t e r n a l to the a c t o r , r e f l e c t e d upon and used by him, i s 
to a major argument o f the books the Hobbesian problem of o r d e r D 
I n o u t l i n i n g Hobbes 5 r a t i o n a l e f o r the problematic s t a t u s of order 
Parsons notes that the concept of power becomes s i g n i f i c a n t only 
on the b a s i s of a c t o r s regarding each other as p o t e n t i a l means 
to be the case" [1937a? 595J 
recognized to be important„ Indeed t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n i s c r u c i a l 
and conditions of the attainment of t h e i r ends [i937as937 
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But i t i s i n the context of h i s d i s c u s s i o n of Marx and 
Weber's conceptions of c a p i t a l i s m that h i s awareness of the 
concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s becomes most evident <> Parsons 
c h a r a c t e r i z e s Marx i n terms of h i s polemics a g a i n s t Hegelian 
i d e a l i s m and Utopian s o c i a l i s m (/1937as **88~495j . To t h e i r 
s t r e s s on the G e i s t and the power of reason "Marx opposed h i s 
view of " i n t e r e s t s " 0 o 
"Men acted r a t i o n a l l y f o r him, even i n a 
somewhat l i m i t e d sense more suggestive of 
Hobbes than of Locke or Condorcet a But 
they acted r a t i o n a l l y w i t h i n a given 
concrete s i t u a t i o n and w i t h i n such a 
s i t u a t i o n the r a t i o n a l norm i t s e l f n e c e s s i -
t a t e s c e r t a i n l i n e s of a c t i o n , p r e c l u d i n g 
o t h e r s 0 Mens, p r e c i s e l y because they do 
act r a t i o n a l l y , w i l l follow t h e i r " i n t e r e s t s " 
as defined f o r them by the s i t u a t i o n s i n which 
they are p l a c e d 8 [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 9 l ] . 
To Parsons then Marx's view of i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e s two points,, 
F i r s t of a l l what he c h a r a c t e r i z e s as a u t i l i t a r i a n conception 
of the a c t o r ' s motivation, a s t r e s s on the a c t o r r a t i o n a l l y 
adopting means to ends, that i s , a c t i n g according to the c r i t e r i a 
of t e c h n o l o g i c a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l e f f i c i e n c y £l 937as *«-93 9 
h9k\ o Secondly, the a c t o r a c t s r a t i o n a l l y i n a given s i t u a t i o n 
and i t i s t h i s which Marx emphasises 0 "Marx's d i f f e r e n c e from 
the c l a s s i c a l economists i s merely t h i s s O o o he threw h i s 
a t t e n t i o n from the r a t i o n a l process i t s e l f back to the s i t u a t i o n 
which d i c t a t e d i t s course 0 ( l 9 3 7 a s ^ 9 3 j „ 
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Now does t h i s emphasis on the s i t u a t i o n mean that Marx i s a 
r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s t emphasising the h e r e d i t y and environment elements? 
From the d i s c u s s i o n above we might expect so„ Yet t h i s i s 
e x p l i c i t l y denied by Parsons„ I n s t r e s s i n g that "Marxism i s 
a s o c i a l d o c t r i n e 5 as against r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m he sayss 
"Marx did not use the word ma t e r i a l i s m i n the f a m i l i e r 
p o s i t i v i s t i c sense of reducing s o c i a l phenomena c a u s a l l y to 
terms of the non-human environment, as n a t u r a l r e s o u r s e s , or of 
b i o l o g i c a l h e r e d i t y or of some combination of both' £l 937as 49C>J „ 
T h i s i s repeated when Parsons sayss " I t should be emphasized 
again that the determinism of the theory l i e s not on an 
i n d i v i d u a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l , but on a s o c i a l l e v e l 0 I t i s the 
s i t u a t i o n which d i c t a t e s a given course of action? i n a 
d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n a l l would be changed" £l 937as 493J •> So i t i s 
the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n faced by any given a c t o r which l i e s at the 
root of Marx's theory; 
'Marx, through h i s d o c t r i n e of i n t e r e s t s , 
e l e v a t e d not only competition but the whole 
s t r u c t u r e of the economic order i n t o a great 
c o n t r o l mechanism, a compulsive system,, T h i s 
i s the e s s e n t i a l meaning of Marx's conception 
of economic determinism 0 I t i s not a matter 
of p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n t i = r a t i o n a l i s m , but of the 
t o t a l consequences of a multitude of r a t i o n a l 
a c t s , On the one hand the system i t s e l f i s the 
= 262 = 
r e s u l t a n t of the myriad of i n d i v i d u a l a c t s but, 
on the other, i t c r e a t e s f o r each a c t i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n which compels 
him to act i n c e r t a i n ways i f he i s not to go 
cont r a r y to h i s interests„ Thus f o r Marx 
e x p l o i t a t i o n was to be blamed on n e i t h e r the 
unreasonableness nor the p l a i n s e l f i s h n e s s of 
the i n d i v i d u a l employer, but the employer was 
placed i n a s i t u a t i o n where he must act as he 
did, or be elimina t e d i n the competitive s t r u g g l e ' 
//1937as491-2] 0 
A f u r t h e r point i s of relevance here. T h i s r e l a t e s to Parsons' 
a l l e g a t i o n that s o c i a l t h e o r i e s which do not include a common value 
element f a i l to provide a s o l u t i o n to the Hobbesian problem of 
ord e r B Marx does not include such a common value system f o r 
s o c i e t y as a whole. Yet Parsons seems to agree that Marx has 
an explanation of order i n c a p i t a l i s m ; 
'The system i t s e l f would be thought of as 
s e l f - a c t i n g s Once the i n d i v i d u a l s involved 
i n i t are placed i n the s i t u a t i o n s that are 
given, t h e i r a c t i o n s are "determined" so as to 
maintain the system as a whole, or r a t h e r to 
d r i v e i t forward on the evo l u t i o n a r y course, 
to end at l a s t i n i t s s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n ' 
fl937as492] o 
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As we have noted Marx's explanation f o r the o r d e r l y but changing 
s t r u c t u r e of c a p i t a l i s m l i e s i n a concept of the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n 
of the a c t o r . Yet Parsons ignores t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y of 
e x p l a i n i n g order i n s o c i e t y e I n the main h i s a t t i t u d e to the 
o r d e r l y s t r u c t u r e of i n t e r e s t s i s summarized when he sayss 
'For t h i s i n t e r l o c k i n g of i n t e r e s t s i s a 
b r i t t l e t h i ng which comparatively s l i g h t 
a l t e r a t i o n s of con d i t i o n s can s h a t t e r at 
v i t a l p o i n t s ' [ l 937as kOk] „ 
However, Parsons' remarks on Marx suggest that t h i s might be a 
premature judgement s Why then was i t not taken up? No doubt 
there are many reasons f o r t h i s but i t might be suggested that 
the f a i l u r e to incorporate a concept of the a c t o r ' s s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n i s one 0 
I n Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n o f Weber the same strand o f the 
importance of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s can be found. At one point he 
says : 
'As Weber puts the p o s i t i o n i n the most 
general terms! i t i s " i n t e r e s t s " not 
"i d e a s " that i n conjunction with the 
conditions of the s i t u a t i o n i n which they 
are placed determine immediately the conduct 
of men' D937a5 520] . 
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T h i s general i n s i g h t i s r e f l e c t e d i n two more s p e c i f i c contexts? 
Weber's agreement with Marx on the c r u c i a l f e a t u r e s of c a p i t a l i s m 
[l 937a o 503^513l and Parsons 8 account of how Weber approaches the 
question of the r o l e of r e l i g i o n i n s o c i e t i e s [l 937as571-573J „ 
With refe r e n c e to the f i r s t Parsons sayss 
" I n t h i s d e s c r i p t i v e aspect of h i s treatment 
of c a p i t a l i s m Weber, al l o w i n g f o r the 
d i f f e r e n c e of "accent", i s i n r a t h e r 
c l o s e agreement with Marx, H is emphasis 
on the "compulsive" aspect of the system 
i m p l i e s agreement beyond mere d e s c r i p t i o n s 
i t i n v o l v e s a t h e s i s concerning the de t e r -
mination of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n w i t h i n the 
system, namely that the course o f a c t i o n i s 
determined i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e by the 
ch a r a c t e r of the s i t u a t i o n i n which the 
i n d i v i d u a l i s placed, i n Marxian terminology, 
by the "conditions of production" 0 T h i s 
i m p l i c a t i o n Weber recognizes q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y , , 
The system, once f u l l y developed, i s s e l f -
s u s t a i n i n g by v i r t u e of i t s compulsive power 
over i n d i v i d u a l s " £l 937as5107 9 
By c o n t r a s t Parsons notes that to Weber r e l i g i o u s i d e a s cannot 
be explained by m a t e r i a l conditions„ However i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
9 the concrete processes by which r e l i g i o u s i d e a s develop and i n 
265 = 
the p a r t i c u l a r d i r e c t i o n the development takes" fl937as 571-572] 
the r o l e of s o c i a l conditions i s a c r u c i a l component of Weber"s 
position,, Parsons notes three p o i n t s h e r e c Prophecy i s the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mode by which systems of r e l i g i o u s i d e a s f i r s t 
a r i s e , but 'the emergence of prophecy i t s e l f 0 0 0 i s to be 
a t t r i b u t e d i n a l a r g e degree to s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s ' (l937as572j . 
Secondly, the 'problem of meaning', the metaphysical b a s i s of 
r e l i g i o u s i d e a s , i s d i f f e r e n t f o r d i s t i n c t s o c i a l groups, the 
problem must be posed i n terms of the kinds of problems men meet 
with, the s o c i a l conditions they are faced with /.1937ag 572] 0 
T h i r d l y , the chance of success of a given system of r e l i g i o u s 
i d e a s i s a fu n c t i o n of 8 the p o s i t i o n i n the s o c i a l "balance 
of power" of the c l a s s who are i t s p r i n c i p a l b e a r e r s ' [1937as 
572] o 
As w e l l as t h i s s t r e s s on the r o l e o f s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s 
i n the development of r e l i g i o u s systems i n s o c i e t y Parsons a l s o 
notes t h e i r r o l e i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l i g i o n and 
p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , emphasising that the l a t t e r i s not merely 
the 'emanation' of the formers 
'The c e n t r a l t h e o r e t i c a l concept i s that 
of r e l i g i o u s "interests"„ Ide a s are 
e f f e c t i v e i n a c t i o n because they determine 
the d i r e c t i o n of p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n 
which the i n t e r e s t s can be pursued,, 
But the very conception of i n t e r e s t s 
i m p l i e s another f a c t o r 0 Human a c t i o n i s 
sub j e c t not only to " i d e a l " but to r e a l 
c o n d i t i o n s ' [l937as572] „ 
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The above remarks then e s t a b l i s h the point that Parsons 
i s not unaware of the concept of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s nor of i t s 
part i n c l a s s i c a l sociology,, T h i s point has been s t r e s s e d to 
make pro b l e m a t i c a l h i s e x c l u s i o n of the concept on the a n a l y t i c a l 
l e v e l which i s h i s main concern. T h i s seems h i g h l y anomolous and 
i t can be suggested that there i s a powerful i n f l u e n c e on Parsons 
here. I t i s t h i s which i s the nest t o p i c of d i s c u s s i o n , 
r e t u r n i n g the argument to the problem of ' the s u b j e c t i v e point 
of view of the actor"„ 
3„ Concepts o f the ac t o r 
The conception of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i s s t r o n g l y a s s o c i a t e d 
by Parsons with what he c a l l s Durkheim"s s o c i o l o g i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m 
£l937as Chapter 9j° I t i s t h i s , the a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h a 
p o s i t i v i s t i c theory of a c t i o n which fundamentally accounts f o r 
Parsons" r e j e c t i o n of s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s as an a n a l y t i c a l concept 0 
Of p a r t i c u l a r note here i s that the term p o s i t i v i s m d e s c r i b e s not 
so much a s e t of methodological r u l e s but a concept of human 
action,, To Parsons a p o s i t i v i s t i c theory of a c t i o n i s d i s t i n -
guished not by i t s methodology but by i t s extension of t h i s 
methodology i n t o a conception of action,, Thus a p o s i t i v i s t i c 
theory i n v o l v e s 'the employment of the schema of s c i e n t i f i c 
methodology as a framework f o r the a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n from the 
s u b j e c t i v e point of view" [l937as37^1 ° Again, the p o s i t i v i s t 
attempts 'to apply the methodological schema of s c i e n c e to the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a c t i o n from the s u b j e c t i v e point of view" 
t 1 9 3 7 a s 3 6 6 ] 0 To Parsons, Durkheim ' r e t a i n ( s ) the s u b j e c t i v e 
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point of view 9 and w i t h i n i t adopted as h i s b a s i c frame of 
re f e r e n c e the schema of s c i e n t i f i c methodology" fl937&s365] o 
I n each of these statements p o s i t i v i s m i s de s c r i b e d as a 
"schema 8, "framework", " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n " , "frame of r e f e r e n c e 
that i s , as a conception of action,, Furthermore such a concep-
t i o n i n v o l v e s the s u b j e c t i v e point o f view D As was noted above 
the very i d e a of the s u b j e c t i v e point of view with r e s p e c t to 
Durkheim's work i s , on the face of i t , somewhat anomalous 0 
However we f i n d Parsons p a r t i c u l a r l y emphasising that the 
p o s i t i v i s t i c Durkheim adopts t h i s c He twice r e f e r s to the 
"importance" of the s u b j e c t i v e point of view to Durkheim's work 
and h i s a n a l y s i s of i t Ii937as3^9, 378] „ 
At t h i s point i t i s oppertune to include a note on the 
general concept of the ' a c t o r ' 0 Parsons sayss 
'Attention has al r e a d y been c a l l e d to the 
f a c t that the schema of a c t i o n i m p l i e s an 
a c t o r 0 T h i s i s as fundamental to the 
concept of a c t i o n as i s the assumption of 
a knowing s u b j e c t to that of knowledge<, I t 
i s impossible even to conceive of "knowledge" 
except as something known by a subject» 
S i m i l a r l y a c t i o n i s a s e r i e s of a c t s of one 
or more a c t o r s " £l937a?745] „ 
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Despite the strength of t h i s statement The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l 
A c t i o n i s remarkable f o r the absence of any extended d i s c u s s i o n 
of j u s t what i s meant by 8 the a c t o r 8 ( 9 ) o The only point that 
Parsons makes e x p l i c i t l y i s that the concept of a c t o r i s an 
a b s t r a c t i o n //1937as84] 0 He means t h i s i n the sense that the 
a c t o r i s not to be i d e n t i f i e d with 8 the concrete biopsycho-
s o c i a l i n d i v i d u a l ' fl937ag252] 0 Rather "The u n i t of r e f e r e n c e 
which we are c o n s i d e r i n g as the a c t o r i s not t h i s organism but 
an "ego" or " s e l f " {l937as47j <> Parsons p a r t i c u l a r l y wishes t> 
s t r e s s t h i s d i s j u n c t i o n between the i n d i v i d u a l as an organism 
and as an a c t o r because to the a c t o r h i s organic body i s a 
c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t of the e x t e r n a l world, the s i t u a t i o n of a c t i o n 
L l 9 3 7 a » 4 7 ] o Then the a c t o r - s i t u a t i o n d i s t i n c t i o n i s not a 
matter of s e p a r a t i n g concrete ' t h i n g s 8 [l937as47] f o r 'There 
i s c e r t a i n l y no e m p i r i c a l " s e l f " known which i s not an "aspect 
of" or " a s s o c i a t e d with" a l i v i n g b i o l o g i c a l organism £l937as45jo 
' I t i s r a t h e r a matter of the a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e d by the c a t e g o r i e s 
of e m p i r i c a l l y u s e f u l t h e o r e t i c a l systems' /l937as47) « The 
human being as an organism then belongs to the b i o l o g i c a l frame 
o f re f e r e n c e El937as47], as an a c t o r , to the a c t i o n frame of 
reference,, 
However, there i s s u r e l y more to the question than this,, 
F o r as w e l l as d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between a c t o r and organism i t i s 
necessary to s p e c i f y the content of the concept of a c t o r D T h i s 
Parsons does not do e x p l i c i t l y although t h i s whole d i s c u s s i o n of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y i s concerned with t h i s c I t w i l l continue with one 
p o s s i b l e model of the a c t o r which Parsons c r i t i c a l l y d i s c u s s e s s 
the p o s i t i v i s t i c model„ 
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As was noted above the p o s i t i v i s t i c model of the ac t o r 
centres on the concept of the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y , the ac t o r 
understanding h i s world i n terms of the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of 
means and ends. T h i s b a s i s however can be developed i n two 
d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s [l 937a: 345] . The f i r s t i s u t i l i t a r i a n 
p o s i t i v i s m . Here the *... c e n t r a l p r i n c i p a l i s the explanation 
of conduct i n terms of the r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t of the wants or 
d e s i r e s of i n d i v i d u a l s * [l937a:3^4J • The norm of r a t i o n a l i t y 
i s applied to the means of ach i e v i n g the a c t o r ' s ends which 
as a consequence p l a y a c r u c i a l r o l e i n the u t i l i t a r i a n system. 
8... only on the assumption that i n d i v i d u a l s do pursue ends and 
that the l a t t e r are e f f e c t i v e f a c t o r s i n a c t i o n does the 
u t i l i t a r i a n a n a l y s i s make sense' 0 937a: 3^57 • But t h i s c r u c i a l 
r o l e i s h i g h l y ambiguous f o r ends are random i n a double sense 
\j\937a:3^k\. They are spontaneous i n t h e i r source, that i s , 
outside the realm of l a w f u l r e g u l a r i t y , and they are p r i v a t e to 
each i n d i v i d u a l . 
Parsons* reading of Durkheim i s that he f i n d s the u t i l i t a r i a n 
explanation of o r d e r l y s o c i a l l i f e inadequate and as a 
consequence r e j e c t s the f i r s t l i n e of development of the norm of 
r a t i o n a l i t y , the d i r e c t i o n which emphasises r a t i o n a l i t y i n the 
p u r s u i t of ends. To the p o s i t i v i s t Durkheim an explanation i n 
terms of a c t o r ' s ends i s t a r r e d w ith the u t i l i t a r i a n brush. The 
norm of r a t i o n a l i t y then i s divorced from the i d e a of the a c t o r 
a c t i v e l y a c h i e v i n g ends fl 937a; 3^6-7j 0 
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The second l i n e of development of the norm of 
r a t i o n a l i t y , which Durkheim takes p a r t l y i n r e a c t i o n against 
u t i l i t a r i a n i s m , Parsons c a l l s r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s m . Here the 
emphasis i s not on the a c t o r r a t i o n a l l y attempting to r e a l i z e 
ends but on the a c t o r r a t i o n a l l y a s s e s s i n g h i s situation,, The 
r a d i c a l p o s i t i v i s t scheme i n v o l v e s ' „ B 8 t h i n k i n g of the a c t o r 
as knowing the c o n d i t i o n of h i s a c t i o n „ <> o ' £l937as 36k] 0 
Durkheim 1 1 s p e c u l i a r i t y i s that he attempts " c o o to extend the 
" r a t i o n a l i s t i c " schema of s c i e n t i f i c methodology from the 
conditions of a c t i o n involved i n h e r e d i t y and n o n - s o c i a l 
environment to the s o c i a l as w e l l ' (,1937as359jo Parsons' 
c r i t i c i s m s of t h i s have been noted above but here i t i s the 
model of the a c t o r which i s of relevance„ Parsons can be 
seen as askings what does s o c i o l o g i s t i c p o s i t i v i s m ' s s t r e s s 
on s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , on s o c i e t y as an environment to the 
actor, imply f o r i t s model of the a c t o r and h i s action? 
I t means f i r s t of a l l that such s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s stand 
as ' f a c t s ' to the actors 
'Now, as Durkheim h i m s e l f s t a t e s , the 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the 
e m p i r i c a l element i s i t s o b j e c t i v i t y , i t s 
independence of the s u b j e c t i v e i n c l i n a t i o n s , 
sentiments or d e s i r e s of the observer. A 
f a c t i s a f a c t whether we l i k e i t or n o t e 
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As he says i t o f f e r s " r e s i s t a n c e " to any 
a l t e r a t i o n on the par t o f the observer, 
A f a c t i s p r e c i s e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the 
c r i t e r i a of e x t e r i o r i t y and c o n s t r a i n t -
i t i s from s c i e n t i f i c methodology that 
these c r i t e r i a have been derived' [ l937as 
Secondly, i t means that the s o c i a l environment i n f l u e n c e s a c t i o n 
8 through the medium of the a c t o r ' s o b j e c t i v e knowledge of i t ' 
s o c i a l f a c t o r , through the medium of men's r a t i o n a l , s c i e n t i f i -
c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e knowledge of t h e i r own m i l i e u s o c i a l a of the 
" s o c i a l r e a l i t y " ' [ l937as36o] . 
T h i s again i s the r a t h e r p e r p l e x i n g step i n Parsons' t h i n k i n g 
noted above i n connection with Pareto and r a d i c a l i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c 
p o s i t i v i s m . He seems c o n s i s t e n t l y to suggest that i n so f a r as 
the a c t o r ' s knowledge i s s c i e n t i f i c then to say that such 
knowledge i s a cause of a c t i o n i s to say that the object of 
that knowledge determines the a c t i o n . Here the same i d e a occurs 
again i n Parsons' comments on Durkheim ' c o l l e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
348], 
[I937as365j 'Action i s thought of as determined by the 
'The phenomena of the e x t e r n a l world are 
n r e f l e c t e d " i n the mind of the s c i e n t i s t i n 
systems of data and concepts. These are h i s 
rt r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " of the e x t e r n a l world. 
Durkheim's famous category of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
i s undoubtedly simply a name f o r the s c i e n t i s t s 
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s u b j e c t i v e experience of the phenomena of 
the e x t e r n a l world s Then according to the 
schema already thoroughly d i s c u s s e d , i n so 
f a r as a c t i o n i s determined by a r a t i o n a l 
process, by the f a c t s of the e x t e r n a l world, 
such as those of h e r e d i t y and environment, 
i t w i l l , as analysed from the s u b j e c t i v e point 
of view, appear as determined by the a c t o r ' s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the e x t e r n a l world, i n 
e x a c t l y the same sense as that i n which Pareto 
spoke of a c t i o n , so f a r as i t i s " l o g i c a l " 
being determined by a "process of reasoning", 
a s c i e n t i f i c theory' 937at 359j » 
However perplexing t h i s might be i t i s c r u c i a l f o r the next two 
pointso For the t h i r d i m p l i c a t i o n of the p o s i t i v i s t i c p o s i t i o n 
i s the model of the a c t o r as s o l e l y a c o g n i t i v e ego„ At 
s e v e r a l p oints Parsons takes i s s u e with Gehlke's a t t r i b u t i o n of 
a ' f a l s e l y r a t i o n a l i s t i c psychology' to Durkheim \\ 937as 36cT/. 
To Parsons t h i s i s not a r a t i o n a l i s t i c psychology but a manifes-
t a t i o n of the 'cognitive b i a s ' \\ 937as36o] of r a d i c a l positivism,, 
'The emphasis on r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i s not the 
r e s u l t of a p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i s m , but 
i s inherent i n the p e c u l i a r s t r u c t u r e of the 
conceptual scheme with which Durkheim i s 
operating. For i t i s b a s i c a l l y a c o g n i t i v e 
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scheme? what i s i m p o r t a n t i s the a c t o r " s 
knowledge o f the s i t u a t i o n o f h i s a c t i o n ' 
ri937as366] . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s c o g n i t i v e scheme i s t h a t t h e p o s i t i v i s t 
° „ o o t h i n k s i n terras o f the p a s s i v e , a d a p t i v e , r e c e p t i v e a t t i t u d e 
embodied i n t h e i d e a l o f an e m p i r i c a l s c i e n t i s t " £l937a.s397j 0 
I t i s i n t h i s c o n t e x t t h a t P a r s o n s makes the f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t s 
'The a t t i t u d e o f the s c i e n t i s t i s e s s e n t i a l y 
t h a t o f t he o b s e r v e r ? he i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h 
g i v e n phenomenao I t i s t r u e t h a t modern 
s c i e n t i f i c methodology h a s become s u f f i c i e n t l y 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d to r e a l i z e t h a t the s c i e n t i s t i s 
more t h a n a p u r e l y p a s s i v e m i r r o r o f the e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d , a p h o t o g r a p h i c p l a t e 0 S c i e n t i f i c 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s i t s e l f a p r o c e s s o f a c t i o n ? 
i t i s t h e p u r s u i t , not o f knowledge i n the 
a b s t r a c t , b ut o f p a r t i c u l a r knowledge o f 
p a r t i c u l a r things„ With r e f e r e n c e to d a t a i t 
i s a s e l e c t i v e p r o c e s s , s e l e c t i o n b e i n g 
d e t e r m i n e d both, a s h a s been s e e n , by t h e 
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e o r e t i c a l s y s t e m s and by e x t r a 
s c i e n t i f i c considerations„ But n e v e r t h e l e s s 
the aim o f s c i e n c e i s t o r e d u c e to a minimum 
the e l e m e n t s w h i c h do not l i e i n the f a c t s 
t h e m s e l v e s o I t s development a p p r o a c h e s an 
asymptote where t h e y a r e e l i m i n a t e d . The 
c o n c e p t o f f a c t , a s i n v o l v i n g c o n s t r a i n t , 
r e s i s t a n c e to e v e r y t h i n g e x c e p t i t s own 
i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e , i s fundamental to science„ 
I n t h i s s e n s e the o r i e n t a t i o n o f the s c i e n t i s t 
i s , i n the n a t u r e o f the c a s e , p a s s i v e ' 
fl937as369] . 
T h i s i s c o n t i n u e d a s t e p f u r t h e r when P a r s o n s , r e f e r r i n g to Durk-
heim's p o s t = p o s i t i v i s t i c s t a g e , s a y s s 
•No l o n g e r i s the a n a l y s i s o f a c t i o n from 
the s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f v i e w i n terms o f an 
e x c l u s i v e l y c o g n i t i v e scheme, t h a t o f 
p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e , a d m i s s a b l e . A whole 
new f i e l d , t h a t o f a t t i t u d e s , emotions 
and the l i k e i s opened up. The ego i s no 
l o n g e r m e r e l y a p h o t o g r a p h i c p l a t e , a r e g i s t r y 
o f f a c t s p e r t a i n i n g to the e x t e r n a l w o r l d 9 
Tl937as388] . 
F i n a l l y , i f the a c t o r i s but an ego, what o f h i s a c t i o n . I t 
c o n s i s t s o f the a c t o r ' s p a s s i v e a d a p t i o n to g i v e n c o n d i t i o n s . 
• A c t i o n becomes m e r e l y a p r o c e s s o f a d a p t i o n 
to a s e t o f c o n d i t i o n s ' f l 937ai36oJ . 
- 275 -
" I n s t e a d o f t h e phenomena o f t h e e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d b e i n g c a p a b l e o f u s e a s means to t h e 
r e a l i z a t i o n o f an end o r , a t w o r s t , l i m i t a t i o n s 
on a c t i o n , t h e y a r e thought o f a s th e d i r e c t 
d e t e r m i n a n t s o f action,. H e n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
from the p o i n t o f vi e w o f t h e a c t o r , t h e 
cat c h w o r d becomes " a d a p t i o n " ' [ l937as37l ] „ 
P a r s o n s r e j e c t i o n o f t h e co n c e p t o f s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s t h e n i s 
ba s e d on a f a r more fundamental r e j e c t i o n o f what he t a k e s to be 
the model o f the a c t o r and c o n c e p t i o n o f a c t i o n i n the p o s i t i v i s t 
t r a d i t i o n . I t h a s been n o t e d t h a t DurMieim's p o s i t i v i s m r e s t s 
on t h e s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f v i e w . Y e t i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s 
t h i s p r o v e s an i m p o s s i b l e p o s i t i o n , Durkheim b r e a k s out o f the 
p o s i t i v i s t mould. From the p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n i t c a n be s e e n 
why t h i s i s s o Q I t i s i m p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e 
a c t o r a s o n l y an o b s e r v e r and p a s s i v e a d a p t o r to t h e e x t e r n a l 
w o r l d . Then t o P a r s o n s i f s u b j e c t i v e c a t e g o r i e s a r e to be 
p r e s e r v e d i t i s n e c e s s a r y to p o s i t t h e a c t o r a s a b e i n g who i s more 
t h a n an o b s e r v e r , t o a c t i s to do more t h a n r e a c t , T h i s i s a t 
r o o t t h e meaning o f P a r s o n s ' dichotomy o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e and 
o b j e c t i v e p o i n t s o f v i e w , M a n i f e s t l y t h i s i s a c o n t r a s t between 
the s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v e r ' s a c c o u n t o f a c t i o n and the meaning o f 
a c t i o n to the p a r t i c i p a n t ( l937as46, l87^j. But i t i s more 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y a c o n t r a s t between two models o f the p a r t i c i p a n t , 
t h e human b e i n g a s o b s e r v e r and a s a c t o r . P a r s o n s ' 
p h r a s e o l o g y a t one p o i n t d e p a r t s from h i s norm and s u g g e s t s j u s t 
t h i s , he s a y s s 
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5 o o o the d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t i v e and 
s u b j e c t i v e i n the s p e c i a l s e n s e s o f "from 
t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f an o u t s i d e observer* 1 1 
and "from the p o i n t o f v i e w o f the p e r s o n 
thought o f a s a c t i n g " 0 //1937as 3457 „ 
I t i s t h e p h r a s e thought o f a s a c t i n g w h i c h i s b e i n g s t r e s s e d 
h e r e D F o r a t h e o r y to adopt the s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f v i e w i t 
must c o n c e i v e o f men a s acting,, n o t i n the s e n s e t h a t men 
a t t r i b u t e meaning to t h e i r a c t i o n s but t h a t men s t r u g g l e to 
a c h i e v e ends and norms w h i c h r e q u i r e w i l l and e f f o r t n o t p a s s i v e 
s u b m i s s i o n t o the f o r c e s o f the b i o - = p h y s i c a l w o r l d 0 The 
p h r a s e 11 the s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f v i e w o f the a c t o r " i s a synonym 
f o r t h e v o l u n t a r i s t i c m e t a p h y s i c o u t l i n e d above. 
k„ Conclusion,, 
A number o f p o i n t s from the above d i s c u s s i o n c a n now be 
brought together,, F i r s t l y , c o n c e p t s w h i c h r e f e r to the a c t o r ' s 
s t a t e o f mind a r e a n a l y t i c a l , t h e y a r e g e n e r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f 
action,, S e c o n d l y , s u c h c o n c e p t s must embody the v o l u n t a r i s t i c 
m e t a p h y s i c w h i c h h a s been found t o l i e a t the h e a r t o f P a r s o n s " 
s t r e s s on t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e a c t o r . T h i r d l y , t h e s e 
c o n c e p t s r e f e r to t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f a c t i o n s y s t e m s and f i n a l l y 
t h e y a r e s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s ; the s t a t e o f mind i s an 
o r d e r l y o r g a n i z a t i o n o f elements„ 
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I f we b e g i n w i t h the most fundamental s u b j e c t i v e e l e m e n t s 
o f a c t i o n ? end and norm, t h e i r v e r y d e f i n i t i o n d i s p l a y s the 
v o l u n t a r i s m o u t l i n e d a b o ve 0 B o t h end and norms a r e d e f i n e d by 
c o n t r a s t t o the s i t u a t i o n c I n d e e d t h i s a p p l i e s v i c e v e r s a s an 
a c t ' 0 0 0 must be i n i t i a t e d i n a " s i t u a t i o n " o f w h i c h the t r e n d s 
o f development d i f f e r i n one o r more r e s p e c t s from t h e s t a t e o f 
a f f a i r s t o w h i c h t h e a c t i o n i s o r i e n t e d , the end" [l 937as „ 
C o n v e r s e l y , a s h a s been n o t e d a l r e a d y , the end r e f e r s to a f u t u r e 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n s o f a r a s i t d i f f e r s from s u c h a s i t u a t i o n a l 
t r e n d o f d e v e l o p m e n t 0 "The c o n c e p t end a l w a y s i m p l i e s a f u t u r e 
r e f e r e n c e , t o a s t a t e w h i c h i s e i t h e r n o t y e t i n e x i s t e n c e , and 
w h i c h would not come i n t o e x i s t e n c e i f something were not done 
about i t by t h e a c t o r o r , i f a l r e a d y e x i s t e n c e , would not r e m a i n 
unchangedo' fl937as45] „ 
S i m i l a r l y w i t h the c o n c e p t o f norms 
0 „ o o i n t h e c h o i c e of a l t e r n a t i v e means to 
the end, i n so f a r a s t h e s i t u a t i o n a l l o w s 
a l t e r n a t i v e s , t h e r e i s a " n o r m a t i v e 
o r i e n t a t i o n " o f action,, W i t h i n t h e a r e a 
o f c o n t r o l o f the a c t o r , the means employed 
c a n n o t , i n g e n e r a l , be c o n c e i v e d e i t h e r a s 
c h o s e n a t random o r a s dependent e x c l u s i v e l y 
on the c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n , but must i n some 
s e n s e be s u b j e c t to the i n f l u e n c e o f an 
i n d e p e n d e n t , d e t e r m i n a t e s e l e c t i v e f a c t o r 0 0 o ' 
[l937as^5] o 
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Note t h a t t h e norm i s a d e t e r m i n a t e f a c t o r , a c a u s a l p r o p e r t y 
o f a c t i o n s . F u r t h e r i t i s by d e f i n i t i o n independent o f t he 
s i t u a t i o n . T h i s c o n v e y s t h e d u a l i s m o f t he n o r m a t i v e and t h e 
c o n d i t i o n a l b ut not t h e i r c o n f l i c t , i n d e e d P a r s o n s s a y s t h a t 
the norm o n l y o p e r a t e s a s an element ' i n so f a r a s the 
s i t u a t i o n a l l o w s a l t e r n a t i v e s 6 . But i f we remember t h a t t h e 
norm d e t e r m i n e s a c t i o n i n t h e s e l e c t i o n o f means to ends w h i c h 
a r e , a s h a s been n o t e d , d i s t i n c t from s i t u a t i o n a l t r e n d s t h e n 
t h i s a s p e c t o f v o l u n t a r i s m soon r e t u r n s . 
I n t h e pages o f The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n P a r s o n s 
b u i l d s o n t h e s e two fundamental s u b j e c t i v e e l e m e n t s i n t h r e e 
ways. The c o n c e p t s o f end and norm a r e e l a b o r a t e d i n t h e 
s e n s e o f b e i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o t y p e s o f end and norm. 
(S e e e s p e c i a l l y \\ 937as 250=64, 698=719] ) . The ends o f a c t i o n 
c a n be e i t h e r immediate o r u l t i m a t e and e a c h o f t h e s e i s sub-
d i v i d e d . W e a l th and power form two c l a s s e s o f immediate 
ends w h i l s t u l t i m a t e ends c a n be e i t h e r e m p i r i c a l o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . 
The c o n c e p t o f norm r e f e r s to the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f means to ends 
but i t c an be e i t h e r i n t r i n s i c , t h e norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y , o r a 
s y m b o l i c means=end r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w h i c h t h e means f u n c t i o n not a s 
a c a u s e o f the end b u t a s an e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e e v a l u a t i v e meaning 
o f t h e end. The norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y i s f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
i n t o t e c h n o l o g i c a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l s u b - e l e m e n t s and a 
s i m i l a r p r o c e s s i s s u g g e s t e d f o r the s y m b o l i c norm. Here r i t u a l , 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l , a r t i s t i c and p l a y f u l e x p r e s s i o n s o f v a l u e s a r e 
mentioned. 
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D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s e l a b o r a t i o n o f the e l e m e n t s 
o f the a c t o r ' s s t a t e o f mind i s none too e x p l i c i t one main 
purpose o f the book seems to be to i d e n t i f y them 0 I n o p e n i ng 
h i s c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r P a r s o n s s a y s 'Above a l l , the main c o n c e r n 
h e r e h a s been w i t h the d e f i n i t i o n o f s t r u c t u r a l e l e m e n t s ' [l937as 
727^ o He c o n t i n u e s ' T h i s h a s n a t u r a l l y i n v o l v e d a g r e a t d e a l 
o f r e f e r e n c e to t h e i r mutual i n t e r r e l a t i o n s ' [l937as727] . 
A l t h o u g h P a r s o n s adds t h a t t h i s q u e s t i o n h a s not been i n v e s t i g a t e d 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y i t c a n be v i e w e d a s t h e second way i n w h i c h P a r s o n s 
d e v e l o p s the fundamental c o n c e p t s d e s c r i b i n g the a c t o r ' s s t a t e o f 
minds T h a t i s , the t a s k i s to i n v e s t i g a t e the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f 
t h e s e e l e m e n t s t o c o n s t i t u t e s t r u c t u r e s o f a c t i o n 0 
F i n a l l y , t h e b a s i c c o n c e p t s o f end and norms a r e p r o p e r t i e s 
o f u n i t a c t s , the d i s c r e t e a c t o f a d i s c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r . 
As was n o t e d i n c h a p t e r I I the e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s 
o c c u r s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f c o n s i d e r i n g t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f more 
complex s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n . T h i s does not mean t h a t the n o t i o n 
o f a s t a t e o f mind r e f e r s to a 'system' o r 'group mind'. 
R a t h e r i t r e f e r s to t h e minds o f a c t o r s a s p e r s o n a l i t i e s and a s 
members o f g r o u p s . Emergent e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n a r e dependent 
upon complexs o f a c t s . 
To c o n c l u d e t h i s s e c t i o n t h e n , t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a c t i o n 
i s c o n t i n u o u s l y and f r e q u e n t l y s t r e s s e d by P a r s o n s . I t i s 
e x p r e s s e d i n terms o f t h e p h r a s e 'the s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t o f v i e w 
o f t h e a c t o r ' . T h i s s u g g e s t s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f s u b j e c t i v i t y 
i n Weberian t e r m s , t h a t i s , i n terms o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e meaning 
o f a c t i o n to t h e a c t o r . However, i t h a s been s u g g e s t e d t h a t 
t h i s s e n s e o f s u b j e c t i v i t y p l a y s a r e l a t i v e l y minor p a r t i n 
P a r s o n s ' t h i n k i n g , on what he c a l l s t h e c o n c r e t e l e v e l o f 
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a p p l i c a t i o n , o f the a c t i o n schema, the purpose o f w h i c h i s 
d e s c r i p t i v e . T h i s i s c o n t r a s t e d w i t h s u b j e c t i v i t y on the 
a n a l y t i c a l , e x p l a n a t o r y l e v e l where the p h r a s e the s u b j e c t i v e 
p o i n t o f v i e w o f the a c t o r h a s an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t meaning. 
T h i s h a s two a s p e c t s . The term s u b j e c t i v e c o n n o t e s the s t a t e 
o f mind o f the a c t o r , a c o n c e p t d e v e l o p e d by c o n t r a s t w i t h 
t h e o r i e s s t r e s s i n g o b j e c t i v e o r s i t u a t i o n a l d e t e r m i n a n t s o f 
human b e h a v i o u r , and u n d e r s t o o d a s a s t r u c t u r e o f c a u s a l 
p r o p e r t i e s . The term a c t o r i s to be u n d e r s t o o d a s e x p r e s s i n g 
P a r s o n s ' v o l u n t a r i s t i c m e t a p h y s i c p a r t i c u l a r i n p o l e m i c a l 
c o n t r a s t to what he u n d e r s t a n d s to be t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c model 
o f man a s o b s e r v e r . The p o i n t o f v i e w o f the a c t o r i s the 
p o i n t o f v i e w o f a t h e o r y p r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t men a r e more t h a n 
o b s e r v e r s , t h a t t h e y a c t i v e l y s t r u g g l e toward ends and norms. 
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n began by s e t t i n g P a r s o n s a p p r o a c h to 
s u b j e c t i v i t y i n the c o n t e x t o f the s c e p t i c i s m a s to the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f a s c i e n c e o f a c t i o n on the p a r t o f t h e i d e a l i s t i c and 
p o s i t i v i s t i c t r a d i t i o n s o f t hought. I t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t 
the two main p l a n k s o f P a r s o n s attempt to b r e a c h t h e gap between 
s c i e n c e and a c t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the problem o f s u b j e c t i v i t y 
were a v o l u n t a r i s t i c m e t a p h y s i c and an a n t i - e m p i r i c i s t , a n a l y t i c a l , 
c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e . What do t h e s e p l a n k s amount to? I n 
v o l u n t a r i s m we have t h e a n t a g o n i s t i c u n i t y o f the i d e a l i s t i c mind 
and t h e p o s i t i v i s t i c body b u t t h i s i s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a n a l y t i c a l 
e l e m e n t s , The p o i n t i s t h a t r a t h e r t h a n the two s i d e s o f t h e 
d u a l i s m c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g two o r d e r s o f c o n c r e t e r e a l i t y t h e y a r e 
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u n d e r s t o o d a s p r o p e r t i e s o f the same r e a l i t y . P a r s o n s a t t e m p t s 
to b r e a k t h r o u g h t h e dichotomy o f man and n a t u r e by t r a n s f o r m i n g 
what were, i n terms o f h i s d i s c u s s i o n , c o n c r e t e t h i n g s , i n t o 
s u c h a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . Y e t the v i c t o r y i s a P y r r h i c one, 
f o r i n t h e p r o c e s s o f b r i n g i n g i t i n t o b e i n g what to the p r e s e n t 
w r i t e r i s the c o r n e r s t o n e o f a s c i e n c e of a c t i o n , the m e a n i n g f u l 
n a t u r e o f a c t i o n (and i n d e e d o f s c i e n c e ) h a s been l o s t s i g h t 
o f . 
C. Normative Determinisms 
1. P r e l i m i n a r i e s 
I n what h a s been s a i d above f r e q u e n t r e f e r e n c e h a s been 
made to norms, ends and knowledge a s ' c a u s e s 0 , ' d e t e r m i n a n t s ' 
o r ' f a c t o r s ' o f a c t i o n . As i n the c a s e o f the n o t i o n o f 
s u b j e c t i v i t y t h e q u e s t i o n o f c a u s a l i t y i s t r a d i t i o n a l l y a v e x e d 
q u e s t i o n i n t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems o f a s c i e n c e o f a c t i o n . 
I n what s e n s e a r e norms o r ends ' c a u s e s ' o f a c t i o n s a s ' e f f e c t s ' ? 
T h i s c o n s t i t u t e s the problem f o r t h i s p a r t o f the d i s c u s s i o n , 
i t w i l l be r e f e r r e d to a s the problem o f " n o r m a t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m " . 
T h i s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d by r a i s i n g a number o f l i n k e d q u e s t i o n s 
and i n v e s t i g a t i n g P a r s o n s ' r e a c t i o n s t o them. I t s h o u l d be 
n o t e d t h a t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a r e t a k e n from P a r s o n s ' t e x t r a t h e r 
t h a n b e i n g imposed by the p r e s e n t a u t h o r . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t f o r what i s c r u c i a l to t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s the way 
t h a t P a r s o n s p o s e s the problems o f n o r m a t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m . T h i s 
g i v e s the f o l l o w i n g pages t h e i r theme. The main c l a i m to be 
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put f o r w a r d i s t h a t P a r s o n s c o n s i s t e n t l y r e g a r d s what c a n be 
c o n s t r u e d a s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems a s s u b s t a n t i v e problems 
w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e t h a t the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a s p e c t o f n o r m a t i v e 
d e t e r m i n i s m i s n o n - p r o b l e m a t i c a l <> 
2„ " N a t u r a l " and " s o c i a l " c a u s a t i o n . 
As a s t a r t i n g p o i n t a t t e n t i o n c a n be drawn t o a 
d i s t i n c t i o n P a r s o n s makes between what he c a l l s ' n a t u r a l i s t i c ' 
and ' s o c i a l ' c a u s a t i o n . T h i s i s employed i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n 
o f the p o s i t i v i s t i c Durkheim where P a r s o n s r e f e r s to ' » o •> the 
t e n d ency o f Durkheim a t t h i s s t a g e to a s s i m i l a t e s o c i a l to 
" n a t u r a l i s t i c " c a u s a t i o n " [i937as375l<> A g a i n when s p e a k i n g 
o f Durkheim b r e a k i n g t hrough the i m p a s s e o f h i s s o c i o l o g i s t i c 
p o s i t i v i s m P a r s o n s s a y s 'The d e c i s i v e s t e p was the d i s t i n c t i o n 
o f s o c i a l c o n s t r a i n t from n a t u r a l i s t i c c a u s a t i o n " Jl937as709j o 
I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n cannot 
be t a k e n v e r y f a r , a s i t i s not e x p l i c i t l y e l a b o r a t e d upon by 
P a r s o n s o However i t c a n s e r v e a s a u s e f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t to 
open up the p r e s e n t f i e l d o f i n q u i r y , , 
T h e r e seems to be two b a s e s f o r t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o f n a t u r a l 
and s o c i a l c a u s a t i o n . They c a n be d i s t i n g u i s h e d a s d i f f e r e n t 
t y p e s o f c a u s e s , n a t u r a l and s o c i a l . Here by n a t u r a l i s meant 
the o b j e c t i v e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f a c t i o n a l r e a d y mentioned, the 
e l e m e n t s o f h e r e d i t y and e n v i r o n m e n t 0 C o n v e r s e l y the term 
s o c i a l i s a synonym f o r s u b j e c t i v e o r n o r m a t i v e c a u s e s 0 But 
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s e c o n d l y the d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and s o c i a l c a u s a t i o n 
i n v o l v e s a f u r t h e r c o n t r a s t w h i c h goes much f u r t h e r t h a n a mere 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f c a u s e s . The d i s t i n c t i o n 
r e s t s r a t h e r on the d i f f e r e n c e i n the c h a r a c t e r o f the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between c a u s e and e f f e c t . I n the s i m p l e s t terms 
n a t u r a l c a u s e s have an "a u t o m a t i c " e f f e c t on a c t i o n , s o c i a l a 
" n o n - a u t o m a t i c 1 e f f e c t . However s u c h a s t a t e m e n t i s too s i m p l e 
and r e q u i r e s immediate q u a l i f i c a t i o n . F i r s t l y , w h i l s t n a t u r a l 
c a u s e s c a n a c t a u t o m a t i c a l l y t h e y c a n be i n v o l v e d i n the non-
a u t o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r i n t h e 
c o n t e x t o f the p l a c e o f the norm o f r a t i o n a l i t y . S e c o n d l y , i t 
i s s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t i n t h e above f o r m u l a t i o n s o c i a l c a u s a t i o n 
i s d e f i n e d r e s i d u a l l y , a s a non-automatic r e l a t i o n s h i p . Q u i t e 
what i t means i n p o s i t i v e terms i s p r o b l e m a t i c a l . 
T h i s l i n k i n g up o f the n a t u r a l and the a u t o m a t i c and the 
s o c i a l w i t h the non-au t o m a t i c h a s a l r e a d y been n o t e d i n t he 
d i s c u s s i o n o f v o l u n t a r i s m . One o f theways i n w h i c h P a r s o n s 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s between h i s v o l u n t a r i s t i c t h e o r y o f a c t i o n and 
i t s p o s i t i v i s t i c / i d e a l i s t i c a n t e c e d e n t s i s t h a t i n d i f f e r e n t ways 
b o t h o f the l a t t e r c o n c e i v e the r e l a t i o n o f norm and a c t i o n a s 
an a u t o m a t i c one. Of the p o s i t i v i s t i c c a s e he s a y s s t h e 
norm i s a mere m a n i f e s t a t i o n , i n the i n d e x s e n s e , o f t he r e a l 
f o r c e s g o v e r n i n g a c t i o n , but h a s no c a u s a l s i g n i f i c a n c e a t a l l . 
A c t i o n i s t h e n an a u t o m a t i c p r o c e s s 
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C o n v e r s e l y f o r the i d e a l i s t ',,, the mere e x i s t e n c e o f 
the norm, t h a t i s , i t s r e c o g n i t i o n by the a c t o r as b i n d i n g , 
i m p l i e s a u t o m a t i c c o n f o r m i t y w i t h i t ' I l 9 3 7 a s 2 5 l ] 0 T h i s 
same c o n t r a s t r e o c c u r s when we come back to the c a s e o f 
Durkheim. P a r s o n s remarks? 'But on a " s o c i a l " l e v e l t h i s 
i m p l i c a t i o n o f the c o n s t r a i n t o f r u l e s a s a c t i n g on the 
i n d i v i d u a l s i m p l y l i k e a p h y s i c a l f o r c e does not seem adequate' 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 3 7 9 ] o The s o u r c e o f t h i s i n a d e q u a c y i s s p e c i f i e d i n 
terms o f the consequence o f v i o l a t i o n o f n a t u r a l and s o c i a l 
c o n s t r a i n t s s u c h a s a r u l e o f h e a l t h and a r u l e o f law 
r e s p e c t i v e l y , , To v i o l a t e a r u l e o f h e a l t h , by r e f r a i n i n g 
from e a t i n g f o r example, i n v o l v e s ' " n a t u r a l " c o n s e q u e n c e s ' , 
'an a u t o m a t i c consequence's ' V i o l a t i o n o f a r u l e o f h e a l t h 
c a r r i e s i t s own consequences a u t o m a t i c a l l y w i t h o u t human 
i n t e r v e n t i o n ' [l937as379]<> 
Now no attempt w i l l be made h e r e to i n q u i r e i n t o t h e d e t a i l s 
o f t h e term ' a u t o m a t i c ' and i t s o p p o s i t e 0 R a t h e r t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s b e s t r e g a r d e d a s a form o f imagery w h i c h s e t s 
the d i r e c t i o n i n terms o f w h i c h P a r s o n s c o n s t r u e s the problems 
o f n o r m a t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m . The r e l a t i o n o f c a u s e and e f f e c t i n 
the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s i s an i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p , some m e d i a t i n g 
l i n k between c a u s e and e f f e c t must be i n t r o d u c e d ( 1 0 ) , T h i s i s 
not e x a c t l y s t a t e d by P a r s o n s but h i s r e f e r e n c e s to t h e a u t o m a t i c 
n o n - a u t o m a t i c c o n t r a s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g n a t u r a l and s o c i a l 
c a u s a t i o n p e r m i t t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . From t h e e a r l i e r 
d i s c u s s i o n i t w i l l be remembered t h a t P a r s o n s ' p r e o c c u p a t i o n i s 
w i t h a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n , t h e s e a r e the c a u s a l f a c t o r s 
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r e l e v a n t to t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , , The i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e n 
i s between s u c h g e n e r a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a c t i o n s y s t e m s and the 
a c t u a l a c t i o n s o f human b e i n g s i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h e a c h o t h e r 0 
The q u e s t i o n t h e n i s what i s the m e d i a t i n g l i n k between c a u s e s 
on t h e a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l and the a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r t h a t i s t h e 
e f f e c t o f s u c h c a u s e s ? I n the c o n t e x t o f t he above d i s c u s s i o n 
o f Durkheim P a r s o n s s a y s ' .. 0 i t i s p r e c i s e l y the f a c t t h a t i t 
i s an e x p r e s s i o n o f human w i l l t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s s o c i a l from 
n a t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t " fl937as38o] . T h i s w i l l be examined 
f u r t h e r below. At the moment what i s r e l e v a n t i s t h a t i t 
ca n be i n t e r p r e t e d to mean t h a t between the a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s 
w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e s t a t e o f mind and f u n c t i o n a s c a u s a l f a c t o r s 
i n P a r s o n s " t h e o r y and the a c t u a l a c t i o n he p l a c e s t h e a c t o r i n 
a c o n c r e t e s e n s e , p u r s u i n g h i s more o r l e s s c o n s c i o u s ends by 
r e f e r e n c e t o more o r l e s s e x p l i c i t r u l e s . So when d i s c u s s i n g 
t h e problems o f n o r m a t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m the p o i n t o f r e f e r e n c e i s 
t h e c o n c r e t e a c t o r and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p to m e a n i n g f u l norms, 
ends and knowledge. B u t , t h i s must be put i n t o t h e above c o n t e x t , 
the c o n c r e t e and t h e m e a n i n g f u l a s m e d i a t i n g l i n k s i n t h e 
c a u s a t i o n o f a c t i o n by a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . 
I t s h o u l d be s t a t e d t h a t the above p a r a g r a p h i s l a r g e l y 
i n t e r p r e t a t i v e on t h e p r e s e n t w r i t e r ' s p a r t and cannot be 
d i r e c t l y c o n f i r m e d by r e f e r e n c e to P a r s o n s ' t e x t . However i t 
i s hoped t h a t the subsequent d i s c u s s i o n w i l l s e r v e to j u s t i f y 
t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n an i n d i r e c t way. 
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3 o C a u s a l and m e a n i n g f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 0 
So f a r t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f n o r m a t i v e d e t e r m i n i s m h a s been 
c o n f i n e d to i n t r o d u c t o r y s u g g e s t i o n s to g i v e some d i r e c t i o n to 
more s p e c i f i c and p o s i t i v e p o i n t s o f argument„ The f i r s t s u c h 
t o p i c i s whether t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a norm o r end and an 
a c t u a l c o u r s e o f a c t i o n i s a " c a u s a l " o r "meaningful" r e l a t i o n -
s h i p 0 The q u e s t i o n w h i c h i s o f t e n r a i s e d i s w h e t h e r the 
norm-act i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p i s one o f c a u s e and e f f e c t 0 Doubt 
h a s been c a s t on t h i s on s u c h grounds a s t he t e l e o l o g i c a l s t a t u s 
o f the norm a s compared to t he l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y o f a c a u s e 
b e i n g a n t e c e d e n t to the e f f e c t , t h e absence o f c o n s t a n t 
c o n t i n g e n c y between norm and a c t i o n w h i c h f u r t h e r l e a d s to 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n subsuming t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p u n d e r a u n i v e r s a l law 
On the b a s i s o f s u c h arguments an a l t e r n a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
sometimes c a l l e d t h e m e a n i n g f u l i s s a i d to h o l d between norm 
and action,, I t i s p e r t i n a n t to note h e r e t h a t t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s on the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p l a n e , i t i n v o l v e s 
q u e s t i o n s w h i c h r e l a t e to t h e l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g 
m a t t e r s o f e m p i r i c a l ^ r e s e a r c h 0 
P a r s o n s r e c o g n i s e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n a s a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
q u e s t i o n i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f i d e a l i s m [1937a?481~6j 0 I n h i s 
p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e d u a l i t y o f c a u s a l i t y and meaning r o o t s i n t h e 
K a n t i a n d u a l i s m o f two ' o r d e r s o f r e a l i t y " , t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d o f 
phenomena and the i d e a l w o r l d o f noumena [i 937as 481 ~4J o The 
the main body o f t h e s e remarks„ We c a n now move on to t a k e up 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m grows out o f t h i s o n t o l o g y s [I937as484=5j 
P a r s o n s ' remarks a r e summarised when he s a y s s 
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" P o s i t i v i s t i c thought h a s a l w a y s d i r e c t e d 
i t s e f f o r t s to the u n c o v e r i n g o f i n t r i n s i c 
c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n t he phenomenal 
i d e a l i s t i c thought to the d i s c o v e r y o f 
r e l a t i o n s o f meanings o f Sinnzusammenhang„ 
With t h i s d i f f e r e n c e h a s gone t h a t o f 
method - on the one hand, c a u s a l t h e o r e t i c a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n , on the o t h e r , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
meaning, S i n n d e n t u n g Q w h i c h h a s s e e n i n the 
c o n c r e t e f a c t s o f i t s f i e l d symbols, t h e 
meanings o f w h i c h a r e to be i n t e r p r e t e d , , 
The o r d e r and system o f s o c i a l phenomena h a s 
been a m e a n i n g f u l , n o t a c a u s a l o r d e r a t a l l 0 
[I937as486] o 
So h e r e P a r s o n s r e f e r s to the problem i n m e t h o d o l o g i c a l t e r m s , 
i s t h e r e l a t i o n o f norm and a c t i o n one o f c a u s e and e f f e c t o r one 
o f meaning and symbol? However, i n the body o f The S t r u c t u r e o f 
S o c i a l A c t i o n the problem i s t r a n s f o r m e d q u i t e d r a m a t i c a l l y , , 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between c a u s e and e f f e c t and meaning-symbol r e l a -
t i o n s i s n o t , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e a t l e a s t , a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l 
q u e s t i o n but a m a t t e r o f two t y p e s o f n o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n 
employed by a c t o r s i n t h e s e l e c t i o n o f means to ends. I n o t h e r 
words t h e d u a l i s m i s c o n v e r t e d into an e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l 
question,, I t i s e m p i r i c a l i n the s e n s e t h a t i t r e f e r s to two 
t y p e s o f norms employed by a c t o r s but i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l i n t h a t 
t h e s e two t y p e s a r e u n d e r s t o o d by P a r s o n s a s a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s 
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o f a c t i o n . The l a t t e r p o i n t s h o u l d be borne i n mind throughout 
t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . 
The p r i n c i p a l o f c a u s a l i t y i s embodied i n what P a r s o n s 
c a l l s t h e norm o f i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y . The c o n c e p t o f 
r a t i o n a l i t y i s employed s o l e l y a s a norms a s t a n d a r d o r 
c r i t e r i o n o f t h e s e l e c t i o n o f means to ends. Then? 
" A c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l i n s o f a r a s i t p u r s u e s 
ends p o s s i b l e w i t h i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t he 
s i t u a t i o n , and by means whic h , among t h o s e 
a v a i l a b l e to t h e a c t o r , a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y 
b e s t adapted to t h e end f o r r e a s o n s u n d e r-
s t a n d a b l e and v e r i f i a b l e by p o s i t i v e 
e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e 8 [1937as58j. 
To a t t a i n an end means a r e s e l e c t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r 
a d a p t i v e n e s s o r e f f i c i e n c y . The c r i t e r i o n o f s u c h e f f i c i e n c y 
i s w h e t h e r the means a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y l i n k e d to t h e end i n 
s c i e n t i f i c t e r m s . T h a t i s , w h e t h e r to a c t i n a g i v e n way w i l l 
c a u s e a g i v e n e f f e c t , the end to be a t t a i n e d s 9,„„ t he means-
end r e l a t i o n s h i p i s i n t r i n s i c , ... t he means w i l l b r i n g about 
the end by p r o c e s s e s o f s c i e n t i f i c a l l y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e c a u s a t i o n 8 
[1937as430] ( S e e a l s o [ l937as211, 7 9 9 1 ) . 
I n many ways t h e meaning-symbol r e l a t i o n s h i p i s d e f i n e d 
r e s i d u a l l y , a t one p o i n t P a r s o n s n o t e s t h a t t h e r e may w e l l be 
a number o f s u b - t y p e s [l937as258] . The c e n t r a l p o i n t h e r e i s 
t h a t t h e norm does not embody i n t r i n s i c , c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
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between the course of a c t i o n and the end to be attained,, So 
at a number of points Parsons c o n t r a s t s the two norms i n these 
termss 
"The term, the "symbolic means-end 
r e l a t i o n s h i p " w i l l be used wherever the 
r e l a t i o n of means and ends can c o n v i n c i n g l y 
be i n t e r p r e t e d by the observer as i n v o l v i n g 
a standard of s e l e c t i o n of means according 
to "symbolic appropriateness", that i s , a 
standard of the order of symbol and meaning, 
not of cause and e f f e c t 0 [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 5 8 ] 0 
The i d e a of meaningful r e l a t i o n s h i p s then becomes a second type 
of norm by re f e r e n c e to which means are s e l e c t e d to a t t a i n ends 0 
I n t h i s case the r e l a t i o n i s not between the a c t i o n (the 
employment of means) as causing the end as effect„ Rather 
the a c t i o n symbolizes the meaning of the end to be a t t a i n e d . 
To perform a given r i t u a l i s an appropriate symbol of the 
r e l i g i o u s end, worshipping God Q The r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not one 
of c a u s a l e f f i c a c y , indeed i t i s a r b i t r a r y from t h i s point of 
view, but of conventional a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s 0 [ I 9 3 7 a s 2 5 8 , kl6~]0 
Here then i s the c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n of the dualism of c a u s a l 
and meaningful r e l a t i o n s h i p s but incorporated i n t o a d i s t i n c t l y 
non=methodological c o n t e x t 0 The question i s not whether the 
student of a c t i o n should or can employ causal/meaningful r e l a t i o n s 
i n h i s account o f a c t i o n but whether the a c t o r can be regarded 
as employing c a u s a l or meaningful standards i n h i s a c t i o n c 
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As such the methodological problem of whether or not norms or 
ends cause a c t i o n seems to have been lo s t o However t h i s i s not 
j u s t a matter of ommission, r a t h e r Parsons" a t t e n t i o n i s focused 
on a d i f f e r e n t methodological problem which a r i s e s out of h i s 
own a n a l y t i c a l approach and i s perhaps somewhat i d i o s y n c r a t i c 
to i t o 
ka Norms as "mediating l i n k s ' 
To understand t h i s we must f i r s t l y r e f e r back to the i d e a 
of a non=automatic, i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between cause and 
e f f e c t which was mentioned above„ T h i s r e l a t i o n holds between 
a n a l y t i c a l elements of a c t i o n and a c t u a l actions,, The norms 
of r a t i o n a l i t y and symbolic appropriateness are such elements of 
action,, However Parsons appears to draw a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
these two norms and what he r e f e r s to as the u l t i m a t e v a l u e s and 
conditions as c a u s a l elements of a c t i o n . Then, s t i l l on the 
l e v e l of a n a l y t i c a l elements, the norms of r a t i o n a l i t y and 
symbolic appropriateness c o n s t i t u t e two mechanisms by which 
e m p i r i c a l and non=empirical r e a l i t i e s , u l t i m a t e c o n ditions and 
v a l u e s , are r e l a t e d to, that i s , cause, action,, The methodo~ 
l o g i c a l problem then, as Parsons sees i t , i s not whether norms 
are c a u s a l l y or meaningfully r e l a t e d to a c t i o n but the r o l e of 
norms i n forming a 'mediating l i n k " (my term) between u l t i m a t e 
e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s and u l t i m a t e non-empirical v a l u e s and 
action,, T h i s i s what the next few pages seek to establish,, 
The major sources i n The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l Action of the 
f o l l o w i n g argument are the s e c t i o n of chapter s i x e n t i t l e d 
"The n o n - l o g i c a l aspect of s o c i a l systems' and the s e c t i o n of 
chapter eleven e n t i t l e d " R e l i g i o u s ideas"„ 
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To begin with the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the e m p i r i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n s of a c t i o n and the a c t i o n i t s e l f £l 937as 2 5 2 - 4 ] „ 
As has already been mentioned the conditions of a c t i o n are 
c o n s t i t u t e d by the b i o - p h y s i c a l world of h e r e d i t y and environ-
ment 0 Parsons o u t l i n e s two ways i n which these elements are 
r e l a t e d to a c t i o n c The two are d i s c r i m i n a t e d according to 
whether or not the a c t o r 'takes account' of the c o n d i t i o n a l 
world i n a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y c o r r e c t manner„ I n the f i r s t p lace 
the a c t o r does not f u l f i l l t h i s c o n dition, he e i t h e r f a i l s 
e n t i r e l y to take account of the conditions of h i s a c t i o n or h i s 
understanding i s d e f i c i e n t i n s c i e n t i f i c terms„ Thus Parsons 
r e f e r s to t h i s type of c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e as " „ o o the r o l e of 
d r i v e s to which the s u b j e c t i v e aspect of a c t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t o 
at most important as a secondary m a n i f e s t a t i o n ' f l 9 3 7 a ? 2 5 3 j ° 
The example given i s the e f f e c t s of a i r - p r e s s u r e changes on the 
bodies of men working under high pressure c o n d i t i o n s 0 I f the 
change i n pressure i s too r a p i d the p a i n f u l , sometimes f a t a l , 
c o n d i t i o n known as 'the bends' \ i r i l l result,, I f t h i s i s indeed 
the r e s u l t then i t can be assumed that the b i o - p h y s i c a l world 
had a d i r e c t e f f e c t on a c t i o n , e i t h e r the a c t o r was ignorant 
of the e f f e c t s of a i r - p r e s s u r e changes on the human body or 
h i s understanding was i n e r r o r Q I n the l a t t e r case the a c t o r ' 
understanding of the b i o - p h y s i c a l world cannot c o n s t i t u t e a 
medium through which that world i n f l u e n c e d h i s a c t i o n . 
However i f the a c t o r takes account of h i s conditions i n a 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e way then t h i s forms the second mode 
of i n f l u e n c e of c o n d i t i o n s on action,, The f o l l o w i n g example 
i s givens 
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'The f i r s t type of i n f l u e n c e i s s u f f i c i e n t l y 
e xemplified i n the way i n which a mountain 
climber adapts h i m s e l f to the nature of the 
t e r r a i n he i s t r a v e r s i n g at the time,, He 
w i l l go at a d i f f e r e n t g a i t according to 
the grade, the more s t e e p l y i t goes up, 
i n general, the more slowly he w i l l go| 
he w i l l use d i f f e r e n t techniques and take 
d i f f e r e n t precautions according to whether 
he i s on rocks or on snow and i c e c I t i s 
not maintained that no other f a c t o r s are 
involved, f o r i n s t a n c e i n slowing up on a 
steep grade the automatic p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
e f f e c t of the g r e a t e r s t r a i n put on the 
h e a r t , lungs and muscles i s involved, but 
i n a d d i t i o n to t h i s there i s , as s t a t e d i n 
terms of the a c t i o n schema, a process of 
t a k i n g account of the f a c t s of the 
s i t u a t i o n 8 3 [ l 9 3 7 a g 2 5 3]o 
I t should be remembered that we are here concerned with the 
c a u s a t i o n of a c t i o n by i t s e m p i r i c a l conditions,, I n t h i s 
mode of causation, however, the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y comes into 
p l a y 0 For t h i s i s what a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e t a k i n g 
account of the f a c t s amounts t o D Now here we have the 
s i t u a t i o n which has been mentioned a number of times i n the 
above d i s c u s s i o n , the conditions of a c t i o n and the a c t o r ' s 
knowledge of those conditions« I t might be thought that there 
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are two d i f f e r e n t types of c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e but as has been 
noted Parsons c o n s i s t e n t l y t r e a t s the two as interchangeable, 
amounting to one form of c a u s a t i o n . T h i s i s d e s p i t e the f a c t 
that the a c t o r ' s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge makes a d i f f e r e n c e to the 
course the a c t i o n would have taken had the a c t o r not had such 
knowledge, [l 937as 25^3 a f a c t which j u s t i f i e s the two modes of 
c a u s a t i o n by the b i o - p h y s i c a l world. T h i s i s because of the 
s t a t u s of the a c t o r ' s knowledge i n the case i n hand D I t stands 
as a c o r r e c t account of the given f a c t s of the e x t e r n a l world, a 
r e f l e c t i o n of that worldo 
'Their [ h e r e d i t y and environmentj e f f e c t s may, 
of course, be studied from the o b j e c t i v e point 
of view, but they are a l s o r e l e v a n t to the 
s u b j e c t i v e point of view. Here, however, 
they may, i n one r e l a t i o n appear as 
" r e f l e c t i o n s " of an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , as 
" f a c t s " of the e x t e r n a l world i n so f a r 
as the s u b j e c t i v e aspect i s considered as 
a "theory"o To the a c t o r they are "given", 
they are independent of h i s s u b j e c t i v e 
"sentiments"„ T h i s independence, on 
which a l l methodologists of p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e 
have l a i d s t r e s s , becomes, i n the context of 
a c t i o n , " r e s i s t e n c e " to the " a r b i t r a r y " w i l l 
of the a c t o r . Th®y are things he must take 
account of as n e c e s s a r y conditions of h i s 
a c t i o n ' f l 9 3 7 a s 2 5 2 ] 0 
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The consequence of such knowledge f o r a c t i o n has been d i s c u s s e d 
above under the heading of the p o s i t i v i s t i c model of the a c t o r , 
the a c t o r p a s s i v e l y adapts to the r e a l i t i e s of life» So 
r a t h e r than knowledge forming an independent c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e the 
p o s s e s s i o n of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of the b i o = p h y s i c a l world 
i n i t s e l f only r e i n f o r c e s the c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e of that world on 
action,, I t i s i n t h i s way then that the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y 
c o n s t i t u t e s a mediating l i n k between the conditions of a c t i o n 
and a c t i o n i t s e l f o 
We w i l l now t u r n to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between u l t i m a t e 
v a l u e s and action,. At v a r i o u s p o i n t s Parsons r e f e r s to the 
i d e a of "ultimate value a t t i t u d e s " d e s c r i b i n g them i n terms of 
t h e i r vagueness, indeterminacy, i m p r e c i s i o n and breadth f l 9 3 7 a s 
2 5 5 , 4 5 * ] . These terms apply to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of value 
a t t i t u d e s but u n f o r t u n a t e l y they a l s o apply to Parsons' concept 
as w e l l 0 We w i l l r e t u r n to the q u a l i t i e s of vagueness e t c , 
i n a moment, but f i r s t the concept i t s e l f must be c l a r i f i e d , , 
T h i s can be done by r e f e r r i n g to Parsons' d i s c u s s i o n of Durkheim's 
approach to r e l i g i o u s ideas because to Parsons 'The fundamental 
s o c i o l o g i c a l importance of r e l i g i o u s ideas l i e s i n the f a c t that 
i t i s p r i m a r i l y i n them that the i n t e l l e c t u a l formulation, p a r t l y 
determinant, p a r t expression, of the c o g n i t i v e b a s i s of common 
ultimate=value a t t i t u d e s i s to be found' [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 2 6 3 „ Crudely 
then, i n s o c i e t y r e l i g i o u s ideas f u n c t i o n to i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
formulate u l t i m a t e value a t t i t u d e s , which i s the task h e r e 0 
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The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g q u a l i t y of r e l i g i o n i s that i t "has 
to do with sacred things" and i t i s the q u a l i t y of sacredness 
which Parsons makes the focus of h i s d i s c u s s i o n . Part of 
Durkheim"s c r i t i q u e of a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s of r e l i g i o n r e s t e d 
on t h e i r f a i l u r e to account f o r the sacred c h a r a c t e r of 
r e l i g i o u s o b j e c t s 0 These t h e o r i e s attempted to e x p l a i n r e l i g i o u s 
ideas i n terms of the i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t i e s of sacred o b j e c t s . 
T h i s was ver y much the root of t h e i r f a i l u r e , f o r the source 
of sacredness l i e s outside the object i t s e l f . The object i s 
to be regarded as a symbol of something e l s e , the q u a l i t y of 
sacredness d e r i v e s from the thing symbolised. Then the 
problem of sacredness becomes a problem of l o c a t i n g "the other 
term of the symbolic r e l a t i o n s h i p " £l 937as 41 6] , Durkheim's 
answer to t h i s problem i s , of course, that i t i s s o c i e t y which 
i s symbolised i n r e l i g i o u s i d e a s 0 However to Parsons i t i s here 
that the c r u c i a l point of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r i s e s 0 I s Durkheim 
working i n terms of a p o s i t i v i s t i c conception of action? I f 
t h i s i s the case then i f r e l i g i o u s ideas are not merely i l l u s i o n s , 
which Durkheim i n s i s t s they are not, then they must be idea s 
about, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of, an e m p i r i c a l r e a l i t y , As such 
they r e f e r to aspects of experience capable of observation and 
a n a l y s i s i n terms of s c i e n c e , Whilst Parsons admits that t h i s 
i s one strand i n Durkheim"s argument he i n s i s t s that t h i s i s a 
s u r v i v a l of a mode of thought which Durkheim has transcended. 
The a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n put forward by Parsons i s that 
r e l i g i o u s ideas r e f e r to ",,, aspects of " r e a l i t y ' " s i g n i f i c a n t 
to human l i f e and experience, yet outside the range of s c i e n t i f i c 
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observation and a n a l y s i s ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 4 2 l ] „ That i s 9 to non-
e m p i r i c a l aspects of ' r e a l i t y ' e 
' I t w i l l be noted that the " r e a l i t y " 
which would then c o n s t i t u t e the symbolic 
reference of r e l i g i o u s ideas has been 
defined only n e g a t i v e l y , as a r e s i d u a l 
category. I t i s non-empirical,, o o s . 
A l l that i s re q u i r e d p o s i t i v e l y i s 
the p r o p o s i t i o n that the s i t u a t i o n of man 
as a c t o r i s such that o r i e n t a t i o n to the 
non-empirical aspects of the u n i v e r s e , 
of h i s l i f e and experience i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
I t cannot be l a i d aside as an "unknowable" 
and "forgotten" [i 937as 422] „ 
T h i s then i s the f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of v a l u e - a t t i t u d e s , they 
are a t t i t u d e s towards, b e l i e f s about, non-empirical e n t i t i e s . 
The second i s that they are ' a c t i v e ' a t t i t u d e s , so that 
Parsons d e f i n e s r e l i g i o u s i d e a s as 
'a 9 . those i d e a s men hold r e l a t i v e to 
aspects of t h e i r l i f e and environment 
which are to them unknown and thought 
to be unknowable by the ordinary 
procedures o f p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e or 
the corresponding common-sense empiricism, 
and toward which they are under the 
n e c e s s i t y o f ta k i n g up an a c t i v e a t t i t u d e ' 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 4 2 4 ] . 
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Parsons does not say much about the " a c t i v e a t t i t u d e ' other 
than d e s c r i b i n g i t as 'the impulse to "do something"' [ l 9 3 7 a s 
4 3 2 ]. 'These a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s imply the n e c e s s i t y of "doing 
something" about the s i t u a t i o n i n which they occur' ( l 9 3 7 a s 
^31-2 ] o However from these b r i e f remarks i t would seem that 
value a t t i t u d e s c o n s t i t u t e the source, the 'springs to a c t i o n 8 
of Parsons' v o l u n t a r i s t i c model of man0 
F i n a l l y , as was mentioned e a r l i e r value a t t i t u d e s are 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 'vague and i n d e t e r m i n a t e 8 0 T h i s then 
forms t h e i r t h i r d f e ature which must be elaborated on a 
l i t t l e o Value a t t i t u d e s are vague and indeterminate because 
they c o n s t i t u t e the source of p l u r a l i t i e s of ends and norms, of 
d i f f e r e n t types and of d i f f e r e n t men, They form the 
'nucleus' [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 6 7 ] of the whole complex of normative 
elements. As such i m p r e c i s i o n i s a c o n s t i t u e n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . 
But as a consequence they do not bear a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n to 
a c t i o n , t h i s would be the i d e a l i s t ' s 'emanation' of v a l u e s . 
Rather value a t t i t u d e s are 'expressed' [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 6 0 , 2 7 l ) or 
'manifested' [ l 937as297] i n the u l t i m a t e ends and norms of 
a c t i o n . T h i s b r i n g s the d i s c u s s i o n back to i t s main thread, 
the r o l e of the two norms, of r a t i o n a l i t y and symbolic 
appropriateness, i n mediating between value a t t i t u d e s and 
a c t i o n i t s e l f . 
A norm, i t w i l l be remembered, forms the l i n k between 
means and ends i n that i t r e p r e s e n t s a standard by which 
a l t e r n a t i v e means to ends are evaluated and s e l e c t e d . I n the 
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case of the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y t h i s standard i s the e f f i c a c y of 
means as causes of ends as e f f e c t s . Now the end of a c t i o n may 
be intermediate or u l t i m a t e , that i s , e i i h e r i t may be a l i n k 
i n a ch a i n of means and ends, to a t t a i n an end i s to provide 
means to a t t a i n a f u r t h e r end or an end can represent the 
terminus of such a chain, i t i s not s i g n i f i c a n t as a f u r t h e r 
means but as d e s i r a b l e i n i t s e l f . However, t h i s q u a l i t y of 
u l t i m a t e ends, that they are d e s i r a b l e , cannot be derived from 
the e m p i r i c a l world of means and co n d i t i o n s , An u l t i m a t e end 
i s a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of value a t t i t u d e s , t h e i r s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
as a future s t a t e of a f f a i r s to be attained,, The f a c t that 
an u l t i m a t e end stands at the terminus of a chain of means and 
ends l i n k e d by t h e i r i n t r i n s i c c a u s a l connections a l t e r s the 
whole complexity of the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y as so f a r discussed„ 
The norm of r a t i o n a l i t y i s s t i l l , of course, a medium between 
co n d i t i o n s and a c t i o n , but now, r a t h e r than a c t i o n being a 
p a s s i v e adaption to the world i t becomes the a c t i v e adaption of 
cond i t i o n s to ul t i m a t e ends,, Then as Parsons n e a t l y expresses 
the matter at one point 0 „ „ 0 these a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are ,,„ 
or i e n t e d "backwards" over the i n t r i n s i c means-end chain 0,„* 
£ l 9 3 7 a s 4 3 3 ] » The norm of r a t i o n a l i t y i s not only a medium 
by which e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n f l u e n c e a c t i o n but a l s o an 
expre s s i o n of a c t i v e value a t t i t u d e s . 
For the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y to apply, however, the 
u l t i m a t e end must be an " e m p i r i c a l ' end. That i s , f o r the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of means and ends to be understandable as a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of cause and e f f e c t the end must be an e m p i r i c a l l y 
observable s t a t e of a f f a i r s . But u l t i m a t e ends may be 
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' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 0 , that i s a future s t a t e of a f f a i r s not capable 
of e m p i r i c a l observation, Parsons example i s ' e t e r n a l s a l v a t i o n 
f l 9 3 7 a s 2 5 7 l o Here as the r e l a t i o n of means and ends i s not 
capable of v e r i f i c a t i o n i n s c i e n t i f i c terms the norm of 
r a t i o n a l i t y i s i n a p p l i c a b l e . The a l t e r n a t i v e i s the norm of 
symbolic a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s 0 Means are s e l e c t e d to a t t a i n a 
transcendental end by r e f e r e n c e to a c r i t e r i o n other than 
t h e i r c a u s a l e f f i c a c y , r a t h e r , i n terms of c e r t a i n conventions, 
the means adopted are appropriate symbols of the transcendental 
end 0 The question i s the grounds f o r 'appropriateness' i n the 
case of r e l i g i o u s r i t u a l , the source of 'sacredness' 0 To 
Parsons the transcendental ends and the norm of symbolic 
appropriateness are expressions of value a t t i t u d e s which provid 
the r a t i o n a l e and j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r 'appropriateness' 0 
' I n these terms, then, i t may be s a i d 
that a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g transcendental ends 
and r i t u a l may be regarded f o r c e r t a i n purposes 
as "expressions" o o of u l t i m a t e value attitudes,, 
That i s , t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the c a u s a t i v e f a c t o r 
i s as a symbolic mode of expression.„„ 0' / l 9 3 7 a s 
259] o 
Note here that the u l t i m a t e value a t t i t u d e s are des c r i b e d as 
'the c a u s a t i v e f a c t o r ' . The norm of symbolic appropriateness 
again c o n s t i t u t e a medium between the non-empirical world of 
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v a l u e - a t t i t u d e s and the a c t i o n i t s e l f . 
The above d i s c u s s i o n can be s e t i n terms of the 
p o s i t i v i s m - i d e a l i s m dichotomy which, as was noted above, 
provides the context out of which Parsons r a i s e s the d u a l i t y 
of c a u s a l and meaningful relationships„ To the r a d i c a l p o s i -
t i v i s t the e m p i r i c a l , b i o - p h y s i c a l world 'causes" a c t i o n , to 
the r a d i c a l i d e a l i s t a c t i o n i s a symbolic "emanation" of 
value a t t i t u d e s . Parsons i s d i s s a t i s f i e d w i th both these 
formulations, i n essence he makes the r e l a t i o n of the two 
orders of r e a l i t y to a c t i o n an i n d i r e c t one, mediated by 
norms. T h i s then a l t e r s the methodological probl em e n t i r e l y . 
Cause and meaning form two types of mediating l i n k between 
the b i o p h y s i c a l world/the world of value a t t i t u d e s and a c t i o n , 
" I t has alre a d y appeared i n the course of the 
present a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n that at l e a s t two 
modes of r e l a t i o n of " i d e a l " elements to the 
s p a t i a l and temporal aspects of experience 
are s i g n i f i c a n t to a c t i o n , whatever others 
f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s might d i s c l o s e . Normative 
elements may, that i s , be r e l a t e d to a c t i o n and 
thought, f i r s t , i n an i n t r i n s i c context and, 
secondly as one term of a symbolic r e l a t i o n " 
| / 1937as483j , 
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To conclude t h i s present phase of the d i s c u s s i o n i t i s 
important to note that the two types of norms are, l i k e 
u l t i m a t e v a l u e s and c o n d i t i o n s , a n a l y t i c a l elements of a c t i o n D 
So f a r then the d i s c u s s i o n has been on the a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l , 
w i t h i n the s t r u c t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of elements, we have yet 
to take up how such a n a l y t i c a l concepts of norms 'cause' 
action,, 
5 o The problem of 'manifestation' 
The l a t t e r problem can be taken up i n the context of a 
d i s c u s s i o n of the term ' m a n i f e s t a t i o n ' 0 T h i s has a l r e a d y been 
mentioned, the norms of r a t i o n a l i t y and symbolic appropriateness 
as manifesting u l t i m a t e condit i o n s and values„ I n t h i s sense 
the problem l i e s i n the s t r u c t u r e of the a c t o r ' s s t a t e of mind 
or o r i e n t a t i o n system, a n a l y t i c a l l y conceived. T h i s i s not 
the sense of m a n i f e s t a t i o n which i s of relevance nowD Rather 
we are now concerned with the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a n a l y t i c a l elements 
i n the a c t o r ' s concrete ends, norms and knowledge 0 I t w i l l be 
remembered that the l a t t e r are more or l e s s meaningful to the 
a c t o r as a purposive, reasoning, s e l f = c o n s c i o u s beingo The 
problem theflis how f a r and i n what sense norms, ends and 
knowledge which are meaningful to the a c t o r can be s a i d to be 
'manifestations' of a n a l y t i c a l , c a u s a l , elements of a c t i o n . 
T h i s i s most e x p l i c i t l y d i s c u s s e d by Parsons on pages 269=273 
of The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l Action., Here he i s concerned 
with the r e l a t i o n of n o n = s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s to a c t i o n £ l 9 3 7 a s 2 6 9 j 
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Two p o i n t s are c l e a r throughout the argument. F i r s t l y , the 
t h e o r i e s i n question are the a c t o r ' s t h e o r i e s but secondly the 
c a u s a l problem l i e s i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of a n a l y t i c a l elements, 
the ' r e a l determinant f o r c e s ' [l 937as 270] , and overt a c t i o n . 
T h i s ' i s a h i g h l y complex problem' on two counts. F i r s t l y , 
the term m a n i f e s t a t i o n has two meanings? the a c t o r ' s theory can 
manifest a c a u s a l element e i t h e r as an 'index' or as an 'adequate 
expression', Secondly the c a u s a l elements involved can be 
e i t h e r the e x t e r n a l world of h e r e d i t y and environment or the 
s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e of mind of the a c t o r . 
We w i l l begin with the cases where the a c t o r ' s theory 
manifests c a u s a l elements i n the sense of standing as an 
index of those elements. I n the f i r s t case the elements 
manifested are the o b j e c t i v e elements of h e r e d i t y and environ-
ment. Here the a c t o r ' s theory i s an i n a c c u r a t e account of the 
e x t e r n a l world, i t i n v o l v e s 'erroneous observation of f a c t and 
s o p h i s t i c reasoning from the observation' [ l 9 3 7 a s 2 7 0 j o The 
question here i s what i s the relevance of such t h e o r i e s to the 
c a u s a t i o n of action? Parsons says: 
' I n so f a r as the n o n - l o g i c a l i t y of a theory 
i s of t h i s c h a r a c t e r the tendency i s , as has 
been seen, to regard i t s meaningful aspect as 
i r r e l e v a n t and to i n t e r p r e t the theory i t s e l f as 
a " m a n i f e s t a t i o n " i n the sense of an "index" of 
something e l s e . Then the " r e a l f o r c e s " of 
a c t i o n are not expressed i n the theory, but 
the l a t t e r i s l i k e a v e i l c overing them, which 
i t i s the b u s i n e s s of the s o c i o l o g i s t to t e a r 
away. I n t h i s sense the f o r c e s manifested i n 
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the t h e o r i e s turn out to be the "non-
meaningful" c a t e g o r i e s of h e r e d i t y and 
environment' [1937ag 2 7Q] , 
That i s , the a c t o r ' s theory i s i r r e l e v a n t to the cau s a t i o n 
problem. I n terms of a s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the causes 
of a c t i o n the p r a c t i c a l r e s u l t i s to 'debunk" ( l 9 3 7 a g 2 7 0 j the 
a c t o r ' s t h e o r i e s and conclude that ',,, they are not i n themselves 
important but are secondary phenomena s i g n i f i c a n t only as 
"thermometer readings"', f l937ag27o] , The a c t o r ' s theory 
does not i t s e l f p l a y a part i n the c a u s a t i o n of a c t i o n , i t 
stands r a t h e r as i t s e l f an e f f e c t of the r e a l determining f o r c e s , 
an index i n the same way as a thermometer i s an index of heat. 
I n the second case, the a c t o r ' s theory as manifesting 
s u b j e c t i v e elements i n the sense of standing as an index of 
those elements the argument i s more or l e s s the same. Rather 
than the a c t o r ' s theory i n v o l v i n g ignorance and e r r o r we have 
',,, an element of "indeterminacy" i n the r e l a t i o n between 
residue and sentiment, between l o g i c a l l y formulated md f a c t o r ' s 
theory] and value a t t i t u d e [ s u b j e c t i v e element] ' £l 937as 2 7 l J „ 
Then ',,, the theory i s not a f u l l y adequate ex p r e s s i o n of the 
r e a l f o r c e s of a c t i o n even the value f a c t o r s , because of i t s 
indeterminacy. I n so f a r as t h i s i s true i t i s not p o s s i b l e to 
take the theory at i t s face value ,„,' ft937as272-3J , 
So again the a c t o r ' s theory i s of no relevance to the c a u s a l 
problem. 
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The p i c t u r e changes when we turn to the second sense of 
man i f e s t a t i o n , when the a c t o r " s theory i s an 'adequate expression' 
of the r e a l f o r c e s governing a c t i o n . For t h i s to be the case 
v i s - a - v i s the o b j e c t i v e elements the theory must be c a s t i n terms 
of statements of f a c t about e m p i r i c a l l y observable phenomena and 
s t a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between such e m p i r i c a l f a c t s i n terms of 
cause and e f f e c t . I t has alre a d y been noted that such 
t h e o r i e s on the one hand adequately express the c a u s a l elements 
of a c t i o n w h i l s t on the other hand f u n c t i o n as a medium v i a 
which those c a u s a l elements i n f a c t cause a c t i o n . The r e l e v a n t 
point here i s that a l i n k i s thus e s t a b l i s h e d between the cause 
of a c t i o n on the a n a l y t i c a l l e v e l and the a c t o r ' s concrete 
knowledge, norms and ends. T h i s point i s of p a r t i c u l a r 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the l a s t case, the a c t o r ' s theory as an adequate 
expression o f the s u b j e c t i v e c a u s a l elements of h i s a c t i o n . 
I n t h i s case the a c t o r ' s theory cannot be s t a t e d i n 
s c i e n t i f i c terms. The e n t i t i e s involved such as u l t i m a t e 
transcendental ends cannot be e m p i r i c a l l y observed and t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s cannot be st a t e d i n terms of cause and e f f e c t . 
However t h i s i s not a fu n c t i o n of the i r r e l e v a n c e o f the theory 
but the logico-experimental standards 
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"But t h e r e s i d u e j t h e p r i n c i p l e , i s an 
e x p r e s s i o n o f the v a l u e a t t i t u d e s under-
l y i n g i t . I t i s more t h a n an i n d e x , i t 
embodies i n i t s meaning a t l e a s t c e r t a i n 
a s p e c t s o f t h e s e v a l u e - a t t i t u d e s * I n 
i t s r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n i t s t a n d s i n the 
n o r m a t i v e r e l a t i o n o f a l o g i c a l l y formu-
l a t e d end o r r u l e w h i c h i n the l i m i t i n g 
c a s e i s a c o m p l e t e l y adequate e x p r e s s i o n 
o f t h e r e a l f o r c e s f l 9 3 7 a ? 2 7 0 • 
Now the p r e s s i n g problem h e r e i s t h e b a s i s by w h i c h P a r s o n s 
c a n d i s c r i m i n a t e between t h e a c t o r 0 s t h e o r y as an i n d e x o r an 
adequate e x p r e s s i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e c a u s a l e l e m e n t s . The c r i t e r i o n 
seems to be the degree o f ' l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n 1 . I n s o f a r a s the 
a c t o r ' s t h e o r y i s a l o g i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f t he s u b j e c t i v e 
element t h e n i t a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s e s t h a t e l e m e n t . I n s o f a r 
a s i t does not t h e n t h e r e i s a degree o f • i n d e t e r m i n a c y ' i n t he 
r e l a t i o n between the a c t o r ' s t h e o r y and the c a u s a l e l e m e n t s w h i c h 
means t h a t t h e former i s to be t r e a t e d a s an i n d e x o f t h e l a t t e r . 
T h i s seems a p a r t i c u l a r l y vague and unworkable p o s i t i o n but t h i s 
i s not the p o i n t a t i s s u e h e r e . R a t h e r two emergent p o i n t s 
s h o u l d be n o t e d . 
F i r s t l y , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e two s e n s e s o f mani-
f e s t a t i o n i n t h e c a s e o f s u b j e c t i v e e l e m e n t s i s not a m u t u a l l y 
e x c l u s i v e dichotomy, but a continuum, a m a t t e r o f d e g r e e 8 At 
one p o l e , o r l i m i t i n g c a s e , as P a r s o n s e x p r e s s e s i t , t h e a c t o r ' s 
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t h e o r y i s an adequate e x p r e s s i o n , a t the o t h e r p o l e an i n d e x . 
But most w i l l l i e i n between* S e c o n d l y , i n so f a r a s an 
a c t o r ' s t h e o r y a d e q u a t e l y . e x p r e s s e s the c a u s a l e l e m e n t s a l i n k 
i s e s t a b l i s h e d between a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s and the a c t o r ' s 
norms, ends and knowledge. 
" I n s o f a r a s t h e s e [ n o n l o g i c a l j t h e o r i e s 
a t t a i n t h e norm o f r i g o r o u s l o g i c a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r own 
s t a n d a r d s t h e y may be r e g a r d e d a s 
" a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s i n g " t h e s e s u b j e c t i v e 
f o r c e s , o r , f o r p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s as 
i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e w i t h them„ T h a t i s , 
a c t i o n may be r e g a r d e d a s d e t e r m i n e d 
by the t h e o r y , the " p r o c e s s o f r e a s o n i n g " , 
i n t h e same s e n s e a s i s t r u e o f l o g i c a l 
a c t i o n 8 [ l 9 3 7 a : 272] . 
T h i s i s i m p o r t a n t i n the c o n t e x t o f the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n f o r two 
r e a s o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e i t means t h a t a t t e n t i o n can now t u r n 
to the r e l a t i o n between c o n c r e t e norms and ends and a c t i o n on 
the above b a s i s , t h a t s u c h phenomena a r e t o some degree adequate 
e x p r e s s i o n s o f t h e ' r e a l , d e t e r m i n a n t f o r c e s ' , , S e c o n d l y , the 
a c t o r ' s c o n c r e t e norms e t c , form an e s s e n t i a l l i n k i n the c a u s a l 
c h a i n . I n the c a s e o f a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g s c i e n t i f i c knowledge o f 
the b i o = p h y s i c a l w o r l d the degree and a c c u r a c y o f t h a t knowledge 
makes a d i f f e r e n c e to the a c t i o n 0 S i m i l a r l y f o r a c t i o n i n v o l v i n g 
n o n - s c i e n t i f i c knowledge o f ends and norms, the a c t o r ' s under-
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s t a n d i n g o f a norm, t h e manner i n w h i c h he p u r s u e s ends, makes 
a d i f f e r e n c e to t h e action,, The c a u s a t i o n o f a c t i o n by a n a l y -
t i c a l e l e m e n t s i s me d i a t e d by the a c t o r " s c o n c r e t e norms, ends and 
knowledge 0 
6 0 The r e l a t i o n o f c o n c r e t e a c t o r s to c o n c r e t e r u l e s s t h e 
problem o f c o n t r o l s 
How t h e n does P a r s o n s u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
c o n c r e t e norms e t c 0 , and a c t i o n ? To answer t h i s q u e s t i o n we w i l l 
t u r n to h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f 'The c h a n g i n g meaning o f c o n s t r a i n t ' 
i n Durkheim's s o c i o l o g y [1937as 3 7 8 ~ 3 9QJ 0 Here t h e e x p l i c i t 
c o n c e r n i s w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between r u l e s o f a c t i o n and the 
a c t i o n i t s e l f , w i t h t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h r u l e s ' c a u s e ' a c t i o n 0 ( l l ) 
To P a r s o n s the problem l i e s i n t h e 'mode o f r e l a t i o n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 6 j 
o f the a c t o r to su c h r u l e s o f c o n d u c t 0 F u r t h e r , t h i s i s to 
be u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f t he a c t o r ' s ' a t t i t u d e ' to su c h r u l e s . 
P a r s o n s works i n terms o f a dichotomy o f two t y p e s o f a t t i t u d e 0 
I n t he f i r s t the a c t o r ' s a t t i t u d e i s a ' m o r a l l y o r e m o t i o n a l l y 
n e u t r a l ' one o f ' c a l c u l a t i o n ' [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 o ] 0 T h i s o f c o u r s e i s t h e 
p o s i t i v i s t model o f the a c t o r d i s c u s s e d above, the r u l e i s 
c o n c e i v e d a s 'a phenomenon o f the e x t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n o f t h e a c t i n g 
i n d i v i d u a l • [1 9 3 7 as 380] . Then r u l e s c a u s e a c t i o n i n the same 
way a s the b i o = p h y s i c a l world,, They a r e g i v e n f a c t s o f t h e 
e x t e r n a l w o r l d w h i c h must be adapted t o 3 P a r s o n s ' r e j e c t i o n 
o f s u c h a model h a s a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d . The a l t e r n a t i v e 
a t t i t u d e to r u l e s i s t h a t o f 'moral o b l i g a t i o n , o f a s p e c i f i c 
r e s p e c t toward t h e r u l e ' f l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 6 ] „ What i s the i m p l i c a t i o n 
o f t h i s a t t i t u d e f o r t h e problem o f c a u s a t i o n ? The 
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c a u s a t i o n o f a c t i o n by r u l e s c a n no l o n g e r be mod e l l e d on the 
i n f l u e n c e o f the b i o p h y s i c a l w o r l d v i a t h e a c t o r ' s c a l c u l a t i o n 
o f t h e e f f e c t s o f t h a t w o r l d on h i m 0 The c a u s a l f o r c e o f r u l e s 
l i e s i n t h e i r ' normative' c h a r a c t e r , 
We c a n n o t e f o u r f e a t u r e s o f t h i s c o n c e p t o f n o r m a t i v e , 
so u b i q u i t o u s i n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n . The n o r m a t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r o f r u l e s h a s , f i r s t l y , a t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n n o t a t i o n , | / I 9 3 7 a 
k9~] r u l e s r e f e r to f u t u r e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s . S p e a k i n g o f Durkheim 
c o l l e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s P a r s o n s s a y s s 
'But t h i s something i s not a contemporaneously 
e x i s t e n t o b s e r v e d e m p i r i c a l e n t i t y , but i s i n 
p a r t a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w h i c h w i l l come i n t o 
b e i n g o r be m a i n t a i n e d i n so f a r a s the 
n o r m a t i v e e l e m e n t s i n f a c t d e t e r m i n e t h e 
a c t u a l c o u r s e o f a c t i o n . I t i s not a p r e s e n t 
but a f u t u r e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n the e m p i r i c a l 
P a r s o n s i n s i s t s however t h a t t h e f u t u r e s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s 
embodied i n n o r m a t i v e r u l e s a r e not j u s t p r e d i c t i o n s a s to the 
more o r l e s s l i k e l y c o u r s e o f development o f t he g i v e n s i t u a t i o n . 
R a t h e r , a n o r m a t i v e r u l e h a s t h i s t e l e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r b e c a u s e 
But t h i r d l y the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f t h e c o u r s e o f a c t i o n embodied i n 
the r u l e i s o f a s p e c i a l s o r t . I t i s d e s i r a b l e i n i t s e l f n ot f o r 
w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e y r e f e r 8 f l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 9 J 
i t s t a t e s an i d e a l i n t h e s e n s e o f d e s i r a b l e , s t a t e (1 9 3 7 a s . 
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any u l t e r i o r p u r p o s e 0 I t i s t h i s w h i c h i s s t r e s s e d i n P a r s o n s ' 
d e f i n i t i o n a l n o t e 'On the c o n c e p t " n o r m a t i v e " ' & 9 3 7 a s 7 5 3 , an end 
o r norm i s n o r m a t i v e to the e x t e n t t h a t i t h a s the q u a l i t y o f 
b e i n g v a l u a b l e i n itself„ T h i s h a s two i m p l i c a t i o n s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
r e l e v a n t h e r e w h i c h form the two s i d e s o f t h e m o r a l q u a l i t y o f 
rules„ F i r s t l y , a r u l e s t a t e s a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n w h i c h i s 
f e l t by the a c t o r to be b i n d i n g o r o b l i g a t o r y to him / l 9 3 7 a s 
3 8 3 = 4 ]o S e c o n d l y , the r u l e h a s a ' d i s c i p l i n i n g , c o n t r o l l i n g ' 
q u a l i t y f l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 5 ] 0 F i n a l l y , t h e n o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f r u l e s 
i m p l i e s what P a r s o n s c a l l s " e f f o r t " 0 As f u t u r e , i d e a l , 
o b l i g a t o r y and r e g u l a t i n g s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s to f o l l o w a r u l e i s 
a s t r u g g l e , i t r e q u i r e s e f f o r t to be a c t u a l i z e d , , I w i l l come 
back to t h i s i n a moment, 
Now t h e s e a s p e c t s o f the n o r m a t i v e q u a l i t y o f r u l e s a r e 
i n t e n d e d a s e m p i r i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the r e l a t i o n o f the 
a c t o r to s u c h r u l e s o The q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n 
i s t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem o f the ' c a u s a l ' r e l a t i o n s h i p o f norm 
and a c t i o n 0 T o some e x t e n t i t might be thought t h a t t h e above 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s make the i d e a o f r u l e s a s c a u s e s and a c t i o n s a s 
e f f e c t s problematical„ I f a r u l e i s a s t a t e m e n t o f a f u t u r e s t a t e 
o f a f f a i r s whose e f f i c a c y depends on the a c t o r ' s a t t i t u d e o f r e s p e c t 
i s not the c o n s t a n t c o n t i n g e n c y o f r u l e and a c t i o n h i g h l y u n l i k e l y ? 
T h i s i n d e e d i s the c a s e f o r P a r s o n s b u t to him, the f u r t h e r q u a l i t y 
o f r u l e s , t h e q u a l i t y o f ' e f f o r t ' overcomes t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , , 
P a r s o n s s a y s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f e f f o r t ' „ 0 o i s n e c e s s i t a t e d by the 
f a c t t h a t norms do not r e a l i z e t h e m s e l v e s a u t o m a t i c a l l y but o n l y 
t h r o u g h a c t i o n , so f a r a s t h e y a r e r e a l i z e d a t a l l ' fl 9 3 7 a s 7 19] <> 
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Norms t h e n a r e o f c a u s a l r e l e v a n c e i n so f a r a s men s t r i v e 
to a t t a i n them 0 As M a r t e l p u t s i t , "the k e y i d e a i s t h a t 
ends h a v i n g s t r o n g e s t commitments a l s o have g r e a t e s t c a u s a l 
force« (1971 8 2 0 1 ) 0 T h i s i s a p o i n t o f t e n r e p e a t e d by P a r s o n s 
' I t may d e f i n e a norm o f what a c t i o n , under 
c e r t a i n a s s u m p t i o n s s h o u l d be, Such a 
norm may be an i d e a l p r e s c r i p t i o n , but 
i t may a l s o be r e l e v a n t to t h e c a u s a l 
a n a l y s i s o f c o n c r e t e human action,, I t i s 
so r e l e v a n t i n so f a r a s t h e r e i s e m p i r i c a l 
e v i d e n c e t h a t men do, i n f a c t , s t r i v e to 
a c t l o g i c a l l y , to a t t a i n t h e norm' //1937as 
250] o 
'But w hether, and the degree i n w h i c h i t i s 
a c t u a l i z e d i s not a q u e s t i o n t h e s o l u t i o n o f 
w h i c h i s g i v e n i n the mere e x i s t e n c e o f i d e a l 
norms a s su c h , but r e m a i n s a problem„ I t 
depends upon t h e e f f o r t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s 
a c t i n g a s w e l l a s upon the c o n d i t i o n s i n 
wh i c h t h e y a c t ' fl 937as 396i] „ 
' I n e l a b o r a t i n g a t h e o r y f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e 
i s n o t h i n g i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s s i t u a t i o n 
to p r e v e n t t h e t h e o r i s t from making a l o g i c a l 
e r r o r - what p r e v e n t s him i s , r a t h e r , h i s 
e f f o r t t o conform h i s a c t i o n to the norm o f 
l o g i c a l c o r r e c t n e s s ' [ l 9 3 7 a ? 4 8 3 j „ 
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Now a l l o f t h i s seems v e r y vague, what i s t h i s t h i n g 
' e f f o r t ' . T h i s i s j u s t the p o i n t s t h e problem f o r s o c i o l o g y 
a r i s i n g out o f The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n i s to open up and 
a n a l y z e t h i s ' r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y ' o f e f f o r t w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h e 
( l a s t ) c a u s a l l i n k between norm and a c t i o n . But what i s 
c e n t r a l h e r e i s t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e problem o f s o c i a l c a u s a t i o n 
h a s changed« I t i s no l o n g e r a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem 
c o n c e r n i n g the l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e co n c e p t o f c a u s a l i t y , , 
R a t h e r i t h a s now become a s u b s t a n t i v e , e m p i r i c a l problem, t h e 
problem o f how r u l e s c o n t r o l o r c o n s t r a i n a c t i o n . ( 1 2 ) P a r s o n s ' 
programme f o r the a n a l y s i s o f e f f o r t p o i n t s t o t h e c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
o f t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l mechanism by which norms c o n t r o l 
a c t i o n . 
On t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l e v e l the t a s k i s the problem o f 
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , how r u l e s '.„. e n t e r d i r e c t l y i n t o t h e c o n s t i = 
t u t i o n o f t h e a c t o r ' s ends t h e m s e l v e s 5 [ l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 2 ] , so t h a t 'the 
normal c o n c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l becomes a m o r a l l y d i s c i p l i n e d 
p e r s o n a l i t y 8 | l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 5 ] , an ' i n d i v i d u a l who i s i n t e g r a t e d w i t h 
a s e t o f s o c i a l norms' |1937as387J <> But i s not the P a r s o n s 
o f The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n an a n t i - p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h i n k e r ? 
I n s o f a r a s p s y c h o l o g y i s u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f r a d i c a l b e h a v i o u r i s m 
and t h e hunt f o r ' i n s t i n c t s ' t h i s i s t h e c a s e . However i n 
P a r s o n s ' r e m a r k s on t h e p l a c e o f p s y c h o l o g y he does n o t e x c l u d e 
the s u b j e c t a l t o g e t h e r b u t r a t h e r c a l l s f o r t h e r e v i s i o n o f s u c h 
r a d i c a l l y p o s i t i v i s t i c p o s i t i o n s . P s y c h o l o g y '... i s c o n c e r n e d 
w i t h t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f human n a t u r e t h r o u g h w h i c h man's b i o l o g i c a l 
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h e r i t a g e i s r e l a t e d to h i s p u r p o s e s , ends, s e n t i m e n t s * ( l 9 3 7 a s 
8 6 ] , As P a r s o n s r e f e r s to e f f o r t a s 8 t h e r e l a t i n g f a c t o r between 
th e n o r m a t i v e and the c o n d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t s o f a c t i o n { I 9 3 7 a s 
7 1 9 ] p s y c h o l o g y c l e a r l y h a s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t to p l a y . F u r t h e r 
P a r s o n s ' comments on n o n = b e h a v i o u r i s t i c / i n s t i n c t p s y c h o l o g y a r e 
n e i t h e r a n t a g o n i s t i c n o r i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the above„ The i d e a 
o f a m o r a l l y d i s c i p l i n e d p e r s o n a l i t y 0 ,, , means above a l l t h a t the 
n o r m a t i v e e l e m e n t s have become " i n t e r n a l " , " s u b j e c t i v e " to him. 
He becomes i n a s e n s e " i d e n t i f i e d " w i t h them. F o o t n o t e s They 
a r e , i n F r e u d i a n t e r m i n o l o g y " i n t r o j e c t e d " to form a " s uperego"' 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 3 8 6 ^ o The t h e s i s o f c o n v e r g e n c e between Durkheim and 
F r e u d w h i c h becomes so i m p o r t a n t to P a r s o n s ' l a t e r work i s 
c l e a r l y a n t i c i p a t e d i n The S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n ( 1 3 ) » 
To the p r e s e n t w r i t e r h i s l a t e r c l a i m t h a t he was l a r g e l y i g n o r a n t 
o f the F r e u d i a n approach to p s y c h o l o g y a t t h e time o f w r i t i n g 
t h i s book i s convincing,, 
T u r n i n g to t h e s o c i a l mechanisms o f e f f o r t Q A g a i n The 
S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n c a n be s e e n a s p o i n t i n g to P a r s o n s ' 
work i n the 1 9 4 0's, i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s f u n c t i o n a l a p p r o a c h . T h i s 
i s most e v i d e n t i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f Durkheim's a n a l y s i s o f the 
f u n c t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s r i t u a l . P a r s o n s t a k e s o v e r one o f 
Durkheim's p o i n t s o f r e f e r e n c e , the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f r i t u a l f o r 
the s o l i d a r i t y o f the s o c i a l group. The o t h e r p o i n t o f 
r e f e r e n c e o f t h e f u n c t i o n a l i s m o f The E l e m e n t a r y Forms o f t h e 
R e l i g i o u s L i f e 8 r e l i g i o n a s r a i s i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l above h i s 
a n i m a l , o r g a n i c n a t u r e , however, i s somewhat changed by P a r s o n s , 
The f u n c t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s r i t u a l f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s not so 
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much c e n t r e d on the e v o l u t i o n o f t he i n d i v i d u a l a s t h e 
s t i m u l a t i o n o f t he i n d i v i d u a l to s t r i v e to a c h i e v e norms ( l 9 3 7 a s 
4 3 6 , kko]0 
A summary o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t he problem o f n o r m a t i v e 
d e t e r m i n i s m i s i n o r d e r h e r e to emphasize how the problem i s 
f o r m u l a t e d and r e s o l v e d i n terms o f P a r s o n s " c o n c e p t i o n o f 
s c i e n c e and voluntarism„ G e n e r a l l y t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem 
o f c a u s a t i o n h a s f o c u s e d on w h e t h e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 
s u b j e c t i v e e n t i t i e s s u c h a s norms and a c t i o n c a n be one o f 
c a u s a t i o n o r w h e t h e r some a l t e r n a t i v e form o f r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 
r e q u i r e d , n o t a b l y , a m e a n i n g f u l l i n k between norm and action,, 
P a r s o n s i s aware o f t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n b ut r a t h e r t h a n t r e a t i n g i t 
a s a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problem he t r a n s f o r m s t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s i n t o 
two t y p e s o f a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s , the norms o f i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y 
and s y m b o l i c a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s 0 T h i s i s l a r g e l y b e c a u s e he 
r e f o r m u l a t e s t h e whole problem o f n o r m a t i v e determinism., I n h i s 
t h i n k i n g i t h a s two a s p e c t s 0 The f i r s t h a s to do w i t h t h e 
s t r u c t u r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s . The two 
norms o f a c t i o n form a m e d i a t i n g l i n k between u l t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n s 
and v a l u e s and the a c t o r ' s a c t u a l norms, They c a n p l a y t h i s 
r o l e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e more o r l e s s m a n i f e s t e d i n the c o n c r e t e 
a c t o r s m e a n i n g f u l norms o f action,, T h i s i s t he second and 
v o l u n t a r i s t i c a s p e c t o f the problem„ F o r s u c h a norm to have a 
c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e upon a c t u a l b e h a v i o u r t h e a c t o r must s t r i v e t o 
put the norm i n t o p r a c t i c e 0 The mechanisms w h i c h d e t e r m i n e 
the degree to w h i c h t h i s i s the c a s e a r e u n e x p l o r e d i n The 
S t r u c t u r e o f S o c i a l A c t i o n but a s s u c h t h e y r e m a i n to be a n a l y z e d , 
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a task which preoccupies Parsons i n the y e a r s subsequent to 
the book's publication,, Perhaps Parsons' understanding of the 
problem of normative determinism can be expressed d i a g r a m a t i c a l l y i 
The a n a l y t i c a l aspect The v o l u r i t a r i s t i c aspect 
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The ' i n d i r e c t l i n k ' between a n a l y t i c a l 
elements and behaviour„ 
a c t o r s ' 
norms 
which 
c o n t r o l 
behaviour 
On f u r t h e r point can be made i n c o n c l u s i o n . Parsons' 
preoccupation with conformity to s o c i a l norms has often been 
noted, f o r example, i n c r i t i c i s m s a l l e g i n g h i s ' o v e r s o c i a l i z e d 
conception of man'. (Wrong (i*?^) Coleman (1971))» The source 
of t h i s preoccupation i s u s u a l l y a s c r i b e d to e i t h e r h i s 
conservatism or h i s concern with the problem of s o c i a l order or 
both. I do not want to doubt t h i s (14) but to suggest that 
there i s a f u r t h e r source of the importance of conformity i n 
Parsons' sociology. T h i s i s the r o l e of conformity with norms 
i n Parsons' methodology. By r e f o c u s i n g the problem of normative 
determinism onto the substantive problem of c o n t r o l Parsons makes 
conformity with norms an e s s e n t i a l requirement of a s c i e n c e of 
a c t i o n s His r e s o l u t i o n of the problem as he d e f i n e s i t depends 
upon a c t o r ' s e x e r t i n g e f f o r t to conform to norms„ 
- 315 •• 
D o The Problem o f V a l u e 
My d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s t h i r d problem i n t he s c i e n c e o f a c t i o n 
w i l l b e b r i e f a s , s i n c e t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f B e r s h a d y 8 s ( 1 9 7 3 ) 
s t u d y , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e problem o f t he r e l a t i v i t y o f s o c i a l 
knowledge i s c r u c i a l t o P a r s o n s 8 thinking,, I n t h i s s e c t i o n I 
w i l l t a k e up an a s p e c t o f t h i s problem n o t f u l l y e x p l o r e d by 
Ber s h a d y , t h e p l a c e o f v a l u e s i n knowledge and the fubsequent 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t knowledge may be r e l a t i v e to v a l u e . The 
c o n c l u s i o n I s h a l l r e a c h i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same a s B e r s h a d y ' s , 
the c e n t r a l i t y o f P a r s o n s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f s c i e n c e a s a n a l y t i c a l , 
g r o u n d i n g i n a scheme o f u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i c a b l e c o n c e p t s , t h e e l e m e n t s 
o f a l l s y s t e m s o f a c t i o n . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge and v a l u e s w h i c h 
r o o t s i n t h e f a c t t h a t 'man i s n e v e r e x c l u s i v e l y Homo s a p i e n s ' 
£l 9 3 7 a s 7 ^ 3 j i s most e x p l i c i t l y d i s c u s s e d by P a r s o n s i n t he c o n t e x t 
o f Weber's p r i n c i p l e o f v a l u e r e l e v a n c e . As su c h i t i s , a s we 
might e x p e c t , an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n •= P a r s o n s n o t e s t h a t 
Weber, i n h i s c r i t i q u e s o f the c o l l e c t i v i s t and p a r t i c u l a r i s t 
b r a n c h e s o f i d e a l i s m , s h a r e s h i s r e j e c t i o n o f e m p i r i c i s m . 
Knowledge i n v o l v e s the employment o f g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s . But 
u n d e r l y i n g s u c h c o n c e p t s a r e c r i t e r i a o f s e l e c t i o n w h i c h f o r 
Weber a r e what P a r s o n s terms the ' s u b j e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t 
p o s i t s two d i r e c t i o n s o f i n t e r e s t b a s e d on two s e l e c t i v e c r i t e r i a 
w h i c h t h e n c o n s t i t u t e the d i s t i n c t i o n between n a t u r a l and s o c i a l 
o f t h e s c i e n t i s t ' / I 9 3 7 a s 5 9 l ] P a r s o n s ' v i e w i s t h a t Weber 
s c i e n c e . T h i s p o s i t i o n i s r e j e c t e d by P a r s o n s [1937 a; 595=60 l l 
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but he does t a k e o v e r i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t s o f Weber's i d e a s on 
th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e y a p p l y to a l l s c i e n c e and on the 
grounds t h a t by comp a r i s o n w i t h ' a l l e m p i r i c i s t v i e w s ' t h e y 
i n t r o d u c e an element o f r e l a t i v i t y i n t o s c i e n t i f i c methodology 
[ l 9 3 7 a s 6 o i ] . I t i s t h i s w h i c h t h e n i n t r o d u c e s the problem o f 
s c i e n c e and v a l u e s i n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t e r m s . The element o f 
r e l a t i v i t y ' r a i s e s i n a c u t e form t h e q u e s t i o n o f the s c i e n c e s ' 
c l a i m to o b j e c t i v i t y . Does i t not r e d u c e t h e i r s t r u c t u r e s o f 
s o - c a l l e d knowledge to mere " m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f s e n t i m e n t s " ? ' 
[ l 9 3 7 a ; 593] • The problem o f r e l a t i v i t y i s r a i s e d t h e n by 
P a r s o n s a c c e p t i n g Weber's v i e w t h a t n o n - s c i e n t i f i c s u b j e c t i v e 
v a l u e s p l a y a s e l e c t i v e , o r g a n i z i n g r o l e i n s c i e n c e . 
What a r e P a r s o n s ' answers to t he q u e s t i o n s o f r e l a t i v i t y 
he h i m s e l f r a i s e s ? We c a n note f i r s t o f a l l t h a t t h e i d e a o f 
v a l u e r e l e v a n c e i s employed on two q u i t e d i s t i n c t l e v e l s . On 
the f i r s t l e v e l we a r e c o n c e r n e d not w i t h an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
q u e s t i o n but w i t h m a t t e r s o f r e s e a r c h d e s i e g n . The v a l u e s 
o f t h e s c i e n t i s t become i n v o l v e d i n s c i e n c e i n t h e p r o c e s s o f 
s e l e c t i o n o f what i s o f i n t e r e s t to t h e s c i e n t i s t , what he 
d e f i n e s as p r o b l e m a t i c a l . So P a r s o n s s p e a k s o f the s u b j e c t i v e 
d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t o f the s c i e n t i s t a s ' i n v o l v i n g a c h o i c e 
o f v a r i a b l e s " [1937as585] <• A g a i n ; 
' T h i s i s p o s s i b l e f i r s t b e c a u s e even though 
i n d e s c r i b i n g a c o n c r e t e phenomenon what i s 
made t h e s u b j e c t o f s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s i s 
not the f u l l t o t a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e a b l e 
f a c t s about i t , but a s e l e c t i o n , t h e f a c t s 
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i n c l u d e d i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l a s 
i t i s c o n s t r u c t e d a r e o b j e c t i v e , v e r i f i a b l e 
f a c t s " [ l 937as 5943 c 
On t h i s l e v e l i t c a n be s a i d t h a t the problem o f r e l a t i v i s m 
s i m p l y does n o t a r i s e . V a l u e s a r e n o t i n v o l v e d i n knowledge 
i t s e l f b u t i n why a g i v e n s c i e n t i s t o r s c i e n t i f i c community i s 
o f v a l u e s d i r e c t i n g and l i m i t i n g the range o f s c i e n t i f i c 
i n t e r e s t , [l 937as 7 5 6 ] . 
But on t h e second l e v e l v a l u e s a r e i n v o l v e d w i t h i n 
knowledge i t s e l f , w i t h i n c o n c e p t u a l schemes and t h u s w i t h i n 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f ' f a c t s 1 . As su c h an element o f p a r t i a l i t y 
o r o n e - s i d e d n e s s i s i n t r o d u c e d and on t h i s l e v e l the c h a r g e o f 
r e l a t i v i s m must be answered. T h i s P a r s o n s a t t e m p t s to do i n 
a way wh i c h goes w e l l beyond Weber. The d e f e n s e b e g i n s w i t h 
Weber's p o s t u l a t i o n o f an immutable and u n i v e r s a l schema o f 
p r o o f 1,1937as 6 0 0 3 , so l o n g a s s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n o r 
e x p l a n a t i o n meets the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s u c h p r o o f t h e n i t c a n 
be r e g a r d e d a s v a l i d even though a s v a l u e p e r s p e c t i v e s change 
i t might be thought i r r e l e v a n t . 
'But to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h i s r e l a t i v i s m , once 
th e d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t i s g i v e n and t he 
r e l e v a n t h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s c o n s t r u c t e d 
and c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e d , t h e system o f propo«= 
s i t i o n s i s , so f a r a s i t meets t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s 
o f t h e l o g i c a l schema o f p r o o f , v e r i f i a b l e and 
i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r knowledge. So P a r s o n s s p e a k s 
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o b j e c t i v e o I t f o l l o w s t h a t even though v a l u e s 
change and w i t h them the d i r e c t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c 
i n t e r e s t , i n so f a r as p a s t i n v e s t i g a t i o n h a s 
y i e l d e d v a l i d knoxirledge, i t r e m a i n s v a l i d , a 
p e r m a n e n t l y v a l i d p r e c i p i t a t e o f the p r o c e s s ' 
[1937as 600] . 
I n t h e p r e s e n t a u t h o r ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h i s i s more o r l e s s where 
¥eber l e a v e s t h e m a t t e r but P a r s o n s c l a i m s t h a t Weber t a k e s the 
d e f e n s e a g a i n s t r e l a t i v i s m much f u r t h e r c T h i s I f i n d most 
d o u b t f u l ( 1 5 ) but what i s c l e a r i s t h a t t h e s e f u r t h e r s t e p s 
a r e P a r s o n s ' own p o s i t i o n even i f t h e i r p a r e n t a g e i s d u b i o u s 0 
The n e x t s t e p P a r s o n s t a k e s i s to argue t h a t however 
d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t u a l schemes a r e i n terms o f t h e i r u n d e r l y i n g 
v a l u e s t a n d p o i n t s t h e y must be ' t r a n s l a t a b l e ' i n t o e a c h o t h e r 
[ 1 9 3 7 a s 6 0 l J 0 T h e r e i s a s u g g e s t i o n h e r e o f the i n f l u e n c e o f 
Mannheim's d o c t r i n e o f ' s y n t h e s i s ' , t h e f u s i o n o f a p l u r a l i t y 
o f p a r t i c u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e s i n t o a l a r g e r one, But i f t h i s s t e p 
i s n e c e s s a r y a t a l l , and P a r s o n s c l a i m s t h a t i t i s f l 9 3 7 a s 6 o f / , does 
i t r e f u t e the c h a r g e o f r e l a t i v i s m ? I f knowledge i s r e l a t i v e 
to v a l u e s t a n d p o i n t s i s i t n o t i m m a t e r i a l how 'wide' the 
p e r s p e c t i v e ? Knowledge i s s t i l l r e l a t i v e to value„ T h i s ; i t 
seems to me ?was Weber's p o s i t i o n when he argued a g a i n s t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a g e n e r a l s o c i a l s c i e n c e . The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
a g e n e r a l system o f t h e o r y i s , c l a i m s Weber, a f u t i l e end, f o r 
t h a t t h e o r y r e s t s on a l i m i t e d v a l u e - r e l e v a n t p e r s p e c t i v e 0 
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The " t r a n s l a t i o n ' argument does not seem to m a t e r i a l l y a l t e 
t h i s argument, o n l y to broaden the v a l u e b a s e D 
However P a r s o n s t a k e s a f u r t h e r s t e p s 
' F u r t hermore, i t i s one o f Weber's b a s i c 
theorems t h a t w h i l e t h e r e i s a p l u r a l i t y 
o f p o s s i b l e u l t i m a t e v a l u e s y s t e m s , t h e i r 
number i s , i n f a c t , limited„ From t h i s 
i t f o l l o w s t h a t on Weber's own p r i n c i p l e s 
t h e r e i s a l i m i t e d number o f p o s s i b l e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f h i s t o r i c a l i n d i v i d u a l s 
from t h e same c o n c r e t e o b j e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e , 
on t h e one hand, and o f s y s t e m s o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
c o n c e p t s , on the o t h e r , From t h i s i t 
f o l l o w s f u r t h e r t h a t t h e r e i s i n p r i n c i p l e 
a f i n i t e t o t a l i t y o f humanly p o s s i b l e 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge" [i 937as 6 0 l ] 0 
A g a i n s 
' I n so f a r a s the range o f e m p i r i c a l i n t e r e s t 
h a s , i n f a c t , been l i m i t e d by t h e s e f a c t o r s 
[ v a l u e s y s t e m s ] i t may be i n f e r r e d t h a t the 
humanly p o s s i b l e a p p r o a c h e s to e m p i r i c a l 
phenomena have not been exhausted,, But a s 
t h e p o s s i b l e range o f human v a l u e s i s a c t u a l l y 
approached, the s c i e n t i f i c range i s a l s o 
broadened. I t h a s been n o t e d t h a t i f t h i s 
- 320 -
element o f r e l a t i v i s m i n s c i e n c e i s not to 
l e a d to s c e p t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y 
to p o s t u l a t e t h a t i n t h i s s e n s e the p o s s i b l e 
p o i n t s o f v i e w a r e o f a l i m i t e d number e With 
the a c c u m u l a t i o n o f v a l u e e x p e r i e n c e the t o t a l i t y 
o f knowledge a p p r o a c h e s the asymptote,' ( l 9 3 7 a s 
7 5 6 ] . 
T h e s e p a s s a g e s a r e quoted h e r e a t l e n g t h and r e p e t i t i o u s l y a s 
i t seems to t h e p r e s e n t a u t h o r t h a t P a r s o n s 8 c l a i m to be 
i n c o r p o r a t i n g Weber's p r i n c i p l e o f v a l u e r e l e v a n c e i s now 
p o s i t i v e l y u n c o n v i n c i n g , F a r from t h e f i n i t e n e s s o f v a l u e 
s t a n d p o i n t s b e i n g a " b a s i c theorem" i t i s s u r e l y the c a s e t h a t the 
i n f i n i t y o f p o s s i b l e v a l u e p o s i t i o n s l i e s a t t he h e a r t o f Weber's 
t h e o r y o f v a l u e s and i s c o n s e q u e n t l y the b a s i s o f h i s c l a i m 
t h a t the c u l t u r a l s c i e n c e s a r e g r a n t e d ' e t e r n a l y o u t h ' 0 ( 1 6 ) 
However t h i s a s i d e t h i s t h i r d s t e p i n the d e f e n s e a g a i n s t 
r e l a t i v i s m o b v i o u s l y p u t s the second i n t o a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , t h e 
t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y o f v a l u e = s y s t e m s does not j u s t b roaden the v a l u e 
b a s i s , i t means t h a t a s the v a l u e b a s i s w i d e n s a p o i n t i s 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y approached where the d i f f e r e n t i a l i n f l u e n c e o f 
v a l u e s c e a s e s to be o p e r a t i v e s The r e l e v a n c e o f v a l u e s t h e n 
i s p r o g r e s s i v e l y e x c l u d e d a s s c i e n c e d e v e l o p s . 
Now i n the above d i s c u s s i o n o f P a r s o n s t h e o r y o f 
s c i e n t i f i c development we have a l r e a d y found t h i s to be t h e c a s e , 
the s c r u t i n y o f r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r i e s i n v o l v e s the e l i m i n a t i o n o f 
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values and t h e i r replacement by t h e o r e t i c a l concepts 0 We f i n d 
the same i d e a i n the context of the present d i s c u s s i o n , f o r 
Parsons takes a f i n a l step beyond the three o u t l i n e d above. 
As the s i t u a t i o n stands even though the range of value stand-
p o i n t s i s f i n i t e and the knowledge produced from any one i s 
t r a n s l a t a b l e i n t o the others i t s t i l l seems necessary to take 
account of the value standpoint of any p a r t i c u l a r knowledges 
I t ' s p lace i n the spectrum of v a l u e s i s one c r i t e r i o n by which 
i t s claims must be a s s e s s e d . Parsons' f i n a l step e f f e c t i v e l y 
removes t h i s requirement. 
I n summarising h i s chapter's on Weber's methodology and 
systematic theory Parsons comes again to the r e l a t i v i t y of 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge introduced by the p r i n c i p l e of value 
relevance j/1937as 637-8) „ Here,however, a f u r t h e r i d e a i s 
introduced, 'the s o l i d a r i t y of s c i e n c e and a c t i o n 8 [l937as637j 
(See a l s o pi 937as 683} ) , T h i s s o l i d a r i t y r e s t s on the e s s e n t i a l 
p lace of the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y i n both a c t i o n and s c i e n c e . 
From the s i d e of s c i e n c e we must r e t u r n to the f i r s t point above, 
the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the l o g i c of proof. T h i s r e p r e s e n t s a 
value standpoint necessary to a l l s c i e n c e , thevalue of the norm 
of r a t i o n a l i t y . Science i s committed to the d i s c o v e r y of 
i n t r i n s i c c a u s a l connections, as such "The very conception of 
s c i e n c e i t s e l f i m p l i e s a c t i o n 1 [I937as683], the s c i e n t i s t o r i e n t s 
h i s a c t i o n to the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y . However from the other 
s i d e , the s i d e of a c t i o n ) we have seen that i t i s Parsons' c l a i m 
that the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y i s a u n i v e r s a l property (or 
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a n a l y t i c a l element) of a c t i o n 0 
Parsons i n s i s t s on t h i s p a r a l l e l , , 
• I f then, there i s to be s c i e n c e at a l l there 
must be action,, And i f there i s to be a 
s c i e n c e of a c t i o n i t must involve the norm 
of i n t r i n s i c r a t i o n a l i t y i n t h i s sense; i t 
must, i n f a c t , revolve about t h i s as a p i v o t a l 
pointo D e n i a l of t h i s fundamental r e l a t i o n -
ship from e i t h e r side i n e v i t a b l y l e a d s sooner 
or l a t e r to s u b j e c t i v i s m or s c e p t i c i s m which 
undermine both s c i e n c e and r e s p o n s i b l e a c t i o n ' 
fl937as683-4L 
Two things are involved here, f i r s t l y Parsons claims to have 
found a ' p i v o t a l point', a u n i v e r s a l standpoint but secondly the 
nature of that standpoint has changed, i t i s no longer a value 
standpoint, r a t h e r t h i s has become a t h e o r e t i c a l concepts the 
norm of r a t i o n a l i t y as an a n a l y t i c a l element of a c t i o n . Again 
then we have the e l i m i n a t i o n of value by i t s conversion i t s 
t h e o r e t i c a l concepts. F u r t h e r Parsons suggests that t h i s can 
be broadened from the base of the norm of r a t i o n a l i t y to apply to 
a whole conceptual scheme of elements of actions 
'Now does not the s o l i d a r i t y of s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge with r a t i o n a l a c t i o n imply the 
e x i s t e n c e of a formal schema of elements 
of a c t i o n which i s i n a sense exempt from 
the r e l a t i v i t y of concrete knowledge?' 
£l 937a: 638] . 
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The conclusion of t h i s then i s that at the l e v e l on which 
Parsons operates, the a n a l y s i s of the elements of a c t i o n , the 
pl a c e of va l u e s i n knowledge i s not a r e l e v a n t consideration*, 
I n Parsons" scheme theory i s developed at a l e v e l which, he 
cla i m s , i n t e g r a t e s common elements of a l l value positions„ 
The p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s claim can only be doubted i n 
terms of the present i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Parsons' work, For 
w h i l s t h i s conception of a n a l y t i c a l s c i e n c e i s again c e n t r a l to 
h i s response to the problem of r e l a t i v i t y to value no mention has 
been made i n t h i s s e c t i o n of the v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic„ Yet 
I have attempted to show that the l a t t e r i s i n t e r t w i n e d with the 
content of the scheme of a n a l y t i c a l elements e F u r t h e r , 
voluntarism i s a metaphysic, a Weltanschauung as to the nature of 
human a c t i v i t y which i s not i n p r i n c i p l e s u b j e c t to v e r i f i c a t i o n 
or f a l s i f i c a t i o n on e m p i r i c a l grounds 0 Values, then, are not 
el i m i n a t e d from Parsons' t h e o r e t i c a l scheme which seems an 
e x c e l l e n t example of Weber's claim that concepts embody 
p a r t i c u l a r value systems. 
E. Conclusions 
I n the l a s t two chapters I have attempted to e x p l a i n how 
Parsons t r i e s to overcome methodological o b s t a c l e s to a s c i e n c e 
of a c t i o n by pursuing two i n t e r r e l a t e d l i n e s of attack s Chapter 
I I o u t l i n e d the f i r s t of these, a n o n - e m p i r i c i s t , a n a l y t i c a l 
conception of s c i e n c e e T h i s present chapter has been concerned 
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f i r s t to analyze the second arrow i n Parsons' bow, the 
v o l u n t a r i s t i c metaphysic of the nature of action., The formal 
method and the metaphysical content have then been shown to be 
c r u c i a l to Parsons' formulation and r e s o l u t i o n of three long 
standing problems i n the methodology of the s c i e n c e of a c t i o n D 
I t i s perhaps worth emphasizing i n c o n c l u s i o n the p e c u l i a r i t y 
of Parsons' sense of "voluntarism" 0 T h i s i s because i t i s so 
o f t e n i n t e r p r e t e d (17) i n terms of the conventional sense of the 
phrase voluntary a c t i o n , to connote freedom of choice on the 
p a r t of a c t o r s who are p o s t u l a t e d to be purposive, s e l f - c o n s c i o u s 
and reasoning b e i n g s 0 My c o n c l u s i o n i s that t h i s sense of 
voluntarism has l i t t l e to do w i t h Parsons, voluntarism to him 
means that a c t i o n i s a struggle to achieve normative v a l u e s , ends 
and r u l e s of conduct i n the face of the stubborn f a c t s of a 
c o n d i t i o n a l world, a s t ruggle which i n v o l v e s people e x e r t i n g 
e f f o r t to r e s o l v e the t e n s i o n , to b r i n g the antagonism of the 
dualism int o some form of balance between the i d e a l and the r e a l 
orderso I f t h i s a n a l y s i s has been convincing then the argument 
so f a r should have c a s t doubt upon claims that i n the development 
of h i s theory over time Parsons moves from a v o l u n t a r i s t i c to a 
n o n = v o l u n t a r i s t i c p o s i t i o n Q That i s , he s h i f t s from an 
emphasis upon the a c t o r and the f r e e l y chosen, meaningful c h a r a c t e r 
of a c t i o n to one which emphasizes the s o c i a l system as e x t e r n a l , 
c o n s t r a i n i n g and u l t i m a t e l y determinant of a c t o r ' s action,, 
Parsons was never a v o l u n t a r i s t i n the conventional sense„ 
However, the t h e s i s that Parsons s h i f t e d the foundations of h i s 
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theory can be approached i n another way, by examining the 
l a r g e number of essays w r i t t e n by him i n the t h i r t e e n y e a r s 
subsequent to the p u b l i c a t i o n of The S t r u c t u r e of S o c i a l A c t i o n . 
Here Parsons e x p l i c i t l y adopts a methodology which emphasizes 
the s t r u c t u r e and f u n c t i o n i n g of s o c i a l systems. Chapters 
I V and V w i l l be concerned with t h i s and t h e i r claim w i l l be a 
c o n t i n u a t i o n of the t h e s i s put forward so f a r . F a r from 
s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s m being a move away from voluntarism 
the l a t t e r i s bound up with Parsons' general methodology,, a 
combination which can be i l l u m i n a t e d by viewing Parsons' 
t h i n k i n g from the p e r s p e c t i v e of problems i n the methodology of 
a science of a c t i o n . 
